

The Politics of Practice: Diplomacy and Legitimacy in International Society.

By David Edward Banks

B.A. in Ancient History & Archaeology; Biblical & Theological Studies, May 2002,
Trinity College Dublin
M.A. in Global Governance, May 2006, University of Delaware

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of
The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences
of the George Washington University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

January 31, 2015

Dissertation directed by

Martha Finnemore
University Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

Henry Farrell
Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

UMI Number: 3673895

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 3673895

Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of the George Washington University certifies that David Edward Banks has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of October 16, 2014. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

The Politics of Practice: Diplomacy and Legitimacy in International Society.

David Edward Banks

Dissertation Research Committee:

Martha Finnemore, University Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Co-Director

Henry Farrell, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Co-Director

Robert Adcock, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

©2014 by David Edward Banks
All rights reserved

Dedication

For my father, who taught me to learn;
for my mother, who taught me to understand.

Acknowledgements

Whatever I thought both I and this project would be by the time it was completed, neither have come to pass. But what I knew at the start, and what I am even more certain of now, is that I could not have done this dissertation on my own. I am indebted to many people for its creation and completion. They are responsible for all that is good about it, while the errors remain mine.

I wish to thank my committee whose members have acted as watchers, guides, judges, and supporters of a project that has gone through many twists and re-imaginings over the years. All three of them read countless drafts and gave this project far more attention than any PhD student has a right to expect. Martha Finnemore's intellectual openness and her commitment to high standards meant that I was never allowed to substitute thematic content for rigor. Without her direction this dissertation would be an incomprehensible shadow of what it is now. Henry Farrell's ability to link concepts and theories from across countless disciplines continues to amaze me. Many of the theoretical positions taken in this dissertation are a direct result of our conversations and the literature he recommended to me. He is also important for something he said very early in this process: "At times, you will hit walls that appear impassible and when you do you will be tempted to lie down at the bottom of them and cry. And you can, for a while. But then you have to get up and climb over them." This single piece of advice kept me going through the more difficult stages of writing and rewriting. Robert Adcock has acted as a teacher, scholar, and mentor ever since I first took classes with him. His sharpness of mind is only matched by his openness to ideas, and his warmth of character. His pragmatic approach to social science research has always helped to ground my thinking

about academic work without ever becoming cynical. He is the best teacher I have ever had.

George Washington University and the Department of Political Science offered me considerable support during my time there. The department offered me a generous funding package that was extended more than once and without which I would have been unable to complete the program. The SICAR program hosted at the Elliot School gave me the training needed to conduct meaningful archive work, and the Loughran Foundation gave me the funding that allowed me to use this training in England. As Director of Graduate Studies, Kimberly Morgan tried to help me find sources of funding after my initial fellowship ran out; her ability and willingness to do so was an act of great kindness.

My personal and professional life has been immeasurably improved by the colleagues I have made in graduate school. Joey O'Mahoney has been a constant source of stimulating and meandering conversation, the quality of which is so high that it can trick you into thinking that a 90-minute rambling chat counts as work. He also professed faith in my work at those times when I was most convinced that it was rubbish. Alise Coen acted as an ersatz-sibling when I first came to graduate school and remains a constant friend. Adam Jungdahl has been my brother-in-arms in this long process and I am happy that we are finishing this journey at almost the exact same time. In addition to these people I have benefitted from all sorts of conversations, book-recommendations, paper-swaps, poker games, good humor, and endless cups of coffee with David An, Dina Bishara, Chris Dallas-Feeney, Colm Fox, Jake Haselswerdt, Lisel Hintz, Jeffrey Hornung, Michelle Jurkovich, Julia MacDonald, Chris Mitchell, Lance Noble, Pooja

Rishi, Mike Schroeder, Chana Solomon-Schwartz, Amir Stepak, Rachel Whitlark, Richie Wilcox, as well as many others. Many professors have also influenced me. The independent study I took with Susan Sell was my first foray into meaningful constructivist work and I am indebted to her for her guidance, and also for introducing me to 19th century history. Daniel Green shares my love of all things historical and I am grateful that he continued to reach out to me even after I completed my MA. Chad Rector showed me the meaning and purpose of teaching. Like many of his former TAs I have stolen much of his method lock, stock, and barrel.

Most significantly I wish to thank my family, who never expressed any doubts in my ability. Even from three thousand miles away my parents always stood sentinel and never let circumstances get beyond my control. My brother, Russell offered support and laughter. Kathy transformed from my little sister into a wonderful friend. My little niece Francesca appeared just in time to put it all in perspective. Lastly, I wish to thank my wife, Nhu. We met just as I was beginning work on my dissertation and she, more than anyone, has had to put up with the material and social sacrifices that it demands. She has done this willingly. More than this, she has been my pillar of support, and was always there when I needed her most. She has also kept my feet on the ground and from her I have learned more about diplomacy and politics, and the joy and absurdity of the world in which we live than I could have ever learned from any book. Undoubtedly she has been my most important finding.

Abstract

The Politics of Practice: Diplomacy and Legitimacy in International Society.

Why do states reject Westphalian diplomatic practice? Diplomacy in international society is a highly regulated practice involving the exchange of representatives, the hosting of embassies, the upholding of rights of immunity and extraterritoriality, and the performance of ceremonial and protocol. Although it appears anachronistic, it is an efficient medium through which all states can participate in diplomacy. Furthermore, it is a low-cost practice to faithfully engage in, but generates considerable costs for those states that refuse to do so. Given all these factors, why would states reject it?

This dissertation offers an answer to this question. By drawing on historical sources, including archival and media materials, I analyze three cases where states rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice for a sustained period of a year or more: Qing China from 1794 until 1860; Soviet Russia from 1917 until 1923; and Revolutionary Iran from 1979 until 1981. I find that the narratives of legitimation used by these regimes – the stories that regimes tell to legitimate their right to rule – caused states to reject Westphalian practice. In order to explain how these narratives of legitimation work I propose a causal mechanism I call “narrative binding.” This mechanism occurs when (a) a regime’s narrative mandates practices that conflict with the practices of Westphalian diplomacy, and (b) when the regime faces internal threats to its survival. Under these conditions a regime will have strong incentives to rely on the symbolic practices that legitimate it, even if this means rejecting those of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In coming to these conclusions this project challenges a number of assertions in the literature on identity politics, strategic bargaining, and domestic audience costs.

Table of Contents

Dedication.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
Abstract of Dissertation.....	viii
List of Figures.....	x
List of Tables.....	xi
Glossary of Terms.....	xii
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Westphalian Diplomatic Practice.....	27
Chapter 3: Why States Reject Westphalian Diplomatic Practice.....	66
Chapter 4: Qing China and the Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice.....	123
Chapter 5: Revolutionaries to Traditionalists: Soviet Diplomatic Practice, 1917-1923..	181
Chapter 6: Traditionalists to Revolutionaries: Iranian Diplomatic Practice, 1979-1981..	262
Chapter 7: Conclusion.....	321
References.....	340

List of Figures

Figure 1: Basic Model of the Mechanism.....	100
Figure 2: “Friendly Jests”.....	208

List of Tables

Table 1: Measuring Regime Survival.....	107
Table 2: Conditions of Narrative Binding.....	112
Table 3: Summary of Explanations.....	119

Glossary of Terms

AP	Associated Press
BCE	Before Common Era
CE	Common Era
EIC	East India Company
FO	Foreign Office
IRP	Islamic Republic Party
ISC	International Socialist Commission
LMI	Liberation Movement of Iran
MEK	Mojahedin-e Khalq
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NDF	National Democratic Front
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
NKID	<i>Narkomindel</i> : Soviet Foreign Office
NYT	New York Times
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
WP	Washington Post

Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1794 Britain's first official embassy to China arrived at the Imperial court in Beijing. Bankrolled entirely by the British East India Company, its mission was to establish formal diplomatic relations with China and to improve trade conditions between the two countries. Both the British and the Chinese governments had incentives to set up a stable diplomatic relationship. The British treasury took in ten percent of its annual revenue from the custom duties on Chinese tea imports; the Qing regime was concerned with the growth of British power in the region. Both sides were sensitive to these issues: when the British ambassador arrived at the court, both he and the Chinese delegates who met him took care to treat each other with courtesy and respect. Yet despite the mutual interests of both states and the best attempts of the British ambassador and the Chinese delegates to accommodate one another, the mission was a failure. In fact, discussions between both parties barely developed beyond a dispute over whether the British ambassador would follow the diplomatic practice of all foreign ambassadors that visited the court and *koutou* at the feet of the Qing Emperor. China claimed that this ritual was a necessary precondition of any audience with the emperor; the British ambassador protested that he could not engage in any practice that might suggest that the English king was not the equal of any other sovereign. Almost-identical disputes over this same element of diplomatic practice were repeated when later missions were sent from Britain to China. In fact, so protracted were the battles over the *koutou* ceremony that, over time, this single issue came to define and sour the Sino-British relationship. It was not until

Imperial China was defeated and Beijing occupied at end of the *Arrow* War in 1860 that China was finally coerced into adopting European standards of diplomatic practice.

The rejection of Western diplomatic practice by Imperial China presents us with a puzzle. Qing rejection of the standards of diplomatic practice demanded by Europeans resulted in a policy of self-isolation that created tensions, inhibited cooperation, poisoned relations, and prevented the integration of China into international society for decades. Had China simply agreed to engage in the diplomatic practice demanded by Britain and other European states, many of these problems could have been avoided. Why then did it refuse these apparently trivial demands? Why do states reject Westphalian diplomatic practice?

Although diplomacy has been a common feature of all international societies throughout history, its practice has always differed. In the Ancient Near East of the third millennium BCE the system of diplomacy varied depending on city-states' relative power to one another. While great powers such as the city-state of Ur nakedly demanded tribute from minor cities, with rivals they engaged in highly regulated forms of flattery. Envoys arrived at the courts of these 'brother-kings' bearing gifts as a mark of respect. Hiding behind this practice of gift-giving was a system in which city-states were able to negotiate marriages and alliances, exchange information, and trade in luxury goods (Van De Mieroop, 2004). Just as different was the diplomatic practice of the Persian empire of the first millennium BCE. In this international society city-states and kingdoms engaged in a diplomatic practice in which the superiority of the Achaemenid dynasty was displayed and upheld for all to see. Ambassadors were sent beyond the periphery of the empire equipped with empty jars. When they returned to Persepolis these jars were

expected to be filled with earth and water taken from the territory of new subjects of the emperor.¹ Intermittently, Persian subjects were expected to travel to Persepolis to publicly recognize the majesty of the ‘king of kings’ (Holland, 2005). Although these diplomatic practices might seem alien to us, they are just examples of varied modes of diplomacy that have been practiced in the past. Equally distinct and unfamiliar diplomacy was practiced by members of the Greek city-state system (Reus-Smit, 1999), the Ancient Roman Empire (Millar, 1988), the Byzantine Empire (Watson, 1992), the steppes of the Silk Road route (Beckwith, 2009), the Islamic world (Bennison, 2009), Ancient India (Roy, 1981), and pre-colonial Japan (Ringmar, 2012).

This dissertation explains why states refuse to engage in – that is, why they reject – particular diplomatic practices. The empirical focus is on the diplomacy of contemporary international society: what I call “Westphalian diplomatic practice.” By using the term “Westphalian” I refer to the modern diplomatic practice that is directly derived from the European – or Westphalian – International society, the norms and practices of which were forged in the religious wars of the 16th and 17th century.² From this period onward European powers extended their influence across the world. When Westphalian international society came into contact with Asia in the 17th and 18th centuries and Africa in the 19th, it supplanted the regional international societies that had

¹ When Persian ambassadors demanded gifts of earth and water from Sparta in 491 BCE they were told that they would find plenty of each in the well that they were subsequently thrown into (Herodotus, 1954, 7.133.)

² Although 1648 was not the complete revolution of international order that some IR scholars consider it to be, the Peace of Westphalia signed by the three great powers of the day – France, Sweden, and the Holy Roman Empire – nonetheless reaffirmed the system of international governance that was first laid down at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 (Croxtton, 1999; Osiander, 2001). This treaty saw the scales finally tipped against an international society that had been dominated by norms of Christian universalism and royal dynasticism. Westphalia reaffirmed that the sovereign nation-state, an entity first recognized at the 1415 Council of Constance, was the only authority in the international realm (Mann, 2012b). By the late 19th century Westphalian international society – and its attendant norms and practices – had been exported,

previously existed in those areas. The states that managed to maintain their independence in these regions were coerced into joining Westphalian international society. In doing so, they also adopted its diplomatic practices. As a result of this expansion the entire world now engages in a diplomatic practice that began life in Renaissance Italy and Louis XIV's France. Indeed, there is no alternative. Westphalian diplomatic practice is the only diplomatic practice that remains.

I consciously use the term "practice" when discussing Westphalian diplomacy. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons for doing so (see next chapter) but one of the key benefits of using a practice approach is that it asks us to consider the actual behaviors that states – or rather their representatives – engage in when they conduct diplomacy. Viewing diplomacy through the prism of practice prevents one from automatically reducing diplomacy to bargaining (Fearon, 1995; Schelling, 1966), negotiation (Jönsson, 2002), or an institution (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004). Rather it asks us to consider how institutions, bargaining strategies and background knowledge actually come together when diplomats interact. It asks us to look at the totality of what diplomats do without a priori assuming some elements of diplomacy are the *real* parts of diplomacy, and that other bits are epiphenomenal. A practice approach begins with the recognition that diplomacy is whatever diplomats actually do, not what theorists think they should do.

Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

Westphalian diplomatic practice is comprised of a bundle of overlapping institutions and actions. States exchange ambassadors, *chargés d'affaires*, and ministers

often forcibly, to every continent in the world.

with one another. Regardless of their rank these representatives are entitled to receive diplomatic immunity from their hosts and are allowed to carry private goods and messages in their state's diplomatic pouch. The embassies and chanceries in which these representatives live and work are granted the rights of extraterritoriality, so that the few acres on which they are sited are considered to be legally-indistinguishable from the territory of the sending-state. Resident ministers manage the day-to-day relations between their sending state and their host by gathering information from local sources and by building connections with local businessmen and political elites. When a state wishes to engage in substantive negotiations ambassadors often act as 'sherpas,' preparing the ground for incoming plenipotentiaries or heads-of-state who, once they arrive, are entitled to the same coterie of social and legal privileges as resident diplomats. A considerable amount of a diplomat's time is also spent representing and embodying her state in an official capacity. In these instances the behavior of visiting representatives and that of hosts are wrapped in, and guided by, rituals and protocols. These rituals are often ceremonial and theatrical, the details and nuance of which are often imperceptible or impenetrable to outside observers. They are just one component of the highly-regulated and multi-faceted language of diplomacy, in which seemingly-trivial acts are loaded with political meaning. New diplomats are accredited to their host state only at the point when they hand their documents into the hands of a foreign minister or head of state. Diplomats write to one another using a collection of specific notes and *démarches* but also by employing non-verbal but equally-conventional signals. For instance a state might indicate its displeasure with another by ordering its representative home for 'consultations,' or by replacing her with a minister of lower rank. This Westphalian

diplomatic practice occurs and reoccurs every day. In every capital city and consular office in the world, this particular form of diplomacy is maintained by thousands of participants who, by engaging in it, reproduce it. To reduce all of these actions down to pre-conceived concepts of bargaining or institutions is to trim the facts and ignore the central reality that every-day diplomacy does not simply exist; it is *practiced*.

For some, the persistence of Westphalian diplomatic practice is a mystery. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, if foreign ministries and embassies “did not already exist, they surely would not have been invented” (quoted in Hamilton & Langhorne, 2011, p. 258). However, states’ acceptance of diplomatic practice is not as puzzling as Brzezinski suggests. Many of the seemingly arcane elements of diplomacy have important functional uses. The use of particular forms of written exchanges allows diplomats to clearly signal the importance or intent of any particular communication. Similarly, many outwardly absurd diplomatic rituals can also act as a quiet signaling-system between states; one that is too subtle for the general public to grasp. For instance, although ordinary citizens might not understand the significance of the number of flags in a cortege or the number of rifle salutes at a military review, alterations or adjustments to these kinds of ceremonial acts can be read loud and clear in the offices of states’ ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) or embassies (Cohen, 1987).³

Diplomatic practice has also remained useful because it has been remarkably

³ For example, in 1987 the East German leader Erich Honecker made his first visit to West Germany. Honecker made it clear that he considered this to be an official state visit by the head of East Germany. Chancellor Kohl of West Germany wanted to make it clear that he did not consider this to be the case (as East Germany was not legally recognized by West Germany). The West German position was symbolically articulated by the downgrading of ceremonial protocol surrounding the visit. Among other minor adjustments, the East German motorcade was only granted 17 motorcycles, rather than the 21 that were associated with an official state visit. However, without the ‘translation’ services offered by a newspaper covering these events, these signals would have remained invisible to most domestic publics (Schmemmann, 1987).

adaptable. For example, while contemporary ambassadors and resident embassies are rarely granted the full plenipotentiary powers of negotiation that they sometimes were in the early Modern period, their presence abroad is still valuable in that these representatives can act as a source of fine-grained and continuous information about the states in which they reside. Diplomatic practice has also seamlessly expanded to allow for the arrival of new diplomatic representatives such as heads of state (Dunn, 1996) and NGOs (Hamilton & Langhorne, 2011), and to be being practiced in new locations such as multi-lateral fora (Davis Cross, 2007).

Aside from its functional uses, diplomatic practice has also persisted due to the manner in which many states associate engaging in particular behaviors as ‘appropriate’ for their role (Finnemore, 1996; Boli & Thomas, 1999). For example, many of the new states formed in the post-colonial period have enthusiastically adopted Westphalian diplomatic practice and have set up embassies across the globe – often at considerable expense.⁴ Therefore, despite all its anachronisms, Westphalian diplomatic practice allows states to mediate their relationships with other members of international society. Indeed, states have no real alternatives to engaging in it. This is why even those states that are not diplomatically recognized by international society, such as Taiwan, nonetheless engage in an ersatz form of Westphalian diplomatic practice.⁵ Refusing to practice diplomacy in the Westphalian mode effectively leads to self-imposed isolation or worse.

One prominent example of the effects of rejecting Westphalian diplomatic

⁴ Ghana opened resident embassies in sixty different countries upon receiving independence. Similarly, in its first year of independence Uganda spent 20% of its foreign affairs budget on refurbishing its embassies and offices abroad (Hamilton & Langhorne, 2011).

⁵ Because Taiwan is not technically recognized as a state by most countries in the world, it is unable to establish de jure embassies abroad. Despite this, it still practices a recognizably Westphalian form of diplomacy in which ‘Taipei Economic and Cultural Representatives Offices’ take the place of embassies.

practice can be seen in the example of Imperial China's fraught relationship with European powers in the 19th century. As I show in chapter four, Imperial China's refusal to engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice made it increasingly difficult for it to communicate with the outside world. This had the practical consequence of amplifying and exacerbating its conflicts with European powers. In addition, aside from the functional inefficiencies the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice incurred, there also appear to have been social costs to states that refused to practice it. Gerrit Gong (1984) has shown how 19th century China and Japan's refusals to engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice marked them out as 'uncivilized' in the eyes of other European states. By contrast, Imperial Siam's willingness to immediately and enthusiastically embrace Westphalian diplomatic practice (including dressing its diplomats in Western fashions) was, according to Gong, instrumental in enabling Siam to maintain its independence throughout the age of colonialism – the only South-East Asian state to do so.

Modern states also pay immediate costs for rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. On 12 January 2010 Israel's foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman invited the press to a meeting he was holding with the Turkish ambassador to Israel. At this meeting Lieberman publicly protested the broadcasting of *Kurtlar Vadisi*, an overtly anti-Semitic show, on Turkish television. Throughout the meeting, the Turkish ambassador was seated in a chair that was smaller than that of his Israeli counterpart. In addition, the small table between both parties was bare except for a single Israeli flag. Seating the Turkish ambassador in an 'unequal' seat without any Turkish flag present was a violation of diplomatic protocol. This violation was brought to the attention of the press by Lieberman himself. Yet Lieberman's decision to refuse the Turkish ambassador (and by

extension, Turkey) its minimum ritual entitlements began a highly public dispute over protocol between the two states that only ended when, in response to a Turkish threat to withdraw their ambassador, Israel publicly apologized (“Israel Contrite,” 2010). Note the significance of this small act of rejection: although it was still faithfully engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice in chanceries around the world, in one room in Tel Aviv Israel chose to reject one element of diplomacy, namely the practice of protocol. In doing so, it suffered costs.

Such minor acts of “rejection” are not uncommon, although they rarely appear to generate positive effects for the rejecter. Closing embassies hurts the closer of the mission as much as the host state (in that both lose an important source of information). Public snubs of state officials, such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ refusal to shake the hand of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in Geneva in 1954 did little to help Sino-US diplomatic relations. Unsurprisingly then, most rejections of diplomatic practice are usually accidents and are quickly apologized for by the offending state in order to prevent them escalating into larger conflicts (Cohen, 1987).

What makes the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice even more puzzling is that accepting Westphalian diplomatic practice does not require significant material contributions on the part of states. Being considered a participant in Westphalian diplomatic practice does not oblige states to build lavish embassies around the world or to build up large MFAs. In fact, many poorer nations only house small embassies at the UN and in the capitals of strategically vital world or regional powers. Choosing to practice diplomacy on this smaller scale is not a rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. ‘Rejection’ can only be considered to be occurring if such a state simultaneously refused

to allow other diplomatically recognized countries to set up embassies in its own capital. In other words, accepting Westphalian diplomatic practice is as much about guaranteeing other states their diplomatic rights as much as it is about being forced to actively do something. Aside from meeting such obligations, Westphalian diplomatic practice does not demand much from its participants.

Therefore, for all of its oddities, the incentives for engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice are clear. States that do so are able to maintain close links with states that matter to them, engage in a routinized and standardized form of communication, and demonstrate that they are ‘good’ members of international society. Although some states may choose to house embassies the world over, this is not an obligation and it is possible to pay little in order to participate. Furthermore, there is no real *systematic* alternative to engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice. As I show in this dissertation some states (such as the early Soviet state) have tried to implement alternative forms of diplomatic practice only to have these attempts rebuffed or treated with outright hostility. The reality is that alternate systems of diplomatic practice do not exist, and those states that choose to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice run the risk of having this behavior turned against them by antagonistic states. In short, there appear to be many incentives for engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice and considerable risks for rejecting it. Why, then, do states choose to reject it?

Why States might reject Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

The existing IR literature does not offer a ready answer to this question. Although IR scholars have studied the processes of socialization in international society, the

emphasis has usually been on how and when socializing succeeds. Work has been done that shows how institutions socialize states by providing explicit rewards and punishments (Checkel, 2005), by reinforcing ‘appropriate’ behavior (Schimmelfennig, 2005), or by creating forums where social mechanisms such as persuasion or social influence can have constitutive effects (Johnston, 2001). While such explanations offer different reasons for how states socialize, they do not offer a good explanation for why states refuse to be socialized to begin with. Why would states such as Imperial China persist in rejecting a practice even after it became clear that this rejection was likely to generate considerable costs? Even more puzzling: why would states that have already been socialized into a practice decide to reject it later? In this dissertation I look at two such cases: revolutionary Russia in the early 1900s, and revolutionary Iran after the fall of the shah in 1979. In both cases, I find that state leaders and representatives were aware of the costs of rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice and did so anyway. Why?

The most immediate answers to this question can be derived from the strategic or the constructivist literatures. From a strategic perspective while rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice is costly, there could still potentially be some payoff that outweighs these immediate and apparent costs. For instance, a state might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice in order to send a ‘costly signal’ to other states in the system that it has high levels of resolve over an issue, or that it shouldn’t be attacked (Schelling, 1966). This might be especially true where another state tries to force it to adopt a practice. In principle, a rejecting state might be concerned that meeting other states’ demands (even if they are reasonable) could create the impression that it is a pushover. Gaining such a reputation might generate security problems on more substantive issues down the road.

Constructivism offers a different rationale for why a state might refuse to engage in behavior that has obvious payoffs – doing so might conflict with a state’s identity. As many constructivists (Wendt, 1999; Mitzen, 2006) have shown, identity is not simply “possessed” by states; it must be continuously created and recreated. A key method for this process is engaging in practices commensurate with a particular identity. If such identity practices conflict with those of Westphalian diplomatic practice, then states may feel there is no way to maintain their identity as they understand it without also rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

As plausible as these explanations are, I find that they do not explain why we see the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice in the cases that I investigate. Not only did the states in the cases I investigate often realize that rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice was costly, they rarely saw any additional strategic benefit in doing so. In fact, in two cases – that of Soviet Russia, and Imperial China – intransigence on this issue was inversely correlated with their strategic situation. For instance, Soviet Russia rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice when it was in the throes of civil war and being attacked by French, British, and American troops. It was only later, when its strategic situation was far more favorable, that it accepted Westphalian diplomatic practice. In other words, when it made the most strategic sense to accept Westphalian diplomatic practice Soviet Russia rejected it, and vice versa.

A traditional constructivist explanation does not fare well either. Although the states I investigate did reject only those particular elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice that conflicted with their identity practices, they did do so in an inconsistent manner. For instance, in the Imperial Chinese case I find that while Qing representatives

were fixated on observing certain ritual practices when foreign envoys visited Beijing, they were willing to ignore these practices or engage in entirely different practices when abroad or in the imperial hinterland. Thus, for Imperial China, identity was not adhered to consistently. Similarly, identity is a poor predictor of another of my cases, that of Revolutionary Iran. Although radicals such as Khomeini enthusiastically supported the storming of the US embassy in November 1979, these same radicals had aggressively put down an attempted takeover of the US embassy eight months earlier. They were radicals in both periods, so why the change in diplomatic practice? While identity practices did appear to matter to these states in a general sense, the observed behavior in these cases suggests that the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was far more calculated than some constructivists might consider.

Explanation and Findings

In this dissertation I draw on both strategic and constructivist insights in order to explain why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. I show how *narratives of legitimation* – narratives used by regimes to uphold their domestic power – sometimes influence states’ diplomatic practices. I find that, under certain conditions, regimes will be so “bound” by these domestic narratives that they will choose to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice even though this can generate considerable costs at the international level.

Narratives of legitimation are the stories told by regimes to their domestic audiences which explain and affirm existing political relations. These narratives can have different sources. For instance, in Imperial China the narrative of legitimation used by the

Qing regime was the traditional “Middle Kingdom” narrative that had been adopted by succeeding dynasties for over a millennium, and which legitimated Qing rule on the basis that the dynasty was preserving the cosmic Confucian order. In Soviet Russia, the “World Revolution” narrative of legitimation used by the Soviet regime drew on Marxist theory and legitimated the regime’s right to rule on the grounds that the socialist end of history was imminent. In revolutionary Iran, the regime mobilized supporters behind an “Anti-Shahist Resistance” narrative that rejected the Shah and everything and everyone associated with him.

In order for a regime to adhere to its narrative of legitimation it must not only pursue the policies that the narrative mandates but also engage in the symbolic *practices* that it mandates. For instance, in modern democracies leaders are not only expected to propose policies but are also expected to engage in symbolic acts such as visiting national monuments, saluting the flag, and so on. US presidents, for example, are expected to show ceremonial deference toward even seemingly-minor symbols such as flag pins. Failure to do this can make them lose popular support, as there is at least a small constituency that is highly responsive to this practice.⁶ Such symbolic practices are valuable to regimes because they generate *common knowledge* about the regime’s power and its values in two ways. First, engaging in symbolic practices that uphold a regime’s narrative of legitimation can signal to supporters or potential supporters that the regime shares their values and thus is entitled to rule. Second, such symbolic practices can also demonstrate to regime challengers or potential challengers that the regime is in command

⁶ A poll conducted in 2008 regarding politicians wearing flag pins found that, “wearing a flag pin resonates most in the South, with voters older than 50 and among those who don't have a college education. Republicans see it as more important than Democrats do, and conservatives more than liberals” (Page, 2008).

of the public square and is not worth collectively acting against (this is especially true in regimes where control of the public square is tightly controlled). I use the word “potential” with regards to supporters and challengers because a regime’s perceived legitimacy may be instrumental in determining whether observing audiences are supporters or challengers of the regime to begin with. Thus by engaging in practices that reaffirm its domestic narrative of legitimation, a regime can maintain supporters and deter opponents.

It is by understanding the role of narratives of legitimation play at the domestic level that I am able to explain why some states reject Westphalian diplomatic practice at the international level. I propose a causal mechanism I call “narrative binding” that explains how, under two linked conditions, regimes are bound by their domestic narratives of legitimation into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. First, a regime has an incentive to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice if adhering to it conflicts with the practices necessary to adhere to the regime’s domestic narrative of legitimation. Whether these practices conflict is dependent on the content of a regime’s narrative of legitimation. Narratives of legitimation *mandate* specific actions and symbolic practices on the part of regimes. As long as a regime – or more precisely, its representatives – is seen to be engaging in these mandated symbolic practices, then it can be said to be adhering to its narrative of legitimation. Some narratives of legitimation, however, mandate that a regime engage in practices that clearly conflict with Westphalian diplomatic practice. Whether a regime whose narrative conflicts with Westphalian diplomatic practice chooses domestic practices over Westphalian practices is dependent on the second condition of the mechanism: regime survival. Regimes concerned with

their survival – i.e. they are uncertain they can withstand domestic challengers – have strong incentives to ensure that they engage in symbolic practices that demonstrate the regime’s adherence to its narrative of legitimation. Failure to do this may cost the regime supporters while simultaneously sending a signal to challengers that the regime is weak or unstable. Therefore, regime survival determines whether a narrative of legitimation is *constraining* for a regime or not. In short, I find that “narrative binding” occurs when (a) engaging Westphalian diplomatic practice conflicts with the symbolic practices of a regime’s domestic narrative of legitimation *and* (b) when the regime is concerned with its survival. Under these conditions, states will reject Westphalian diplomatic practice.

This study also generates a number of other interesting findings. First, while the mechanism of ‘narrative binding’ is precise about the conditions under which regimes are likely to care about their narratives of legitimation, this dissertation finds that regimes cannot fully control which actions or practices can come to be associated with their narratives of legitimation. Narratives that are ‘silent’ regarding specific practices or actions at one time can come to mandate actions or practices at a later time. This happens when issues are ‘linked’ with a regime’s existing narrative in such a way that the narrative mandates a response to these issues from the regime. In other words, while a narrative’s content can remain constant, new events or actors can come to be associated with it. When this occurs, the practices or actions mandated by the narrative can extend to these new issue-areas. In Chapter Six I show how this dynamic lay at the heart of revolutionary Iran’s rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice when it permitted the takeover of the US embassy by radical students in November 1979. While hostile to the US, the revolutionary Iranian regime had carefully adhered to Westphalian diplomatic

practice for the first eight months of its rule. This changed when the shah was admitted to New York for cancer treatment. In protest to this event, students took over the US embassy and demanded the US return the shah if it wished for its embassy to be evacuated. By linking the US embassy with the hated figure of the shah, regime officials suddenly found themselves bound by their ‘Anti-Shahist Resistance’ narrative into supporting the students, and by doing so, supporting the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. If the shah had not been admitted to the US then the students could not have legitimated their action in terms of the regime’s narrative. This would have left the regime free to protect the US embassy (as it had done months earlier). In other words, by admitting the shah the US ‘inserted’ itself into the Iranian narrative of legitimation and bound the regime into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Understanding the role of narratives also helps to explain why states such as Soviet Russia and Imperial China *systematically* rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice, whereas Revolutionary Iran rejected only one element of it. In the Soviet and Chinese cases, both states rejected engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice with all other states in the system; that is, they systematically rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice. By contrast, while Iran refused to uphold the US’s right to diplomatic extraterritoriality and diplomatic immunity, it fully engaged in Westphalian diplomatic practice in every other way with every other state. The divergence in the scope of rejection by the Qing and Russia on one side, and Iran on the other can once again be explained by understanding how their individual narratives mandated particular symbolic practices. While the domestic narratives of legitimation used by the Soviets and China mandated rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice in its entirety (in that they rejected

Westphalian international society as a concept), the Iranian narrative only mandated the rejection of US diplomatic rights, and even then only after the US was linked to the Iranian domestic narrative of legitimation.

Aside from these findings, this study also generates interesting implications regarding how narratives change. If narratives are most constraining when regimes are concerned with their survival then we should expect that regimes should be able to change their narratives when they are not concerned with survival. This is what I find in the Soviet case, where the shift from the narrative of “World Revolution” to the narrative of “Socialism in One Country” occurred only *after* the civil war had been won by the Soviets, factionalism had been suppressed inside the party, and Stalin had consolidated power. No longer dependent on the immediate support of radicals and ordinary citizens, Stalin could write a new narrative of legitimation that deviated significantly from the one that had constrained Soviet diplomatic practice in the previous years. In other words a new narrative was – rather clumsily – imposed in a top-down way typical of authoritarian regimes (Wedeen, 1999).

In addition to these empirical findings, this project also has important theoretical findings. The first is with regards to scope conditions under which legitimacy matters. Although IR scholars have recognized the constraining and enabling effects that legitimacy can have on state action (Hurd, 2008; Barnett, 1998), these explanations are somewhat underspecified. Specifically, while previous studies show us that states care about legitimacy they do not offer clear conditions for when legitimacy is likely to be *more* important than other potential payoffs. By introducing the concept of narratives of legitimation, and specifying the causal mechanism that leads regimes to prioritize such

narratives over other concerns, I am able to offer an explanation for when legitimacy matters ‘more’ than other considerations. Furthermore, the focus on legitimation practices also speaks to the literature regarding the relationship between talk, decisions, and action. However, unlike typical accounts of “organized hypocrisy” – which focus on how talk can be used to *compensate* for taking actions that diverge from important norms (Brunsson, 1989) – I find that if a regime’s survival is under threat it has clear incentives to *align* talk and action, as failure to do so many lead to internal threats to its rule.

Second, by focusing on political actors’ practices rather than solely focusing on the social norms and material structures that inform actor behavior, this dissertation helps to delineate the micro-practices that link meaning to action. In particular I offer a much more nuanced account of how legitimacy works. I show that legitimacy is not simply (or even) a function of providing public goods or mechanically ‘deploying’ symbolic resources. Instead I show that legitimacy is often created and maintained by engaging in seemingly innocuous symbolic practices in specific contexts. Although they may be ‘cheap’ to engage in, these practices can have considerable political influence. Furthermore, failure to engage in them can generate political costs. By focusing on how legitimacy is practiced and how this practice can have an international dimension, this dissertation suggests that the proximate causes of some diplomatic crises may not be epiphenomenal; they may be the genuine point of contention. This is an important contribution because the actual immediate issues of diplomatic disputes are often seen as basically irrelevant for explaining events such as the outbreak of WWI (Miller & Kagan, 1997).

Third, by focusing on how regimes worry about domestic public opinion this

dissertation offers an alternative pathway for understanding the role of domestic audiences in international relations. Most of the domestic ‘audience costs’ literature argues that (a) audiences only pay attention to international events when leaders draw attention to them, and (b) that domestic audiences/interest groups are only satisfied by substantive policy outcomes. My argument (consistent with the most recent critiques of the audience costs literature) is that domestic audiences have their attention drawn to international events due to the ways these events overlap with domestic narratives of legitimation (i.e. audience attention is generated through a bottom-up rather than a top-down process). My argument also offers an explanation for why these audiences might be satisfied by ‘symbolic’ outcomes – e.g. an apology – rather than concrete policy outcomes. (I return to these discussions in the concluding chapter.)

Methods

Understanding why states reject Westphalian diplomatic practice is challenging as this question has not been the focus of previous studies. In terms of study, while the question above gives a clear sense of the ‘Y’ we are trying to explain, the current literature does not readily provide us with a set of competing ‘X’s. Therefore in designing this research it was not possible for me to engage in traditional ‘theory-testing’ as there is no extant theory that focuses on diplomatic practice. Instead this dissertation is an exercise in ‘theory-building.’ As will be detailed further in chapter 3, this approach is largely an inductive one in which existing theories are brought to bear on a new issue area and, by engaging in a process of “soaking and poking” (Bennett & Checkel, forthcoming, p. 22), are refined or discarded, while new theories might be developed that

account for the outcome we see. The major finding of such a study is the specification of a causal mechanism that can clearly account for what we observe. The downside of this approach means that it is hard to make claims that might apply to larger population cases. Yet, what theory-building loses in generalizable findings it gains in precision. Such a project “fills a ‘space’... [it’s] generalizations are more narrow and contingent than those of ‘covering laws’... but they are precise” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 78).

A theory-building approach has implications with regards to case-selection. Because the focus is on developing a casual mechanism that can explain why states reject diplomatic practice I have selected ‘extreme’ cases (Gerring, 2007, p. 101-105). These are cases where the variables of interest – narratives of legitimation; the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice – take on a high value. Selecting extreme cases allows me to more precisely uncover the relationship between these variables of interest. Practically speaking, I have selected cases where (a) a regime possessed a well-articulated narrative of legitimation, and (b) where states engaged in the sustained rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice for at least more than one year. By focusing on cases with a well-articulated narrative of legitimation I am much better able to determine the content of this narrative. By focusing only on instances of sustained rejection this study can exclude those instances of short-term rejection where states may not have initially recognized the consequences of rejection.⁷ Although selecting on the dependent variable is not an issue for theory-building (see chapter 3), the cases selected do nonetheless exhibit different patterns of rejection. 19th century imperial China consistently rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice until it was occupied by European

forces in 1860. Soviet Russia rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice in 1917 before fully accepting it by 1923. By contrast revolutionary Iran initially accepted Westphalian diplomatic practice before rejecting it by allowing the US embassy to be stormed in November 1979. By studying cases where there is variation over time on the outcome of interest (rejection) I am better able to determine what explains this.

In determining the viability of the argument, I focus on two different strands of evidence. First, in each case I draw on primary and secondary sources in order to establish and describe each state's narrative of legitimation, as well as to determine the threats to regime survival. This evidence allows me to determine if and how narratives mandated practices that conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice, and whether regimes were under threat. These pieces of evidence are important for assessing if and when the causal mechanism was in operation. Secondly, as much as possible I dig into the actual justifications or explanations offered by the 'rejecters' themselves. Although such evidence may not give us the true motives of any actor, it nonetheless helps to give a sense of the structures that actors felt themselves to be constrained by. This allows me to better determine why states chose to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. In order to do both these things, I rely on rigorous analysis of both primary and secondary historical sources. These sources allow me to unpack the narratives of legitimation of each state, as well as the justifications offered by the relevant actors in each case. In each case, this evidence is also used to assess alternative possible explanations – strategic and constructivist – that might explain why states reject Westphalian diplomatic practice.

⁷ This includes cases where states accidentally rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice and then corrected themselves, or cases such as the Israeli-Turkish one above, where 'rejection' only took place for a few

Plan of Study

The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter Two I clearly delineate what I mean by Westphalian diplomatic practice, both conceptually and empirically. In doing so I describe in detail the particular actions that states are expected to engage in – such as exchanging resident embassies, observing rank, granting diplomatic immunity and extraterritoriality, and engaging in ceremony and protocol – and the purpose that underlies these actions. By grounding the reader like this, he or she will be better equipped to recognize when and how a ‘rejection’ of Westphalian diplomatic practice occurs. In Chapter Three I draw on the existing IR literature to develop an explanation for why states reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. After existing strategic and constructivist explanations are considered, I draw on the literature on legitimacy to devise a theory that focuses on how narratives of legitimation can lead states to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. In presenting this explanation I specify the particular causal mechanism – narrative binding – that can account for the outcome. The chapter ends with a consideration of the relevant methods that are used to support this argument, and to adjudicate between it and alternatives.

I then turn to the three empirical chapters in which I demonstrate my argument. Each chapter looks at an instance of ‘rejection’ and offers explanations for the diplomatic practice we see. In each of the chapters I present the arguments and evidence in a similar way. I begin by describing the diplomatic practice of the rejecting state being investigated in the chapter, including any variation in its diplomatic practice. I then evaluate traditional strategic and constructivist explanations for this diplomatic practice. Last, I evaluate an explanation based on narrative binding. In doing this I do the following: I

hours (even if the consequences stretched out for months).

describe the content of the regime's narrative of legitimation; I outline if and how the practices associated with this narrative conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice; I specify the threats to survival faced by the regime during the period under consideration; and finally show how this explanation accords with the evidence. The three chapters are as follows.

Chapter Four investigates one of the most prominent examples of rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice: the diplomatic practice of Qing China in the 18th and 19th centuries. From an analysis of historical accounts and the records of diplomats of the era, I find that China's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was a consequence of Qing concerns regarding domestic legitimacy and regime survival. Because the ethnically-Manchu Qing regime shared institutional control with a Han elite it distrusted, it relied heavily on its "Middle Kingdom" narrative of legitimation in order maintain regime survival. However, the practices mandated by this narrative conflicted with those of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In particular, the Qing could not allow Europeans to post resident ambassadors in Beijing, or to engage in Westphalian diplomatic protocol, as such acts directly conflicted with the symbolic practices expected by the Qing narrative of legitimation. Because of this conflict and because it faced considerable threats to its survival, the Qing regime was bound by its narrative into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice, at great cost to its own international security.

In Chapter Five I investigate the rejection and subsequent acceptance of Westphalian diplomatic practice by Soviet Russia. I find that the variation in Soviet diplomatic practice can be explained by the binding effect that the regime's "World Revolution" narrative of legitimation had on Soviet diplomacy. This narrative had been

created by the Bolsheviks before they came into power in order to gain the support of radicals. Once in power, this narrative mandated that the Soviet regime engage in revolutionary activities abroad. While the regime had incentives to keep radicals on board, it also faced considerable resistance from the ordinary masses who wanted to see practical results from the regime. Over time, the tension between these two goals (pursuing revolutionary and pragmatic policies) led to a schizophrenic form of diplomacy where the regime rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice surrounding issues of protocol, ambassadorial ranking, the diplomatic pouch, and resident missions, while also attempting to maintain diplomatic ties with outside powers. It was only when the Soviet regime no longer faced a survival threat from radicals that it was no longer bound by its narrative of legitimation. At this point it was able to fully accept Westphalian diplomatic practice.

In Chapter Six I explain why the revolutionary Iranian regime adhered to Westphalian diplomatic practice for the first eight months of its rule until November 1979 when, by allowing students to take the US embassy hostage, it rejected Westphalian diplomacy. Iran's action is especially puzzling as the regime had already put down a similar student assault in February 1979, and had – rhetoric about the “Great Satan” aside – been actively pursuing closer links to the US government. Unlike the previous two cases I find that the change the Iranian diplomatic practice was driven more by variation in the binding force of the narrative rather than just by threats to the regime's survival. I find that the domestic narrative of legitimation used by the regime – which I have dubbed a “Anti-Shahist Resistance” narrative – did *not initially* mandate rejectionist diplomatic practices at the international level, even toward the US. This was because this narrative

mandated hostility toward the shah and all he associated but not toward Westphalian international society in general. In other words, the narrative was initially ‘silent’ on issues regarding Westphalian diplomatic practice. However, the centrality of the shah in this narrative meant that Carter administration’s admission of the shah into US in October 1979 was linked to the Iranian domestic narrative of legitimation. This linkage had the effect of mandating support of the students’ violation of the US embassy’s diplomatic immunity, and by extension, mandating the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. Therefore, unlike the other two cases, this case shows how external events were linked to an existing narrative in such a way that it *became* binding over an issue where it had previously been silent. However, the mechanism that links regime survival and narrative content is still central to understanding how this change took place.

Note that each of the chapters exhibits different variation in the states’ rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In Chapter Four, Qing China consistently rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice for nearly a century (until its regime was overthrown by external forces). In Chapter Five, Soviet Russia began by rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice before coming to accept it. In Chapter Six, Revolutionary Iran began by accepting Westphalian diplomatic practice before rejecting it.

Lastly, Chapter Seven presents the conclusions of my dissertation. It summarizes the main findings of the empirical chapters before considering the implications of these findings for current IR research, particularly the literatures on domestic audience costs, crisis resolution, and IR theory. It also suggests future areas of research.

Chapter 2

Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

By the Late Middle Ages, Europe was beginning to cohere into a distinct international society.⁸ Although Europe had in principle been united as one Christian *Res Publica* since the conversion of Emperor Constantine in 312 CE, in reality whole regions had had little international interaction with one another for nearly a millennium. By the mid-1400s this had changed. Europe had developed into a number of regional subsystems – the Italian city-states; the Baltic system; the German kingdoms; and England, France, Spain, Scotland, and the Netherlands – that frequently interacted with one another (Anderson, 1993). This deepening of international ties coincided with the emergence of an international system dominated by new political actors – sovereign states – who had begun to resist claims of authority from feudal lords, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the Papacy (Spruyt, 1994). For many IR scholars the key moment in this development occurred at Westphalia in 1648. It was here that most of the major powers in Europe⁹ met in the German towns of Osnabrück and Münster and signed the treaties that brought the Thirty Years War to an end. At the stroke of a quill, the old system of international politics was swept away and a “new diplomatic arrangement – an order created by states, for states – replaced most of the legal vestiges of hierarchy, the principle of which were the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire” (Holsti, 1991, p. 25). Although the claim that modern international society began at Westphalia has been disputed for some time,¹⁰

⁸ As a historical period the Late Middle Ages (1300-1500) can be distinguished from the High Middle Ages (1000-1300) and the Early Middle Ages (476-1000).

⁹ With the exception of England, Poland, Muscovy, and the Ottomans.

¹⁰ The most prominent critique comes from Osiander (2001).

“1648” has nonetheless become a form of academic shorthand that refers to the birth of the contemporary international system. It is not difficult to find examples of international relations scholars referring to the “Treaties of Westphalia” in order to signal to the reader that they referring to a configuration of international politics that approximates our own (Krasner 1995; March & Olson 1998; Klotz & Lynch 2006). Whether this date was truly the birth of modern international society is not at issue in this dissertation. Instead, I am interested in the diplomatic practice that mediated these diplomatic conferences, and that has mediated international relations ever since. Like the sovereign state system, this “Westphalian diplomatic practice” was not created at these conferences, nor did it cease to evolve afterward. However, the broad contours of this practice have been remarkably consistent and, like the state system that evolved from Westphalia, have become the ‘only game in town.’¹¹

This chapter conceptualizes and describes Westphalian diplomatic practice in detail. The primary purpose of the chapter is to ground the reader and help him or her to understand what it is that states do when they engage in diplomacy. This will also allow the reader to be able to understand just why the behavior of states in the subsequent chapters counts as ‘rejection.’ After all, only by understanding what Westphalian diplomatic practice looks like when it is being accepted by states can one understand what ‘rejection’ looks like. This chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first section I describe the conceptual approaches used by IR theorists when discussing diplomacy, and outline the limits of these approaches. In the second section I offer both theoretical and empirical reasons for why Westphalian diplomacy should be conceptually understood as

¹¹ For a detailed and accessible account of the evolution of diplomacy in general, see Hamilton & Langhorne (2011).

a *practice*. I argue that using the language of a practice-approach allows us to consider diplomacy as a multi-faceted phenomenon in which different elements are combined and recombined by creative and entrepreneurial political actors. Practice language directs our attention to the fact that diplomacy is not just a behavior, a tool, or a set of rules, but also a collection of actions that, when practiced, recreate a particular social system: namely that of juridically equal sovereign states. In the third section I outline and describe the specific empirical elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In describing Westphalian diplomatic practice I draw on diplomatic memoirs and handbooks, as well as prominent secondary sources. In particular, I describe the following: the resident embassy system; diplomatic rank; diplomatic immunity; and diplomatic ceremonial & protocol. These are the elements that diplomats draw on when engaged in Westphalian diplomatic practice. They are also the fault-lines of potential rejection; that is, when states ‘reject’ Westphalian diplomatic practice they are refusing to adhere to some or all of these elements in some way.

Diplomacy in International Relations Theory

Treating diplomacy as a practice is somewhat of a departure from the disciplinary norm.¹² For many IR scholars there is no analytically distinct category called ‘diplomacy’ to begin with. Many treat the term as synonymous with interstate bargaining: a strategic but fundamentally simple interaction that occurs between rational unitary actors.¹³ From a bargaining perspective, the specific details of diplomacy – either as a process or as an institution in its own right – are abstracted away. Instead, the focus is on actors’

¹² For prominent exceptions to this see Constantinou (1996) and Der Derian (1987).

¹³ For examples see Krasner (1983); Haggard and Simmons (1987); Milner (1992).

preferences, their information environment, and the probabilities they assign to others' potential choices. Diplomacy means the logic of contingent choice – just at the international level.¹⁴ As Paul Sharp (1999) points out, even when more detailed research is attempted, diplomacy is treated as simply another word for statecraft and is left under-theorized.¹⁵ The actual context in which diplomacy takes place and the manner in which it is practiced is often ignored. This theoretical reduction is strange considering that diplomacy is *the* central feature of international society. States do not spend most of their time engaging in war; nor are their days filled with strategic bargaining. However, there are very few states that do not constantly practice diplomacy. Every day, all over the world, ambassadors and consuls pick up the phone to communicate with their hosts, meet with the diplomatic corps, represent their state at official functions, or engage in a host of other diplomatic duties. This is the normal diplomacy of international society. Yet this is rarely studied in a theoretical manner.

Some scholars – such as those in the neo-institutionalist tradition – treat diplomacy with more consideration. Although the focus remains on strategic maximizing, neo-institutionalists nonetheless recognize that interstate interactions are often ordered. Scholars in this tradition focus on how states construct institutions in order to organize and regulate their interactions (Keohane & Martin, 1995). From this perspective, diplomacy does not simply refer to the bargaining that actors engage in, but also the various fora – the UN, the WTO, the EU – where these states meet. This approach is strictly functionalist: states “use international institutions to further their own goals, and

¹⁴ For more on the strategic choice approach, see chapter 3 below.

¹⁵ In an *International Security* special issue focusing on the intersection of diplomatic history and IR theory, none of the authors actually discussed how diplomacy might be conceptualized, and instead spent most of the time discussing ways in which the two disciplines might reinforce one another. For an overview

they design institutions accordingly” (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001, p. 762). Diplomatic institutions are the self-conscious creations of states, used to regulate their interactions with one another by providing information, generating certainty, and reducing transaction costs. Although individual institutional designs might be sub-optimal or privilege certain actors (Krasner, 1991), diplomatic practice is nonetheless expected to meet the interests of some of its participants (and, at a bare minimum, be too costly for other actors to refuse to engage in). This functionalist logic has been used to explain such events as the design and persistence of institutions in international politics (Keohane, 1984), the rise of multilateralism (Pahre, 2001), and the postwar reconstruction European trade and payment scheme (Oatley, 2001).

Such functionalist logic can be useful for our understanding of diplomatic practice as it does seem to map onto elements of Westphalian diplomacy. The ambassadorial system of Renaissance Italy, for example, was originally designed in order to improve and regulate the exchange of information between the city-states of northern Italy, just as neo-institutionalists would expect (Mattingly, 1971). Furthermore, even if such a functionalist logic has its limits not all institutionalists subscribe to it.¹⁶ Many scholars in the institutionalist tradition expand the definition of institutions to refer to “rules or sets of rules that pattern human behavior” (Farrell, 2009, p. 30). This definition allows scholars to consider how informal institutions – institutions that do not have their rules written down – can influence things such as how actors are selected as members of a group, how actors make decisions, and the rules that order actor behavior. This informal institutional approach is typical of with the way that English School scholars tend to

see Elman & Elman (1997).

¹⁶ For a critique of functionalist logic see Wendt (2001).

approach diplomacy. Since Hedley Bull's (1977) seminal *The Anarchical Society*, English School scholars have convincingly established that states mediate their interactions through different institutions – such as war, international law, the balance of power – each of which have their own sets of formal and informal rules and procedures. In general, authors in the English School tradition treat diplomacy as a “master institution” of the international realm; an essential element without which international relations could not exist (Buzan, 2004). By conceptualizing diplomacy in this way the English School recognizes that diplomacy is not just something states do, but is an institution that constitutes states as actors in a society. Without diplomacy, international relations would not just be harder: it would cease to exist as we understand it. Thus, by engaging in the particularly Westphalian mode of diplomacy, states recreate a particular Westphalian international society (Reus-Smit, 1997; 1999).

Although the institutional literature can help our understanding of diplomacy there are a number of good reasons to move beyond it. First, existing institutional approaches are either too narrow or too broad. While focusing on how state decisions are influenced by formal institutions such as the WTO or the EU is useful, reducing diplomacy to the interactions states engage in at such fora oversimplifies the way that diplomacy is often practiced. Undoubtedly states that are engaged in, for example, trade negotiations meet at at fora such as the WTO in order to conclude (or maintain) trade deals. However, diplomacy cannot be reduced to interstate activity at such institutions. While trade specialists might bargain over the particulars of an agreement in Geneva, resident ambassadors might be also simultaneously interact with business elites in other states (Putnam, 1998). Even seemingly unimportant activities, such as ceremonial events,

might play an important role in sealing a deal. For instance, Nitsch (2007) has shown that states that engage in formal state visits increase their trade exports to the receiving state. Yet existing institutionalist accounts do not provide us with the analytic language that can allow us to understand how these multiple elements of diplomacy overlap. The English School approach does not solve this problem because although it recognizes that diplomacy is a socially complex system of mediation irreducible to one or two formal institutions, the level of analysis is so abstract that we are unable to gain any real empirical purchase. For instance Bull's (1977, p. 163) definition of diplomacy – “the conduct of international relations by persons who are official agents” – is more descriptive than theoretical. This vagueness is not uncommon: a recent compendium on the English School lists diplomacy only five times in the index, and when referenced, discusses it in an offhand way (Linklater & Suganami, 2006).

A second limit of the institutional approach is that it overplays the role of rules and downplays the role of agency. A state's behavior (or more specifically, its representatives' behavior) is explained by the institutional structure it inhabits. Yet the behavior of actors can rarely be determined simply by understanding the rules that surround them. Possessing knowledge of the rules of a game does not guarantee that actors will choose the optimal strategies. While this observation may not matter for the study of some institutions, this is quite problematic when we study diplomacy. After all, the history of diplomacy is the history of canny strategists who could outplay their opponents (Kissinger, 1994). To reduce this creative aspect of diplomacy to the “error term” means ignoring some of its most interesting elements. While the rules provided by institutions clearly do shape and direct actor behavior they are not determinative of it. For

instance, sometimes actors are able to generate solutions or strategies that are exogenous to the institutional structures they inhabit (Farrell, 2005). Institutional approaches cannot tell us why or when this is so. Similarly, although institutional approaches recognize that actors forum-shop when negotiating (Busch, 2007), this observation does not adequately capture the way in which diplomatic actors switch from one element of diplomacy (such as written diplomatic notes) to another (such as meeting at a forum) or how these elements might be brought together as part of a unified strategy. As noted above, diplomatic outcomes cannot always be reduced to the output of one single institutional process. Nor can the creativity of the diplomats who construct these solutions be ignored.

In short, most existing IR studies on diplomacy exhibit one side or the other of the famous ‘structure-agency’ problem (Wendt, 1987). For those in the rationalist tradition diplomacy is about actors’ preferences and the strategies they devise in light of these; diplomacy is just another word for the bargaining that goes on between rational utility-maximizing states. From the institutionalist and English School perspective, diplomacy is the bargaining that states do at particular fora, or the general system of mediation that exists between them. However, neither of these approaches are able to articulate most of the everyday diplomatic behavior states engage in. Certain elements of diplomacy are explained by their functional utility (such as embassies) or dismissed as “obviously” irrelevant (diplomatic ceremonial and protocol). Instead of trying to determine if, how, and why, all these disparate elements might be linked, these approaches decide – a priori – that some behaviors or processes count as ‘real’ diplomacy while other elements are assumed to be ‘noise.’ These are heroic assumptions. In order to overcome them we must first recognize that diplomacy is what diplomats do, not what we might think they should

do. By beginning with this observation, we can actually get a better grip on what diplomacy really is and how it works. Fortunately, the recent “practice turn” in IR, provides us with the theoretical language that allows us to do this.

Understanding Diplomacy as a Practice

In order to better understand and unpack diplomacy I decide to explicitly treat it as a *practice*. Doing so refocuses the theoretical lens in a way that better captures some of the key features of diplomacy and, importantly, helps us to better understand why states might reject it (the subject of the next chapter). Practice language helps us to do this as it focuses on the empirical behavior we actually observe diplomats participating in. This allows us to untangle how engaging in different actions can aid or inhibit actors, how different actions can be linked to another, and how these actions can create or recreate a particular social world that might privilege some actors over others. I follow the definition of practice set out by Adler & Pouliot (2011, p. 5): practices are “competent performances [...] socially meaningful patterns of action, which in being performed [...] simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.” In this section, I will show why treating diplomacy as a practice has both theoretical and empirical advantages.

The Theoretical Contributions of a Practice Approach. Why does it make sense to approach diplomacy as a practice? The answer is that there are a number of features of the social world that the practice-approach draws our attention to that are relevant for understanding why states conduct the diplomacy in the manner that they do. In particular, I wish to highlight four key theoretical contributions of a practice-approach:

the ontological space between structure and agency that the concept of ‘practice’ occupies; the distinction a practice-approach draws between behaviors, actions, and practice; the way in which a practice-approach recognizes the importance of background knowledge; and the recognition of this approach that engaging in practices (re)creates particular social systems, and that this means that practices have value for actors. Each of these contributions provides advantages for our understanding of diplomacy.

First, to talk of practice is to focus on the actions people engage in, not simply the ideas or motives behind these actions. Practice refers to the actions that are made by agents who themselves are framed and constructed by their engagement in an activity. From a practice perspective structure is not nearly as determinative of behavior as sociological or material accounts suggest that it is. Instead, structure exists because actors behave as if it does. By engaging in certain practices actors make structures real. From this approach, neither agent nor structure is intelligible without the practices that recreate both entities. In other words, ‘practice’ occupies a space between structure and agency. This may seem like a trivial point but it is not. For instance, many ideational accounts can overstate the manner in which ideas cause action. Ideas undoubtedly matter but not simply because they lead people to believe things. Indeed, even people who claim to be motivated by the same idea may be neither fully governed by that idea, or be influenced by it in a uniform way.¹⁷ Belief-systems – such as the belief in the Westphalian system of states – do not, on their own, ‘cause’ actors to behave in systematic ways. Rather, actors engage in practices in order to *demonstrate* their belief in a particular social system.

¹⁷ Barry Barnes (2006, p. 26) gives the example of vegetarians who, “do not employ scientific experts or modern laboratory techniques to separate the animal and the vegetable. Nor does one vegetarian community necessarily follow the same dietary prohibitions as another...[V]egetarianism is not a matter of behaving in ways that can be exhaustively specified by abstract verbal rules.”

Whether actors actually ‘believe’ in the ideas that are upheld by these practices is immaterial in such an account. By focusing on the ontological space between agent and structure, a practice-approach avoids making claims that the ‘ideas’ in the heads of actors cause events. Instead of trying to get inside actors’ heads, practice scholars focus on the actual material physical behaviors of individuals and draw attention to the discourse that gives meaning to these behaviors. By making this theoretical move a practice-approach “permits attention to meaning without having to focus on whether particular actors believe, think, or act on specific ideas” (Swidler, 2001, p. 84). To study practice is to look at what actors actually do and consider the consequences of changes in action. We can posit or assume motives for the actors – in fact I implicitly assume that actors are strategic – but these assumptions are not important as they are not where the analytic action is.

Second, a practice-approach is useful as it helps us to unpack actor activity. Importantly, practice-language draws distinctions between behaviors, actions, and practices; words that are often used interchangeably but that can be made ontologically distinct. *Behavior* refers to the actual “material dimension of doing”; that is it refers to a physical act in a way that does not imply meaning (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 5). An example of a behavior would be: “the man shot a gun at another man.” This type of description is devoid of any particular subjective content. By contrast, an *action* is a behavior that contains meaning. Here context and meaning are, often subtly or imperceptibly, folded into the ‘description’ of an activity. For instance we could – depending on the actors involved and the situation in which they found themselves – rephrase the above behavior as: “the police officer shot an armed robber;” “the criminal

engaged in a violent mugging;” “the soldier attacked a fixed position;” “the soldier murdered a civilian.” Note that in all of these examples the behavior remains identical: what changes is the meaning associated with the behavior. This association is determined by the actors involved and the nature of their relationship to one another as defined by the social structure they inhabit. These are not simply statements of reality; they are also statements that create a reality. A *practice* refers to a general class of recurring actions that are not limited to or reducible to a single type of action. To return to the above examples we might say that a police officer was engaged in the recurring practice of “combating crime”, or that a criminal was practicing “mugging.”

Note that rephrasing these actions in terms of the larger practices of which they are an instance does not imply uniform behavior. It is not necessarily the case that all police officers who combat crime shoot criminals, or that all muggings result in a shooting. Nonetheless, the behavior of shooting is consistent with a broader set of practices that are easily understood by both participants and observers. One of the advantages of locating behaviors and actions inside broader sets of practices is that it allows us to recognize that actors could have engaged in very different actions (tazing the criminal; not harming the victim) and still have been engaged in the same practices. In short, actors engaged in an identical practice might engage in very different actions. Therefore, while the “rules” matter so does the creativity of the agents. If this distinction between behaviors, actions, and practices seems like an academic point, it might be due to the way that scholars sometimes do not adequately consider the way in which ‘objective’ analyses of behavior are actually analyses of actions or practices. Consider commonplace discussions of ‘costly signaling.’ Moving an aircraft carrier into the

Persian Gulf to deter Iran is usually treated as an objective behavior, when it is in fact a context-sensitive action. After all, aircraft carriers and other warships move around all the time; it is only in very particular contexts that this behavior changes from being one form of action (a patrol) into another (a warning). Indeed, this kind of action is only recognizable as a ‘signal’ because it fits into a well-established practice (deterrence) that makes it and its implications instantly understandable to observers. In reality, “obvious” costly signals are only obvious to people who are already imbued with context-specific background knowledge. Consequently, seemingly objective behaviors that are engaged in to signal cost may in fact derive far more of their signaling capacity from the shared culture and conventions of participants than they do from their material characteristics (Jervis, 1970; Cohen, 1997).

This points to the third key contribution of a practice approach: its recognition of the important role that background knowledge – what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as ‘habitus’ – plays in explaining actor behavior. Habitus is a set of dispositions or master-patterns that “enable an intelligible and necessary relationship between practices and a situation” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101). This habitus, or background knowledge, shapes many of the categories of thought that actors draw on when they act in the world.¹⁸ Unlike institutionalist accounts that explicitly or implicitly focus on how actors’ strategically manipulate ‘the rules’ in order to achieve their objectives, a practice approach understands that actors themselves may not fully understand the rules that surround them, and thus why they succeed or fail. As Pouliot (2008, p. 260) notes, many

¹⁸ Habitus derives from a mutually reinforcing combination of social and material conditions. Socially, actors are *subjectively* conditioned by their position in a society, as well as their education, to believe in the normalcy of their lot. Materially, they are limited from changing position (and thus potentially acquiring a new habitus) by the economic or security constraints placed on them by *objective* conditions.

explanations of actor behavior “focus on what actors think about (reflexive and conscious knowledge) at the expense of what they think from (the background know-how that informs practice in an inarticulate fashion).” Background knowledge not only helps to structure how actors see the world,¹⁹ but also orientates their responses to situations. This does not mean that agents simply act out social roles in a deterministic matter. Rather background knowledge privileges “tendencies or probabilities” (Codd, 1990, p. 138). Actors are free to choose among strategies of action, but these are in some ways determined by the habitus they possess. Furthermore, actors in possession of background knowledge have distinct advantages over others. Return to the example of the police officer who shoots a criminal in order to disarm him. An officer with more background knowledge might – due to a combination of training, social background, and experience – determine (perhaps unconsciously) that there is alternative action that could disarm a criminal without firing a gun; in short, that there is a better way to engage in the practice of combating crime. Similarly, shrewd diplomats might recognize that maneuvering aircraft carriers might not be best way to elicit a response from an opponent, and that – depending on the context – going through back-channels might be just as effective. In short, background knowledge determines what is imaginable and unimaginable; what is natural and what is deviant. It informs the practices that can be drawn on by actors. The enactment of this belief system is not predetermined by rules or intentions. It may be highly creative and novel while still understandable by others as being ‘appropriate.’ By foregrounding the role of background knowledge in this way a practice-approach engages with the “creative dimensions of human agency” far more ably than rationalist or sociological accounts are able to (Simpson, 2009, p. 1331).

¹⁹ In this sense background knowledge is similar to a ‘schema’ (Axelrod, 1973).

This leads to a fourth and final theoretical contribution of a practice approach: the manner in which this approach treats culture. One of the key observations of practice proponents is that culture is not floating ‘out there’ but is in fact only made apparent when it is displayed and practiced by members of a society. Practice is “a central mechanism for the reproduction of political, social and economic structures in society” (Jackson, 2008, p. 165). We only know what a society’s culture is by observing the practices that its members engage in. Treating culture this way makes it far more empirically tractable than other accounts because instead of asking, “how did culture or an idea cause an action?” we focus on the expressions of the culture of a society. Practices create culture; not the other way around. The more mutually reinforcing practices that are engaged in, then the more ‘solid’ a particular culture appears.²⁰ In some sense then, there is a positive feedback effect between practice and culture. The more particular practices are engaged in, the more a specific culture is reified. Conceptualizing culture as practice has two important implications for understanding the role of culture in politics. First, if practice creates and recreates culture then, in doing so, it makes some actors more powerful than others. Because some cultures privilege some actors over others (such as whites versus non-whites in the antebellum United States) this creates incentives for actors to maintain this culture. Consequently culture is not just something that influences actor behavior but is something that actors *contest*. Second, not all practices are equal. Some practices are much ‘deeper’ and shape and constitute many

²⁰ Swidler (2001) draws attention to the work of Richard Biernacki who has found that the differences in industrial relations in 19th century Britain and Prussia can be explained by understanding the manner in which labor was ‘commodified’ in both states. British manufacturers measured labor value from the amount of commodities that workers produced. By contrast Prussian manufacturers calculated labor value on the amount of work that workers engaged in (measured by counting how many times a laborer sent the shuttle back and forth on a loom). These differences in how labor was understood (i.e. through workers’ practices) then informed the entire landscape of industrial bargaining. Furthermore, it was changes in

other practices. These ‘anchor’ practices are more significant in their effect on the society around them. Such anchor practices are often difficult to identify as their influence is often so pervasive as to be invisible.²¹

The Empirical Advantages of a Practice Approach. When we approach Westphalian diplomacy using practice-language the four theoretical contributions outlined above are especially useful. First, a focus on action over ideas is useful as diplomacy is not just a set of rules that diplomats draw on, but rather a set of repeating practices that diplomats engage in. Although scholars often *a priori* reduce diplomacy to negotiation or to a set of rules, such restrictive language is rarely used by practitioners of diplomacy themselves. This can be seen in the language used in prominent practitioner-guides. For instance, writing in the early-20th century, career-diplomat Ernest Satow (1958, p. 1) described diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states... or, more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means.”²² According to Satow, the role of the diplomat, “is to watch over the maintenance of good relations, to protect the interests of his countrymen, and to report to his government on all matters of importance, without always being charged with the conduct of a specific negotiation”

worker practice, not changes in ideas, that caused industrial relations to modify.

²¹ Swidler (2001) uses the example of house construction and the practices of a house’s architect and the contractor hired to build it. Whose practices are determinative of the other’s in such an account? Do the plans and designs drawn up by the architect limit and constrain the practices of the contractor? Or is it the case that the types of materials used by builders, the limits of construction, and the constraints of planning, that really shape the practices of the architect? This type of chicken-egg conundrum is not easily resolvable. Nonetheless, we can recognize that both of these actors are acting inside a much ‘deeper’ set of cultural practices; those of market capitalism. It is only in a world in which property-ownership, mass-production, specialized labor, contracts, and standardization exist that the activities of architects and contractors - or even their existence as agents - can be made understandable. Thus, although it is not easy to readily spot them, there is good reason to accept that some practices are more influential than others.

²² Born in 1843, Satow was one of the new professional diplomats that entered British service. He began his career in the Foreign office in 1861 as an interpreter in China and Japan, where he spent much of his career until his retirement in 1909. He is most famous for his *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*; first published in

(Satow, 1958, p. 115). The most prominent professional diplomat of the 20th century, Harold Nicholson (1963, p. 15), applied a similar definition: “diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist.”²³ The purpose of this interaction is “the maintenance of amicable relations between states” (Nicholson, quoted in Otte, 2001b, p. 158). Similar definitions of diplomacy can be found in the writings of the prominent practitioners from previous eras. For instance, in his highly influential *De la Maniere de Negocier avec les Souverains* (*On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*) François de Callières (1983, p. 75) stated that diplomats must not simply be good negotiators but also display a “spirit of attention and application... [and]... should have command enough over himself, so as to be able to resist the strong inclination he have to speak before he has well considered what he ought to say.”²⁴ The admonition that diplomacy is not reducible to negotiation is most forcefully expressed by one of the first diplomatic theorists of the modern age, Abraham de Wicquefort.²⁵ In fact, de Wicquefort considered negotiating as a subordinate duty

1917.

²³ Like Satow, Nicholson was a career diplomat in the British foreign service. Born into minor noble family in 1886, Nicholson entered the diplomatic service in 1909 and, following postings in Madrid and Constantinople, spent the war years and beyond at the Foreign Office. He was attached to the British delegation to Paris in 1918-1919. Disillusioned by the encroachment of non-professionals into the realm of diplomacy, he finally left the foreign office in 1929. Following his retirement he published his famous book on diplomatic practice: *Diplomacy*.

²⁴ François de Callières (1645-1717) practiced diplomacy during the reign of Louis XIV, most notably during the Nine Years War, when he successfully negotiated the terms that led to the Congress of Ryswick in 1697. His *De la Maniere de Negocier avec les Souverains*, first published in 1716, was written as a guide for envoys and so its emphasis was on diplomatic practice, not theory. It was received with “immediate acclaim” and it remained popular throughout the 18th century (Keens-Soper, 2001b: 106). He was also a considerable influence on later theorists of diplomatic practice such as Satow and Nicholson.

²⁵ Abraham de Wicquefort (1606-82) was one of the first diplomatic theorists of the post-Westphalian-settlement age. Although he never held a higher post than diplomatic envoy of the second rank, he spent many decades traveling throughout the courts of Europe and was an observer at the Congress of Westphalia. Later in his life he was imprisoned in his native Holland, and in prison wrote his *L’Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions* which was first published in 1681 and translated into English in 1716. Of the approximately 153 books published on diplomacy between 1625 and 1700 his was seen by most

compared to a diplomat's obligation to act as a physical representative of his prince (de Wicquefort, 1716).

There are three things worth noting about this collection of definitions. First, all of them treat diplomacy as a set of actions, not a set of rules. Diplomacy is something that is done; not something that does things. Second, in outlining the duties of diplomats, the authors do not reduce diplomacy to negotiation or gathering information. They also draw attention to other elements of diplomacy that are often ignored by IR scholars, such as the ceremonial and representative duties of a diplomat. In addition, they stress that one of the key duties of a diplomat is simply to 'maintain good relations' with other states – something that more strategic definitions entirely miss. Last, these guides not only suggest duties but also appropriate modes of behavior. Diplomats are not only supposed to represent, negotiate, or maintain friendly relations, they are expected to do all of these things in patient, tactful, and humble manner. From the perspective of these influential practitioners, diplomacy is not just about what diplomats do, but how they do it.

The second reason that a practice-approach is useful for understanding diplomacy is because of the distinctions that such an approach draws between behaviors, actions, and practices. By disaggregating diplomacy in this way a practice-approach provides us with the theoretical language needed to fully understand the manner in which diplomacy often takes place. By moving away from rules and structures and by not privileging certain elements of diplomacy over others a practice-approach allows us to consider all how disparate elements of diplomacy come together in different ways to create the outcomes we see in the international world. As mentioned earlier, diplomats draw on different materials – e.g. embassies, diplomatic notes – and draw on different actions –

diplomats as the best guide to diplomatic practice (Keens-Soper, 2001a).

e.g. state visits, conferences, back-channel negotiations – in a variety of combinations in order to meet their goals. Diplomacy is rarely conducted by one actor or institution, nor does it always follow predictable paths. Instead diplomats engaging in diplomatic practice often engage in an overlapping set of actions and draw on different combinations of materials in order to meet their goals. Recognizing that diplomatic practice is composed of many different elements makes it possible to incorporate the creative aspects of diplomacy into an analysis. It also draws our attention to many of the understudied parts of diplomacy, such as its ceremonial and symbolic elements, and allows us to consider how these elements can sometimes explain why interstate relationships have the contours that they do. Such an expansive view of diplomacy is useful because the theatrical and ceremonial elements of diplomacy can be instrumental in shaping audience expectations and persuading both publics and elites to interpret events in certain ways (Cohen, 1987). For instance, the public symbolic practices of both French and German diplomats in the late 19th century helped to simultaneously dampen and yet recreate the antagonism felt between the publics of both countries (Steller, 2008). Similarly, Anwar Sadat’s highly public state-visit to Israel in 1977 was instrumental in shifting Israeli domestic public opinion in favor of a peace settlement with Egypt (Gross-Stein, 1993; Lewis 1979). Using a practice-approach allows us to incorporate these kinds of diplomatic actions into our analysis in a holistic but coherent way.²⁶

A third reason that a practice approach is useful for studying diplomacy is because it draws attention to the significant role that background information plays in the conduct of diplomacy. Before the 20th century – and the professionalization of MFAs in most states – diplomats were almost always drawn from the higher social strata of their

²⁶ The importance of symbolic practices is covered in considerable detail in the following chapter.

states. Partially this was done for financial reasons. As resident ministers abroad were often expected to shoulder much of the cost of their missions it made sense to draw diplomats from the aristocracy. However, money was not the only concern. In states such as Britain and Germany penniless ambassadors were often sent abroad while members of the new (moneyed) industrial classes remained excluded from the diplomatic service (Jones, 1983; Cecil, 1976). This was because sending-states often considered the social background of a diplomat to be more important than a diplomat's financial health. States wished to ensure that their representatives would have the personal disposition necessary for them to correctly conduct their duties abroad. In practice this meant drawing diplomats from the aristocratic classes as these shared similar background knowledge throughout Europe. Possession of this background knowledge made it possible for diplomats to engage not only in the official institutional elements of diplomacy, but also the the important 'unofficial' elements, such as socializing, as well. Diplomats who were not in possession of the requisite background knowledge were at a considerable disadvantage compared to others. For example, 19th century US diplomatic history is littered with instances where US envoys, disdainful of the pomp of European society and at pains to demonstrate their homespun republicanism, would find themselves isolated from the diplomatic corps of which they were a member (Nickles, 2008). As a consequence of their inability or refusal to engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice they reduced their diplomatic impact. The importance of background knowledge has not diminished in the modern age. Modern MFAs – especially in Europe – still often select trainees into the diplomatic service based on intangibles such as 'attitude' rather than their mastery of technical skills (Hamilton & Langhorne, 2011). In the European Union's

diplomatic corps background knowledge contributes to the persistence of an epistemic community of like-minded diplomats (Davis-Cross, 2007). Indeed, background knowledge has been such an important lubricant for the gears of the diplomacy, that many have not even been aware of its role. For instance, it was not until the sudden expansion of international society in the post-colonial era that Western MFAs realized that many of the unspoken practices of diplomacy needed to be articulated in order for new states to be able to practice diplomacy. Therefore it was only in the 1960s that many of the rights, obligations, and entitlements of Westphalian diplomatic practice were finally codified in the Vienna Convention on Relations (1961) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963). Up until this point, diplomats did not have to have this information written down; they were assumed to have already known it. No wonder that Harold Nicholson (1963, p. 43) famously summed up diplomacy as “common sense”; he was not aware how particular this common sense was.

The final reason that a practice-approach is so suitable for studying diplomacy is due to the way that culture is conceptualized by this approach; i.e. that culture does not cause action, but rather that actions create culture. This observation matters for our understanding of diplomacy for a number of reasons. To begin with, it reminds us that by engaging in diplomacy states recreate a particular international culture. Although almost every element of diplomacy was initially created for functional reasons, these elements also have social dimensions and are important for the maintenance of a “diplomatic culture” in which independent and estranged sovereigns are continuously constituted and sustained by one another, and in which diplomats were expected to uphold amicable relations between them in order to maintain this system (Der Derian, 1987, p. 4). Even

though many of the earliest elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice – such as immunity, privileges, ceremony and protocol – all predate Westphalia and in fact found their origins in the medieval era, they have nonetheless become associated with being a full member of international society. Initially, these actions were not justified in the language of sovereignty – which was an alien concept until the religious wars of Europe were in full sway – but in the language of religion. For instance, when Hugo Grotius – who is often presented as one of the earliest philosophers to support a Westphalian international society – specified the concept of the *societas gentium* (the society of nations) and argued for the importance of international law (and activity) he justified the concept in terms of religion and natural law.²⁷

By the late 18th century however, Enlightenment rationalism became the dominant discourse of international politics. The church, religion, and natural law fell away as legitimating discourses, and slowly international politics was no longer understood in terms of religion or dynasticism but in terms of juridically equal sovereign states.²⁸ Thus, although throughout this period the broad elements of diplomatic practice

²⁷ Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was born into a wealthy Dutch patrician family and came into adulthood at the same time that Europe was convulsed in the final stages of the religious wars that had plagued it for over 50 years before his birth. He spent much of his life engaged in some form of international politics, including serving as an ambassador for Sweden to Paris for over a decade. In 1609, following years serving the interests of the Dutch East India company, he wrote the work he is most famous for: *Mare Liberum*. In addition to this he also wrote *De Jure Praedae* (not published until 1868), and *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres* (Three Books on the Law of War and Peace)

²⁸ In *Beyond the Anarchical Society* Edward Keene identifies the Napoleonic era as the period in which a Westphalian discourse became the dominant discourse of legitimation in international society. In an attempt to de-legitimize Napoleon's conquests and to mobilize their own populations, monarchists in this era drew on the language and symbolism of nationalism and international law. Counter-revolutionary thinkers reacted to Napoleon by explicitly positing the existence of (and therefore the normative superiority of) an international *Staatensystem* in which public order was maintained by recognizing and accepting the inviolability of borders. These thinkers argued that Napoleonic imperialism and revolutionary behavior was de-stabilizing to the natural balance of the international society because it had shattered the delicate legal system of treaties that was necessary to support this balance. Instead of defending monarchy on the grounds that it was natural or divinely sanctioned, this discourse defended monarchy on the pragmatic and legalist grounds that the autocratic power of monarchs allowed them to manage the affairs of the international system in a form of "cabinet rule" (Keene 2002: 18). Therefore, revolution was de-legitimized at the

remained largely the same (see below), the underlying meaning and purposes attached to them changed. As the discourse legitimating international society shifted from that of Christianity toward that of independent sovereignty, practicing diplomacy did not (re)create a Christian *res publica* but rather to a system of states that were entitled to their rights as equally independent sovereign entities. From roughly 1648 onward, engaging in diplomacy did not just mean negotiating with other states but also *recognizing the existence of other states as independent and equal actors*. Diplomatic practice did not (and does not) only act as functional medium between states but actually recreates the “relations of separateness” necessary for the state system to exist (Sharp, 2009, p. 10). Diplomats occupy an unusual space between communities where – even if their states are allies and share the same diplomatic culture – the diplomat’s role is to manage and maintain the division of the world into distinct entities. Thus diplomacy is “not just a functional or structural process. It is not just international or interstate. It is definitely not just interpersonal... it is primarily intersubjective...[and] takes place between constructed subjects whose very construction relies on the intercourse and mutual recognition of diplomacy” (Constantinou, 1996, p. 25). In other words, diplomatic practice helps to reaffirm and recreate the practice that ‘anchors’ all of international society: that there exists a thing called international society, and that this is populated by juridically equal states.

The recognition that engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice recreates international society also reminds us, therefore, of the important and somewhat hidden-power dimensions of this practice. By engaging in a diplomatic practice that repeatedly

domestic level with the language of nationalism, and de-legitimized at the international level with the language of rational legalism.

recreates a world in which sovereign states are the only legal actors in the international realm, these sovereign states are repeatedly granted considerable political power. By acting like states are the only the legitimate form of international actor, then this becomes true. Diplomatic practice does not simply mediate relations between states, but also acts as a motor that constantly grants certain actors (or their representatives) privileges and status. The flip-side of this observation is that if such practices are interrupted or abolished, then so too is the culture that grants these advantages. To put it another way, if enough actors refuse to engage in the actions and practices that recreate this ‘reality’ then it will cease to be real. Little wonder then, that states might be sensitive to violations of Westphalian diplomatic practice. If other states refuse to practice Westphalian diplomatic practice then this implies something negative, whether this implication is intentional or not.

The Recurring Elements of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

Having established that diplomacy can be understood as a practice, I now present the key empirical elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice; that is its material objects, and the actions that constitute it. I intentionally use the term ‘elements’ as it reminds the reader that to discuss diplomatic practice is not simply talk to about the actions of diplomats, but also the context in which they operate. Practices are ‘culture in action’ (Swidler, 2001). It is only by acting (or not acting) that people can assign social meaning to the objects and events around them. In short, practices are “both *material* and *meaningful*” (Adler & Pouliou, 2011: 15). This means that ‘elements’ refers not only to the actions of individual actors engaged in diplomatic practice, but also the material

objects and social facts that surround these actors, and on which these actors draw. By combining material objects with specific actions diplomats create and recreate the diplomatic culture they operate in. For instance, the social fact of sovereign equality is materially maintained in the place of embassies and chanceries, but also in the social practices of protocol and diplomatic immunity. This section will present the prominent elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Resident Diplomatic Missions. The most important innovation of European diplomacy was the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions abroad. The resident mission was an Italian creation that first appeared in Renaissance Florence, Venice, Milan, and soon spread northward. By 1432 the duke of Milan had a resident ambassador at the court of the Holy Roman Emperor; by the 1470s Florence had representatives in Paris; and by 1500 England hosted numerous Italian resident diplomats in London.²⁹ By the Westphalian era, the network of embassies had expanded considerably. In 1685 France had embassies in Rome, Venice, Constantinople, Vienna, the Hague, London, Madrid, Lisbon, Munich, Copenhagen, and Berne.³⁰ The system was quickly adopted by other powerful states in Europe and became the diplomatic standard; persisting right up to the modern era. Since the Congress of Vienna of 1815 diplomatic missions have taken the form of either full embassies (or high commissions) that house ambassadors or legations that house lower-ranked diplomats (see below). These types of missions are traditionally located in the capital cities of the hosting states. In addition to embassies,

²⁹ The key reason for the spread of this system across the Alps and beyond was the invasion of Italy by the French in 1494 and the subsequent adoption of the system by the French king Charles VIII. In 1515 France only had one resident ambassador abroad (at the court of the Holy Roman Emperor); by Charles' death in 1547, it had ten (Anderson 1993).

³⁰ In addition, there were special missions to Württemberg, the Elector Palatine, and the Elector of Mainz. In addition, resident ministers were established at Genoa, Mantua, Hamburg, Geneva, and Florence (Nicolson, 1954).

states also sometimes maintain consular missions abroad. These missions have a much more explicitly commercial role and are located in economically important port cities or similar areas.³¹

Before the introduction of the resident embassy abroad, diplomacy was practiced in an episodic way. Rulers sent envoys bearing messages to one another when they felt it necessary. This method was problematic as it meant that the information necessary for crafting diplomatic policies was gathered inefficiently. It also significantly slowed the process of negotiation as rulers simply waited for envoys to return with new messages. The embassy system resolved these issues. Resident ambassadors located in politically sensitive cities or at the courts of important sovereigns were able to regularly send information back to their rulers. While these ambassadors were rarely given the ability to negotiate on behalf of their sovereign (i.e. they were not given plenipotentiary powers) the continuous presence of an ambassador at a foreign court nonetheless allowed for a ruler's interests abroad to be defended, and for new possible political contacts to be discovered and explored.

Although resident missions were initially sent in order to meet this functional purpose, their commission soon took on a social dimension as the sending and receiving of embassies became tied up with notions of prestige and respect. A state's ability to send embassies was a mark of its power and prestige and being able to do so (or markedly refusing to send full embassies, as the US did for much of the 19th century) sent a signal about a state's position in international society and its opinion of other members. As a demonstration of this, throughout the 18th and 19th century, Great Powers usually only

³¹ Consuls are responsible for managing the affairs of fellow nationals resident in the state in which the consulate is resident. This distinguishes them from embassies, which are responsible for all official state

sent full embassies in the capitals of other great powers. Smaller states and, most notably, non-European states, were frequently host to nothing larger than legations or consular missions. For instance, it was not until its success in its war against Russia in 1904-05 that Japan's missions were upgraded to embassies in Western capitals. This social dimension of resident missions is still significant for contemporary diplomacy. Indeed, despite the development of communication technology and the increased ease with which leaders can meet one another, the embassy system has expanded throughout the 20th century. For instance, in 1815 Britain only had nineteen missions abroad (and only two outside Europe); by 1914 it had forty-one. Currently it has at least one mission (and sometimes more) in approximately 150 states. This upward trend is typical of most states in the system (Hamilton & Langhorne, 2011). It should be noted, however, that states are not obliged to send resident embassies abroad. Many smaller states choose to limit their missions only to strategically important states and to the UN. However, in principle, refusal to accept an embassy from another state has a negative social connotation.

Types of Diplomat. The rise of the sovereign state over its competitors not only changed the manner in which diplomacy was conducted, but also who conducted it. Whereas a fifteenth century court might have been populated with a bewildering range of nuncios, orators, procurators, legates, deputies, consuls, commissioners, and ministers (all 'ordinary' or 'extraordinary' to different degrees), by the sixteenth century the office of resident ambassador came to replace these various representatives as the primary diplomatic agent abroad. With the exception of papal nuncios in certain capitals, representatives of sovereign states supplanted all other forms of diplomatic agent by the late 18th century. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 this system of state representation

business at the international level, even if they also engage in consular functions.

was finally regulated and ordered – due to continued battles over precedence (see below) – so that three different rank of diplomat were universally recognized by members of European international society: ambassadors and nuncios; envoys or ministers assigned to sovereigns; and *chargé d'affaires* assigned to ministers or MFAs (Zamoyski, 2007).³² The centrality of the ambassador as primary mediator of diplomatic affairs was a persistent feature of international relations until the twentieth century. At this point new types of representatives came to take over many of the functions we associate with ambassadors – most notably those relating to negotiation. For example, since the Paris Peace talks of 1919, there has been a marked increase in ‘summit’ diplomacy, where heads of government negotiate person-to-person (Dunn 1996). In addition, negotiation by ‘generalists’ such as ambassadors has decreased, and has been replaced by negotiation by specialists who are tasked to negotiate on specific issues (Barston 1997).

While the exchanging of diplomats was – like resident missions – initially instituted for functional reasons, over time the practice came to take on a social meaning. Sending an ambassador was a clear symbol of a prince’s political independence. Writing in the early 18th century, de Wicquefort (1716, p. 6) claimed that “there is not a more illustrious Mark of Sovereignty than the Right of sending and receiving Ambassadors.” Being able to exchange ambassadors was associated with prestige, and thus the act of exchange in and of itself had meaning.³³ Consequently, choosing to send a certain rank of representative or only agreeing to receive a certain rank of minister over another had

³² In 1818, a fourth category was added - ministers-resident - that occupied a rank between envoys and *chargés*.

³³ Indeed, de Wicquefort distinguishes between ambassadors and ministers of the second order: “All ministers of the second order are negotiators, whereas all ambassadors are not, neither are all negotiators ambassadors. The ambassador of obedience, and for the observation and execution of a treaty of peace, or to *represent* his prince at the ceremonies of a christening, a marriage, a coronation, or a funeral, *negotiate nothing*; however this does not hinder them from being ambassadors, and indeed they receive more honor

political meanings, as lower ranked diplomats might be sent or received in order to signal displeasure. For example, during the 17th century “the King of France himself, who cannot oblige the court of Vienna to give his ambassador the rank which he holds everywhere else, sends there only a minister of the second order” (de Wicquefort, in Berridge, 2004, p. 125). As mentioned above, throughout the 19th century the receipt of an ambassador was something to which only the great powers were ‘entitled.’ Such subtle signaling still occurs. In November 2013 Egypt downgraded its diplomatic relations with Turkey due to the Turkish prime minister’s public criticism of the Egyptian regime (Kareem and Arsu, 2013).

Diplomatic Immunity and Inviolability. Westphalian diplomatic practice is not simply reducible to the actors that participate in it, but also the rules and norms that govern their interactions. One of the most prominent of these norms is the norm of diplomatic immunity. At its most simple form in pre-Westphalian Europe the norm of diplomatic immunity entitled sovereigns’ representatives to safe conduct on their journeys across foreign lands, and would only last for the period of an embassy’s commission (which, prior to the existence of resident embassies, was always temporary). This norm simply implied the right of an envoy to be free from molestation in any way that might impede his office. However, it did not absolve him from paying taxes, tolls, debtors, or in any other way alleviate his liabilities as a private citizen. The adoption of resident embassies expanded the rights of immunity in both their degree and physical scope. First, the duration of residencies meant that being hounded by creditors or being subject to local laws could impede an ambassador’s duties. Thus, with time, immunity came to also imply exemption from many laws. Second, immunity was expanded to

than they that negotiate” (de Wicquefort: 4; italics mine).

apply not only to the person of the ambassador or other accredited representatives, but also to the physical space of the embassy and the diplomatic pouch.

The norm was originally upheld on religious grounds; in particular on the assumption that – because all sovereigns were subjects of a unified Christian *res publica* – the exchange of representatives helped to bring peace and stability to the world. Violation of this law could lead to excommunication on the part of the offender. The norm also had a legal basis in the Roman laws that had been transmitted through the centuries and that entitled a representative's principal the right to punish the transgressor (Hamilton & Langhorne, 2011). However, with the shift into the Westphalian era, the body of the diplomat (and his residence and letters etc.) also became more explicitly associated with the entity of the sovereign state itself. Immunity was 'granted' not due to the assumed peacefulness of the mission of diplomats, but rather because a system of sovereign and equal states meant that no state had the right to interfere with another's property or symbols. This position was explicitly articulated by Grotius who argued that ambassadors should receive immunity and special privileges because states had no rights over one another, and such a system allowed these sovereign entities to best regulate their affairs with one another (Berridge, 2001c). Although Grotius' argument was – broadly speaking – a functionalist one (i.e. reciprocating was in the interest of all states), once more the immunity and inviolability of diplomats and their effects has come to take on a social meaning in international society. Violation of this norm is not only seen as breaking an informal contract, but also seen as insulting and degrading behavior. Furthermore, it is seen as behavior that is beyond the pale and marks the violator out as a pariah. As I will demonstrate in later chapters, refusal to adhere to this norm can very

quickly open a state up to hostile actions by the insulted party or even by other states that are not directly affected.

Diplomatic Ceremonial & Protocol. Diplomatic ceremonial and protocol attends all international diplomacy to one degree or another. It may be as dramatic as lining major roads with the national flags of visiting dignitaries who, flanked by a precise number of motorcycle-mounted police officers, are rushed in convoy from the red carpet of an airport to the red carpet of the state's government buildings. It can be as subdued as the solemn procession of visiting prime ministers, presidents, vice-presidents, ambassadors, and foreign royalty behind a deceased head of state's funeral cortege. It can be as attention-grabbing as the signing of a peace treaty on the deck of a battleship. It can be as minor as ensuring that the flags of every state representative are in place in front of their seats at diplomatic conference (and, of course, that this seating is arranged according to the standards of protocol). It is the sometimes-stagy political theater that accompanies all official diplomacy in international society.

By using the term *diplomatic* I only refer only to ceremonies and protocols that are expected to apply to state envoys or representatives located abroad, such as resident ambassadors, plenipotentiaries-in-extraordinary, and heads of state or government; in short, the people who "represent" the state. This definition excludes other foreign nationals abroad, such as members of a legation who are not accorded full diplomatic status (e.g. embassy staff or clerks). This definition also excludes other state symbols that can be found abroad – such as flags, ships, military bases, or embassies – around which political theater and dramas often take place. *Ceremonial* refers to the lavish, theatrical, and/or ritual elements of diplomacy. As such it refers to the symbols and symbolic

behaviors that diplomatic representatives and states engage in and provide when an envoy is received abroad. This includes the ceremonial displays put on by a hosting state, such as military or police escorts that accompany a visiting envoy, red carpets, flags displays, ritual reviews of troops and so forth. It also refers to the ceremonial displays that might be put on by visiting envoys when they arrive in another state, such as ceremonial entries into a city, the public display of an envoy's entourage, the type and presentation of gifts they may bring, the entertainments they might sponsor or provide, and the ritual or symbolic behaviors they might engage in. As such, diplomatic ceremonial is something that is engaged in by both representative and hosts. An example of such a ceremonial ritual is the presentation of diplomatic credentials by a newly-arriving ambassador. In this ritual, the ambassador physically places his credentials into the hands of the head of government of the receiving state. Following this, he meets with the ambassadors of other states, according to the rules of protocol.³⁴ *Protocol* refers to the specific rules that codify and determine which ceremony a representative is entitled to at any particular time, how such a ceremony should be staged, and exactly how all participants in this ceremony should behave. In short, "protocol codifies and puts into practice the rules of ceremonial and supervises their application" (Woods & Serres, 1970, p. 18). It is the specific traditional ceremonial rights and privileges that representatives – both visiting and hosting – are *entitled to* in international society. In practice, these protocols are often highly specific and detailed, and can prescribe on issues as narrow as the procedure in which people enter the room, how one should be attired, the manner in which people should be addressed, where flags and national symbols should be placed, what form (if

³⁴ In contemporary international society, the ambassador visits the ambassadors of other states beginning with the longest serving ambassador in the hosting state (the dean, or doyen), and then working his or her

any) gift-giving should take, and so on. While it is entirely possible (and very likely) that at least some people will be unaware of these rules, or have little interest in whether or not they are violated, they still exist, and at least some people (the protocol officer, for example) are likely to be aware of them (McCaffree & Innis, 1989). Protocol might demand a high level of ceremony for certain diplomatic engagements (e.g. state visits) and low levels for others. It is perfectly possible that states might (and often do) go beyond what protocol dictates (by offering even more ornamentation or filigree than that prescribed). Although this might be related to protocol, this is not the same thing. Protocol should be understood as the *minimum* ceremonial ritual or symbolic privileges to which diplomatic parties are entitled in any particular setting. These ceremonial obligations and privileges can be distinguished from the political and legal privileges that a diplomat might also be entitled to, such as the right of immunity from arrest or prosecution.³⁵

Originally, diplomats were entitled to such ceremonial and ritual treatment for religious reasons. Diplomats were expected to receive diplomatic inviolability and ritual care because as diplomats were assumed to be acting in the cause of peace this made them akin to angels.³⁶ Rituals and ceremonies were important for this designation as they made manifest the sacred nature of a diplomat's mission and "sanctioned the *movement across* social and political boundaries" necessary for a diplomat to pursue this mission (Der Derian, 1987, p. 34; italics in the original). As the influence of the church and religion decreased, new associations were made between protocol, ceremony, and diplomats. Even before the conferences at Westphalia, the body of the diplomat became

way down the ladder of seniority. For more on this, see Satow (1958).

³⁵ Of course, such rights of immunity might also be ceremonially upheld or displayed.

associated with his or her sovereign. Consequently, a failure of an envoy to receive his rights according to protocol was seen as signaling something about the sovereign. Similarly, failing to ceremonially display the power and prestige of the sovereign might indicate something to onlookers. As Abraham de Wicquefort, writing in the early Westphalian period, explained: “at assemblies of ceremony... [an envoy] cannot quit his rank without a crime: and even at his table, where he gives a scantling of the grandeur and magnificence of his prince, he may represent him in some measure” (de Wicquefort, 1716, p. 294). If an ambassador behaved poorly towards others, such poor manners were likely to be treated as a sign of an official position, as one who was the recipient of such incivility was likely to “doubt the intention of the [sending] Prince” (de Wicquefort, 1716, p. 166). Indeed, de Wicquefort urged practitioners to recognize the symbolic role of their job: “the ambassador... ought to have the tincture of the comedian, and I must here add, that perhaps in the whole commerce of the world, there is not a more comical personage than the ambassador. There is not a more illustrious theatre than a court; neither is there any comedy, where the actors seem less what they are in effect, than ambassadors do in their negotiation; and there is none that represents more important personages” (de Wicquefort, 1716, p. 294).

The admonition to take extremely seriously the representational role of diplomats is repeated in the most prominent diplomatic guides of the last few centuries. Writing in the early 1700s, Antoine Pecquet (2004, p. 72) explained that protocol had to be carefully adhered to as it was “an attribute of each sovereignty.”³⁷ Indeed, Pecquet goes even

³⁶ The word *angeloi* is derived from the Greek for ‘messenger.’

³⁷ Pecquet (1700-62) was a senior official in the French MFA a century after it had been founded by Cardinal Richelieu. In 1725 Pecquet was made one of the three clerks (*premier commis*) responsible for foreign affairs; given responsibility for England, Holland, Northern Europe, Poland, and Russia, and parts

further and writes that any possible bargaining outcome cannot come at the expense of the image of the prince, and that firmness regarding protocol and ceremony is “especially necessary on those occasions that concern the dignity of the Crown or the Sovereign that one represents” (Pecquet, 2004, p. 42). Similarly, de Callières (1983, p. 77) wrote that “an ambassador resembles in some respect a comedian, exposed upon the theatre to the eyes of the world, to act the parts of great personages... and he must pass for a very bad actor if he knows not how to support the dignity of that rank.” In order to “keep up this dignity” one must have “his magnificence appear in his train, his liveries, and the rest of his equipage; that his table be served neatly, plentifully, and even delicately” (de Callières, 1983, p. 77). In short, by engaging in diplomatic ceremonial and protocol rituals state representatives can send particular messages regarding political and social recognition. For example, heads of state are entitled to very different treatment than heads of government. The former are entitled to be met with a red carpet at the port of entry, as well as a 21-gun salute. The latter is only entitled to a 19-gun salute. Refusing to grant certain kinds of ceremonial privileges can suggest that the states exist in a very particular relationship.³⁸

Until the Congress of Vienna in 1815 disputes over ceremony and protocol were pronounced and frequent, largely because it was understood that an informal hierarchy of states existed in international society. This meant that seemingly-minor issues – such as an envoy’s position in a procession or their place of seating at a conference – could take

of the French Empire. Pecquet’s *Discours sur L’Art de Négociier (Discourses on the Art of Negotiation)* was published in 1737, at the height of Pecquet’s career in the French MFA. The tone of the book is typical of diplomatic books of the era and, as Berridge (2004: 161) puts it, “contains its fair share of rather predictable homilies about the ‘perfect ambassador.’” Nonetheless, he had a strong influence on 20th century diplomatic writers such as Satow, who regarded Pecquet’s discussions on negotiation to be among the more usable texts from the past.

³⁸ I remind the reader of the example, given in the introduction chapter, regarding the visit of East

on huge diplomatic significance.³⁹ In fact, the very reason that the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ consists of two treaties rather than one was due to issues of ceremony and protocol. One version of the treaty was signed in Osnabrück by the Holy Roman Empire, and Sweden and her allies. The other version, signed in Münster, was an identical text but was this time the signatories were the Holy Roman Empire, and France and her allies. The reason that this treaty had to be signed in two different places is that France and Sweden could not agree which had precedence over the other, and so it was decided that neither should meet in the same location. As neither was willing to back down on what they considered their ceremonial rights of precedence with regards to public gatherings, seating arrangements, processions, or church services, the result was the same treaty being signed

Germany’s Honecker to West Germany.

³⁹ A few examples can illustrate the point. In the 18th century court of the Holy Roman Empire in Vienna, the French ambassador, conscious of his sovereign’s position in the social hierarchy, literally got up from his seat and squeezed himself into the seat between the Russian ambassador and the emperor. This action led to a brawl and ultimately a duel, in which the Russian ambassador was wounded (Thaler, 1959). In 1633, at the wedding of the Crown Prince of Denmark, a dispute over precedence broke out between the French and Spanish ambassadors. When the Danish ministers tried to solve this through various seating arrangements, the French Ambassador said, “I will give the Spanish ambassador the choice of the place which he regards as the most honorable, and when he shall have taken it, I will turn him out and take it myself” (quoted in Satow, 1958, p.27). Far more serious and far-reaching in its consequences was the dispute over precedence that occurred between the French and Spanish embassies in London in 1661. While gathered on the banks of the Thames awaiting the arrival of the new Swedish ambassador to the city, the two embassies began to jostle for the right to go first in precedence. This small dispute quickly developed into a running street-fight in which around 50 people died. In response to this the French king demanded, on pain of war, that all Spanish envoys resident at courts where there was also a French envoy present publicly recognize the precedence of the king of France (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011).

in two different towns.⁴⁰ Although Westphalia reinforced the idea that all states were juridically sovereign, it was not until the Congress of Vienna that it was decided that all states would be understood as socially equal. Among the many committees that re-wrote the rules of international society, a Committee on Diplomatic Precedence met four times in December 1814. Here the complicating role of precedence was discussed and in early 1815 final decisions were made on the exact rights and obligations of sending and receiving states in international society. These discussions were not a sideshow, and involved Castlereagh, Talleyrand, Metternich, and Razumovsky in their proceedings (Zamoyski, 2007). Some of the great powers argued that international society should become explicitly hierarchical and pushed for the establishment of a two-tier status system in which some states would have their preeminent position reflected in ceremonies. The British Lord Castlereagh led the counter-argument and pointed out that such a system would likely lead to a recurrence of past problems, as states squabbled over which tier they were in. His argument carried the day and participants agreed that the ceremonial obligations of states would be fixed and standardized for all members of international society. New rules of precedence, based on equality, were devised and

⁴⁰ This obsession with diplomatic ceremonial and protocol was not an isolated incident; it was a defining feature of the negotiations at Westphalia. Throughout the entire conference envoys frequently engaged in contests of ceremonial grandeur and precedence. When the French delegation entered the town of Münster with eighteen splendidly-outfitted coaches, hundreds of coaches from other delegations had already cluttered the streets. The lead French envoy complained to his Queen that although his entry into the city was magnificent it was not as splendid as he would have liked: "I took a good hour to make my entry, though I had been disappointed of thirty horses which are coming to me from Groningen, and some other things I wanted." Nonetheless he took some solace when he observed the retinues of other delegations. He took special interest in the Imperial delegate who "they tell me ... [had] only one shabby coach...and no attendants for visits of ceremony" (quoted in Bernard, 1868, p. 24). This concern with diplomatic ceremonial and protocol was not limited to just the French and Swedish delegation. All of the envoys present, even those from the (ostensibly austere and practical) Dutch Republic, dwelt "almost exclusively on petty points of precedence... and imaginary advantages gained [in issues such as] the order of the procession and the arrangement of the chairs in the church" (Bernard, 1868, p. 18). As de Wicquefort noted (1716, p. 94) about Westphalia: "more attention was paid to issues of representation, recognition, rank, precedence, ritual, and ceremony than over striking the bargains that eventually resulted in the terms [of the

which modern international society still adheres to. Now when two or more states have envoys of the same rank in one location the rules of precedence are applied by a simple seniority rule: the longest-serving and high-ranking resident diplomatist is the automatic dean of the diplomatic corps resident in a city, and all others are assorted according to the same rule. All states are still entitled to their ceremonial rights but this new rule means that these rights can be granted or removed with little cost to any nation's honor. This reordering of the meaning of protocol and ceremony has helped to reduce the conflicts that used to break out between states. However, it should not be taken to mean that these issues have lost their importance. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Relations – the UN treaty regarding the duties and privileges of diplomats – contains 53 articles, yet only one of them actually details what diplomats *do*; the rest focus on the symbolic privileges of diplomats (Brown, 1988). As I will show in subsequent chapters, violating diplomatic protocol can damage relationships, and even offer a legitimate justification for war.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to specify the concept of Westphalian diplomatic practice both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, I have moved beyond typical approaches to diplomacy – most notably strategic and institutionalist approaches – by conceptualizing Westphalian diplomacy as a *practice*. Doing this makes it possible to understand diplomacy in a holistic way – that is it allows us to consider the role of many understudied elements of diplomacy – without becoming so abstract as to be worthless. This move allows me to consider the importance of many of the day-to-day elements of diplomacy; elements that cannot easily be explained or captured by standard accounts of

treaties].”

diplomacy. Empirically, I have focused on four elements of diplomacy: the exchanging of resident missions; the ranking of diplomats; diplomatic immunity; and diplomatic ceremony and protocol. These elements are the tools of everyday diplomacy that states draw on when they engage in interstate interaction. But these elements do not simply have a functional role; they have each taken on important social meanings. By engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice states do not just attempt to meet their interests, they ‘say’ things about other states and about international society. Similarly, by rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice states do not only frustrate the pursuit of their own interests they also make statements about other states and international society. Considering the harmful functional and social costs associated with such rejection, it is puzzling that states would do such a thing. Why they might is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Why States Reject Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

What is the relation that so intimately links power to glory? If power is essentially force and efficacious action, why does it need to receive ritual acclamations and hymns of praise, to wear cumbersome crowns and tiaras, to submit itself to inaccessible ceremony and an immutable protocol – in a word, why does [it] need to become solemnly immobilized in glory?

- Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory*, p. 195.

As the previous chapter made clear Westphalian diplomatic practice has both functional and social effects. Although historically contingent, the development of resident missions, ambassadors, diplomatic immunity, and diplomatic ceremonial and protocol have become key elements in helping to regulate and reproduce an international society of legally equal sovereign states. Westphalian diplomatic practice is not just a functionally efficient institution necessary for informing state decisions and maintaining state relations; it also helps to maintain social stability. By engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice, a state sends relatively low-cost signals to other states that it accepts and adheres to the basic norms of mutual respect and recognition that underpin international society. To practice Westphalian diplomacy is to recreate a world that emphasizes and reinforces the differences between political units, but that also regulates and reduces the potential conflicts these differences might produce. This means that Westphalian diplomatic practice appears to offer considerable benefits for its practitioners for a relatively low cost. The question then is why would any state refuse to participate? Why do states reject Westphalian diplomatic practice?

Answering this question is not easy as the existing literature does not offer a strong guide empirically or theoretically. As noted in the previous chapter, diplomacy is generally treated as something that guides actor behavior, not as a connected set of behaviors (or more accurately, actions) to begin with. Most ostensible analyses of diplomacy are more likely focused on bargaining, negotiation, institutional design, or some other sub-element of the broader practice of diplomacy. Thus they offer imperfect signposts for how diplomatic practice – or its rejection – can be studied. Uncovering an answer to this question is thus an exercise in theory-building rather than theory-testing. This does not mean that this research is unstructured or undirected (see methods below), or that it is unrelated to existing literature in the discipline. Indeed, while traditional strategic and constructivist theories have not directly addressed this issue, it is still possible to derive plausible explanations from them. However, as will be clear in the empirical chapters, these explanations have been unable to account for the rejections of diplomatic practice that we observe.

In order to account for this I propose a new theory that combines insights from both of these literatures and that focuses on how regime concerns about domestic legitimacy can determine whether or not states reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. Specifically, I offer an explanation that argues that the *narratives of legitimation* used by regimes to uphold their right to rule can sometimes “bind” regimes in such a way that rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice makes sense. In practice, this explanation was discovered through an iterated process of collecting evidence, inferring the existence of manifestations of the phenomenon of interest, and after repeating this process for some time, inferring the existence of a causal mechanism (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, Ch. 2).

However, for ease of reading this process has been masked, and instead I present the theory, and the two major alternatives from which it was derived and with which it competes, as three distinct and fully formed explanations. This, however, is an editorial device and does not accurately capture the actual research process.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I draw from the two theoretically dominant approaches in International Relations theory – rationalism and constructivism – to generate two different explanations for why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. In each instance I lay out the theoretical logic of these approaches and offer explanations for why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. Second, I present an alternative explanation that occupies the theoretical middle ground between these two approaches, and lays out in detail (i) how practices are an essential mechanism used by regimes to maintain domestic legitimacy, (ii) how these practices are drawn from domestic narratives of legitimation, and (iii) present a causal mechanism that I call “narrative binding” that specifies the conditions under which regimes will become unwilling to jettison domestic practices in favor of alternatives (i.e. Westphalian diplomatic practice). In the final section I present a research design that outlines the methods used to derive this theory, my case selection strategy, and how evidence is used to adjudicate between these competing explanations.

Rejecting Westphalian Diplomatic Practice: Explanations from the IR Literature

Rejecting Westphalian Diplomatic Practice: Strategic Explanations. One potential set of explanations for why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice can be derived from the IR literature on strategic bargaining. The bargaining approach is

focused on the conditions under which actors achieve cooperative outcomes, and is particularly interested in the contingent nature of bargaining. In a typical bargaining model, actors attempt to communicate their interests to one another in order to shift the size and shape of the ‘bargaining space’ between them. This is done in order to reach a bargain that will most closely meet their preferred outcome. Their chance of finding a mutually agreeable outcome is dependent on each actor establishing the other’s ‘type’ – that is, the true preferences of the other. Discovering an actor’s type is difficult because – in order to get a better deal – actors have an incentive to lie to create the impression that they have a large outside option. An outside option is the alternative Actor A has to reaching an agreement with Actor B.⁴¹ The danger of engaging in a strategy of lying is that it can cause an ex-ante mutually agreeable bargain to collapse (Fearon, 1995).⁴² In order to avert such a bargaining-collapse actors engage in behaviors that sends signals to each other. Signals are, “statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among actors” (Jervis, 1970, p. 18), and the purpose of which is to, “influence the perception and thereby the actions of other parties” (Hörner, 2012, p. 1). However, many of the signals actors send are ambiguous. This is problematic as a signal that does not clearly indicate a sender’s type leads to a pooling equilibrium, which in turn makes it difficult for a receiver to decide what strategy to adopt.⁴³ If a

⁴¹ For example, Krasner (1991) shows how due to its large outside option larger states are able to obtain nearly all of the gains at the Pareto frontier when negotiating international agreements. This is because they don’t need the deals as much as weaker states. An actor’s outside option is also sometimes known as her BATNA (“best alternative to no agreement”).

⁴² For a succinct and non-formal account of the logic of bargaining, see Muthoo (2000). See also David A. Lake & Robert Powell (eds.) *Strategic Choice in International Relations* (1999).

⁴³ A pooling equilibrium is one “in which each sender types send the same signal with a probability one” (Sobel, 2008). For example if a police officer was interviewing people suspected of a crime, both innocent and guilty parties would be likely to say they were not guilty. As a result, in the absence of other evidence, such individual statements would not very useful for determining whether a suspect’s ‘type’ is innocent or guilty.

sender's signal is not clear, then the receiver has no way of distinguishing which type the sender is and will discount the signal. As a result of this signaling dynamic, actors have an incentive to send *credible* signals; signals that other actors will perceive as a 'sorting signal.'⁴⁴ One method for establishing credibility is by sending costly signals. There are a variety of mechanisms for do this such as placing hostages,⁴⁴ or engaging in brinkmanship.⁴⁵ In addition, there is another source of credibility that can potentially help to explain why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. While costly signaling is an effective means of establishing credibility, states can also establish credibility by behaving in a consistent manner. If an actor has persistently behaved in the same way in similar past situations, this increases the likelihood she will be believed in the future (Schelling, 1966).⁴⁶ Thus, an actor with a strong reputation for consistent behavior will be more likely to be believed by another in any particular bargaining situation, even if such an actor does not engage in costly signaling.

From a strategic perspective, then, practices should be understood as *the collection of actions states engage in in order to send signals to opponents*, the purpose of which is to improve the sender's potential bargaining outcomes. Westphalian

⁴⁴ For example, the US was able to deter the USSR from invading West Berlin by placing a garrison of 7,000 troops. This deployment acted as a strong signal that the US was serious about its commitments to the city. If Berlin was attacked the US troops stationed there would, "die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there" (Schelling, 1966, p. 47).

⁴⁵ In *Strategy and Conflict* (1960; reprint, 1980, p. 196) Schelling offers the analogy of two people on a boat crossing a lake. One of the boaters demands the other row the boat on his own or else he (the boater making the demand) will capsize this boat. This threat is not inherently believable, so in order to establish credibility the boater that makes the demand stands up and starts "rocking the boat" until the other agrees to the request. The demander is credible because there is a real chance the boat will capsize accidentally; a chance that becomes more likely the longer the other boater refuses to concede to the demands placed on him. By engaging in behavior that makes the threat credible, the demanding boater is able to convince his opponent to acquiesce. For an application of this dynamic to cases of international relations, see Schelling 1966, chapter 3.

⁴⁶ For a formal treatment of the same argument see Sartori (2002). However, such a bargaining strategy only works if interaction is iterated between actors, and cannot help to establish credibility in a first encounter. Furthermore, actors may not pay attention to previous behavior as each bargain introduces a new

diplomatic practice might then matter as could act as a convenient ‘focal point.’ Focal points tend to converge around salient symbols, markers, or behaviors (Sugden, 1995). They act as important equilibrium points that stand out from others due to some virtue all players can recognize (Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden, 1994). In other words, Westphalian diplomatic practice might be a place and manner of communication from which states can send credible signals to one another. Because Westphalian diplomatic practice has such clear shared meanings to members of international society, choosing to dispute these practices could be a reliable way to catch other states’ attention. This leads to the following general hypothesis:

H1: States reject Westphalian diplomatic practice in order to send signals to other states.

While this discussion offers a strategic rationale for why states might fixate on Westphalian diplomatic practice it does not explain why states would have incentives to reject it. The logic of the bargaining model offers two general reasons that states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. The first focuses on how disputing issues (such as diplomatic practice) might be done in order to help a state achieve specific goals. The second focuses on how publicly disputing issues might demonstrate a state’s general level of resolve and thus improve state security. I will address each of these in turn.

First, states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice because it might give them an edge in a negotiation, and therefore let a state more readily achieve its goals. Assuming that Westphalian diplomatic practice holds no particular value to a negotiator except as a signaling device (e.g. she has no preference about how diplomacy should be conducted), choosing to reject such practices could still be beneficial. As the emphasis of this bargaining model is on information, signaling, and credibility, a state might engage

set of issues and interests (Press, 2004/2005).

in aggressive behavior – such as rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice – in order to send information to a bargaining interlocutor. Rejection could send a signal that the sender has less stake in the outcome of the negotiations than the receiver might otherwise think. By jeopardizing a negotiation on symbolic issues regarding diplomatic practice the sender could create the impression that they have little stake in the negotiation, and thus have a large outside option. This in turn might influence the receiver’s bargaining stance and make her more likely to settle the negotiation in a manner favorable to the sender.

Rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice may not only be useful for sending information in a negotiation, but also for receiving it. A state might reject Westphalian practice in order to gather important information about their opponent by observing the opponent's response to such a challenge. If an opponent is seen to quickly back down over a seemingly-trivial issue (such as a seating arrangement, their willingness to bow to a king, etc.) it is possible that they might also back down on future issues of contention. However, if an opponent refuses to back down over such an issue this may be an indication that her general bargaining style will be stubborn and confrontational. In diplomatic history an example of such a dynamic can be seen in the run-up to the second meeting of the Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill – the “Big Three” – in 1945. During the preparation stages of the conference, Stalin made clear that he would not meet in any location outside the Soviet Union, despite the fact that the journey to the USSR was dangerous and that President Roosevelt was ill. When Churchill and Roosevelt finally consented to meeting at Yalta in the Crimea their acquiescence was interpreted by Stalin as a sign that the Western Allies were not in a strong bargaining position (Dunn, 1996). Thus there are incentives to negotiating “offensively” (Ilich, 1973, p. 85-88) and while

there is a danger that engaging in this strategy can cause the entire bargain to collapse, the essential logic is clear: bad behavior might actually amount to good bargaining.⁴⁷ This allows us to refine the above hypothesis:

H1a: States reject Westphalian diplomatic practices if they believe it will improve their bargaining outcomes.

The second ‘strategic’ reason that a state might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice focuses on the security environment in which states exist, rather than any immediate bargaining goals they might have. This variant of a strategic explanation links bargaining logic to realist arguments regarding the security threats that states face. Realists contend that states operate in a competitive environment in which they are ultimately responsible for their own security (Waltz, 1979).⁴⁸ Accordingly, this makes states especially sensitive to how they are viewed by other states. They carefully monitor the signals of other states in the system in order to determine how much they might be able to rely on their allies (Mercer, 2005); how offensively or defensively threatening other states’ arsenals appear (Van Evera, 1998); or how other states respond to past military threats (Schelling, 1966).⁴⁹ Not only do states attempt to understand the signals being sent by other states, they want other states to understand their own, and thus be

⁴⁷ There is also a danger that an opponent will spot this offensive strategy then turn it against the disputant by arguing at length over the trivial issue, finally “conceding”, and then using that concession to demand that one of his (actually substantive) issues are addressed (Churchman, 1993, p. 47). In fact, this is the exact strategy that the American ambassador, Caleb Cushing, used when bargaining for trade terms with Imperial China in 1844 (see Chapter Four)

⁴⁸ For pushback against this claim see Wendt, 1999; Buzan, 2004. In order to combat the insecurity that states might feel in an anarchical environment, they may engage in balancing (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) or bandwagoning (Walt, 1985; Schweller, 1994), design formal institutions to try to control for the information problems that might lead to disagreement (Keohane, 1984; Milner, 1992) or that can act as signaling devices in the international system, such as the UN (Voeten, 2005). English School and constructivist scholars offer additional sources of potential security in international society, such as great power consensus (Bull, 1977; Clark, 2005), diplomacy (Wight, 1991; Watson, 1992), and international law and norms (Buzan, 2004; James, 1993; Finnemore, 1996).

⁴⁹ For a rebuttal of this argument see Press (2004/2005)

deterred from attacking. In such an insecure and anarchical environment disputes over symbolic acts or practices can have considerable importance as they can act as important focal points for the broader community. Consequently, this can create incentives for states to behave aggressively even over seemingly-trivial issues.

The logic is similar to that of a prisoner cafeteria. In his analysis of why prisoners fight over trivial issues Gambetta (2009) finds that much of the violence is driven by the prisoners' need to establish their credibility not only with immediate challengers but also with the broader prison community. Prisons are insecure environments in which actors are uncertain about the 'types' of the other prisoners but have strong reasons to suspect that at least some other prisoners are potential threats. While prisoners might in principle prefer not to fight, a prison environment creates strong incentives for them to nonetheless engage in hostile activity because, paradoxically, the best way a prisoner might reduce the level of threats he faces from the prison community at large is to 'get tough' with challengers when they do present themselves. This means a prisoner has incentives to stand up to challenges if they do occur, regardless how trivial these challenges might be. Whereas in the (secure) civilian world people might not treat trivial disputes as a meaningful signal of an actor's 'type', in insecure environments community attention will focus on minor but public disputes.⁵⁰ Observing audiences will update their beliefs about the actors involved depending on the strategies the antagonists pick, and depending on the outcomes of the challenge, update their opinions about who is a potential target and who is best left unmolested. In order to survive in such an environment there are incentives for actors to adopt a "bourgeois" strategy, and be willing to aggressively

⁵⁰ In fact, in a secure environment the logic is reversed and most people would probably think that anyone disputing trivial issues was rude, dangerous, or in some other way unpleasant. In other words, by engaging

respond to any threats to their status (Gambetta, 2009, p. 100).⁵¹

By this logic, a state might choose to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice simply because another state demanded that they accept it. The rejecting state might be concerned that if they back down on such a ‘trivial’ issue that this behavior could be interpreted as general weakness by other states. States concerned that others would make such an interpretation have incentives to engage in confrontations over issues – issues to which the antagonists might attach no substantive value in and of themselves – simply because they want to preserve a reputation for not backing down.⁵² This desire to protect reputation can create incentives for states to adopt consistent bargaining stances across a variety of issue areas.⁵³ However, an unintended side-effect of adopting such a strategy is that states might find themselves disputing non-substantive issues.⁵⁴ In short, states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice because they think this will send a signal throughout the system that will improve their security.⁵⁵ This leads to the following

in challenging behavior a disputant’s reputation would most likely be harmed, not enhanced.

⁵¹ Bourgeois behavior is observed in animals that ritually fight over property.

⁵² The idea of reputation as property is a game theoretic assumption which does not bear out empirically, according to Mercer (1996, p. 34-36; 103). However, this does not matter for my question as I am not concerned what reputation really is; rather I am interested in analyzing whether statesmen *think* it matters, and if so, how. See also Tang (2005). For more on credibility, see Schelling, 1966, chapter 2. For details on escaping commitments see especially, p. 63-69.

⁵³ This is due to the particular way in which a reputation is theorized to form. A reputation forms “only if the observer uses a dispositional attribution to explain or predict the target’s future behavior” (Mercer, 1996, p. 45). A dispositional attribution implies that an actor behaves in a way that is inherent to their character. This is distinguished from a situational attribution, which implies that anyone would behave in the same way under the same circumstances. According to most theories of reputation observers are unlikely to update their beliefs about an actor’s future behavior by observing a situation where they feel like their behavior is exactly what one would expect under the circumstances. For instance, people are unlikely to consider it cowardly if a person hands over their money to an armed mugger. While submissive, this behavior is typical. Thus it would be seen as a situational attribution and a poor predictor of whether that person was likely to be brave or cowardly in the future. By contrast, if a person did not challenge a six-year old mugger, an observer would most likely treat this as a dispositional attribution, and update their impression of them.

⁵⁴ Essentially, this is the argument behind much of the crisis literature. States engage in risky behavior in order to demonstrate their resolve, but at the risk of causing an outcome that none prefer (Smith, 1998; Slantchev 2006).

⁵⁵ The logic is the same as that regarding costly signaling outlined above. The difference is that in this

alternative specification of H1:

H1b: States will reject Westphalian diplomatic practice if they believe it will improve their security.

In summary, from a strategic perspective we should expect states to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice if they think it will improve individual bargaining outcomes, or if they think it will improve their security. Because Westphalian diplomatic practice is so clearly routinized states can send clear signals to other states by rejecting it. This signal might be intended to influence negotiations with another state. Alternatively, the signal might be sent in order to influence a larger audience and increase the security of the sender. In either account, Westphalian diplomatic practice has no independent value in and of itself – it is just a convenient focal point for disputes.

Rejecting Westphalian Diplomatic Practice: A Constructivist Explanation.

The strategic explanations presented above treat the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice as a form of signaling behavior. Aside from being a focal point for actor attention, Westphalian diplomatic practice is not assumed to have any intrinsic value. By contrast, a constructivist explanation takes seriously the contention that practices might have *value* for actors. Practices – often symbolic and ritual – are important for an actor as they are instrumental in creating and maintaining an actor's identity. From a constructivist perspective, the manner in which practices construct identity makes them worth rejecting or fighting for.

Constructivists have long recognized the role that identity plays in explaining state behavior in international politics. Identity has been used to explain states' foreign policies (Johnston, 1995), why democracies do not fight one another (Owen, 1994;

instance the intended receiver of this signal is not (only) the other state in a bargaining dynamic.

Mousseau, 2005), why outsiders are treated with more hostility than insiders (Mercer, 1995), why certain categories of actor are treated with privilege (Carpenter, 2003), and how actors are linked in social networks (Nexon, 2009). In many of these accounts identities act as motivators for actor behavior or cause actors to ‘constitute’ the world that they inhabit.⁵⁶ Identity is often treated as a property that an actor intrinsically possesses. Although an actor’s identity might be changeable, once it has settled it is something that exists inside him or her with its effects emanating outward.⁵⁷

While it may make sense to conceptually ‘freeze’ identity like this for some analytical purposes, it does not accurately reflect two critical elements of identity. First, identities are not located ‘in here’ but are instead practiced ‘out there.’ Second, for an identity to become ‘real’ it requires that its putative possessor *and* other members of society engage in the practices that instantiate it. In other words, for an actor to claim to have an identity he or she must have this identity *socially recognized* by others. Social recognition is the process by which an actor’s *subjective* identity is *intersubjectively* accepted by social community in which she exists. Social recognition theorists argue that identity does not just guide actors’ behavior by telling them who they are and (consequently) what actions are appropriate for them to engage in. It is also an object that actors struggle to obtain, maintain, and protect (Honneth, 1995). Identity is created by an actor’s interaction with his or her social environment and the manner in which this environment responds to the actor’s identity claims. Social recognition theory thus distinguishes between the subjective “I” – who lies at the center of an actor – and the

⁵⁶ For more on the role of co-constitution in international politics, see Wendt, 1999, chapter 5.

⁵⁷ Identities may change due to a propagation of new norms throughout the system (Klotz, 1995). A number of processes and vectors have been proposed for explaining how these processes of change occur such, such as socialization (Waltz, 1979; Checkel, 2005), norm cascades (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), and

objective “me” – who exists in the social world in which an actor operates, and who is created as much by society as by the actor (Blumer, 1986).⁵⁸ Regardless of its source, an actor’s identity does not exist independent of her society. In a process Wendt (1999, p. 323-333) refers to as “social learning” actors only come to know who they are by engaging with one another. Sometimes a society will recognize an actor’s preferred subjective identity. At other times it may force an actor to hold an intersubjective identity they might not subjectively hold (such as the identity of prisoner or slave).

Regardless of who is choosing the identity, so to speak, this identity is created and recreated through a process of co-constitution and mutual recognition. This process of mutual recognition is integral for *all* actors in a society. One can only know oneself by understanding one’s identity in relation to other categories.⁵⁹ This struggle for recognition can lead to conflict because, in attempting to establish one kind of identity, an actor may have to contest the identity of another. Mutual recognition is often a struggle between actors who, in the desire to establish their own subjective identities, may need to alter someone else’s intersubjective identity (Honneth, 1995, Part III). Due to this dynamic identity is much more than just a motivator for action but is also something actors seek to actively maintain or alter, sometimes at the expense of other actors.

How do these insights help us to better understand why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice? They do so because of the central role that of practice

persuasion (Risse, 2000)

⁵⁸ It is more complex than this, in that most actors possess many “mes” in front of a single “I”, each of which prescribe certain behaviors in certain contexts. For example, one is primed to be concerned about different things and engage in completely different practices when they are guided by their “family-member” identity versus when they are guided by their “co-worker” identity.

⁵⁹ The classic example is Hegel's master-slave relationship. In order for one to be a slave, there must be a master. A master-slave relationship requires the mutual recognition of the existence of this relationship in order for it to operate. If an actor does not recognize the other as slave then they cannot be master, and vice versa.

plays in theories of social recognition. The day-to-day maintenance of any identity manifests itself in routine and practice. By behaving in a consistent manner on a day-to-day basis, actors will be more certain about who they are and how they should behave. Critically, this maintenance of routines and practices is also required from other members of society. An individual's subjective identity can only become intersubjective when it is actively practiced by him or her *and* by others in a society. The practices of an actor and the practices of other members of society act as the important intersubjective descriptors that define a particular identity (Ringmar, 2012).⁶⁰

Two central elements of practice are important for an individual if he or she wishes to maintain a particular identity. First, he or she must be able to lay claim to the particular symbols and to engage in the specific actions – some symbolic, some practical – that are necessary components of any such particular identity. These personal practices are what Collins & Arnett (2009) refer to as ‘demeanor practices.’ Such demeanor practices mean things like wearing the right clothes or using the proper expressions. But they are also the “forms of respect given, as well as demanded, from others.”⁶¹ This leads to the second important element of practice and identity: that in order to lay claim to an identity an actor needs others to engage in practices that reinforce this identity. By engaging in these mutual ‘deference practices’ others can help to reinforce the idealized sense that an actor projects into the world.⁶² If others are unwilling or unable to engage in

⁶⁰ An intersubjective descriptor is one that is defined by standards ‘out there’ rather than by subjective standards ‘in here.’ Social facts such as ‘loyalty’ or positions such as a ‘policeman’ are examples of such descriptors.

⁶¹ For example, in order to be recognized as a doctor of political science, one requires a PhD. Although the conferral of this is due to the recognition decision of others, without this objective piece of paper, it is impossible to claim that status. In addition to this, one is expected to engage in particular actions (researching, teaching) and adopting particular stances with regards to students, colleagues, and non-academics.

⁶² Thus, a PhD is only one way of having the identity of “doctor.” One must also be recognized as one by

practices that reinforce an actor's subjective identity then this can lead to a state of "ontological insecurity" for the actor (Mitzen, 2006). Ontological insecurity occurs when an actor feels that her identity is being eroded or is disappearing in some way. In response to this threat to her intersubjective identity an actor has three choices: accept the changed identity, bide her time, or fight back (Ringmar, 2010). "Fighting" – what Honneth calls "struggling" – here means forcing others (through coercion, persuasion, or any other mechanism) to engage in practices that reaffirm one's subjective identity.⁶³ Often actors will fight even if it incurs significant material costs (or even death).⁶⁴ Thus, only through a combination of refusing to engage in practices that undermine a subjective identity *and* ensuring that others engage in the 'correct' practices can one's intersubjective identity be maintained.

There is considerable empirical evidence from a variety of domains that supports the argument that actors frequently value maintaining their identity for its own sake. Experiments have shown that people are unwilling to accept free money if the offer is presented in terms that belittle them,⁶⁵ or that they can become hostile when offered monetary compensation for damage done to sacred symbols important to their sense of

other members of society. Receipt of this social recognition is what distinguishes academic doctorates from the ones purchased on-line for five dollars.

⁶³ The operative motivational mechanism here is psychological, not rational. Actors who feel that their subjective identity is not being recognized tend to respond in an irrational way. This assumes that actors can and do think rationally. For a discussion for how rationality is, empirically speaking, inseparable from (and impossible without) emotion see Mercer (2011).

⁶⁴ This is not surprising in some instances, such as when one actor wishes to force an identity such as "slave" on another.

⁶⁵ One experiment that has been repeated in a number of settings is the 'ultimatum game.' In the ultimatum game two players are given a certain amount of money and asked to divide it according to the following rules: the first player makes a proposal to the second player; then the second player can accept the proposal and divide the money, or reject the proposal, in which case neither player receive anything. Expected utility theories would predict that the second player should accept even the smallest possible proposal from player one (e.g. one cent out of a dollar) as this leaves her better off than rejecting a deal. However, repeated experiments have demonstrated that proposals offering lower than a 60:40 split of the money are routinely rejected (Thaler, 1988). These results have been replicated in high-stakes settings (Cameron, 1999).

identity (Atran & Axelrod, 2008).⁶⁶ Indeed, simply treating people with respect when offering them a deal increases the chance of their accepting it (Mercer, 2010). Similarly, apologizing to someone – or 'cooling' them off after having taken advantage of them – can help to reduce the chance of retaliation or punishment (Goffman, 1971). Recognition dynamics have also been shown to operate in international society. In order to obtain recognition as the possessors of particular identities states have entered wars (Wohlforth, 2009; Ringmar, 1996); built navies (Murray, 2010) or air forces (Eyre and Suchman, 1996); initiated nuclear weapons programs (Sagan, 1996) or liquidated their nuclear stockpile (Tannenwald, 1999). Evidence also shows that states have become hostile when threats have been directed toward their prestige (Gilpin, 1981; Markey, 1999, 2000); their sense of respect (Wolf, 2011); or when engaged in disputes in order to protect their honor (O'Neill, 1999; Joshi, 2008). Even recent episodes in politics can be understood from this perspective. Saurette (2006) argues the aggressive foreign policies of the United States following 9/11 stem from a desire to avenge its 'humiliation.'

The reasons why an actor might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice from this perspective should be clear by now. If an actor's intersubjective identity is dependent on her engaging in the practices relevant to this identity then she will refuse to engage in practices that undermine it. Similarly if an actor's identity is also dependent on the practices of others, then an actor will want to ensure that others engage in the practices necessary to reinforce this identity. Therefore, if this explanation is true, we should expect that states would reject Westphalian diplomatic practice if it interfered with the practices required for a state to maintain a particular identity. It should be noted that this

⁶⁶ Actors treat such offers as insults because they suggest that an actor's markers of identity can be bought. In turn, this actually makes them less willing to agree to future bargains.

does not imply that a state would reject *all* elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice; just those that overlapped with and conflicted with the practices necessary to maintain its identity. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: States will reject Westphalian diplomatic practices if they conflict with state identity practices.

Summary. So far I have offered two possible explanations for why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. The strategic account places the analytic focus on the information that is revealed by engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice. From this perspective practices do not have any real importance in their own right. Instead, the purpose of engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice (or indeed, any practice) is to send signals and to gather useful strategic information. By contrast, the constructivist account considers the way in which practices are the essential building-blocks that actors rely on to create and maintain their identities. From this perspective actors should be strongly and even existentially connected to certain practices. However, both of these accounts tend to go too far in one theoretical direction or the other. From the strategic perspective, practice is just subsumed under the much broader concept of signaling; actors are not expected to meaningfully care one way or another about practices. By contrast, the constructivist argument goes to the other extreme: because actor identity is indistinguishable from the practices used to reinforce it, actors are expected to care about practices deeply and without calculation. From one perspective, nobody cares about practices; from the other: everyone does.

Narratives of Legitimation & the Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

In this section I present an alternative explanation for why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. This explanation accepts that political actors sometimes engage in disputes over practice for strategic reasons, but contends that the *political* effects of practices (Westphalian or otherwise) cannot be captured in the simple language of signaling. In order to fully capture the political role of practice we need to import some of the insights from constructivist approaches, especially those that focus on how practices are used to create images of reality. In particular, I discuss how regimes have incentives to engage in symbolic practices. By successfully engaging in symbolic practices mandated by their narratives of legitimation regimes can generate common knowledge about their right to rule as well as dissuade potential challengers from acting against them. The net result is that by engaging in symbolic practices regimes increase or maintain their legitimacy and stability.

The central premise of my argument is that while practices might not necessarily matter to everyone at any one time they usually matter to *someone*. By engaging in these practices regimes can demonstrate their right to rule. In any particular instance the practices that regimes engage in are context-specific and involve (but are not reducible to) politically salient rituals, symbols, and symbolic actions. What links these elements of practice, and makes them more or less important in domestic politics, are the *narratives of legitimation* used by a regime. These narratives are the stories that regimes tell their populace that delineate who has the right to rule and why they have this right. These narratives unify and make sensible the political world of a society and create obligations and expectations for regimes, elites, and the masses. By engaging in symbolic practices regimes are able to demonstrate the reality of a narrative of legitimation and their

adherence to it, and thus to legitimate their own authority. This argument suggests that in order to remain legitimate a regime must do more than simply deliver on promised policies. Its representatives must also engage in practices such as issuing statements of a particular form, engaging in specific political rituals, affecting certain demeanors in public, and so on. In short, adherence to narratives of legitimation is not simply stated in word or deed; it is *practiced*.

Establishing that narratives of legitimation may matter to regimes is not sufficient to explain why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice, however. In order to explain the conditions under which these narratives can lead states to do this, I specify a causal mechanism – which I call ‘narrative binding’ – that explains how a regime’s legitimation practices can conflict with those of international society, and thus lead the regime to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. This mechanism has two components. First, the *content* of any particular narrative of legitimation matters for understanding whether states will have an incentive to reject a narrative of legitimation. The content of narratives mandate what types of practices regime representatives are expected to engage in. It is only when a narrative’s content mandates contradictory practices than those expected of Westphalian diplomatic practice that regimes have an incentive to reject. A second condition must also be fulfilled for this mechanism to operate: whether or not a regime is facing threats to its *survival*. Regimes that have their survival threatened are constrained by their narrative of legitimation as failure to adhere to it could lead to drop off in support or a challenge to their rule. When both these conditions are fulfilled regimes are ‘bound’ by their narrative and we should expect them to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice.

In order to lay out the logic of this argument in full, this section proceeds in a number of stages. First, I briefly discuss the political importance of legitimacy in the political world. Second, I introduce the concept of narratives of legitimation as a source of political legitimacy. Third, I present a causal mechanism – narrative binding – that delineates when narratives of legitimation will cause a state to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice.

The Power of Legitimacy. Legitimacy is a form of social power that provides meaning and order to actors in the world. Whereas economic and military power give authorities the ability to immediately meet their goals these forms of “compulsory power” are transparent and obvious (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). By contrast authorities that are considered legitimate by others can inform and influence the beliefs and actions of other actors. Very often in order to obtain obedience, what matters is not what actors want but what they accept in the world to be true or legitimate. Thus, legitimacy operates more on the level of perceptions and beliefs than it does on preferences.⁶⁷

Broadly speaking, being seen as legitimate can generate a number of benefits for political authorities. At its most basic, legitimacy reduces the cost of governing. As Weber (1978, p. 212) notes it is rarely the case that political domination – “the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons” – is reducible to naked displays of coercive or economic power. All domination has some element of “voluntary compliance” – a willingness to obey. If people accept something as legitimate then voluntary compliance naturally follows. The ‘somethings’ that people might accept to be legitimate can be varied. At the most

⁶⁷ Of course, it is often the case that beliefs and perceptions affect an actor’s preferences in that they can shape what an actor thinks is an appropriate desire or an appropriate strategy in any given moment (Legro,

profound level, legitimacy can literally shape the manner in which people view the world. At this level legitimacy can act as a form of “structural power” that “defines what kinds of social beings actors are” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 18). When the structures of the world are considered legitimate then these definitions will influence how actors will order themselves with regards to one another, and which social orderings they will deem correct or appropriate. When effective, this type of legitimacy has pronounced influence on authority relations as it will inherently privilege the social position of certain actors based on often-arbitrary markers (such as race or gender). This type of privileging does more than just constitute actors and their capacities; it also shapes their own self-understanding and interests (Sidanius, 2001). If actors accept as self-evident that certain other actors are entitled to different treatment, then this can radically empower or disempower them.⁶⁸

Legitimacy also influences “productive power”: the power that shapes the “constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 20). While similar to structural power, this form of power is different. Whereas structural power is made manifest in interaction, productive power refers to the systems of signification which define the reality in which actors find themselves. In short, productive power refers to the stories or myths that justify the constitution of actors and the definitions of legitimate or illegitimate behavior inside a social system. This is the

2005; Wendt and Fearon, 2002).

⁶⁸ For instance, Keene (2002) has shown that in the past states in European international society viewed other states as either ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders.’ This division prescribed two completely contradictory behaviors. For European insiders, the Grotian norm of reciprocity and fair treatment held; for non-European outsiders, the norm of conditional sovereignty was prescribed. Because non-European states were seen as fundamentally different to European states this difference was used to justify the colonization policies enacted by European states.

form of discursive power that orders the world and the categories in it. It is “transcendent” in the sense that it is “set apart from and above more secular structures” (Mann 2012a, chapter 1). As Foucault describes it, it is the “power that comes from below” (Foucault, in Lynch, 2011, p. 22) and that orders the myriad local choices and decisions that actors make. As such, productive power is similar to the concept of background knowledge discussed in the previous chapters. It forms the background beliefs and agreements necessary for a society to operate (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, chapter 2). For example for a statesmen to believe that states are not allowed to go to war without UN authorization, they must first “know” that states and wars are things that exist in the world and that they have certain properties associated with them. Or, to return to the Keene example, Europeans justified and legitimated their behaviors from inside a discourse that accepted ideas such as ‘civilization’ and racial hierarchy as obvious and normal. By treating these beliefs as obvious and unproblematic this profoundly shaped their beliefs, perceptions, and strategies.

Although legitimacy can act in this unseen way, political actors are often aware of these sources of structural and productive power and attempt to exploit them to further their interests. This can happen in a number of ways. Most obviously, leaders can attempt to increase their legitimacy with domestic or international audiences. By being seen as ‘legitimate’ leaders can increase the chances that others will feel obliged to obey them (Kelman, 2001). Barnett (1998) has shown that Arab leaders received considerable payoffs by associating themselves with salient symbols of Arabism in order to bolster their legitimacy with domestic audiences. By creating the impression that they were acting in adherence to the norms that were valued in the Arab world, these leaders were

provided with symbolic capital that could then be ‘exchanged’ for other forms of capital, such as political capital. Schimmelfennig (2005) has also shown the way that background discourse can influence outcomes in his study of the EU’s expansion eastward. According to Schimmelfennig East European diplomats were able to force Western European states into allowing EU expansion by ‘rhetorically entrapping’ them. Because Western states did not want to be seen to undermine the liberal norms they claimed were at the heart of the European project, they were constrained into accepting the accession of new states. To do otherwise would have painted their policies as illegitimate. This demonstrates that legitimacy can matter irrespective of the personal motives of actors; whether they believe in legitimate norms or not, actors may still be constrained to abide by them (Hurd, 2008).

In summary, legitimacy can be seen as largely synonymous with ‘acceptance.’ If something is said to legitimate then actors will accept the claims that it makes. The ‘something’ that actors might accept can vary considerably. At the deepest level actors might accept certain categorizations of the world as the ‘true’ ones, and then order their behavior around these truths. Alternatively, they may accept that a particular authority should be entitled to obedience, or accept that a certain norm is worth adhering to. However, for authorities to maintain this legitimacy they are also constrained in their behavior. Thus, at a political level, legitimacy generates both constraints and opportunities for political authorities.

Narratives of Legitimation. Where does legitimacy come from? Why do actors accept that certain views of the world are the ‘right’ ones or that certain actors or institutions have the right to expect obligatory behavior from others? These are important

questions as knowing where legitimacy comes from gives us a sense of how and when it is likely to influence actors. There are a number of potential sources of legitimacy. Some scholars argue that legitimacy fundamentally amounts to the consensus position of actors with pre-existing preferences (Chayes & Chayes, 1993), and is more robust the more clearly these preferences are understood by the broader community (Voeten, 2005). However, reducing legitimacy to the interests of (mostly powerful) actors is insufficient for capturing how it is created and maintained. After all, one of the puzzling features of legitimacy is the manner in which ideas and rules persist even when they do not seem to be generating benefits for many members of society. For instance, sometimes systems are put in place that might be simultaneously considered unfair but legitimate (Hurd, 2008). How can this be? For some scholars, the answer to this question lies in the social context in which claims of legitimacy are made (Clark, 2005). Something “is legitimate if it is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group” (Zelditch, 2001, p. 33). Thus, certain ideas are more or less legitimate depending on how well they link with the normative discourses that are already being used by members of society. These normative discourses can be very different, and thus oblige different actions from individuals. Furthermore, without these background discourses the social and political world cannot be ordered or understood.

This project is focused on the discourses used by political regimes to legitimate their right to rule: what I call their *narratives of legitimation*. Narratives of legitimation are the stories told by regimes to their domestic audiences that explain and affirm existing political relations. I call these discourses “narratives” for a number of reasons. First, narratives offer culturally-specific claims for why regimes should rule. Unlike, Weber’s

(1978) “ideal-typical” and abstract conceptualization of legitimacy, to talk of narratives is to focus on the particular legitimacy claims that regimes make.⁶⁹ Narratives do not say simply “King’s rule”; they say “this particular dynasty rules for these particular reasons.” In making such claims narratives usually draw on myths. A myth is a “belief held in common by a large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning; it is typically socially cued rather than materially based” (Edelman, 1971, p. 14). The importance of these myths lies in their ability to “justify or oppose the arrangement of power and the positions of the powerful in this arrangement” (Firth, 1973, p. 87). Myths help to account for the particular social order which actors inhabit by using the past to legitimate certain values or social relationships. By being able to declare their right to rule in terms of such of “master-narratives” (Migdal, 1997) or “controlling political idea[s]” (Geertz, 1973) regimes can uphold their rule with more than (or even without) coercive power. Second, narratives have ‘plots.’ These plots are important not just for constituting actors but also for prescribing actions on the parts of protagonists. What these actions ‘should’ be are sometimes implicit rather than explicit. Nonetheless, these plots generate audience expectations about what actors should do in specific circumstances. As a practical matter this means that an analysis of narratives must focus on what actors do in order to align themselves with narratives as much as what they say.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Weber distinguishes between three different types of legitimation for authority: charismatic, rational-legal, and traditional. The legitimacy of charismatic authority is based on the “heroism or exemplary character of a single individual.” The legitimacy of rational authority is based on “the belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.” Finally, traditional authority is based on the “established belief of immemorial traditions” (Weber, 1978, p. 215). Thus, in a society dominated by charismatic authority leaders would be entitled to unilaterally issue proclamations about the world and expect obedience from followers. By contrast, individuals who live in a rational-legal system will only accept proclamations as legitimate if they have been seen to go through the correct (usually very formal) procedures. This can explain why states will accept the pronouncements of IGOs that are not materially powerful (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

⁷⁰ Although, of course, saying something might be the action they are supposed to do in certain

Narratives of legitimation can have different sources. For instance, in Imperial China the narrative of legitimation used by the Qing regime was the traditional one that had been adopted by succeeding dynasties for over a millennium. In Soviet Russia, the narrative of legitimation used by the Soviet regime was crafted by the Bolsheviks before taking power and drew on Marxist theory that had been reinterpreted in light of the cataclysm of World War I. In revolutionary Iran, the regime mobilized supporters behind a narrative that drew on Shi'ite myths and symbols and that advocated public resistance to the shah and the values he stood for. While the sources of these narratives can vary, their contours are readily understandable.

A final note on narrative content. Because the focus of this study is on how narratives of legitimation influence outcomes – not on what causes these narratives to appear, change, or disappear – the manner in which these narratives might change can be somewhat bracketed. This is not an overly problematic assumption. First, for the purposes of analysis the causal mechanism of narrative binding (below) treats narratives of legitimation as reasonably static and unchanging. Second, we have good reasons to think that narratives of legitimation might be resistant to change for a number of reasons. Unlike like norms or discourses in general, narratives of legitimation explicitly or implicitly privilege certain actors in a society over others. Consequently, these actors will have strong incentives to actively maintain and support the narratives that legitimate these privileges (Kelman, 2001). Powerful actors are likely to actively contest or prevent any attempts by others to “delegitimize” or “denormalize” the narratives that create privileges for them (Crawford, 2002, Ch. 2). Narratives may be institutionalized and woven throughout the bureaucratic or institutional structure of a regime or state. This

circumstances.

increases the chances that individuals – even those who do not believe in the narrative or who are opposed to it – will repeatedly engage in the everyday practices that reinforce a narrative. Furthermore, even if there is widespread cynicism or antipathy to a narrative it may nonetheless reproduce itself unless it fails to explain the world in unexpected ways (Legro, 2005) or there is a well-articulated alternative (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). In short, this argument treats narratives as rigid and unchanging. (Some conditions under which we might expect narratives to change are discussed in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.)

Narratives of Legitimation and the Practice of Power. In order for regimes to demonstrate fealty to their narratives of legitimation, they (or their representatives) must publicly engage in actions that are mandated by these narratives. The most obvious way this is done is by implementing policies favorable to domestic groups (Putnam 1988). However, the relationship between a society and its leadership cannot be simply reduced to policy-outcomes. Although leaders and elites craft and implement policies the manner in which this is done is rarely observed. Thus for leaders to communicate with their followers they must engage in “impression management.” This is the process through which one can “convey an impression to others which it is in his interests to convey” (Goffman, 1959, p. 4). One of the main ways regimes can do this is by engaging in public symbolic and ritual practices. While these symbolic practices might seem unimportant, they can be just as valuable as implementing concrete policies for generating legitimacy. By simply engaging in practices that project messages about the present and the future, leaders can show that they are committed to their narrative of legitimation and, by showing this, maintain support. This is even true with regards to

policies. As Murray Edelman (1971, p. 4) notes, it is often “*in the process* (rather than in content of statutes, court decisions, and administrative rules) [that] leaders gain or lose followings” (italics mine).

Symbolic practices act as frames that influence observers. Barnett (1998, p. 41) notes, “to frame an event means to situate it within a particular *story line* in order to locate that event, organize the experience, and guide the action” (italics mine). Symbolic practices operate by drawing the attention of observers to certain facets or elements of meaning – what Laitin (1986, p. 171) refers to as “points of concern” – while downplaying or excluding others. Thus symbolic practices act as the hook that link individuals in society to each other and to the narratives of legitimation that structure the political and social order (Kertzer, 1988). The classic example of this dynamic is Clifford Geertz’s (1973) famous study of the Balinese cockfight. At this public event the symbolic practices of individuals demonstrated who in local society was powerful and how they staked their claim to that power. This activity is more than signaling. By individuals participating in the cockfight networks of power were created, ordered, or destroyed. Thus by engaging in symbolic practices and by observing others engaging in them, new coalitions or corporate actors can be formed while others disappear. To put it another way, engaging in symbolic practices can generate ‘common knowledge’ about the state of the world. Common knowledge exists “among a group of people if everyone knows [something, and] that everyone knows that everyone knows it, etc...” (Chwe, 2001, p. 9). It is the knowledge that others know that others know what others know. Common knowledge occurs when an behavior is public and the meaning of the act is readily interpretable – i.e. when it is an *action* (see Chapter Two). If one observes an action and

is certain than others observed it and took the same meaning from it, then they can readily choose their best strategy for success, even if this strategy is not their preferred strategy.

The potentially powerful coordinative role of symbolic practices can be politically useful for regimes. This is especially true in autocratic systems of rule where there are few institutionalized avenues of dissent. In states such as these, regimes have an incentive to display their power and generate common knowledge of their scope and supremacy. For instance, during the medieval era it was common for monarchs to engage in a sequence of grand tours around their territory. By traveling from town to town the majesty, but also the political reach, of the monarch could be observed by all potential dissenters (Anglo, 1969; see also Geertz, 1973). The ability to make an event common knowledge can also be highly useful for coordinating some actions and deterring others. Consider the Nazi salute: due to the public and obligatory nature of this symbolic behavior it made it hard for potential resistors to identify each other. And although refusal to carry out the salute would instantly create common knowledge of one's potential to resist it would communicate this just as clearly to authorities as it would to other resistors. Thus, control of this symbolic action was of great utility to the Nazi state for intimidating dissenters. Similar practices persist in modern autocracies. Wedeen (1999) argues that the practice of exaggerated and absurd cult-like worship of Assad's regime in Syria was over-the-top precisely to demonstrate the overwhelming power of the state and the futility of resistance.⁷¹ Similarly, Ozouf (1998) provides evidence that the festivals and ceremonies promoted by the revolutionary French regime were intended not

⁷¹ Not only is such a system effective at preventing collective action against the regime, it also operates by wearing down the dignity of the participant forced to participate in such a blatant charade (Wedeen, 1999,

only to create enthusiasm but also to deter dissent by illustrating the state's ability to completely reorder reality.

Aside from this deterrent effect, symbolic practices can also be important for mobilization. Symbolic displays can privilege one set of cultural norms over another, and make a certain set of values the hegemonic ones, to which all others are subordinated (Greenwald, 1973).⁷² Consequently, elites have an incentive to engage in symbolic practices that are highly valued by domestic constituents (Edelman, 1964). Associating with such symbols can trigger “value-rationality” in observers. Individuals motivated by value-rationality will express their commitment to follow a certain value without regard for the consequences (Johnson, 1991, p. 73-77). This effect of symbols can be instrumental to generating mass support by legitimizing or de-legitimizing particular forms of action (Bloch, 1974; Swidler, 1986), for mobilizing groups (Kaufman, 2001), or forming and reforming coalitions (Ross, 2007; Goddard, 2006).

Thus by engaging in symbolic practices or associating with significant social symbols such as flags or national myths, regimes can try to draw attention to and privilege certain authority structures. Such symbolic practices “do not just reflect authority, but create and recreate it” (Cohen, 1974, p. xi). As Geertz (1980, p. 213) puts it, “by the mere act of providing a model, a paragon, a faultless image of civilized existence, the court shapes the world around it.” When regimes engage in practices that reflect their narrative of legitimation they do not simply communicate their material

chapter 3).

⁷² Laitin discusses how the dominant cultural and symbolic system in Yorubaland defines the basis of social conflict and cooperation in terms of ancestral heritage. As this system dominates what citizens 'points of concerns' are, other fault lines for conflict – such as religious difference – are only understood through this initial frame and thus muted (Laitin, 1986, chapter 6). Similarly, Hitler unified Germans by asking them to actively stop associating with symbols such as political groups or class – which were divisive symbols – but rather to associate with the broader and more inclusive (at least for some) symbols of nationhood

wealth or power (Lane, 1983). These practices also proclaim a “delimitation of social reality; that is, [they set] the limits of what is relevant in terms of social interaction” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 102).

This discussion about common knowledge also reminds us of the delicate relationship between those engaging in symbolic practices and their audiences. Indeed, this relationship is why I choose to talk about actors engaging in ‘symbolic practices’ rather than ‘deploying’ symbols. Mere ‘possession’ of symbols or a narrative is not enough to generate a response in an audience; actors must create a “fused performance [where] audiences identify with the actors, and cultural scripts achieve verisimilitude through effective *mise-en-scène*” (Alexander, 2004, p. 527). When this occurs audiences will stop viewing the performance cynically and believe in the authenticity of the event. For symbolic practices to work actors need to take care to properly prepare the setting, to engage in readily understandable actions that link them to important narratives (Turner, 1969; Mills, 1959),⁷³ to improvise where necessary, and to perform these actions with the utmost sincerity and with no sense of irony or boredom. Symbolic practices that can bring these elements together will have a far greater chance of being persuasive to observing audiences. Those that do not bring the relevant elements together are likely to fall flat or even send out a contradictory message. The better equipped an actor is to understand these multiple conditions, the better they will be at engaging in the actions

(Taylor, 1981).

⁷³ The ability of an individual symbol to influence people varies by two elements: the emotional attachment observers have to the symbol (its *affect*), and their ability to understand the appeals the symbol makes (its *cognitive meaning*). If an observer has a high affective attachment to a symbol then he is likely to have a strong reaction when it is presented in front of him. However, an observer’s ability to understand what a symbol is asking him or her to do toward it is a function of the symbol’s cognitive meaning for that person. If it has a well-specified meaning then the observer will know what the symbol is directing them toward doing. Symbols with high levels of affect and well-specified meanings are likely to generate an ideological response, meaning that observers will have a clear sense of what to do and be motivated to do it (Elder and

that constitute the practice (Ringmar, 2012).

To understand the point better, compare the two following instances in diplomatic history where leaders engaged in symbolic practices. In 1970, the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt arrived in Warsaw to sign the Warsaw treaty as a step toward normalizing relations between the FDR and its Eastern neighbors. Part of Brandt's itinerary included a visit to the memorial commemorating the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. While straightening out a wreath on the memorial, Brandt fell – in full view of the press – on his knees and remained still for about a minute. Rather than being treated with cynicism or confusion this behavior was viewed by both the press and domestic audiences as a “symbolic transformation of German Identity” (Rauer, 2006, p. 274). By engaging in a symbolic action that demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of symbols and setting, Brandt was able to demonstrate the sincerity of West Germany's appeal for reconciliation. Contrast this event with President Ronald Reagan's visit to Bitburg cemetery alongside Chancellor Kohl in 1985. While Reagan's intent was to signal to international society that Germany was a trusted ally and partner, the setting and performance confused this message. Shortly before his visit it was revealed that, in addition to the thousands of regular army that were buried there, Bitburg cemetery housed 38 SS soldiers. Despite Reagan's attempt to deflect attention from this element, the media focused on it. In order to combat the negative image that was being created in the press, elements of the ceremony were altered; a decision that made Reagan unpopular in Germany (Kertzer, 1988, p. 92-95). As these examples show impressions are not simply created by the sender of messages. The responses of audiences are crucial in establishing whether legitimacy practices are working. The reactions of observers is key

because these observers, “however passive their role may seem to be, will themselves effectively project a definition of the situation by virtue of *their response* to the individual” (Goffman, 1959, p. 9, italics mine).

These examples also show the double-edged nature of symbolic practices. While there are benefits to engaging in symbolic practices there are also costs for failing to engage in them successfully. If public symbolic practices create common knowledge then they will create it whether regimes want them to or not. When in public, leaders are not able to go ‘backstage.’ Instead all of their behaviors/actions are subject to scrutiny. Thus there are not moments of more or less legitimacy. Legitimacy is constantly practiced by regimes and consistently reciprocated in the actions of the population. From this perspective, legitimacy is not something that is won or lost, “but something to be continually bargained for” (Collins & Arnett, 2009, p. 117).

By understanding the particular ways that regimes engage in symbolic practices we can now get a better sense of when states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. Because all regimes are dependent on some degree on narratives of legitimation in order to maintain their survival, they have incentives to engage in the symbolic practices that reinforce this narrative. However, it is possible that some element of these practices might conflict with the actions prescribed by Westphalian diplomatic practice. This conflict can only be resolved by one practice being rejected in favor of another. This leads to the following general hypothesis:

H3: States will have incentives to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice if its practices conflict with the practices associated with their regimes’ narrative of legitimation.

It is important to recognize that there is no reason to expect that all rejectionist

states would reject the same particular element of Westphalian diplomatic practice. On the contrary, we should expect that they would only contest those particular elements of diplomatic practice that interfere with symbolic practices associated with their individual narratives of legitimation. Because no two regimes share the same narrative of legitimation we should fully expect regimes symbolic practices to vary from state to state. Thus even though rejectionist states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice in order to defend their domestic narrative of legitimation, the exact point of contention should be different every time. To paraphrase Tolstoy, we should expect that those states that are unhappy with Westphalian diplomatic practice to be unhappy with it in their own way.

Specifying the Mechanism: Narrative Binding. The above discussion gives us a general but somewhat underspecified hypothesis for why narratives of legitimation might lead states to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. Although there are good reasons for believing that regimes have incentives to engage in practices that uphold their narrative of legitimation we need a much clearer understanding of when these narratives are going to be in tension with the diplomatic practices of international society, or when regimes would care so much about their narratives of legitimation that they would engage in the costly behavior of rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

In this part I propose a mechanism that specifies the conditions under which a regime's concern with its narrative of legitimation will lead to a state rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. Through a causal mechanism I call "narrative binding" I argue that states will reject Westphalian diplomatic practice when (a) the regime's narratives of legitimation mandate practices that are contradictory to the practices prescribed by Westphalian diplomatic practice, and (b) the regime is concerned with its

domestic survival. The basic model can be seen in figure 1.

Narratives of Legitimation → Narrative Binding → Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

Figure 1: Basic model of the Mechanism.

These two conditions are more than just intervening variables because the focus is not just on the existence of these conditions. In specifying a causal mechanism it is also necessary to explain how “causal forces are transmitted through the series of interlocking parts of a causal mechanism to contribute to producing an outcome” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 25). Each of the conditions should be thought of stages where the the presence of each generates an activity that – like a gear wheel in an engine – ‘bites’ into the next stage in order to produce the overall outcome. In other words, each condition should be thought of as a ‘noun’ that, when present, actively transmits a causal force (the ‘verb’) in a particular way (Beach & Pedersen, Ch. 4). As a theoretical point, these conditions should not be considered ‘variables’ as such as they can only take on one of two states: presence or absence (that is they do not take on a variety or spectrum of values – see methods section below). In terms of explanation this means that unless *both* conditions are fulfilled then we should not expect the mechanism to be present or to have any effect.

Stage 1 of the Mechanism: Narrative Mandates. The first condition of this mechanism focuses on the content of a regime’s narrative of legitimation. As I discussed above narratives generate the background material from which symbolic practices are drawn. For narratives to influence audiences they must present content that is likely to resonate with audiences. Content here refers to the symbols and “rhetorical

commonplaces” (Jackson, 2006) used by actors to present political narratives. This content may be drawn from a society’s culture or from a broader religion or ideology, and act as the “grammar” in any political narrative. Sacred venues, specific dates in calendars, famous or revered figures of the past, mythical enemies or events, expected political end states, and so forth can all be drawn on and presented by actors as part of a narrative. This content can help audiences understand who the ‘characters’ of the narrative are, the behavior that is expected of them, and what an ending might look like to the political events under dispute.

However, the content of these narratives are not just a resource that can be mined à la carte by regimes. Very often narratives of legitimation *mandate* that regime representatives engage in specific *actions*. By their nature narratives create frames that define a situation. But on certain issues these frames will also generate implications (Krebs & Jackson, 2007). This means narratives will mandate that leaders do more than simply pursue particular policies. In some contexts narratives will also mandate that regime representatives engage in specific symbolic actions which indicate fealty to the narrative. To give a clear example, US Presidents are mandated by the civic and national narrative of American politics to stand and exhibit reverence during the playing of the national anthem or else lose legitimacy.⁷⁴ By doing so, presidents engage in the symbolic practice of patriotism. Mandates create incentives to engage faithfully in the requisite symbolic practices associated with them.

While narrative content can be quite resistant to change, the relationship between mandates and content can be more dynamic. Usually narratives do not mandate actions or practices for everything that actors do. They are often ‘silent’ regarding specific

behaviors and do not imbue them with any meaning one way or another. For instance, the modern American narrative of legitimation does not mandate that presidents use a specific hand when signing bills into law. Because of the narrative's 'silence' on this issue a president's legitimacy is not affected by him or her being right or left-handed. However, it is possible that mandates can 'extend' to new issue areas in way that is not fully predictable. This can occur when an event takes place that can be 'linked' to the existing narrative. For this to take place the event must be easily connected to the existing narrative's content. This is a key point. While canny political actors might engage in "grafting" – framing new ideas as consistent with pre-existing norms or beliefs (Price, 1998) – their ability to succeed will be heavily circumscribed by a narrative's extant content and mandates. To return to the above example, it would be difficult if not impossible for any political entrepreneur to de-legitimize a president on grounds of them being right or left-handed. Such a claim just wouldn't make narrative sense. Nonetheless, if new events are linked to an existing narrative the consequences of this will be that practices that a narrative had previously been 'silent' on might now become the focus of audience attention. When this happens, regimes will be mandated by the narrative of legitimation to engage in the appropriate symbolic practices surrounding this event.

Unpacking the content of narratives of legitimation, and specifically their mandates, is important for understanding why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. If a regime's narrative of legitimation mandates symbolic practices that conflict with the practices prescribed by Westphalian diplomatic practice then this generates incentives for regimes to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. By contrast if their narratives are silent on these practices we should not necessarily expect any conflict as

⁷⁴ To put it another way, imagine the consequences if a president did not do this.

there is little downside risk for a regime to engage in these practices.⁷⁵ We can better specify this condition as follows:

Condition 1: Narratives of legitimation that mandate conflicting symbolic practices will generate incentives for regimes to refuse to engage in the actions associated with Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Stage 2 of the Mechanism: Regime Survival. Narrative content helps us to understand when regimes have incentives to engage in practices that contradict those of Westphalian diplomatic practice. However, it gives us no insight into when a regime may feel that the benefits of engaging in these domestic practices outweigh the benefits of engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice. I argue that these symbolic practices become more important than Westphalian diplomatic practice when a regime's *survival* is threatened. A regime's survival is threatened when (a) the regime does not have sole control of the institutions of governance and (b) the elite are divided against themselves. Under these conditions a threatened regime has incentives to fastidiously engage in legitimacy practices as these practices might be the only bulwark the regime has against elites and/or masses mobilizing and creating political instability. Under these conditions symbolic practices become *constraining*. When this occurs regimes will have incentives to practice them as fastidiously as possible, even if this means rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

All regimes are concerned to a greater or lesser degree with ensuring their own survival. A regime's survival is threatened when a regime is unsure that it can avoid crises and that, if crises occur, it will be able to resolve them in its own favor (Slater &

⁷⁵ Of course, as I pointed out in the introduction, sometimes regimes go out of their way to create conflicts. However, these should be seen as self-inflicted rather than a function of the narratives that regimes use.

Fenner, 2011). Regimes are dependent on two things in order to survive: (i) institutions, and (ii) the consent of elite actors. Of these two the more important are institutions. Slater (2010, Ch. 2) finds that authoritarian regimes that are able to establish strong institutions early in their rule remain the most durable in long run. By establishing full control over state capacity, military cohesion, and (if present) political parties, regimes are able to consolidate their rule and are free to engage in policies or practices that do not necessarily have the consent of most of the ruled, including the elites. The benefits of these institutions are immediately obvious. If a regime is able to establish full control over revenue-extraction this will simultaneously allow the state to become stronger while also granting the regime more influence over its subjects (Tilly, 1992; Levi, 1988). Similarly, control of the coercive apparatus of the state can have obvious deterrent effects against any potential challengers to the regime. Control of political parties can also generate benefits for a regime in that the regime can coordinate and direct patronage, as well as organize the division of institutions in the state (Greene, 2007). Furthermore, where durable institutions exist, the effect of factionalism is likely to be diminished (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). In short, a regime in full control of a state's institutions is in possession of the "ultimate institutional weapon" needed to consolidate its rule (Slater & Fenner, 2011, p.17).

However, it may be difficult for a regime to establish complete control over the institutions of the state for two reasons. First, the institutions of the state may be divided between various elements of the elite with no single group being able to establish total control. In this case ideological, military, political, and economic factions will compete to control the state (Mann, 2012a). Secondly, institutions themselves – whether controlled

by a single faction or divided among elites – may simply be too weak to have any real influence on domestic politics. In these instances, while a regime may be in nominal control of state institutions, the practical effect of these institutions might be negligible. This situation is characteristic of some post-colonial states in the 20th and 21st centuries. In these “quasi-states” institutions are extremely weak or have collapsed completely (Jackson, 1987).

If a regime is unable to establish total control over institutions then the role of elite-coalitions in maintaining a regime’s survival will become prominent. Key to maintaining these elite coalitions are the interests of the elites themselves (Wagner, 2007, Ch. 3). In the absence of institutional mechanisms to bind elites, regimes have to rely on “attitudinal” mechanisms in order to maintain support. These are mechanisms that are based on elite preferences. As long as elites believe that it is in their interest to support the regime then they will do so. The most typical attitudinal mechanism proposed to explain why elite coalitions form or collapse is mutual interest. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that regime stability in general is determined by the size of winning coalitions of elites, and the size of the “selectorate” from which these elites are drawn. If elites receive satisfactory ‘side-payments’ from a regime then they will continue to support it. If a regime is not able to supply enough side-payments to satisfy a minimum winning coalition then this will lead to regime collapse. Similarly, Spruyt (1994) argues that the rise of the sovereign state as a political entity was the result of a mutually-agreeable bargain struck between monarchs and burghers against noble elites. Mutual interest is not the only attitudinal mechanism that might influence whether or not elites join coalitions, or agree to remain in them. Slater (2010) finds that shared fear rather than

shared gains can be just as instrumental in explaining how elites form coalitions. Elites that fear the masses more than they do a potential Leviathan state will allow for more consolidated authoritarian regimes to be constructed. According to Slater, elite coalitions formed as these “protection pacts” will lead to more durable regimes than coalitions based on “provision pacts” – i.e. pacts that are formed because they meet elites’ mutual interests (Slater, 2010, chapter 1).⁷⁶ Whether the posited attitudinal mechanism is mutual fear or mutual interest the implication for regime survival is clear. Regimes that do not have full control over institutional mechanisms are much more dependent on the preferences of elites for their survival. If a majority of elites are satisfied that the status quo is better than the alternative then we can consider this elite to be united. However, if a majority of elites do not share the same perception of the regime then we can consider the elite to be divided. In situations where elite opinion is divided *and* the regime does not have full control of institutions we can consider a regime’s survival to be threatened. These various permutations can be seen in table 1.

If a regime’s survival is threatened the consequences are easy to understand. Elites will accept a regime’s authority over them only if they share the same interests as the regime, the regime is strong enough to force them to do so, if the regime provides sufficient side-payments, or if elites fear the consequences of regime collapse more than the regime itself. If none of these attitudinal mechanisms is present then elites have strong incentives to topple the existing regime and form a new “winning coalition” in its place.

⁷⁶ Slater’s study goes much further than this and explains why authoritarian regimes take the various forms that they do, but these details are not relevant for this discussion.

		Elite Actors	
		United	Divided
Regime has Institutional Control	Yes	<p>Survival not Threatened</p> <p>Logic: Regime maintains control by relying on state institutions</p>	<p>Survival not Threatened</p> <p>Logic: Regime maintains control by relying on state institutions</p>
	No	<p>Survival not Threatened</p> <p>Logic: Regime maintains control through attitudinal mechanisms</p>	<p>Survival Threatened</p> <p>Logic: Regime unable to rely on attitudinal or institutional mechanisms</p>

Table 1: Measuring Regime Survival

While these consequences are clear, this still does not explain why legitimacy practices are likely to matter more to regimes in these circumstances. In order to understand this we need to unpack two implicit assumptions in the coalitions literature: (a) that elites will know how strong or weak a regime is, and (b) that elites will be confident that other elites will mobilize against an existing regime. These assumptions are not insignificant. It has long been established that common interests do not automatically lead to common action. Although members of a particular selectorate may prefer to form a new “winning coalition” and supplant an existing regime, there may be strong disincentives to act. Firstly, elites will want to be certain that a regime is as weak as they suspect it is. Secondly, they will want to be sure that if they choose to act against the regime that other elites will join them and not ‘free ride’ (Olson, 1965, chapter 1). Thus not all moments of discontent are created equal. Only in moments of obvious threat

to a regime's survival will elites feel confident that other elites will mobilize their resources and join together in order to overturn the existing order. Otherwise any particular elite group is in danger of opposing a regime alone and without any support.⁷⁷ In short, the survival concerns of a regime are no guarantee that elites will move against it. On the contrary, a regime's concern with its own survival needs to be *perceived* by elites in order for it to have political effect. This basic insight is present in much of the literature about regime instability. Yashar (1997) looks at the conditions under which elites will form into political coalitions in order to build democracies. A key element in her account is the existence of "democratic moments" (Yashar, 1997, p. 17): instances where divided elites perceive an opportunity to link to the masses and begin mobilization. In his study of democratization in authoritarian regimes, Brownlee looks at periods of what he calls "opportunities for democracy." These opportunities are moments when "the fundamental patterns of public life are uncommonly contested and vulnerable to change by the actors involved" (Brownlee, 2007, p. 24). Yet there is no theoretical reason for us to assume that such opportunities are self-evident. Opportunities and threats are not objective things but rather attributed by actors. As McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly (2001, p. 43) note: "no opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is a) visible to potential challengers and b) perceived as an opportunity."

The potential importance of symbolic practices to a regime concerned with its survival should be becoming apparent to the reader by now. As I outlined earlier symbolic practices are useful to regimes in two different ways. First, successfully engaging in symbolic practices can act as a sign that the regime shares the values of the

⁷⁷ One is reminded of John Harrington's famous epigram: "Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason? Why, if it prosper, none dare call it treason."

domestic audiences. This can work at the elite or mass level. At the elite level, engaging in symbolic practices can indicate that the regime shares the preferences of disgruntled elites even if it cannot meet these preferences at a particular moment. Elites who ‘see’ these practices might think there is no point in trying to establish an alternative “winning coalition” because they will attribute the cause of a regime’s failure to deliver on its promises as unrelated to the composition of coalitions.⁷⁸ In addition, by engaging in symbolic practices a regime can signal to mass publics that it shares their values. This can dampen or sever links between disgruntled elites and the mass publics that these elites might otherwise try to mobilize.⁷⁹ Second, by engaging in symbolic practices regimes can deter elites who remain unconvinced that the regime can meet their interests. By controlling the public square regimes can create the impression that they are still powerful, and thus make it hard for dis-satisfied elites to identify the level of discontent present. Under such circumstances any individual elite actor will have disincentives to be the first to act against a regime. In short, by successfully engaging in symbolic practices regimes can try to limit the *perception* of their weakness by elites or the masses. If these potential challengers are uncertain about the actual state of the political environment then this reduces their potential political power. Wagner (2007, p. 122) puts it succinctly: “The mere availability of the idea of a radically different type of contract, if it becomes common knowledge, can change the relative bargaining power of the ruled.” If regimes

⁷⁸ To put it another way, if a regime consistently engages in practices which appear to be attempting to meet the preferences of elites, then there is no necessary reason for elites to think alternative coalitions would necessarily deliver on these preferences any more successfully.

⁷⁹ McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly (2001, chapter 2) describe how the actions of Rosa Parks in Montgomery Alabama was essential in focusing the attention of various interests groups during the civil rights movement. Her simple act of refusing to sit at the back of the bus was perceived as threatening by southern elites but an opportunity by other civil rights activists. Indeed, much of the “battleground” of the civil rights movement - at least in its public dimension - rested on violating existing practices and, by doing so, generating the conditions that caused elites and masses to mobilize.

have few other ways of influencing elites, then the role of perceptions becomes critical.

This logic implies that the symbolic practices mandated by its narrative of legitimation not only become more politically valuable to a threatened regime; they also become *constraining*. Threatened regimes will have incentives to engage in these practices even more fastidiously for two reasons. First, if a regime does not have alternative institutional mechanisms to maintain its survival then symbolic practices become one of the primary mechanisms for maintaining survival. Second, these symbolic practices become even more important when a regime's survival is threatened because divided elites will have incentives to take advantage of any unsuccessful symbolic practices by a regime. As Goffman (1959, p. 30) puts it, "When the audience is known to be secretly skeptical of the reality that is being impressed on them...[they have a] tendency to pounce on trifling flaws as a sign that the whole show is false." Failure by a regime to successfully engage in symbolic practices might be perceived as the "opportunity" for elites to collectively act. Depending of the nature of these failed practices, disgruntled elites might be able to attract mass support to their cause by pointing out the 'illegitimate behavior' of a regime. These two pressures thus create strong incentives for a threatened regime to fastidiously engage in symbolic practices and not be seen to deviate from its narrative of legitimation. We can better specify this condition as follows:

Condition 2: Regimes whose survival is threatened will be constrained to engage in symbolic practices that uphold their legitimacy.

Summary of the Mechanism. The mechanism of narrative binding can help to specify why and when a regime's narratives of legitimation will cause states to reject

Westphalian diplomatic practice. Two conditions are necessary for this mechanism to operate. First, a regime's narrative of legitimation must have content that mandates practices that conflict with those of Westphalian diplomatic practice. Second, a regime's survival must be threatened. When these two conditions are fulfilled we should expect a state to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. This causal mechanism is summarized in table 2.

Cause	Causal Mechanism: Narrative Binding		Outcome	
Narrative of Legitimation	Stages of Mechanism	<u>Stage 1</u>	<u>Stage 2</u>	Westphalian Diplomatic Practice Rejected
	<i>Activity Generated</i>	<i>Symbolic Practices</i>	<i>Regime Constrained</i>	
	Condition Present	Narrative Content mandates conflicting practices	Regime Survival Threatened	

Table 2: The conditions of narrative binding.

As the table shows these two conditions are not simply two stand-alone intervening variables. Rather, in each stage of the mechanism the causal force of the narratives of legitimation are transmitted through particular activities. In stage 1, the content of narratives mandate regimes to engage in symbolic practices that conflict with those of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In stage 2, a regime's whose survival is threatened is constrained into engaging in these practices. This mechanism allows us to

better specify hypothesis 3:

H3a: States will reject Westphalian diplomatic practice under conditions of narrative binding.

Methods

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, theory-building requires a different approach to research than traditional theory-testing. Theory-building begins with “empirical material and [using] a structured analysis of this material [attempts] to detect a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism whereby X is linked with Y” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 16). This process has specific implications for the methods selected, for case selection-strategies, for using and assessing evidence, and for the role of alternative explanations. In this section of the chapter I address each of these issues in turn.

Method Selected: Process-tracing. Because theory-building is focused is on discovering causal mechanisms and the manner in which they operate, I utilize a qualitative method. This method can “add inferential leverage that is often lacking in quantitative analysis” (Collier, 2011, p. 823). Specifically, in order to determine why states reject diplomatic practice I engage in within-case analysis, also known as process-tracing. This approach differs from the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation that undergirds statistical analyses and cross-case comparisons (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). Unlike D-N’s focus on covering laws, process-tracing is about uncovering narrower causal mechanisms in order to validate a theory (Mahoney, 2012). Consequently it is not feasible or useful to study a myriad of cases, as the purpose of

process-tracing is not to determine *whether* the presence of variables matter, but *how* they operate, and to draw inferences from understanding these processes (Collier, Mahoney, & Seawright, 2004). Thus, the leverage provided here is not influenced by the number of cases I have, but rather from an ability of “individual observations to confirm or challenge a researcher’s prior expectations about what should occur” (Mahoney, 2010, p. 128).

In practice, this means that evidence is investigated in order to elucidate the mechanism that causes states to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. What is needed for inferring causality are two things: (1) clear counter-factual conditions, and (b) a comparison of what would have happened if the cause had been absent (Brady, 2004). The advantage of detailed process-tracing is that it avoids the danger that one might be over-stating or under-stating the causal forces one is interested in by explicitly unpacking these forces and examining how they hook up with the evidence. In terms of presentation this means that cases are not necessarily presented chronologically, but rather with a mind to identify the mechanism(s) in operation. Furthermore, while the findings of this approach might be narrow, process-tracing generates real theoretical payoffs and is not just an exercise in single-outcome analysis. Instead, the causal mechanism that is identified is posited to exist in a *general* sense across similar cases (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Once identified this mechanism can, in principle, be recoded as a variable and then tested against other theories in a broader set of cases. In short, process-tracing “it is not simply glorified historiography, [but] nor does it proceed by the logic of frequentist statistics” (Bennett & Checkel, forthcoming, p. 10).

Case Selection. Theory-building also has implications for case-selection. First,

cases should be selected in order to determine if and how a causal mechanism operates in different instances. Thus it is the mechanism that is being compared across the cases, *not* variation on the independent variable. This creates some interesting challenges regarding evidence. As I will detail below, the purpose of evidence is to establish whether the conditions necessary for the mechanism to operate exist in each case. However, this evidence might be different in each case. For instance, threats to regime survival were very different for the Soviet regime in 1917-1924 than they were for 19th century Imperial China, yet in both instances we can say that the regimes' survival were under threat. Because the evidence used to measure the relevant concepts is case-specific, cross-case comparison may not be possible, as the evidence in one case might sometimes not be meaningfully compared to that of other cases (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, Ch. 3). This means that the method of selecting cases 'close to the regression line' might not be feasible, and moreover, even if it is possible might not be useful if such a case selection strategy would not help to meaningfully uncover the causal processes in the cases. Instead, for process-tracing studies cases should be selected because the cases are illuminating in a theory-relevant way. Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007, p. 28) compare case-selection for theory-building and note that, "just as laboratory experiments are not randomly sampled from a population of experiments, but [are] rather, chosen for the likelihood that they will offer theoretical insight, so too are cases sampled for theoretical reasons." Selecting cases like this allows the researcher to (among other things) evaluate possible alternative explanations, and to elaborate an emergent theory. Each case stands on its own as an analytic unit. Each additional case acts as a replication or repeat of an experiment. The data acts as the disciplining guide as it stops the researcher deviating off

target.

This leads to the second implication of process-tracing. Traditional concerns regarding selection bias do not always apply when selecting cases for process-tracing. In general, there is great admonition not to ‘select on the dependent variable.’ According to this argument attempts at making general claims from such cases are untenable as it is not possible to assume that the observed relationships exist in a broader universe of cases (Geddes, 1990). While this claim can be valid for theory-testing – where we are trying to determine *if* variation in an X caused correlating variation in a Y – in a theory-building situation it does not apply. This is because in theory-building the purpose is to establish how a causal force is transmitted. Consequently, one prefers to study cases where the value of the ‘X’ is high as this allows better specification of the mechanism. Therefore, for theory-building process-tracing we naturally use a ‘deviant’ or ‘extreme’ case-selection strategy. An extreme case is one that is picked where the value of the X or Y “lies far away from the mean of a given distribution; that is to say it is *unusual*” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 308). While such cases are not representative they are perfectly suited for an exploratory method in which one wants to map out possible causes, or the effects of an individual cause (George & Bennett, 2005). In this project I select cases that take on an extreme value of both the X – the narratives of legitimation used by regimes – and the Y – rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice by states.

What does it mean to ascribe an extreme value to a narrative of legitimation? Here, I consider a narrative to be extreme not based on the substance of its content (e.g. is it fundamentalist etc.) but rather by how explicitly articulated the narrative is. As is well established, the social and political world is populated with actors who operate against a

background set of assumptions which are more or less explicit. To some degree, then, all regimes must legitimate themselves within a narrative. Often these narratives are rather nebulous, however. This makes them difficult to clearly analyze. For instance, while it seems apparent that US politicians must demonstrate fealty to narrative tropes of freedom, democracy, exceptionalism, patriotism and so on (Kertzer 1988), it would be a challenge for a researcher to clearly delineate the content of this narrative. In fact, insomuch as it exists this content is most likely quite malleable and difficult to pin down.⁸⁰ This creates considerable problems regarding confirmation bias and similar methodological challenges. To avoid these problems I select cases where the regimes had highly articulated narratives of legitimation in which the symbolic practices mandated by these narratives are readily identifiable. Furthermore, each of these cases is extremely well-documented in the secondary sources. This means allows me to be confident that my characterization of the content of these narratives does not deviate from the consensus position in the relevant historical literatures.

Each of these cases also exhibits an ‘extreme’ value on the outcome of interest: rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. I consider an instance of rejection to be extreme when the rejection has been sustained for a year or more, and in the face of repeated demands for states to change their practices. Choosing these cases allows me to ‘select out’ those cases of accidental rejection that are a commonplace feature of international diplomacy (and which are usually quickly reconciled). It also allows me to select out those cases where the ‘rejecter’ was unaware of the consequences of rejection.

The three cases are as follows. In Chapter Four I investigate why Imperial China rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice beginning with its first official encounter with

⁸⁰ For an example of a study that manages to surmount these challenges see Jackson (2006).

European representatives in 1793, until the sacking of the summer palace in Beijing in 1860. Despite having strong incentives for resolving their diplomatic issues with European states, China repeatedly rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice, especially those elements surrounding the hosting of resident embassies, and diplomatic ceremonial and protocol. In Chapter Five, I analyze Soviet diplomatic practice from 1917 to 1924. When they first burst onto the world stage, the Bolsheviks rejected the ranks and protocols of international society, and repeatedly violated practices surrounding diplomatic immunity and inviolability. I explain why the Soviets rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice when they did, and why they ultimately came to adopt Westphalian diplomatic practice. In Chapter Six, I consider the diplomatic practice of Iran from 1979 to 1981. When the revolutionary regime first took power they adhered to all elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice, including protection of hostile states' embassies. However, by November 1979 the regime no longer protected the US embassy and allowed it fall into the hands of radical students, thus rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Alternative Explanations. While this project is focused on theory-building, this theory was not created *sui generis* but rather through a process of analyzing the evidence using existing theories, and refining them and any alternatives over a number of iterations. Therefore, throughout the process of theory-building I ensured I followed the standards of good process-tracing by taking equifinality seriously, and considering how well the alternatives could account for the observed outcomes (Bennett & Checkel, forthcoming). As a result in each case the causal mechanism I propose is also tested against the strategic and constructivist alternatives outlined above.

The selection of cases I make helps to better establish the validity of this mechanism against the alternatives because (although it is not necessary for process-tracing), the outcome takes on different values in each case. In the Chinese case, the Qing regime refused to accept Westphalian diplomatic practice for over sixty years. When they finally succumbed it was due to externally enforced regime change (i.e. for reasons exogenous to any of the theories presented). Consequently, this can be counted as a case of persistent rejection. However, in the other cases we do see variation over time in the regimes' practice of Westphalian diplomacy. In the Soviet case, the Soviet regime initially rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice before coming to accept it. By contrast, the Iranian case shows the opposite historical path: where the revolutionary regime initially accepted Westphalian diplomatic practice, they later came to reject it. Therefore, each case shows differing forms of within-case variation of the phenomenon I am explaining. This helps to better separate out the causal force of the various explanations proposed.

Assessing the Evidence. I use evidence in two ways in these cases: to measure the presence or absence of the relevant causal forces, and to determine why states rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice. Each of the explanations offered in this section require slightly different pieces of evidence in order to determine how well they explain the outcome under observation. While all of the explanations are focused on the behavior of state representatives, each explanation expects representatives to (a) contest different types of practices, (b) have different reasons for rejecting them, and (c) have different payoffs for rejecting them. These explanations are summarized in table 3.

Explanation	Which Practices?	Why Reject?	Payoff for dispute
Strategic 1	Any.	Demonstrate Resolve/gather information.	Improve bargaining position.
Strategic 2	Internationally understood.	Protect Reputation.	Increase security.
Constructivist	Practices necessary for identity maintenance.	Ontological security.	Maintain/obtain identity.
Narratives of Legitimation	Practices that conflict with mandates of narrative	Regime is constrained.	Reduce threat to survival.

Table 3: Summary of Explanations

Due to these context-specific factors that affect the political influence of practices, it is necessary to engage in “thick description,” as this allows me to place practices in context.⁸¹ I also keep the analytic focus on the practices themselves, not on the actors. This focus on practice and context avoids talking about symbolic practices as ‘resources’ (Barnett, 1998; Bourdieu, 1984) that are ‘deployed’ onto the political landscape by canny political actors (Hurd, 2008; Tarrow, 1992; Johnson, 1991). Symbols cannot just be driven onto the political landscape like tanks onto a battlefield. They have to be carefully and precisely displayed in a context-sensitive manner.

In the cases I employ a “Folk Bayesian” approach to analyze the evidence. In this approach the “analyst gives greater weight to evidence that is expected a priori to be less probable based on previous knowledge of the phenomenon” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 83). The central idea here is that different pieces of evidence hold different weight

⁸¹ For more on thick description see Laitin (1986, Ch. 5); Geertz (1973, Ch. 1).

depending on how likely we would imagine that they would occur. Thus the focus is not on frequentist evidence (i.e. how often something occurred), but rather on evidence that – unless an explanation is true – it would surprise us to find. Using this approach not only allows me to zero in on the most relevant pieces of evidence, but also avoids detailing every piece of evidence in a case.⁸²

However, broadly speaking, I look for similar types of evidence for each explanation. For the strategic explanation I look at two strands of evidence. First, I draw on primary and secondary sources in order to determine whether rejecting states thought that there was some bargaining advantage to rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. When possible, I try to draw on debates inside the regime or on the rationales offered by representatives to the diplomats of other states. Second, I draw on secondary evidence to establish the security environment of the rejecting state in each case. In particular I pay close attention to the fluctuations (if any) in this environment.

In order to determine the role identity played in the cases, I rely less on actor accounts because (as outlined above) identity itself is not easily articulated. Instead, by drawing extensively on the consensus position found in secondary sources I attempt to roughly reconstruct the ‘identity’ of each of the states, and then delineate what kinds of practices were engaged in by state officials and decision-makers in order to recreate this identity. This allows me to determine what counts as a ‘break’ from a state’s identity at any given time in the analysis.

All of these types of evidence are carried into my analysis of the role of narratives of legitimation in these cases. In order to determine a regime’s narrative of legitimation, I use the same secondary sources used to determine a regime’s identity. This allows me to

⁸² For more on the Folk Bayesian approach see McKeown (2004); Collier (2011).

establish the content of the narrative and what practices this content mandated. I also use primary and secondary sources to establish the threats to regime security that existed in these cases. In particular I also try to analyze the rationales offered by representatives of rejecting states and their contemporaries. This is done in order to determine the degree to which it seemed that regimes were bound into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. I remind the reader that the standards required for establishing the presence of the mechanism are slightly different than for those of the other explanations. Most importantly, the mechanism of narrative binding is only expected to be operative if *both* conditions outlined above are fulfilled. Thus for the mechanism to be present and to exert causal force it must meet INUS conditions.⁸³ If only one of the two conditions is present we should not expect rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice to occur.⁸⁴

A final note on measurement. Due to the considerable historical differences between these cases finding measures for concepts such as “international security environment,” “identity,” “narrative mandates,” and “threats to regime survival” that can translate across cases is, in practice, impossible. For instance, narratives of legitimation and their mandates in the Iranian case are to be found in the writings of intellectuals and the public proclamations of elite actors who all operated in a modern media environment. By contrast, narratives of legitimation in Imperial China were transmitted through official stelae, monuments, memorials and court practices. Similarly, the survival threats faced by each of the regimes differed in their particular dimensions even though we can say that all three regimes faced threats to their survival at different times. Therefore, instead of

⁸³ INUS conditions refer to “insufficient but non-redundant parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect” (Mackie, 1974, p. 62).

using measures that are translatable across cases, I instead measure concepts using the logic of ‘sets.’ Using this logic concepts are measured based on their possession of certain general characteristics which must be identified on a case-by-case basis. This is a suitable method when engaging in process-tracing as for this method we only need to measure when the relevant concepts are present or absent. We do not need to establish a concept’s full range of potential variation (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, Ch. 4).

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to offer possible explanations for why states might reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. I presented two different explanations drawn from the literature before offering a causal mechanism called narrative binding. I then presented a research design based on within-case process tracing in three different cases. The remainder of this study evaluates these explanations by understanding the variations in acceptance and rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice by three different states: Imperial China, Soviet Russia, and Revolutionary Iran. It is to the first of these cases that I now turn.

⁸⁴ Note that this INUS language is extended to the conditions of the mechanism itself, *not to* narratives of legitimation (i.e. the X). It is entirely possible that narratives of legitimation would exist (indeed it is hard

Chapter 4

Qing China and the Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice.

This chapter investigates Imperial China's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice from the late 18th century until the mid-19th century. Although China had been interacting with Western states for centuries, it was not until Britain's 1794 diplomatic mission to Beijing that attempts were made to formally include China into European international society. Yet when this occurred the Chinese Qing regime was unwilling to adopt some of the elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In particular it was unwilling to symbolically recognize the legal equality of Western states or to permit the housing of resident ambassadors in Beijing.⁸⁵ Although British diplomats were treated with respect and honor when they first arrived in China, they were nonetheless not granted the full ritual reciprocity expected by European international society. As became increasingly clear to British emissaries, foreign envoys were expected to engage in symbolic practices that recognized the social and political superiority of the Chinese state over all others. While British envoys were willing to turn a blind eye to these claims, they were unwilling to publicly engage in practices that reinforced them. Most significantly, British ambassadors refused to ritually prostrate themselves, or *koutou*, in front of the Chinese emperor. When carried out this ritual involved a person kneeling three times and knocking his head on the floor in full view of domestic and foreign dignitaries. The British refusal to do this quickly became a major issue of contention between the two states. The second issue of contention was the stationing of permanent ambassadors in

to imagine a situation where they wouldn't), but this alone does not predict any particular outcome.

⁸⁵ Russia had maintained a quasi-diplomatic mission in Beijing since the 1600s although this was not

Beijing. According to the standards of Chinese international society, foreign embassies were allowed to appear in Beijing only at regulated times, for brief periods, and according to specific restrictions. Envoys were expected to engage in the ritual *koutou* ceremony and to have a brief meeting with the emperor, after which they were expected to leave the country. The concept of permanent representation and continuous diplomatic interaction – cornerstones of European international politics since the early 17th century – was entirely alien to Chinese international society. Consequently, China continually refused Western demands for permanent representation at the capital. These two issues of diplomatic practice were a reoccurring focus of dispute between China and Britain, the consequences of which had repercussions for all members of international society.

China's rejection of these elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice is puzzling for three reasons. First, on the face of it there were considerable benefits and little costs in accepting Westphalian diplomatic practice. By the late 1700s and especially into the 1800s, China had become aware of the considerable power that Britain and other European powers were developing in the South Asian region. By the time that the British first visited, China had clear incentives to improve its ability to communicate with European international society. Second, China's continued rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was itself a considerable contributing factor in the breakdown in relations that occurred between China and European powers in the period under investigation. China's insistence that representatives from Western states *koutou* in front of the emperor turned elite and public opinion in the West against China so that, over time, these disputes over diplomatic practice came to negatively define the outside world's relationship with China. Third, Chinese behavior is puzzling because although

recognized as an embassy (see below).

the imperial regime refused to grant concessions on these issues of diplomatic practice they were willing to grant concessions on other issues that appeared to be more valuable, such as the ceding of treaty ports. Indeed, China was willing to conduct diplomacy, but only at the borders of the empire and, later, in the treaty ports. However, these diplomatic solutions were a second-best response born out of Qing refusal to engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice; especially the practices surrounding protocol and resident embassies. It was not until the storming of the Chinese capital and the sacking of the summer palace in 1860 that China was forced at gunpoint to accept Westphalian diplomatic practice.⁸⁶ Considering these costs, why did the Qing regime fixate on ritual issues and refuse entry to foreign ambassadors? At the exact time that China had incentives to resolve its issues with the West or at least open lines of communication, why did China reject Westphalian diplomatic practice and worsen its relationship with Western powers?

In this chapter I find that Qing China rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice due to narrative binding. First, there was a conflict between the practices mandated by the Qing regime's "Middle Kingdom" narrative of legitimation and Westphalian diplomatic practice. Westphalian diplomatic practice mandated that Western states were entitled to have their representatives be treated with ritual reciprocity and – in the case of powerful states – have resident embassies stationed in the capital of receiving states. Any other treatment would be considered a violation of Westphalian diplomatic practice. However, for these two expectations to have been met, the Qing regime would have been forced to abandon two elements of practice mandated by their own domestic narrative of legitimation. Thus Qing China was unable to accept Westphalian diplomatic practice

⁸⁶ In 1861 the imperial government created a department of foreign affairs (the *Zongli Yamen*) and began the process of integrating into the western system. See the conclusion of this chapter for more.

without engaging in practices that conflicted with its own domestic narrative of legitimation. Second, I find that the Qing regime's survival was threatened. These threats made the Qing regime dependent on large-scale symbolic actions in order to legitimize their rule. By engaging in these actions they were able to claim authority and also create common knowledge about the scope of their rule. This could help dissuade domestic revolt. It also meant that the Qing regime was constrained by its narrative of legitimation. Taken together these two factors meant that the Qing regime was bound by its narrative into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. This explains why in the face of considerable Western pressure, the Qing refused to accept Westphalian diplomatic practice until Beijing was fully occupied by European powers.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section I outline the background of Sino-Western relations in the period under consideration. In particular I focus on three prominent British missions to China from 1793 until 1860. In this section I also describe the specifics and consequences of the Qing regime's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In the second section I present competing explanations for the rejection of Westphalian diplomacy and find that these are inadequate for explaining Qing behavior. In the third section I present an explanation that focuses on the role of the narratives of legitimation in Qing domestic politics. I show how the content of the Middle Kingdom narrative of legitimation mandated practices that conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice. I also describe the survival threats faced by the Qing regime at the time. Fourth I show how these conditions came together so that the Qing regime was bound by its narrative into Westphalian diplomatic practice. Finally, there is a brief conclusion.

The Qing Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

China and European International Society. Although European international society had been in contact with the Chinese empire since the 1600s, the connection was only quasi-formal. With the exception of Russia, European states mediated their relationship with imperial China through merchants and charter companies who were engaged in what was known as the “Old China trade.” This was trade in bulk goods such as Chinese luxury items, porcelain and from the mid-1700s onward, tea (Marshall, 1993; Greenberg, 1951). Due to a number of cultural and institutional roadblocks, these European merchants had a difficult time conducting trade with China. Aside from a small trade in high-value goods, the Chinese state had little interest in promoting trade because there was very little domestic demand for anything that European traders were selling.⁸⁷ Furthermore, despite their potential for amassing great wealth, merchants – foreign and domestic – were held in low esteem by Confucian Chinese society.

Consequently, China had little interest in promoting trade with European “barbarians.” These barbarians were subject to heavy regulations and restrictions. European traders were required to conduct all of their business from tiny entrepôts in Macao and Canton, far from the imperial capital (Cranmer-Byng, 1963). Europeans were not allowed into the interior of the country, and trade between European traders and ordinary Chinese buyers or the imperial government was forbidden. Instead, all trade was conducted through local Chinese merchants known as ‘Cohong’ traders. These traders

⁸⁷ This was the case until traders began smuggling opium into China in large quantities. This unofficial Opium trade became the cornerstone of the East India Company’s (EIC) success in this region from the later 1700s when the EIC began hiring private merchants in the South China Sea to smuggle opium into China. The particulars of the system are quite complex. Due to its monopoly position in Canton the EIC did not want to jeopardize trade with China by antagonizing authorities there. Instead, British agency houses bought opium from the EIC in India, shipped it to China and then paid the receipts from the sales into the Company treasury in Canton in return for bills payable in India or London. This system was known as the

were under considerable financial pressure and were frequently unable to purchase European goods, thus slowing down or freezing trade in the ports. In addition, the goods Europeans bought and sold were often subject to heavy customs duties and tariffs. The overall result was an uncertain and inefficient trading system.⁸⁸

These inefficiencies began to have strategic consequences for European states in the eighteenth century, most notably for Britain. By the late 18th century tea accounted not only for the entire profit of the East India Company (EIC), which held the monopoly on British trade in China, but also for one-tenth of England's entire revenue (Greenberg, 1951).⁸⁹ Despite the strategic need for a stable tea-trade there was no institutional mechanism to address the grievances of the European traders who could not even meet with local Chinese officials in order to resolve their differences. Short of sending notes to the local viceroy and hoping they were sent on to Beijing, no formal mechanism existed for petitioning the central government. Furthermore, even when European traders were allowed to visit Beijing, they were treated according to the traditions and laws of Chinese international society. In their capacity as private merchants, European traders did not meet the conditions for an official embassy and as a result found themselves unable to communicate with the Chinese regime. The overall result was that European traders were participants in a system over which they had no control or influence. As the tea-trade

“country trade” (Morse, 1910).

⁸⁸ In 1764, the Qing dynasty ordered its most restrictive measures yet, which not only increased customs duties but further burdened the Cohong traders with which the Europeans were forced to trade. As more of the Cohong went bankrupt there were even fewer vectors along which European goods could enter the Chinese market, or Chinese goods could leave.

⁸⁹ So important was the East India Company for the British national interest that the Pitt government passed a number of new measures to promote it. In 1783, duties on tea were reduced from 120% to 12.5% in order to defeat smuggling. In 1784, the India Act was passed, which led to the setting up of a special governmental Board of Control that directly connected the prime minister's cabinet to the EIC's administrative structure. These changes in policy directly flowed from a new assertiveness in British imperial policy that resulted from the loss of its largest settler colony in 1783 (Hilleman, 2009).

became increasingly important for Britain's overall well-being, the British government became convinced that nothing short of an edict from the Chinese emperor could change this trade dynamic. In order to acquire this edict, and to preempt any future problems, Britain decided to seek out permanent representation at Beijing, and to finally draw the Chinese state formally into the European system of international relations. Following a failed attempt in 1788,⁹⁰ an official diplomatic mission left from England in 1792.

Although China was willing to receive an official embassy mission, it was soon clear to both British and Chinese representatives that China would not easily adapt to European international society. As I show in the remainder of this chapter, China rejected the standards of Westphalian diplomatic practice from the time of the first British embassy under Lord George Macartney until the conclusion of the *Arrow* war and the occupation of Beijing in 1861. Two prominent elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice in particular were rejected by the Chinese government: diplomatic ceremonial and protocol in which the equality of European states was recognized; and the establishment of permanent resident embassies at Beijing. For the remainder of this section, I will present a number of instances of Chinese rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In particular I focus on China's response to three official embassies sent by Britain between 1794 and 1859. These three instances are selected for a number of reasons. First, Britain was the first European state to try to formally incorporate China into European international society.⁹¹ Second, it was as a consequence of Britain's second

⁹⁰ The ambassador died en route.

⁹¹ Although Russia had interacted with China on a number of occasions, it treated China as an alien presence on its borders and did not attempt to integrate China into broader European affairs. Conscious of the importance of Russia for security on its northern frontiers, Russia was granted a certain amount of special treatment by the Qing. Russia maintained treaty relations, sent missions, and was allowed special religious, commercial, and educational privileges in Beijing. Russian traders were allowed to come to Beijing every three years and their goods were exempt from duty and were permitted to stay longer than the

embassy mission in 1816 that China formally banned all Western states from sending missions to Beijing. Third, considering that Britain was the most powerful and the most active Western state in the region during this period, China's hostility toward this state is even more puzzling than its interactions with other states. Fourth, these accounts focus directly on issues of diplomacy *qua* diplomacy. While relations between China and Europe became extremely complex (and violent) in the period under consideration, these interactions did not have the official diplomatic quality of the embassy missions I focus on. In other words, although Britain did negotiate with China over issues in this period, these three instances were the only time Britain tried to get China to explicitly engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice. Last, I use these three instances to give a fine-grained and specific account of Chinese rejection of international society. In offering these detailed accounts I can give a clearer sense of the particular and seemingly-idiosyncratic rejection of the specific elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice outlined above. That said, I do consider the relevance of other events, and do draw comparisons to other embassies, but only to better clarify the causal processes under investigation.

The Macartney Mission of 1793. China's first rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice occurred with the arrival of the British Macartney mission in 1793. A career diplomat, George Macartney had been sent by the British government to negotiate and finally resolve the trade problems between China and the EIC. He was tasked with getting the Qing to sign a commerce treaty, open new ports, grant new land to the EIC, abolish the abuses of the Canton system, and to allow the opening of new

usual eighty days. Priests were also allowed to come every ten years to administer to foreigners at court. The Russians were also entitled to a permanent mission at Beijing. However, as is explained below, this was not an official diplomatic mission. For more see Hsü (1964).

markets.⁹² Ultimately the mission was to turn the trade balance around and, once this was successfully accomplished, to establish full diplomatic ties in order to maintain the new relationship. At the end of the mission, Macartney was expected to leave his secretary, Sir George Staunton, behind as a resident minister (Berg, 2006).

Macartney arrived at the port of Taku on in July 1793.⁹³ Here he was met by two “chief Mandarins” who were assigned to him and aided in the mission’s preparations to travel into the Chinese interior. As he sailed up the Great Canal to Beijing in August, Macartney was treated with considerable honor and respect. At various points along the journey, Macartney’s mission observed thousands of people assembled along its banks. In one instance, “both sides of the river were lined for nearly a mile in length with the troops of the garrison, all in uniform, accompanied by innumerable flags, standards, and pennants” (Macartney, 1963, p. 78). Despite the lavish treatment that the embassy received, for most of their journey upriver the Chinese refused to discuss anything substantive with Macartney. As the retinue came closer to the capital, the Chinese representatives, “with the appearance of more formality than usual,” brought up the issue of the *koutou* in order to show Macartney how to practice it (Macartney, 1963, p. 84). This was the first time the *koutou* had been brought to Macartney’s attention and it appears from his account that neither side had initially prepared for it to be an issue. As the Macartney mission neared Beijing over the next six days, the issue was repeatedly brought up by Chinese representatives who refused to discuss any other issue. When Macartney finally arrived at the capital, he was asked again if he would *koutou* when he

⁹² The embassy was not just a diplomatic enterprise. There was also a desire to learn as much as possible about the Qing regime in China, and to obtain a tea plant (Cranmer-Byng 1963).

⁹³ Located on the Peiho River (the modern-day Hai), Taku was the port from which all foreign representatives of the Chinese tributary-system traveled to Beijing.

finally met the emperor. Macartney sent an official note stating that he would not. This note was sent ahead of Macartney's retinue to the Manchu palace beyond Beijing at Jehol, where Macartney was expected to finally meet with the emperor. Immediately upon arriving at the palace on 8 September Macartney was visited by "several Mandarins of high rank." They once more pressed Macartney on the *koutou* ceremony. According to Macartney's diaries this meeting and subsequent meetings over the next two days focused exclusively on this issue. Macartney proposed modifications to the existing ceremony which might satisfy both parties. Instead of performing the traditional *koutou*, he would bend down on one knee and kiss the emperor's hand. Macartney had explained that this was similar to the ceremony that he performed for the English king. The Chinese agreed to this rite, but refused Macartney the right to kiss the emperor's hand or to place his (Macartney's) credentials in the emperor's hands.

On September 14, Macartney was roused at 4am and was escorted to the court in order to participate in the ceremony. Macartney was directed to a large and highly decorated tent. Inside there were over six hundred attendees including Manchu princes and bannermen, tributary princes, envoys from other states, Chinese regional viceroys, and ministers from the court; all lined up according to rank (Singer, 1992). Macartney writes that when the emperor passed, the British attendees:

"paid him our compliments by kneeling on one knee, whilst all the Chinese made their usual prostrations. As soon as [the emperor] ascended the throne I came to the entrance of the tent, and holding in both my hands a large gold box enriched with diamonds in which enclosed the King's letter, I walked deliberately up, and ascending the side-steps of the throne, delivered it the Emperor's own hands, who, having received it, passed to the

minister” (Macartney, 1963, p. 122).

Macartney’s last-minute decision to place his credentials into the hands of the emperor was a violation of the agreement that he had reached with the Chinese. It was also in express contravention of Chinese court practices, which did not allow anyone to touch the emperor. Following the ceremony, Macartney and his entourage were invited to sit on the emperor’s left at the official banquet. In total, the symbolic performance that Macartney performed was an amalgam of traditional European and Chinese rites, and was a compromise that neither side liked (Wang, 1993).

The day after the ceremony Macartney met with the emperor’s Grand Secretary and Chief Minister but could not get the negotiation to move to any of the issues he had been sent to discuss. At this point, Macartney began to get the impression that there would be no substantive negotiations to be had (Singer, 1992, p. 74). On September 17, the entourage was once more roused early in the morning, this time to attend at the ceremonies for the emperor’s birthday. This was a far more lavish display than had occurred at the tent.⁹⁴ After this ceremony, the entourage was escorted outside and attended a banquet. The following day Macartney was once more called upon to attend to the emperor; this time at an elaborate theater show held in the inner palace. Before the performance the emperor sent for Macartney directly. When he finally met him, Macartney asked the emperor for some consideration of the issues of the British mission but this request was ignored. Instead Macartney was given some gifts to return to Britain

⁹⁴ The attendees all stood in a courtyard that had been draped in cloth. As soon as the emperor - invisible to the crowd behind a screen - was on his throne, whips were cracked nine times. Following this all the attendees were moved into a vast hall inside the palace. The hall was furnished with musical instruments and decorations, to which was added a choir of eunuchs. As the music rose in intensity, “the whole court fell flat on their faces...[and when the music commanded it] all the dwellers upon China earth there present, except ourselves, bowed down their heads and prostrated themselves upon the ground at every renewal of the chorus” (Macartney, in Singer 1992, p. 78).

and was sent away. He was told that the birthday celebrations were over and that he had to return to Beijing to await the return of the emperor.

The ceremonies concluded, Macartney thought more serious issues of business could now finally be dealt with. However, at Beijing the diplomatic climate had turned markedly chilly. Macartney was soon ordered to take the imperial edict that had been memorialized by the emperor and depart from the city. Any attempt to have another meeting with the emperor or to negotiate further was ignored. Macartney wished to remain, and to leave Staunton behind as ambassador but his requests were treated with hostility. It was at this point that Macartney became conscious of the fact that his refusal to concede to the carry out the ritual was the cause of the growing tension he was experiencing. Macartney even became concerned that he might be physically coerced into performing the ritual. Thus he left Beijing with only an Imperial edict that offered no trade concessions and “a broad hint to leave as soon as possible” (Rockhill, 1897b, p. 633). Macartney considered his mission a failure. He had failed to meet any of the substantive goals regarding trade.⁹⁵ This may have been beyond Macartney’s ability to solve because, as already noted, the Chinese government had little interest in trade. What puzzled Macartney even more was the degree to which the dispute over the *koutou* had come to dominate all of his interactions with Chinese representatives. What had begun as a minor issue when Macartney was in Taku, had expanded to become the *only* issue which Chinese representatives – including senior ones – talked to Macartney about. The Chinese were unwilling to allow Macartney to interact with emperor in a manner

⁹⁵ In fact Macartney did negotiate better terms for Britain on a number of minor issues such as duties on British cargo, increased freedom of movement for merchants, the setting-aside of land for sick Englishmen, permission to trade with non-Hong merchants; and the permission to be taught Chinese. These conditions were negotiated with the governor of Zhejiang (at the order of the emperor) outside the city.

consistent with Westphalian diplomatic practice, and instead tried to force Macartney into engaging in their diplomatic practices.

The Amherst Mission of 1816. Chinese rejection of Westphalian diplomacy was even more pronounced during the embassy mission of Lord William Amherst in 1816. Amherst had been sent with much the same mission as Macartney: to promote commerce and to establish formal diplomatic relations.⁹⁶ However, this time the issue of the *koutou* was to be even more intractable than before. Disputes over this issue quickly led to a whole-scale collapse of Amherst's mission, and ultimately the banning of all Western foreign representatives by China.

The Amherst embassy was formed by the British government in response to a petition from the EIC to find a diplomatic solution to continuing trade problems in Canton. This time, the directors of the EIC and Amherst were aware of the role that the *koutou* had played in influencing the Qing reception of Macartney and were also aware that a Russian embassy had failed on similar grounds in 1805.⁹⁷ With this in mind, the EIC were even more explicit in Amherst's orders than they had been with Macartney's, and requested that the *koutou* not be allowed to interfere with the possible trade deals that might be struck. The EIC directors accepted, however, that Amherst was an official Plenipotentiary-in-Extraordinary and representative of the Crown and as such any final decision would be left to him (Ellis, 1818, p. 63-77). Unlike Macartney – who had been taken by surprise when the issue began to take on political significance – Amherst fully

⁹⁶ Shortly after Macartney returned home, Britain was embroiled in the first of its coalition wars against France. This put much of its imperial policy on hold and it wasn't until Napoleon was decisively defeated in 1815 that it returned to its policy of active imperialism.

⁹⁷ Although previous Russian ambassadors had been willing to engage in the *koutou* (see below), in 1805 the Russian ambassador had refused. As a result the Qing had refused to admit the mission (Letter from Amherst to Foreign Office, 8 August 1816, FO/17/3).

expected that “the Tartar Court Ceremony [was] likely to form part of [his] earliest disruptions with the Chinese government.”⁹⁸

Amherst’s mission appeared without notice at the Chinese port of Taku in late July 1816. There Amherst was met by some low-ranking Qing officials who accompanied him and his retinue of fifty-four upriver to the city of Tientsin. At Tientsin Amherst met some officials from the Qing court who immediately brought up the issue of the *koutou* ceremony, asking whether or not Amherst would be willing to practice it. Amherst tried to put the Chinese delegation at ease and distract them from the issue, promising that he “should be prepared to meet with the Emperor in the most respectful manner.”⁹⁹ Yet any attempts to change the topic of discussion or ignore it until reaching Beijing, as Macartney had done, was not possible. The Qing representatives returned to the *koutou* issue repeatedly and each time Amherst offered to perform the same ritual in front of the emperor that Macartney had – i.e. a modified version of the European ritual that did not involve prostrations or head-knockings – he was rebuffed by the Chinese representatives, who claimed that Macartney had performed the full *koutou* ritual when he had visited.¹⁰⁰ At this point Amherst thought it wise to make some concessions and offered to perform a ritual bending of one knee nine times in front of the throne of the emperor. The Chinese were anxious about this ritual and asked that it be visually rehearsed in front of them; which Amherst’s son did. The Chinese intimated that this might be sufficient. Yet, two days later two senior Chinese delegates was then told that “the Emperor could not be approached in any manner than in the mode practiced at

⁹⁸ Amherst to Foreign Office, 8 August 1816, FO/17/3.

⁹⁹ Amherst to Foreign Office, 8 August 1816, FO/17/3.

¹⁰⁰ This claim was declared as “a complete falsehood” by George Staunton, a member of Amherst’s embassy who had also traveled with Macartney as a young boy.

his own Court” and if Amherst refused to acquiesce then there would be less than in a “one in ten thousand” chance of meeting the Emperor.¹⁰¹ The embassy was moved to the city of Tongzhou and met by the Emperor’s brother and the President of the Tribunal Ceremonies who had not come to “treat with us upon the subject of the ceremonial, but merely to instruct us in the performance of it.” Adopting one of the solutions of Macartney, Amherst offered to perform the ritual if a mandarin of equal rank performed it in front of a picture of the English Regent, Prince George.¹⁰² He was informed by one of the representatives, “that the established usage of the Chinese Court could not be dispensed with and he added, after some high and haughty language, that as there was only one Sun in the firmament, so there was only one Sovereign in the Universe, the Emperor of the Heavenly Empire.”¹⁰³ Amherst remained steadfast that he could not perform the *koutou*, sending a letter to the emperor to that effect. After five days Amherst finally received the order to proceed directly to Beijing. Amherst took this as a sign that the Qing had relented on the issue.

However, at Beijing the Qing rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was even more acutely realized. Upon arrival, Amherst was treated with little of the courtesy Macartney had received. Instead, Amherst describes “transactions of an extraordinary nature, so little to be accounted for by the usages of European Courts.” Unlike the description of “decency and regularity” recorded by Macartney, Amherst’s account described scenes of, “hurry and confusion...irregularity, and disorder, insult and inhumanity, and almost of personal violence sufficient to give the Court...the manner, character, and appearance of a Tartar Horde.” Instead of entering the main gate, the

¹⁰¹ Amherst to Viceroy of Pecheli, 8 August 1816, FO/17/3.

¹⁰² As Prince of Wales, George was regent from 1811 until he assumed full authority as George IV in 1820.

entourage was brought through a dangerous side entrance at night. Instead of the plush apartments which had been offered to Macartney, Amherst was brought to a “mean and dirty dwelling.”¹⁰⁴ Amherst found the overall treatment of his mission humiliating and intimidating, and felt that his embassy was treated with considerable public disrespect. This was a clear rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. Most significantly, immediately upon arrival in the early hours of the morning, Amherst was ordered to meet with the emperor. While he was preparing for this another message appeared ordering Amherst to the immediately meet the emperor. Amherst refused this order, arguing that he was not prepared. As a result of his refusal, and to his surprise, Amherst was summarily dismissed and his entire entourage were ordered to immediately leave Beijing.

Even more than in the case of Macartney’s mission, the *koutou* issue had plagued the negotiations between Amherst and the Chinese and had resulted in the mission’s dismissal. Even worse, when Amherst returned to his ship he found a note waiting for him from the Chinese emperor ordering the British to send no more embassies. Not only had Amherst failed in his diplomatic mission, his refusal to *koutou* had *worsened* diplomatic relations between the two states.¹⁰⁵ Just like the Macartney mission, Chinese intransigence about the practice of Westphalian diplomatic – most notably surrounding the issue of the *koutou* – had interfered with Amherst’s ability to execute his mission. However, the conflict was even more acute than it had been when Macartney had visited. While it took some time into his mission before Macartney and his Chinese interlocutors

¹⁰³ Amherst to George Canning, 10 February 1817, FO/17/3.

¹⁰⁴ Amherst to George Canning, 7 March 1817, FO/17/3.

¹⁰⁵ In a letter to the British regent the emperor explained that there was no reason for future embassies as it was clear that foreigners struggled to perform the ceremony of the *koutou*. This, combined with the fact that the “Empire does not value things brought from a distance...all the extraordinary and ingenious productions of your country,” meant that the British monarch need not suffer the burden of sending any more ambassadors (Amherst to British Prince Regent, 7 January 1817, FO/17/3).

slowly came to the mutual realization that the *koutou* was likely to become a sticking point in negotiations, in the case of the Amherst mission it was the dominant topic of negotiation from the moment Amherst first met with Chinese representatives. In fact, of the letters and reports that Amherst sent back to India and Britain that I have studied, discussion of the *koutou* accounts for over 75% of the content. Trade – the ostensible central purpose of the mission – was never brought up as a topic of negotiation at all. This was not because Amherst was uninterested in fulfilling his mission, but because both he and the Qing representatives could not agree to move on to any other issues of discussion until the dispute over the *koutou* ceremony was resolved. The result was deadlock and bad-feeling. Once more the Qing regime had refused to engage in the ceremonial and ritual elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice. Indeed, in order to prevent going through such a negotiation again, the Qing banned all Western embassies from visiting Beijing. Therefore, due to disputes over diplomatic ceremonial and protocol, China had effectively isolated itself from European international society. This had happened at the exact moment that European powers were becoming more powerful and aggressive in the region.

From Amherst to the Arrow War of 1861. The Qing rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice and its turn towards isolationism was not without consequence for China. In the first place, repeated Chinese demands for the public recognition of the emperor's putative superior position had poisoned European public opinion toward China. Whereas the imperial system of China had been held up as the exemplar of good governance in intellectual circles in Europe for much of the 17th and 18th centuries, from the late-18th century onward China was increasingly viewed as a despotic and decaying

state, with – as the repeated disputes over the *koutou* indicated – ideas above its station.¹⁰⁶ In light of China’s repeated “bad” behavior popular opinion of the Chinese empire had considerably declined throughout Europe. At the official level, Britain thought that China’s behavior was generally indicative of a hostile attitude toward British trade and interests in the region. Amherst thought that China’s demands were incredible, writing that “it would have been a humiliation to accept an audience on the terms proposed.”¹⁰⁷ While it might be considered acceptable that Japan or Siam allow their envoys to *koutou*, Amherst would refuse “any comparison to be drawn between the King of Great Britain and the feeble states which surrounded the Chinese Empire.”¹⁰⁸ This sentiment was shared by the British public who, already offended by the treatment of the first embassy, turned decisively against China following Amherst’s return (Graham, 1978). This shift in British opinion regarding China was compounded by a second issue: the unresolved state of diplomatic affairs between the two states. At the exact time that British elite and mass opinion was shifting decisively toward treating China in a more aggressive manner, China had isolated itself.

In addition to the collapse of official diplomacy, the central conflict of interest between Britain and China – trade – was no closer to being resolved. Having given up on resolving this issue through negotiation, Britain finally declared war on China in 1839. Although the scholarly consensus is that the Opium War (1839-1842) was triggered by the British desire to alleviate its trade problems, it is worth noting how central the *koutou* dispute had become in framing the conflict. Observing events from afar, former US

¹⁰⁶ China had been held up as the ideal form of a rational state in the eyes of philosophers such as Voltaire and Leibniz, who were impressed by the bureaucratic sophistication of the Chinese empire (Hilleman, 2009).

¹⁰⁷ Amherst to George Canning, 22 March 1817, FO/17/3).

diplomat, Secretary of State, and President John Quincy Adams considered the Chinese demands for the *koutou* to have been “insulting and degrading” and the sole cause of the war (quoted in Hevia, 1993, p. 61).¹⁰⁹ The war was a decidedly one-sided affair. In June 1840, British forces reached the coast of China. By 1842 they had taken Shanghai and were traveling through the Chinese interior along the Yangtze River. As British forces approached Tientsin, the Chinese government finally agreed to come to terms. The war ended with the Treaty of Nanking, signed on 29 August. The treaty established five ports for British trade: Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Nongpo and Shanghai. Britain also received Hong Kong, indemnity payments, a tariff agreement which meant that China could not unilaterally change tariffs, a guarantee of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status for Britain, and British consular jurisdiction over all British subjects in China.

While the war settled the Sino-British conflict over trade, tensions remained between both states.¹¹⁰ While it was far more comprehensive than any previous agreement, this treaty still left some issues – such as the status of the opium trade and the

¹⁰⁸ Amherst to Viceroy of Pe-che-lee, 8 August 1816, FO/17/3.

¹⁰⁹ Adam’s comment aside, the war probably had three interconnected causes. Firstly, Britain’s balance of trade deficit – which both Macartney and Amherst were sent to alleviate – had become more pronounced. The solution this problem had been found in the second factor leading to hostilities: the illegal opium trade into China. Before 1767, opium was only a small trade into China; no more than 200 chests per year. By 1800, this had increased 1000% to 2000 chests. As the “country trade” (as it was known) became more lucrative the tax returns it generated became important for the crown. Taxes collected on Chinese tea rose from £600,000 in 1796 to £3.3 million in 1833 (Compilation Group for the “History of Modern China” Series, 1979). The effects on the Chinese state were immense. Not only did drug addiction become a serious problem across all social classes, the state lost much of its wealth. One estimate suggests that one-fifth of all silver in circulation in China between 1821-40 – approximately 100 million dollars’ worth – was drained from China (Compilation Group, 1979). This reduced the flow of money into state coffers and also further impoverished the peasants who, because they were paid in coppers but were obliged to pay taxes in increasingly scarce silver, were basically subject to huge tax increases. The last factor leading to hostilities was the abolition of the EIC in 1834 and its replacement by an organization of 109 separate companies, each of which had close ties to the Foreign Office (The East India Company and China Association was formed in 1836). These three factors contributed to increased tension between China and Britain. The actual spark that led to war was the Chinese attempt to ban the opium trade into China.

¹¹⁰ It is worth reminding the reader that at least some of these tensions were driven by the increased jingoism and racism of European international society and the competition over territories in Asia and (later) in Africa.

right of diplomatic representation – unresolved. Although the Treaty of Nanking allowed Britain (and other European states) to post representatives, these representatives only operated at the periphery of the Chinese empire, and were unable to communicate directly with the central executive.¹¹¹ In fact, as I show below, the Chinese government was willing to trade away territorial rights on the edges of the empire *instead* of allowing foreign resident embassies at the capital. This trade-off resulted in an international relationship between China and other powers that was mediated by local regional governors. These governors made decisions that could have considerable strategic consequences for the Chinese state. Small local disputes could easily escalate into much larger crises.¹¹²

The inadequacy of this arrangement became apparent on 5 October 1856 when the *Arrow*, a ship crewed by Chinese sailors but flying under a British flag, was stopped by the Chinese navy. The crew was imprisoned and the ship impounded. When the Chinese government refused to apologize for the incident, the British Governor-General used this as a pretext to push the local Chinese governor to allow British traders into Canton city, as per the conditions of the Treaty of Nanking (Graham, 1978, p. 304). This local dispute triggered a sequence of events which escalated into the *Arrow* War.¹¹³ In 1857 British forces destroyed the bulk of the Chinese navy in a sequence of engagements. When this proved unsuccessful in forcing the Chinese to come to terms, James Bruce, 8th Earl of Elgin, was sent by the British government to end the war and find a settlement. Lord Elgin arrived in Canton and immediately led a successful assault on the interior of the

¹¹¹ During the negotiations of the treaty the British representative Henry Pottinger ignored a Foreign Office order to press on to Beijing. Instead he allowed the treaty to be ratified in Nanking.

¹¹² For a detailed account of this period see Graham (1978).

¹¹³ This is sometimes also referred to as the Second Opium War, although opium was not the central issue

city. Following this, Elgin moved his forces to the Peiho River and stormed the forts at Taku in May 1858. It was not until his forces arrived at Tientsin, the last city before Beijing, that the Qing regime recognized that Elgin was likely to attempt to force entry to Beijing. In face of this, they met with him and signed the Treaty of Tientsin in June 1858.

Aside from the specific provisions dealing with trade, such as the legal rights of traders and so forth, this was the first treaty signed by China in which they conceded to allow the British to post a permanent resident ambassador in China. There were some limits to this concession. Originally Elgin negotiated for this ambassador to be stationed at Beijing. However, the Qing representatives with whom he negotiated pleaded that this representative reside at Shanghai instead.¹¹⁴ Although Elgin saw this concession as an important one, he nonetheless decided that there was little functional difference between having the ambassador reside at one city over the other. Thus, Elgin advised the incoming British ambassador to accept residence at Shanghai and not to press the Chinese on the issue of Beijing.

The incoming ambassador was Elgin's brother, Frederick Bruce. His first task was to travel to Beijing in order to exchange ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin with the Chinese emperor. After this he was to return to Shanghai (Graham, 1978). Bruce, accompanied by a naval squadron, arrived at Shanghai in May 1859 and was surprised to be met by Chinese commissioners, who appeared to have been waiting for the squadron. The Qing commissioners (the same who had ratified the Treaty of Tientsin) requested that the ratification ceremony be moved from Beijing to an already-existing

under dispute.

¹¹⁴ Elgin received a note from American and Russian ministers that the Chinese envoys would be executed

Treaty port. When Bruce refused this request, he was then asked if the mission could make its way to Beijing along a land route that twisted around the city and came from the north, as opposed to the southern entrance through the main gate on the Peiho river. They also asked that the mission enter without banners any escort which might “illustrate the power and prestige of Western arms” (Graham, 1978, p. 367). However, Bruce had been given clear instructions to head to the mouth of the Peiho and travel to Beijing from there. He had also been instructed that upon reaching Beijing he was not to engage in “any ceremony, or any form of reception, which might be construed into an admission of inferiority on the part of Her Majesty in regard to the Emperor of China” (Banno, quoted in Graham, 1978, p. 367). When Bruce reached the Peiho in late June he found the forts along its banks occupied by Chinese troops, and the mouth of the river blocked with iron barriers. After a few days of discussion with his advisors, Bruce decided to remove the barriers and shell the forts. However, once the first barrier was removed the British found themselves under withering Chinese cannon-fire. After a full day’s engagement, which involved an unsuccessful attempt to storm the forts from land, the British forces had lost over 500 men dead and 400 wounded.

The Qing decision to bar entry to Beijing was to have terrible consequences for the regime. When news of the battle reached the British parliament and press there was universal outrage. Although Bruce was condemned for his crude diplomacy, there was unanimous support for a complete attack on China (Graham, 1978, p. 380). Lord Elgin returned to China and led a fresh assault up the Peiho River and stormed Tientsin. Yet even with the British approaching the gates of Beijing the Qing defended their ritual system. When Elgin demanded that he be allowed to hand the Queen’s terms directly to

if they conceded on this issue (Elgin, personal diaries, 29 June 1858).

the emperor and that a Qing refusal would be treated as a *casus belli* by Britain the negotiations broke down once more (Wang, 1971). British representatives were kidnapped and murdered by Qing forces. In response, A combined Anglo-French force stormed Beijing. In retaliation for the attack on Britain's national honor and the mistreatment of captives, Elgin decided that the Qing emperor would have to suffer the humiliation of the destruction of his famous summer palaces in Beijing (Elgin, personal diaries, 25 October 1860). The Qing emperor fled Beijing never to return.¹¹⁵ In command of the capital city, Britain and other European states now claimed full diplomatic rights. Resident embassies were established in Beijing, and European diplomats refused to engage in any ritual practices that suggested anything other than full sovereign equality.¹¹⁶ Chinese rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice on the seemingly-trivial issues of ceremonial and protocol and resident embassies had directly contributed to its own diplomatic isolation, to the escalation of the *Arrow* war, and ultimately to the deposing of Qing emperor.

Two Possible Explanations for the Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

Why did China reject Westphalian diplomatic practice for so long, even in the face of considerable aggression? In particular what was it about the issues of the *koutou* and resident embassies that led the Qing regime to contest them so violently? As has been shown, Qing intransigence on these issues resulted in diplomatic isolation, and later caused them to fight wars with a power they knew they would not likely beat. This

¹¹⁵ The Xianfeng emperor died in the Manchu summer palace in August 1861.

¹¹⁶ However, the British and the French no longer pressed their demand for an audience with the emperor. Bruce was instructed not to insist on an audience, but only to require to be acknowledged as British representative. The *North China Herald* agreed: "England can well afford to waive this ceremony; it cannot

behavior is extremely puzzling once we consider that the Qing regime was willing to concede on issues that seem much more valuable – such as land concessions in the form of treaty ports, or accepting the importation of opium. Furthermore, Qing intransigence did not occur in a political vacuum. China’s rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice inflamed the public and elite opinion of European international society at the exact time that policies of aggressive racist imperialism were becoming adopted by Europe. China’s rejection of traditional diplomacy made Europe more hostile, while simultaneously making it harder for China to interact with it. What explains China’s puzzling behavior at this time?

In this section I outline competing explanations and evaluate the evidence that decides for or against them. First, I assess the degree to which Qing rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was a function of strategic concerns. In particular I assess the degree to which Qing rejection was motivated by a desire to improve China’s general bargaining position, and/or its international security position. I find little evidence to support this argument. Although the Qing were unaware of the severity of rejecting Westphalian diplomacy in their initial interactions with Macartney, the strategic consequences of this rejection soon became clear. Yet even with British and French forces assembled close Beijing, the Qing emperor still refused to accept the standards demanded by Britain.

Second, I assess the degree to which rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was a function of the identity of the Qing regime. While there is some evidence to support this explanation I find that this explanation is not sufficiently supported due to the fact that the Qing obsession with identity practices was not consistent and that, under

afford to fight for it” (quoted in Wang, 1971, p. 618).

certain circumstances, the Qing were willing to waive engaging in the practices they demanded from the British missions. In particular I find that the Qing regime was only concerned with diplomatic practice when it was occurring at their courts in Beijing and Jehol. On the outskirts of their territory or beyond, they were willing to engage in different practices. This indicates they had a pragmatic relationship with these practices.

A Strategic Explanation for Qing Diplomatic Practice. The strategic literature would expect the Qing regime to have rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice if this rejection would somehow improve China's strategic situation. There are two variants of this argument. First, we would expect that the Qing regime rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice because it thought that this would somehow improve their bargaining position versus Britain (or at least not harm it). Second, this explanation would expect that the Qing regime rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice because it thought that doing so would send a signal to other states, and thus improve China's international security.

There is some small evidence that suggest that, at least initially, the Qing regime did not think there was any downside risk to rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. At the time of the Macartney mission the Qing had little interest in international trade and thus had little interest in improving relations with trading-states. Furthermore, the Qing did not really understand the concept of diplomatic missions in the same way that Europeans did (Zhang, 1993). Although Macartney thought that meeting with the emperor would be a precursor to negotiations, the Chinese mandarins leading Macartney to Beijing treated him as they would any other foreign envoy, and thus focused on the

ceremonial obligations Macartney would be expected to fulfill.¹¹⁷ In this sense, the Qing regime was not ‘bargaining’ with the British as it saw nothing to bargain over. That said, it appears that the Qing regime did not think that there was any security risk in rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. Although the arrival of “sea-barbarians” worried the Qing court – who saw it as a possible threat that might one-day destabilize and overthrow the dynasty (Cranmer-Byng, 1963, p. 10) – it is also clear that China had a poor understanding of exactly what the nature of the threat that they faced was. Qing records of the world beyond its immediate neighbors were poor and outdated. Western European countries were frequently confused with one another by China, and the politics of Europe was often assumed to have remained static since the first Portuguese embassies reached China in the 1600s. For instance, an official work drawn up in the 1750s claimed that Sweden and England were dependencies of Holland, and that they were also shorter names for the same country; that France was the same country as Portugal; and that Italy was actually the Holland of 1667 (Fairbank, 1942). Bargaining explanations thus do not get us very far in understanding early China’s behavior. Qing officials were not negotiating with British officials or trying to send signals to a wider world that they knew very little about. At most, a strategic account of early Qing behavior shows us that the regime thought there was little downside risk in rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. But it cannot tell us why they did it.

However, such a strategic account completely fails to explain the persistent

¹¹⁷ In fact, unknown to Macartney, the Qing regime had already decided its position on Macartney’s requests before he had even began his journey from Cochin China. On Aug. 3, three days before Macartney landed in China, the Grand Council submitted a draft edict for the emperor’s approval, which rejected all of the British embassy’s proposals (Singer, 1992, p. 24). In the Imperial edict that Macartney brought back to Britain, the Qianlong emperor explained: “your Ambassador petitioned my Ministers to memorialize me regarding your trade with China, but his proposal is not consistent with our dynastic usage and cannot be entertained. Hitherto, all European nations, including your own country’s barbarian merchants, have carried

rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice by China in later periods such as the time of the Amherst mission, and especially following the Opium War. Following Amherst's expulsion from Beijing in 1816, China forbade any more European embassies from coming to the capital. From a strategic perspective this is puzzling. While the Qing regime was uncertain about European intentions in the 1790s, by the late 1820s it would have been clear to the Qing leadership that refusal to formally engage with European powers would not make the problems it was having with these states go away. The country trade was having the dual effects of generating widespread opium addiction among the population and – due to the removal of silver from the state and the effect this had on real wages – creating widespread impoverishment. Yet despite these pressures, and even after after huge defeats of the Opium and *Arrow* wars, the Qing regime still refused to budge on issues regarding diplomatic practice. In particular, the Qing refused to alter their audience ceremonies, or to allow European envoys to reside in the capital. From the perspective of a strategic explanation such behavior is self-defeating. In short, although the Qing may not have considered the initial rejection of Westphalian diplomacy as a costly behavior, the continued rejection of Westphalian diplomacy is not reconcilable with traditional strategic explanations.

A Constructivist Explanation for Qing Diplomatic Practice. A second explanation for the Qing regime's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice is derived from the constructivist literature. From this perspective we should expect that the Qing regime rejected any practices that conflicted with the practices that were necessary to create the Qing identity. If a practice directly contradicted the Qing's Middle Kingdom identity then we should expect that the Qing refused to engage in this practice. We should

on their trade with our Celestial Empire at Canton" (Qianlong Emperor, 1792, Edict to George III).

expect that the Qing only adopted those practices that did not contradict this identity.

There is some evidence to support this explanation. As is discussed in much greater detail in the next section, the Qing dynasty in China acted in a way consistent with the Middle Kingdom Chinese identity. Although ethnically Manchu, the Qing quickly adopted the traditional Han identity of the supplanted Ming dynasty after they took over in 1644. While this identity was modified to incorporate distinctly Manchu elements, such as the topknot haircut, the Qing Middle Kingdom was recognizably Han Chinese in many of its practices. Furthermore, the Qing regime made sure to fastidiously adhere to the rituals and practices associated with this identity, of which the *koutou* was an instance. Qing disputes over issues of diplomatic practice thus appear, at first glance, to be consistent a traditional constructivist explanation. In order to maintain their self-identification, the Qing emperors defended – sometimes violently – their identity.

However, this stubborn defense of identity was much more conditional than it first appears. First, although the Manchu Qing did go to great lengths to adopt traditional Chinese imperial practices, they also upheld Manchu traditions and tried hard to protect the “Manchu Way”: the particular martial and cultural values and practices distinct to the Manchu. (They had only partial success – see below). Thus, the degree to which the Manchus became truly “sinicized” is a debate that has not been fully settled by historians, although the consensus appears to be that the Manchus maintained at least some element of difference from their Han subjects.¹¹⁸ Of course, on its own, this evidence does not mean that the Qing representatives who contested Westphalian diplomatic practice were not defending this particularly Manchu version of Chinese identity. Much stronger evidence against this explanation comes from the behavior of the Qing outside of their

Chinese dominions. While the Qing were fastidious practitioners of the Middle Kingdom identity *inside* China, it had a far more pragmatic and fluid relationship with identity practices elsewhere. The Qing Empire included not only China but also the territories of Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Shengjing, Heilongjiang, and the northern territory from which the Manchu ruling house came. In these non-Chinese territories the Qing *did not* engage in the same identity practices that they did inside China. During their domination of Tibet for example, the Qing emperor competed openly with the Dalai Lama in engaging in Tibetan legitimation practices. Instead of trying to impose Han traditions and legitimation practices the Qing just adopted the existing Tibetan ones. The Qing erected stelae and consecrated Tibetan Buddhist Temples. Similarly, in the Mongol areas that they controlled the Qing portrayed the emperor as the “new Kubilai” (Waley-Cohen, 1998, p. 342). Thus, the image the Qing portrayed was multi-faceted. To the Chinese they sought to portray themselves as Confucian sages and direct heirs to previous dynasties and famous emperors. However, to the the Mongols Qing emperors appeared as great khans; to Tibetans as “turners of the wheel of time” (Waley-Cohen, 2006, p. 2). If nothing else, this evidence shows us that the Qing regime saw the political utility of identity practices and engaged in at least some of them in a calculated way.

The Qing regime’s ‘pragmatic’ relationship to identity sometimes extended to diplomatic practice. For instance, in order to placate the interests of their powerful northern neighbor, the Qing did not distinguish between the diplomatic missions and the trade missions sent by Russia. Instead, it treated both as tributary missions. It was even flexible on the issue of resident embassies and in the late 1600s allowed the *E-lo-ssu kuan* (Russian Hostel) to be set up to house Russian visitors to the capital. While the

¹¹⁸ For a discussion of the literature see Elliot 2001, p. 26-32.

principal occupants of the *E-lo-ssu kuan* were priests or language students, in 1720 Russia was allowed to station a permanent minister responsible for Russian caravans at the hostel. However, while this building de facto operated as a Russian mission, it was *officially* recognized as a religious building. Its head was given the title of archimandrite of the Eastern Orthodox Church (Ssu-ming, 1960-1961). Similarly, the Qing regime was willing to compromise with Russia on issues of ceremonial and protocol. When Leon Izamailov appeared in 1721 he agreed to *koutou* to the emperor only if a Qing representative agreed to do the same to the Tsar when visiting Russia (Pritchard, 1943). Although technically – that is according to Chinese diplomatic practice – foreign kings were expected to *koutou* to Qing envoys, the Qing readily accepted this compromise. This evidence suggests two things. First, the Qing regime was willing to basically accept some of the functional elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice (such as resident missions) provided these elements were repackaged so as not to appear as official embassies. Second, although the Qing regime was immovable on issues of practice inside its borders, it could be very flexible on such issues when abroad.

In short, although some of the evidence supports a constructivist explanation, it is not sufficient to explain Qing behavior regarding diplomatic practice. Although the Qing regime does appear to have been considerably concerned with issues of practice, this concern does not seem to be motivated by a desire to create and recreate some ontological sense of self. On the contrary, the Qing were happy to make adjustments to routines or practices as long as it did not undermine projections of authority inside China. Yet while the Qing relationship to practice seems far more calculating than a constructivist explanation would expect, it is *not* calculating in the way much of the

strategic literature would suggest.

The Qing Narrative of Legitimation and the Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice

In order to explain why the Qing regime consistently rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice it is necessary to consider the role that the Qing regime's narrative of legitimation played in Chinese domestic politics and the way that this narrative bound the Qing regime. By understanding the political role of the Qing regime's "Middle Kingdom" narrative in domestic politics, we can understand why the Qing regime refused to engage in practices that contradicted this narrative. The Middle Kingdom narrative legitimated Qing rule on the grounds that the emperor was the link between the material world and the cosmic realm, and as such, was the most important figure in the world. This narrative was explicitly hierarchical and mandated that all states subordinate themselves to China, and that all sovereigns subordinate themselves to the Qing emperor. This subordination took the form of ritual acts of submission such as the *koutou*, which was practiced by embassies sent explicitly for this purpose. The Middle Kingdom narrative of legitimation, and the practices it mandated, had existed for two millennia, and had been adopted by every Chinese dynasty over this time.

The content of the Qing narrative of legitimation conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice by mandating practices in which (i) foreign representatives were expected to publicly subordinate themselves to the Qing emperor, and (ii) embassies were only expected to reside at the capital for a short time. I find that Qing regime was constrained into adhering to these practices because of the survival threat faced by the

regime. Although the Qing actively presented themselves as the legitimate successors of the Ming dynasty that they deposed in 1644, they were ethnically Manchu and thus distinct from the Han Chinese who made up the vast majority of China's population. While the Qing had initially upheld their right to rule through a combination of coercion and legitimation practices, by the time of the Macartney mission the regime could no longer rely on its own armed forces and faced threats from Han elites and an increasingly rebellious peasantry. In order to bolster their political rule the Qing increasingly relied on public displays of power and legitimacy. The most important of these was the *koutou* ceremony in Beijing, an event to which the most powerful (usually-Han) governors were invited to take part. Due to the threats to its survival, the Qing regime was constrained into engaging in this practice fastidiously. Therefore I find that due to the conflicting practices mandated by its narrative of legitimation, and the threats it faced to its survival, the Qing regime was "bound" by its narrative of legitimation into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

The remainder of this chapter shows how this explanation can account for China's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. First I unpack and describe the 'Middle Kingdom' narrative used by the Qing regime. Second, I describe the manner in which this narrative was practiced by the Qing regime. Third, I explain how certain elements of this practice conflicted directly with Westphalian diplomatic practice. Fourth, I outline the survival threats faced by the Qing regime in this period. Lastly, I present evidence that shows precisely how narrative binding lay at the heart of the diplomatic collapse between the Qing and British diplomats. In making this argument, and in order to better demonstrate the causal processes that were at work, I also include some instances of Qing

interaction with other members of international society.

The Content of the Qing Narrative of Legitimation. The Middle Kingdom narrative of legitimation used by the Qing regime was rooted in millennia-old traditions of Chinese empire. Manchu in origin, the Qing had invaded China in 1644, toppling and replacing the Ming dynasty. Despite the new Manchu ruling-class's foreign origins, inside China the Qing adopted almost wholesale the domestic narrative of legitimation that had been used by the Ming. Such adoption was typical of new imperial dynasties. The Ming, when they had come to power in 1368 had similarly adopted the narrative of the supplanted Yuan regime, as had the Yuan when they had replaced the Song. Thus the Qing were the inheritors of a narrative of legitimation with a pedigree that stretched back to the third century BCE.

At the center of this narrative was the person of emperor, whose rule was divinely sanctioned with a 'Mandate from Heaven.' While the emperor had absolute power over all of his subjects his role in society was more than just political. Since the time of the Zhou dynasty (founded c. 1046 BCE) the Chinese state had maintained that the emperor was the most important spiritual figure in the world: the Son of Heaven. This sacred personage was the link between the cosmos and the material plane. He was both a secular and a religious ruler, heir to millennia of tradition and custom, responsible for all events in his realm, and the center of political, social, cosmic, and moral order. There is no comparison to this level of traditional power in European history. Unlike European absolute monarchies, the emperor's right to rule did not imply a right to unrestrained behavior. On the contrary, "the emperor was obliged to respect the norms and forms imposed on him" (Gernet, 1987, p. xxii). The emperor had an obligation to rule, rather

than a right, and was heavily circumscribed in the actions he could legitimately take. All behavior, right down to the emperor's edicts, residences, calligraphy, seals, and rituals were carefully regulated. The stress on cosmic relationships was central to a Chinese political philosophy that saw man as part of nature, not in conflict with it, and that saw all nature as linked to heaven through the person of the emperor. This philosophy provided the ethical basis for the emperor's place in the social and political hierarchy of China. As the Son of Heaven it was the emperor's function to maintain the harmony between earth and the celestial realm. Failure to do so indicated that the emperor was unfit to lead.¹¹⁹

The Practice of the Qing Narrative of Legitimation. The primary method of creating and maintaining this narrative of legitimation was through the correct application and practice of a coterie of symbolic acts and rituals. The emperor demonstrated his right to rule through the studied and careful observance of rites, which themselves illustrated and reinforced social relations. In fact, disharmony and calamity was often blamed on the Emperor's inattention to rites.¹²⁰ The significance of this symbolic and ritual system was that even if no political actors really believed in the sacredness in such a myth and its attendant symbols and rites, their own actions or political outcomes could be *legitimized* by reference to them.

The branch of government responsible for the transmitting and maintenance of the ritual and symbolic system was the Board of Rituals (*li Pu*). This board was "responsible for the whole code of rites and ceremonies binding on all people irrespective of their position in society" (Cranmer-Byng, 1963, p. 120, fn. 32). It is worth noting that in terms of bureaucratic hierarchy, the Board of Rituals was considered more important than the

¹¹⁹ Indeed, part of the collapse of the Ming dynasty in 1644 had been explained by the imbalance in the natural order caused by the political rise of the eunuchs at the imperial court (Spence, 1990, p. 58-64).

Board of War, or the Board of Punishments (the departments of external and internal force, so to speak).¹²¹ These symbolic systems of control spread into all corners of the Chinese empire. The official editions of the *Daqing tongli* (*Comprehensive Rites of the Great Qing*) of 1759 and 1824 “affirmed the connexion [sic] between universal order and the ceremonies and customs observed by the dynasty” and were disseminated throughout the empire in help instruct subjects on the correct application of ritual (Bastid, 1987, p. 148). For example, when an imperial edict was received by officials, sticks of incense would be lit and rituals prostrations would occur in front of the seal of the sovereign (Gernet, 1987). Such rituals were more than just routinized bureaucratic procedures; emperors often took a personal interest in their application.¹²² At the informal level, the symbolic systems used by the Qing were complemented by the traditional customs and practices of Chinese society.¹²³ The Qing legal system was, according to Huang (1998, p. 202): “a combination of Weber’s ideal-types: of substantivist rule of absolute authority linked to patrimonialism with the routinized rule of law linked to bureaucratic government.” The legal system was dependent on both representations and practice. The order and stability of the regime was not just determined by brute material facts or legalism therefore, but rather by the reciprocal ritual expression of this order by

¹²⁰ This was a typical claim of rebellious groups; see below.

¹²¹ The rank-ordering of Qing bureaucracies along these dimensions might surprise political scientists who often tend to subscribe to a Weberian (1978) definition of statehood and consider the legitimate monopoly of force to be the ultimate determinant of government power.

¹²² In the middle of the Qianlong emperor’s (r. 1735-1796) reign three important texts were published regarding ritual: in 1756, *Daqing tongli* (Comprehensive Rites of the Great Qing); in 1761, the *Wuli tongkao* (A Comprehensive Investigation of the Five Rites); in 1766, *Huangchao liqi tushi* (Illustrated Regulations and Models of Ritual Paraphernalia of our August Dynasty) (Waley-Cohen, 2006, p. 69).

¹²³ Unlike Europe, formal law in Imperial Chinese society was far more limited in its application, and was predominately used in the domain of penal law and administration. Otherwise, unwritten law obtained. Family law and commerce were regulated through informal rules. Civil law was regulated through custom, and the Chinese state encouraged education in these customs as the foundation of political order. Ultimately, “Chinese unwritten law, belonging to the domain of the custom and usage, may to some extent have shared in the respect which the law in general enjoys in the West as the ultimate authority in the body

individuals in society.¹²⁴

The public expression of Qing rule was also used to impress upon any potentially unruly subjects. This symbolic domination was expressed in two ways. First, the Qing emperors made sure to monumentalize their achievements throughout the empire. The Qing regime dotted the countryside with monuments and plaques recording the power of the dynasty. For example, the summer palace at Chengde was designed as a miniature recreation of the Qing Empire where the famous structures of the imperial landscape were modified and replicated in miniature. Many more memorials and monuments focused on the military dimension of Qing rule. For example, the Qianlong emperor (r. 1735-1796) publicized his “Ten Complete Victories” across the empire.¹²⁵ Each of these victories was personally commemorated by the emperor in one of the many of thousands of essays attributed to him. These commemorative writings were prominently engraved on monuments in Beijing, written on hanging scrolls, or incorporated into tapestries. In addition, thousands of copper engravings depicting victories were distributed throughout the empire or given as gifts to dignitaries (Waley-Cohen, 2006). Memorial stela commemorating the wars were also produced in the hundreds in the eighteenth century. The Qianlong emperor not only sponsored these commemorations but took an interest in their exact mode of expression.¹²⁶ The purpose of these memorials was to make clear the

politic” (Hulsewé, 1987, p. 13).

¹²⁴ For more on the importance of image over substance in Chinese legal decisions see Waley-Cohen (2003).

¹²⁵ These victories counted three wars of conquest in Xinjiang, two wars on the Sichuan-Tibetan border to suppress rebellious minorities, two wars against Nepal, and wars in Vietnam, Burma, and Taiwan.

¹²⁶ Waley-Cohen (2006, chapter 2) gives two examples of the emperor’s personal interest in the commemoration of his victories. In one instance, Qianlong critiqued a poet’s account of one of the Xinjiang wars and gave explicit instructions on the edits that needed to be made. In a second instance, Qianlong had an observer sent to Sichuan province to ensure that the right spot be selected for a monument. The inspector was then required to send back details on the size of stone slabs being used so that the inscriptions could be designed accordingly.

reach and power of the Qing regime and, presumably, the pointlessness in resisting it. Indeed, whereas wars over neighbors were officially celebrated, suppression of rebellions was officially ignored. For example, although the Qing also put down various insurgent groups such as Muslims in Xinjiang and Gansu province, millenarians in Shandong province, and various minority groups these domestic wars were not publicly recorded and monumentalized by the Qianlong emperor and were in effect written out of official public memory.

The second way symbolic practices were used by the Qing regime was much more explicit and involved the active control of Qing subjects' behavior in public. The Qing regime often forced or obliged subjects to engage in symbolic actions that reinforced the Qing regime's authority. Shortly after the invasion of China, the Manchu regent ordered that Manchu dress and hairstyles – which included the distinctive shaved forehead and braided knot – were to be adopted by ethnically Han people who wished to obtain or retain government positions. This hugely unpopular edict was strictly enforced, as can be testified by the popular contemporary phrase, “lose your hair and keep your head.”¹²⁷ The knot not only allowed the Manchu to erode the spirit of the newly-conquered Chinese, but would also serve as a signal of obedience, and a common-knowledge generator of the power of the Manchu. Qing emperors also projected their power by occasionally embarking on royal tours of the provinces, most notably under the rule of the Qianlong Emperor.¹²⁸ Officially, the court offered non-political rationales for these tours. For example in the final two tours of the Qianlong emperor in 1780 and 1784, the tours were justified as inspections of the hydraulic standards of the regions visited.

¹²⁷ In many areas this order led people to directly take up arms against the Manchu (Spence, 1990, p. 39).

¹²⁸ Six times during his reign, the Qianlong emperor went on tours; in 1751, 1757, 1762, 1765, 1780, and

While the emperor certainly did visit such sites, these tours did not simply coincide with the construction or completion of any major projects in the regions visited. In fact, these ostensibly “administrative” tours coincided with the erosion of imperial legitimacy which had occurred in China; an erosion that had occurred primarily as a result of the popular suspicion that the emperor had taken Han concubines. According to Chang (2007, p. 395), in the informal social structure of Imperial China the rumors of salacious imperial behavior were reasonably harmless unless they threatened to erode “the court’s capacity to police the boundary between the realms of credible elite opinion and incredible popular rumors.” Thus, ostentatious and imposing tours helped to reinforce the perception of a powerful and all-reaching imperial court. Imperial displays of power did not end with grand tours. The Qing also engaged in large-scale military rituals and grand hunts.¹²⁹

The most significant of all the symbolic practices associated with Imperial power was the ritual *koutou* that took place at Beijing. Because the emperor was the supreme lord (*huang di*) of the material world, Chinese protocol demanded that all petitioners to his court ritually acknowledge this by engaging in various public rituals and ceremonies.¹³⁰ At the center of this ritual system was the emperor, whose authority was

1784.

¹²⁹ There were a number of military rituals used by the Qing. The Grand Inspection (*Dayue*) became a regular Qing ceremony after it was first introduced in 1636. Taking place outside Beijing or in the per-conquest capital of Shenyang, it involved tens of thousands of soldiers, each dressed in ceremonial colors, who were drawn from each of the eight banners (Manchu warrior nobles). Artillery pieces fired and music played as officers reported to the emperor at a temporary palace, constructed especially for the ceremony. At this point the emperor, dressed in ceremonial armor, rode out escorted by sixty officers and reviewed the troops. These troops would then drill in front of the emperor. In addition to this ceremony there were military rituals governing the dispatching of generals on campaign, triumphs, and hunts. For more on military rituals see Waley-Cohen 2006, chapter 4. For more on the Imperial hunts see Elliot 2001, chapter 4.

¹³⁰ There were five rites associated with the Emperor: auspicious rites (*ji li*) recognized the emperor as the Son of Heaven; felicitous rites (*jia li*) were concerned with the “south-facing ruler,” i.e. his rule over his domain; martial rites (*jun li*) recognized the emperor as warrior; guest rites (*bin li*) were about the

recognized by petitioners by their practicing the ritual *koutou* as part of any audience with him. The *koutou* involved kneeling three times and knocking one's head on the floor. Following this ceremony, the envoys might be brought to side door of the hall and would kneel in front of door through which they could ask questions to the emperor. After the conversation was over, the emperor could choose to have the tea with the envoys in another hall, or to dismiss them. Very often, envoys did not even get to meet the emperor, and were expected to simply be thankful for the "extension of imperial grace" (Hevia, 1989, p. 84). Throughout the entire ceremony, the superiority of the emperor was maintained. At no point in his movement around the audience venue did an ambassador ever occupy a center line or central space. Envoys were always to be seen as representing the orbit of all things around the emperor.

Petitioners and envoys came annually, usually arriving at times when many other petitioners would also be present, such as new years celebrations. At these audiences the Qing bureaucracy, Manchu noble bannermen, regional viceroys, tributary envoys, and hundreds of officials from the empire publicly and in full view of each other demonstrated their ritual subordination to the emperor. The *koutou* ceremony had two important effects. First, petitioners who *koutoued* publicly legitimized the emperor's authority. Second, it generated common knowledge regarding the scope and permanence of the Qing regime's dominion. If the most powerful people in the empire and beyond were seen to subordinate themselves to the emperor, then this acted as an effective means of suppressing any potential collective action. All highly-ranked civil and military officials would be obliged to have an audience with the emperor (Elliot, 2001, p. 163).

emperor's relationship with other lords, and; inauspicious or funerary rites (*xiong li*) were about the interment of the emperor or other significant people (Hevia, 1989).

Whether these rituals actually led to feelings of domination and submission is unknowable; however, the very public nature of these ceremonies at least helped to create the appearance of such a relationship, which from both a political and a social point-of-view was highly desirable to the Qing. Of course the opposite is true: refusal to engage in the *koutou* could massively undermine imperial prestige.

To summarize, a combination of symbolic practices, rituals, and traditions that purported to link the Qing emperor with the cosmos and the material plane, the past with the present, and to display the majesty of the emperor, were the cornerstones of Qing political rule. As Laurence Oliphant (1970, p. 276), an official who accompanied Lord Elgin to China in 1859, observed: “Any person who has attentively observed the working of the anomalous and altogether unique system under which the vast Empire of China is governed will have perceived that, though ruling under altogether different conditions, supported, not by a physical force, but by a moral prestige unrivaled in power and extent, the Emperor of China can say with no less truth than Napoleon, “L’Empire c’est moi”... Backed by no standing army...he exercises a rule more absolute than any European despot.”

The Practice of the Qing Narrative and its Conflict with Westphalian Diplomacy. The Middle Kingdom narrative also informed China’s relations with foreign powers. China was the center of what Michael Oksenberg (2001) has referred to as Eastern Regional System, more commonly known as the “tributary system.” The East Asian tributary system was built on the same political myths as the Chinese domestic system. All states participating in the tributary system understood and accepted the superior hierarchical position of the Chinese emperor over all other monarchs and states.

According to the norms of this system the emperor's demesne did not end at the borders of the Chinese state but was understood to extend across the entire world. Although the Chinese system recognized the existence of de facto independent states beyond its direct command, these states were still socially regarded as dependent on the emperor for cosmological harmony and, therefore, as obliged to recognize the emperor's superiority as his own domestic subjects were. States on the periphery of the Chinese empire were expected to periodically send representatives to publicly pay tribute to the emperor and recognize his overlordship of the world. This 'tributary' system worked so well for so long as there were constant incentives for both sides. In general, China had little interest in the outside world. It had no navy and trade was predominantly between internal "macro-regions" (Spence, 1990, p. 92-3). However, for the states bearing tribute – most of which were satellites to China – the system was the main medium through which all other diplomatic intercourse was conducted, such as alliances, negotiations, and threats of force. It also allowed for the trade of luxury goods, which were transported duty-free as part of an envoy's baggage trains and then sold at special markets which lasted from three to five days at the Residence for Tributary Envoys (Fairbank, 1942). The tributary system was valuable to the Chinese government as it upheld and reified not just the centrality of Imperial China, but also of the particular dynasty that ruled in China. The relationship between China and its tributaries can be summarized as follows: the Chinese valued the moral element of tribute; the tributaries valued the material benefit of security and/or trade. Although tributary states were free to pursue their own particular interests their behavior was understood to take place inside an international society in which all actors ostensibly recognized the power of the Imperial throne (Kang, 2012).¹³¹

¹³¹ A European analogy for the Chinese emperor might be the Holy Roman Emperor who was able to

The norms of this system directly contradicted those of European international society. Unlike European international society the Qing tributary system did not recognize the existence of legally and socially equal sovereign entities. However, although the potential for friction between these two systems was obvious, there is no *a priori* reason that these incompatible social and political claims needed to necessarily lead to conflict. I argue that it was not simply the content of these conflicting narratives that led to conflict, but rather the manner in which this content was *practiced*. Although many of the strict regulations regarding tributary visits – the limited the size of retinues, the route they would take to the capital, the locations where legations were to stay, the supplies they were to receive, when they were to pay homage to the emperor, banqueting, and when and how they were to leave – implied certain things about the Qing emperor, these practices could all be accommodated to Westphalian diplomacy. However, there were limits to such accommodations. Although diplomats could (and did; see below) turn a blind eye to some claims of imperial superiority, they could only do so as long as these claims were ambiguous. Macartney and his successors would not publicly engage in any act that explicitly acknowledged the overlordship of the Qing regime.

Therefore although the mandates of the conflicting narratives could be dodged or ignored to some degree, their conflict became acutely realized around the issues of the *koutou* and resident embassies. The *koutou* ceremony held entirely different meanings in European international society than it did for members of the tributary system. The ceremonial and protocol elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice entitled even the smallest state to ritual equality. As a consequence a public act of subordination could

leverage considerable power as the nominal head of the secular Christian empire, even while the Elector states were able to make considerable gains by making their votes conditional on particular policies.

only mean weakness, and would unacceptably diminish a state's prestige. By distinction, for members of the tributary system there was nothing inherently abject or servile about the *koutou* ceremony. It was culturally understood to grant agency to both the emperor and the participant. The fact that only certain actors were invited to *koutou* implied recognition of their status. To be asked to *koutou* could actually be an honor, not an insult (Hevia, 1994). Furthermore, the entire system of Chinese diplomacy itself – focused as it was on ceremony and short audiences – was an anathema to a Westphalian diplomatic practice that considered the stationing of a resident diplomat abroad as both a necessary method for engaging in continuous diplomacy, and the right of any powerful state. Therefore, although the tributary system and European international society differed in many ways, these conflicts only became apparent when certain *practices* associated with the these systems overlapped and conflicted. Whereas European states recognized no higher authority than their own sovereign, the tributary system explicitly placed China at its center. Whereas the European states saw equality of states as the underlying constitutional structure of the system (Reus-Smit, 1999), the Chinese system could not fully understand what equality might even imply, as there was no “outside” to their system. And on the issues of the *koutou* and resident embassies, the implications were clear. The practices mandated by the Middle Kingdom narrative conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice.

The Qing Regime's Survival Threats. While there were conflicts between the practices mandated by the Qing narrative of legitimation and Westphalian diplomatic practice, this does not fully explain why the Qing would reject Westphalian diplomacy, especially if we consider China's international situation at the time. As the 19th century

progressed the encroachments and increasingly aggressive policies of western states were becoming a serious threat. Yet by rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice, the Qing regime cut itself off from international society and antagonized already-hostile states. Why would the regime cling to a narrative of legitimation that was costing them so much? In order to understand this we must consider the threats to Qing regime survival. Possessed of weak institutions and few means of dealing with a divided elite and a restless populace, the Qing regime became increasingly dependent on its narrative of legitimation in order to maintain itself.

Since its founding in 1644 one of the most basic concerns for the Qing dynasty is what Mark Elliot (2001, p. 3) calls the “minority-rule question.” Even after migrating into China in the hundreds of thousands, the Manchu ruling-class was outnumbered by ethnic Han Chinese by approximately three hundred and fifty to one. The Qing regime was acutely conscious of the danger this represented to their regime and actively sought to defend itself from this potential threat. In particular the Qing worried about the possibility of collective action against them as the Qing considered factionalism and public dissent to have been the key cause in the Ming dynasty’s collapse.¹³² Yet the central bureaucracy inherited from the Ming, while useful for administrating the empire, was not especially useful for deterring factions.¹³³ In order to maintain their position the Qing originally

¹³² The Qing regime was particularly concerned with the Donglin and Fushe movements. The Donglin movement was a collection of academicians who presented themselves as Confucian loyalists to the Ming, and criticized the coalition of eunuchs and grand sectaries at the imperial court. The Fushe (Restoration Society) also claimed that it wished to see a return to traditional Confucian norms at the court - particularly with regards to civil service meritocracy. For more see Wakeman (1998).

¹³³ The Chinese administrative system in the 18th century was more developed than that of its European contemporaries. The central government had considerable ability to control and direct the population, the army, the economy and taxation, coinage, and religion (Gernet, 1987). Policy was devised by a Confucian scholar class and executed through six Chinese Boards (*pu*) of Government. These boards were ordered, from most to least important, in the following hierarchy: the Civil Office; Revenue; Rituals; War; Punishment; and Works. At the center of this bureaucratic system was the emperor who, in principle,

relied on two pillars of control: (1) large-scale symbolic demonstrations of Qing power, and (2) the institutional power of a distinctly Manchu army.

The first pillar of Qing rule has been covered in some detail above. The Qing clearly and publicly cast themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the Chinese Middle Kingdom. This narrative was reiterated throughout the empire. Not only did the Qing fill the public square with symbols and practices that legitimated their right to rule, they severely circumscribed the ability of dissenters from expressing alternative points of view. As soon as they took power, Qing emperors cracked down on the types of networks-of-opposition that had destabilized the Ming regime. Discussion critical of the regime was banned at academies, so that by the 1660s they were no longer sites of dissent. The Kangxi Emperor (r. 1662-1722) banned non-sanctioned public discourse and even minor infringements against the regime were punished.¹³⁴ Kangxi's successor, Yongzheng (r. 1723-1735) also reigned in a climate of suspicion and fear. In 1725 he published a *Discourse on Parties and Cliques (Pendang lun)* which warned officials not to join factions. In addition, many believed that he had sent spies throughout the empire to report on officials' public actions (Wakeman, 1998, p. 174). When a plot was uncovered to overthrow the emperor (on the grounds that Yongzheng had murdered his father) the emperor took the opportunity to publish a tract that defended and legitimated his rule. All degree-holders in China were required to read this tract.¹³⁵

exercised absolute power, and whose decisions were executed by the Confucian mandarins that surrounded him; in reality, the universal power of the emperor was an ideal rather than an empirical fact. For all of its bureaucratic sophistication, the Chinese administrative framework was quite thin and control was exercised with a reasonably light touch.

¹³⁴ For example, in 1713 a member of the Hanlin Academy, Dai Mingshi, was arrested and accused of sedition for using outlawed Ming titles in a letter to his student. As punishment for this infraction Dai and all his kinsmen were sentenced to death. The emperor mitigated this judgment by executing Dai and only exiling his family (Wakeman, 1998).

¹³⁵ The putative rebel, Zeng Jing, was spared on the grounds he had exposed more prominent plotters.

The second mechanism for upholding Qing rule was the installation of Manchu “bannermen” nobles in garrison cities across the Qing empire. Traditionally the military had been a weak actor in Chinese politics and was rarely used to put down rebellions. The sheer territorial size of the Chinese empire meant that force was generally an impractical method for maintaining authority, and had usually been used by emperors in an ad-hoc way to “show determination, embarrass enemies, punish defectors or simply defend themselves and their way of life” (Adelman & Shih, 1993, p. 4).¹³⁶ However, when they invaded the Qing found this system inadequate and replaced it with a new system that relied on bannermen. The Eight Banners system began as a organization responsible for mobilizing Manchu forces in the many territories that they controlled. Predominately composed of Manchus it also included some Mongols and Chinese soldiers. The Eight Banners were subdivided into a total of twenty-four ethnic banners, each of them led by a banner commander and approximately 20-30 other officers. Unlike the parallel Han Chinese elite, the banners were hereditary and their status rested on their martial ability, not their education and literacy. The bannermen were deployed in garrisons known as “Manchu cities” (*mancheng*) built inside already-existing cities. Most took the form of miniature cities inside cities, of which the Forbidden City in Beijing would be the archetypal example. By the time of Macartney’s mission there were approximately one hundred *mancheng*, nineteen of which were located in China proper.¹³⁷ Most of these had been founded in the early years of Qing rule and were laid out in

However, when Yongzheng’s successor took the throne he ordered Zheng executed and the tract was seized and destroyed (Wakeman, 1998).

¹³⁶ In the 2,000 years of the Middle Kingdom the use and purposes of force in Imperial China differed greatly than that of contemporary European states. Considering that the Chinese state had been successfully consolidated for over two millennia, force was not used to expand influence or to capture territory nearly as much as it had in Europe. For details on the successful consolidation of the Chinese Middle Kingdom, see Tin-bor Hui (2005).

overlapping networks of “chains” that all met at Beijing. The largest of these garrisons housed as many as ten thousand banner soldiers; the smallest: as few as fifty. Originally, the system had created and reinforced an effective apartheid system. Inside these walls the bannermen soldiers would be attended by the various other members of the banner institution.¹³⁸ The areas outside of these banner quarters (but inside the walls of a larger city) were populated by Han. The banner system was an essential part of the Qing’s governing apparatus for over a century and was instrumental in consolidating the Qing against domestic rivals and foreign threats.¹³⁹

As time went on, however, the Qing were not able to rely on the banner-system to maintain domestic control. This was for a number of reasons. First, even though the bannermen were used by Qing emperors to deter revolts by Han subjects, even they were not completely trusted. Following the accession of the Yongzheng emperor, for example, seventeen of the twenty-four commanders were replaced by followers considered to be more loyal. Generals were usually moved around with frequency; by the time of Macartney’s arrival the average tenure of a garrison general was less than three years.¹⁴⁰ This reduced the military effectiveness of the garrison system. This was compounded by a second issue: the general weakening of the bannermen in the later periods of Qing rule.

¹³⁷ The others were located in the non-Chinese territories of the Qing empire.

¹³⁸ The Eight Banners was a highly complex organization that combined various military, political and social functions. It included not only soldiers and officers, but also slaves, women and children, and the elderly. In general, for every one soldier there would be an additional nine other bannermen of some description, including family members. Comparing it to modern American institutions, Elliot (2001, p. 41) describes it as a “cross between the Marine Corps, the Civil Service, and the Veterans Administration, thickly overlaid with a combination of old-boy networks, political preferences, and partially articulated Affirmative Action policies.”

¹³⁹ The Qing Empire expanded in three phases. The first phase (1636-1681) saw the consolidation of the Qing against their internal rivals and ended with victory over the Three Feudatories. In the second phase (1681-1760) the Qing turned their attention to the northwest, in particular the Zungars, who had imperial ambitions of their own. In the third phase (1760-1799) the Qing consolidated their holdings (Waley-Cohen, 2006, chapter 1).

¹⁴⁰ Down from an average of about five and a half years in the 1740s (Elliot 2001, p. 143)

The apartheid system that initially reinforced ethnic distinctions eventually broke down so that by the early 1800s many Chinese had moved into the Inner City in Beijing. Furthermore, although the bannermen were supposed to extol martial Manchu values, the reality was that after a few generations, this was no longer the case. By the time of the Qianlong emperor, bannermen began to attract a reputation for a love of luxury, and shirked their martial responsibilities by training less frequently. Paradoxically, the increased bannermen interest in luxury came at the same time that bannermen became poorer. From the mid-1700s the banner system began to suffer from what was known as the “Eight Banner livelihood problem” (*Ch baqi shengji wenti*). Although roughly a quarter of state expenditures were set aside to pay the costs of the bannermen, a combination of population increases, corruption, and inflation meant that the money did not go as far. As bannermen received most of their income from the state and had – by the 1740s – few other sources of income, this impoverished many bannermen. The state tried to respond to this by increasing investment, but also had to cut back on the amount of banners held. By the late-1700s the Chinese banners had been effectively disbanded. While this allowed the regime to redistribute wealth, it further weakened the Eight Banners as an institution.¹⁴¹ As a consequence of this weakening the position of garrison general became somewhat of a retirement position for the old and feeble. The net effect of these changes was that by late 18th century real power in the regions had shifted to the office of the governor-general not the garrison general (Elliot, 2001, p. 139). A third reason that the banner-system was no longer as reliable was the resurgence of the Han elite. As the banners weakened the Qing regime began to rely on the Han elite in order to

¹⁴¹ Of the total number of 1,151 companies of banners, 266 (or 23%) were Chinese. For a detailed discussion of the weakening of the banner system see Elliot (2001) chapters 7 & 8.

run their Chinese possessions. In the provinces (*zhou*) and counties (*xian*) the official imperial administration existed next to local networks of former Han officials and mandarins. In these regions the exercise of power was managed by or shared with local power-holders (Schwartz, 1987). These power-holders often had influence in the other military force in China: the Green Standard Army. Drawn from the ethnic Han populace, this army was about three times the size of the Eight Banner armies and was commanded by a mixed staff of Eight Banner and Green Standard officers.

In short, although the Qing dynasty initially based the stability of their regime on two pillars – controlling the public square, and maintaining a military deterrent – as time went on the latter of these pillars began to crumble. Not only did the bannermen system weaken, but real power shifted to Han elites who controlled larger parallel armed forces. By the time Macartney visited the China there were real threats to the Qing regime's survival. This made the Qing more reliant on the first pillar in order to deter potential challengers. This was not an easy task. At exactly the time that European states were taking a formal interest in China the cracks in Qing rule were beginning to show. From the second half of the eighteenth century onward rebellions and uprisings became more common. These rebellions took a number of forms and included secret societies, peasant revolts, urban workers' riots, garrison mutinies, and full-scale uprisings. Regardless of the type, most were led by Han Chinese literati such as monks, disaffected bureaucrats, and doctors. Although these uprisings had many varied underlying causes,¹⁴² what is notable is that they were often justified in terms of reaction against illegitimate Qing rule. In 1786, the millenarian Eight Trigrams sect mobilized against the Qing province of Zhili

¹⁴² Market relationships in general may help to explain many uprisings. Peasant revolts were usually against local money-lenders, for example. For more see Wakeman (1997).

and expressly condemned the Qing as illegitimate (Naquin, 1992).¹⁴³ In 1813, the Eight Trigrams rebel Lin Qing actually attempted to storm the palace in Beijing. By the 1852 the situation was even more perilous when the Qing regime was wracked by the most severe rebellion of its history: the Taiping Rebellion. This rebellion was the most intimidating to the regime so far because its leader Hong Xiquan developed a revolutionary ideology that completely rejected the Confucian one,¹⁴⁴ and devastated huge swathes of the Chinese countryside, ultimately killing millions (Van de Ven, 1996).

Narrative Binding and Qing Diplomatic Practice: Assessing the Evidence

The conditions outlined above mean that the Qing regime was subject to narrative binding. First, the Qing regime relied on a narrative of legitimation that drew on ancient Chinese traditions regarding the absolute and eternal power of the emperor. This narrative mandated public displays such as the erecting of monuments throughout the empire, and large-scale symbolic practices such as military parades, grand hunts, and – most important of all – the *koutou* ceremony at Beijing. However some practices mandated by the narrative of legitimation conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice. Second, these elements of practice were important for the Qing regime’s survival. Both the location of Beijing and the practice of the *koutou* were central elements in the symbolic practice of the Middle Kingdom narrative because they allowed the regime to demonstrate to supporters and potential challengers that the regime still had the

¹⁴³ The Eight Trigrams sect was an offshoot of the long-standing White Lotus sect, which since the 1350s had prophesied that a “prince of radiance” would appear to triumph over all the forces of darkness. Although the sect had been banned in the 14th century it reappeared intermittently and was usually openly anti-government in its tone. The sect had a ‘restorative’ ideology and thought that reinstating the lost dynasty (Song in the case of the Ming; Ming in the case of the Qing) would usher in its followers millennial expectations (Wakeman, 1977, p. 207).

¹⁴⁴ Hong Xiquan claimed that he was the brother of Jesus Christ.

right to rule. In the absence of other mechanisms of political control the regime was constrained by its narrative of legitimation. Taken together, the presence of these two conditions means that the regime was subject to narrative binding. Because of this we should expect to see the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice.

There is considerable evidence that supports the claim that the Qing rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was due to narrative binding. As the evidence below illustrates, the Qing regime – while flexible on many political issues, such as treaty ports – was highly protective of the *koutou* ceremony, and the location of Beijing. This is exactly the behavior we should expect from a regime under conditions of narrative binding. Indeed, not only did the Qing regime protect these practices, it actively bargained in order to be allowed to practice them. Finally, when these practices were violated by outsiders, the regime made sure to disguise this from domestic audiences as much as possible before finally banning any European embassies from traveling to Beijing. Together, this evidence strongly suggests that the Qing regime valued these practices and was unwilling to violate them, even at the cost of rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. I will go through each strand of evidence in turn.

Regarding the *koutou*, the only time that the Qing regime showed any flexibility on this issue was during its initial encounter with Macartney in 1793. When Macartney first arrived the Qing regime was excited at the prospect of his mission, as a tribute from such a faraway state would enhance the prestige of the throne. From the Qing perspective Macartney was not being welcomed in order to conduct meaningful negotiations but because his presence improved the image of the Qing emperor. For instance, the evidence suggests that the many thousands of well-organized subjects that crowded the banks of

the River Peiho as Macartney were not assembled to solely impress upon Macartney. The banners that bedecked his boat – which read “The English Ambassador bringing tribute to the Emperor of China” – also created common knowledge of the emperor’s prestige and power.¹⁴⁵ In other words, Macartney, like any other foreign envoy, was to be used as a prop by the Qing regime for its audience ceremonies. The Qing regime had initially assumed that Macartney had come to pay tribute to the emperor and not for any ulterior motive. Macartney had been simply expected to pay tribute, banquet, and leave.

The Qing regime only became hostile to Macartney’s mission once it became clear that (a) Macartney was unwilling to *koutou*, and later (b) that he would violate the ritual. In fact, it appears that Macartney only got as far as Beijing without first agreeing to practice the *koutou* because of communication failures within the Qing administration.¹⁴⁶ The initial Qing response to Macartney’s disputes was to accommodate him as much as possible from within inside the existing *koutou* ritual. Once Macartney explained his situation, regime officials agreed to make some small adjustments to the *koutou* ritual as an indicator of imperial benevolence.¹⁴⁷ The dispute over the *koutou* only took on major significance for the Chinese *after* Macartney directly handed his credentials to the emperor; an act that was an unambiguous violation of court protocol. In an internal letter from the Grand Council, Macartney and his retinue were accused of being “ignorant barbarians” who had become “unwarrantably haughty” (Cranmer-Byng, 1963, p. 33). In

¹⁴⁵ Macartney only discovered the banners’ meaning when he asked his translator. Unlike the *koutou* issue, Macartney felt he could strategically feign ignorance about the banners on the grounds that he could not read Chinese (Macartney, 1963, p. 78).

¹⁴⁶ The representative with whom Macartney negotiated prior to reaching Jehol had lied to the court and said that Macartney had expressed willingness to *koutou*. It was not until Macartney arrived at Jehol that the emperor himself became aware of the problem (Singer, 1992).

¹⁴⁷ Minor modifications were often made to ceremonies. As Hevia (1989, p. 79) notes, the relationship between the emperor and the world was not a vertical hierarchy but an encompassing one where, “the power of the superior [lay] in his capacity to generate conditions necessary for the inclusion of inferiors;

response to Macartney's public insult, the Qing regime attempted to ritually accommodate the poor behavior of the British mission in front of the assembled crowds.¹⁴⁸ However, when the Amherst mission arrived in 1816, the Qing regime took no chances, and insisted that the *koutou* issue be resolved in advance. When Amherst refused to make assurances that he would practice it his mission was expelled from China. Even more significantly, the Qing regime forbade any Europeans to visit Beijing from this date until 1860, when the city was occupied by European forces.

The Qing regime was equally defensive about the physical location of Beijing itself. As has been discussed, Beijing was the ritual heart of China and the place where governors, generals, and dignitaries came to seek an audience with the emperor. The location in which these embassies were housed was very public which meant that – like the *koutou* – the treatment and behavior of missions was open for all other elites to see. Any changes to the manner in which diplomacy in this city operated would conflict with the Qing narrative of legitimation. This can help us understand why the Qing refused to allow official embassies to be placed there as such an act would be an unprecedented (and illegitimate) change in diplomatic practice.¹⁴⁹ Understanding the important public element of Beijing for the Qing narrative of legitimation can also explain why the Amherst mission was treated with less respect than the Macartney mission. As Amherst documented, the disregard with which his mission was treated was observed by other Qing subjects. Indeed, he had not been even allowed to enter through the main gate, but was brought in through a side gate – an act that indicated his embassy's inferiority.

the power of the inferior [lay] in his capacity to bring to completion what the superior [set] in motion.”

¹⁴⁸ From this point on his embassy, Macartney was placed on the emperor's left in public settings. This indicated that he only had the status of an administrator, as only representatives of *martial* powers were placed on the emperor's right (Hevia, 1989).

Bruce's refusal to acquiesce to a Qing request to enter a similar side gate was what led the Chinese to fire on British forces at the mouth of the Peiho river. Instead of allowing Bruce public entry through the main gate, the Qing regime had been willing to re-initiate war with a foreign power that had already defeated them twice. Narrative binding can help us to understand this otherwise seemingly self-destructive behavior.

The binding nature of the Qing narrative of legitimation is also apparent when we consider the degree to which the Qing regime not only defended their narrative of legitimation, but actively bargained with other states in order to maintain its practices. During his time in Beijing Amherst came to believe that his presence in the Chinese capital was making matters worse than if he'd never come at all, and that the consequences of his behavior might "no longer be confined to a simple rejection of the Embassy [but that] the Chinese Government seemed to have measures in contemplation which might... operate most injuriously on the trade in Canton." Not only did Amherst think that his position on the *koutou* was jeopardizing any potential bargain, he also came to believe that if he were willing to make some concessions on the issue it might actually *improve* the possibility of striking a bargain on trade with the Chinese. Amherst got the impression that "a prospect was held out to us of a positive good by a compliance with the Emperor's wishes" (Amherst to George Canning, 10 February 1817, FO/17/3).

This impression was shared by other Western diplomats, most notably the American representative Caleb Cushing. Just after the Opium War had ended in 1844, the US sent Cushing to China in order to alleviate the "intolerable" commercial restrictions there (Welch, 1957, p. 329). The U.S. had the same complaints as Britain and had sought to alleviate the restrictions on trade to Canton, to break the monopolies of the Hong

¹⁴⁹ Unless the mission could be suitably disguised, as the Russian one was.

merchants, to agree to set tariffs, and to remove the restrictions on travel and commerce to which Westerners were expected to adhere. Once he arrived in China, Cushing decided to use the Qing regime's obsession with its symbolic practices as a bargaining chip to help him to achieve his mission's objectives. In particular, Cushing decided to demand his right under Westphalian diplomatic practice to visit the capital of a receiving state. Cushing did this as he was certain that the Qing would bargain away other concessions in order to prevent this from happening. His instincts were correct. From the outset of negotiations the Qing representative Kiyeng tried to dissuade Cushing from visiting Beijing. In a letter to Cushing Kiyeng explained that were Cushing allowed to travel to Beijing it would "put an end to civility and [lead] to rule without harmony" (quoted in Chia Kuo, 193, p. 38). Cushing agreed to "pass" on his rights only if he could receive more generous terms than the British had already received.¹⁵⁰ The result was the Treaty of Wanghia which granted the United States, among other things, the right of extra-territoriality; a concession that even the British had been unable to gain as part of the Treaty of Nanking.¹⁵¹ It is clear from the memorials sent to the capital by Kiyeng that Cushing's 'capitulation' on this issue was the reason for the generous treaty terms that the U.S. received. Kiyeng's memorials focus little on trade and much more on whether Cushing could be dissuaded from his demand to travel to Beijing (Chia Kou, 1933, p. 45fn). Once Cushing agreed not to travel, the deal was struck. This shows that the Qing regime was willing to sacrifice in order to protect their symbolic practices.

There is some additional evidence, specific to the their engagement with Western

¹⁵⁰ By the time Cushing arrived the Treaty of Bogue had been signed between Britain and China. Due to the most-favored-nation clause of this treaty the US had now received all the concessions the mission had originally been sent to request

¹⁵¹ The MFN clause of the Treaty of Bogue did mean that once it was granted to the US, Britain also

powers, that also demonstrates the Qing sensitivity to what had occurred during the Macartney mission and the lengths to which they went in order to rectify it. In 1795 Isaac Titsingh, an emissary from the Dutch East Indian colony of Batavia, arrived in Beijing.¹⁵² Titsingh had been sent to try to establish a permanent embassy for the colony in order to improve trade relations. Unlike Macartney, Titsingh did not feel obliged to defend his sending-state's status from Chinese demands of ritual prostration, and he was completely willing to perform the symbolic practices that Macartney had quarreled over (Duyvendak, 1938). However, unknown to Titsingh, the Qing intended to use him as a prop in a symbolic performance designed to make up for the diplomatic mess created by Macartney in the previous year. The Dutch ambassadors were subject to the harshest form of treatment prescribed for envoys. This involved them spending long periods of time outside in the early morning, and being dragged and whipped in very public settings in view of other tributary states (Van Braam Houckgeest, 1798, p. 186-88). What the Dutch did not realize was that they were being punished for the behavior of the British. This was because, according to the records kept the Board of Rituals, Britain was technically inferior to the Netherlands (Fairbank, 1942). Thus the Qing was able to disseminate internal propaganda which claimed that the Dutch were coming to apologize for Britain. In summary, the Qing regime's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice can be explained as an instance of narrative binding. The *koutou* and the location of Beijing were essential elements in the practice of the Qing narrative of legitimation as they allowed the emperor to create an illusion of superiority and power. Allowing an outsider to undermine the emperor in full view of the most powerful actors inside China

received this right (Harrison, 1967).

¹⁵² Batavia was controlled directly by the Dutch East India Company and was part of a regional empire

threatened to send a signal that the emperor was weak. For a regime whose survival was under threat, this was unacceptable. As Singer (1992, p. 57) notes, the emperor was not nervous about the British for international reasons, “but because the independence of thought that Western barbarians brought with them that posed the threat to the delicate stability of relationships that held the empire together.” In order to maintain this delicate balance, the Qing regime rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Conclusion: Resident Ambassadors and the end of the Tributary System

The Qing regime continued to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice until 1860, when the regime was forced into accepting it by European force of arms. Once Elgin decided to advance on Beijing, the emperor fled, never to return.¹⁵³ Following the destruction of the Summer Palace in 1860, the British (as well as other European powers) demanded that the Qing regime engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice. They claimed the diplomatic right of legal recognition with full ambassadorial rights. A now thoroughly-weakened and impotent Qing administration tried one last time to dispute the audience question but it was finally resolved in favor of the Western powers. Although the Qing could maintain their tributary relationship with other states, there was no longer any pretense that China was preeminent among states. Nonetheless, even in this environment the Qing regime struggled to maintain some elements of their domestic narrative, and put off holding an audience with European ambassadors for over a decade.¹⁵⁴ The issue was finally resolved on 24 February 1873. Upon the ascendancy of

which comprised over 20 fortresses of over 100 men each across Asia (Israel 1995: 939).

¹⁵³ He died in Jehol on 22 August 1861.

¹⁵⁴ The new-formed Chinese MFA (*Zongli Yamen*), perhaps due to their new institutional role, tried to stress the fact that the audience ceremony was seen as a discourtesy by European powers and were

the new emperor to his throne, the ambassadors of England, France, the United States, Russia, and Germany were received by him in the throne room. There the ambassadors placed their credentials directly in the hand of the emperor, and, in accordance with European standards, lightly bowed (Wang, 1971). The entire audience ceremony lasted less than five minutes. The European ambassadors had now received the recognition they sought.¹⁵⁵ Thus, eighty years after it had first arisen, disputes over diplomatic practice had finally been decided in favor of the Westphalian system. This was a long time to dispute such seemingly-trivial issues. However, as I have shown in this chapter, the decisions of the Qing regime can be seen as been a calculated response to domestic pressures. The ritual *koutou* and the city of Beijing were symbolic practices that bound the Qing regime into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

concerned that it would lead to another conflict. Although some officials argued for leaving the ceremony unchanged, the majority suggested some mutually acceptable modification of the ceremony should be worked out (Wang, 1971).

¹⁵⁵ Ultimately the *koutou* issue never truly disappeared until the Boxer Protocol of 1901 exempted all

Chapter 5

From Revolutionaries to Traditionalists: Soviet Diplomatic Practice, 1917-

1923

This chapter investigates the changes in Soviet Russia's diplomatic practice from 1917 until 1923. Over this period Soviet diplomatic practice underwent three broad shifts. In the first phase, from late-1917 until mid-June 1918, the Soviets practiced a radical form of diplomacy that ignored, undermined, and rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice.¹⁵⁶ In the second phase, from 1918 until 1923, the Soviet practice of diplomacy was 'two-faced.' On the one hand, the Soviet MFA adopted an increasingly Westphalian form of diplomatic practice. At the same time, the diplomacy practiced by the institution of the Comintern was even more revolutionary in style than the diplomacy of 1917. The third phase of Soviet diplomatic practice started after 1923. From this point on, the influence and activities of the Comintern were restricted and Soviet diplomatic representatives became fastidious practitioners of traditional Westphalian diplomacy. As I will show in this chapter, the Soviet rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was not without consequence. Many states justified their own hostile activities against the Soviets by pointing to the Soviet unwillingness to accept Westphalian diplomatic practice. I explain why, in the face of these international pressures, the Soviet regime

Europeans from having to perform anything but European diplomatic ceremonies.

¹⁵⁶ Due to the fluid nature of domestic and international Russian politics in this period finding a simple moniker for the Russian state is difficult. From 1917 to 1922 the revolutionary state of Russia was known as the RSFSR. After 1922 it integrated with some of its neighbors to become the USSR. During this time, while dominant in Russian politics, the Bolsheviks were not the only party in power in the state; they also shared power with members with the Socialist Revolutionaries until 1918. Further confusing this narrative, the Bolshevik party officially changed its name to the Communist party in 1918. Thus, in order to prevent confusion I use the terms Bolshevik, Communist, Left SRs etc. specifically to refer to the factions inside Russia. When discussing the regime that ruled Russia following the Bolshevik coup in late 1917, I refer to

engaged in these diplomatic practices.

In the previous chapter I showed how Qing diplomatic practice could be explained by understanding the way in which the Middle Kingdom narrative of legitimation bound the Qing regime. In this chapter I also find that Soviet diplomatic practice between 1917 and 1923 can be explained by understanding the conditions under which its ‘World Revolution’ narrative bound the regime. The World Revolution narrative mandated that the Soviet regime engage in a highly revolutionary form of diplomatic practice that rejected elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice regarding diplomatic immunity, extraterritoriality, protocol, rank, and support of revolutionary movements abroad. When bound by its narrative the Soviet regime, like the Qing regime in the previous chapter, engaged in a systematic rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. However, this chapter is different than the previous chapter in that Soviet diplomatic practice *varied* in this period. What began as a highly-revolutionary form of diplomatic practice shifted into a two-faced form of diplomacy before the Soviets finally adopted full Westphalian diplomatic practice in late 1923. I argue that this shift in diplomatic practice occurred due to the weakening of the binding nature of the Soviet narrative. This weakening occurred due to changes in the *threats to regime survival*. As these threats diminished the binding effects of narrative dissipated and Lenin was able to commit the Soviet regime to fully adopting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

The argument can be summarized as follows. From 1917 to 1923 Lenin led a *divided elite* of radicals and moderates in which neither group dominated the Soviet regime. The Bolshevik-led Soviet regime had won the support of these various groups due to a set of promises drawn from its particular ‘World Revolution’ narrative of

it as the Soviet regime, or the Soviets.

legitimation. The regime initially had few sources of institutional control outside of Petrograd and Moscow, and was thus highly dependent on satisfying coalition members for its own stability. Consequently, once in power, Lenin had to commit the Soviet regime to policies and practices that were mandated by its narrative of legitimation. This need to maintain legitimacy constrained the form of many Soviet practices and policies, including its form of diplomatic practice. In order to maintain and reinforce its World Revolution narrative of legitimation, the Soviet regime engaged in radical diplomatic actions that – while demonstrating the legitimacy of Lenin’s leadership – actually undermined the Soviet state’s strategic goals. It was not until the radicals underwent a shift in their expectations regarding world revolution in 1923 that the regime was no longer mandated to engage in highly revolutionary diplomatic practice. To phrase the explanations in the terms outlined in Chapter Three, the shift in the expectations of radical elites meant that there was now *elite unity* on the issue of revolution. Consequently, the regime’s survival was no longer threatened (at least on diplomatic issues), meaning that the regime was no longer bound by its narrative of legitimation. From point on the Soviet regime was able to accept Westphalian diplomatic practice.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section I outline the Soviets’ ascent to power in Russia in 1917. In this section I also describe the observable shifts in the Soviet diplomatic practice from 1917 until 1923, and the international political consequences of this diplomatic practice. In the second section I evaluate alternative explanations that might explain why the Soviet regime initially rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice before ultimately coming to accept it. I find that these explanations are inadequate to explain the nature of Soviet diplomatic practice or why it varied. In the

third section I present an explanation for Soviet diplomatic practice that focuses on the role of narratives of legitimation in Soviet domestic politics. I discuss the content of the World Revolution narrative, outline the practices it mandated, and demonstrate how these practices conflicted with those of Westphalian diplomatic practice. I also outline the survival threats to the regime over this period. Fourth, I evaluate this explanation and show how the binding effect of the Soviets narrative of legitimation can explain the diplomatic practices adopted by the regime, and show how this binding effect dissipated once threats to the Soviet regime diminished. Finally, there is a brief conclusion.

Soviet Diplomacy: From Revolutionary to Westphalian Practice

Historical Background, and the 1917 October Revolution. By early 1917 the Great War had been raging for far longer than any of its participants had initially expected. British and French manpower had been severely reduced by the inconclusive campaigns of 1916. Germany's economy had been ravaged by naval blockade and its military had been exhausted by battles at Verdun and the Somme. Austro-Hungarian forces were almost completely broken. The Ottoman Empire was tottering on the edge of collapse. In Russia the situation was even more severe. On the front, military morale had finally shattered following a series of failed offensives that had cost millions of lives. Behind the lines the exceptionally bitter winter of 1916-17 had caused acute food and fuel shortages. The government of the tsar – wracked by internal problems – was unable or unwilling to address the state's problems.

In February 1917 in Petrograd a Woman's Day strike protesting bread shortages broke out. Within six days revolutionaries had overtaken Moscow, the tsar had abdicated,

and power had passed to a provisional government composed of liberals (Kadets) and constitutional monarchists (Octoberists) that was eventually led by Alexander Kerensky. Yet this government was also unstable. The Provisional government jostled for position against a number of competing groups and never managed to fully consolidate its power in the face of right-wing militarists and left-wing radicals.¹⁵⁷ The Bolsheviks seized power on 25 October (7 November N.S.),¹⁵⁸ supported by a contingent of their 'Red Guard' troops. Overcoming resistance at the Smolny Institute (home of the Petrograd Soviet), the Bolsheviks then took the Provisional government's HQ at the Winter Palace. This coup coincided with the opening of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the institution that had been charged with running the administrative apparatus left behind by the tsar. The Congress, physically intimidated by the Bolsheviks and their 'Left' Socialist Revolutionary (SR) allies, retroactively endorsed the coup. Now it was the turn of the Bolsheviks to attempt to consolidate their rule while facing opposition from the Kadets, the social democratic Mensheviks, and the Right SRs.¹⁵⁹

Whereas the Provisional government led by Kerensky had largely continued the foreign policies and diplomatic practices of the Tsarist regime, the Soviets introduced a completely new approach to foreign affairs. The Bolsheviks entered power with a foreign policy of "proletarian internationalism" (Debo, 1975, p. 463). The aim of this policy was

¹⁵⁷ In one instance, the Kerensky regime armed the Bolsheviks in order to confront the Bonapartist ambitions of the Russian general Kornilov, who was marching on Petrograd. After Kornilov's arrest the Provisional government lost its remaining support in the army and also found the Bolsheviks unwilling to disarm.

¹⁵⁸ Until February 1918 Russia used the Julian calendar, which was thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar that was in use in the rest of the world. This means that some of the dates of the Russian revolution are confusing. For instance, Russia's 'Red October' took place in what was November for the rest of the world. For all dates before February 14 1918 (in the Gregorian calendar) I use the dates that were used by Russian contemporaries while also recording the 'New Style' (N.S.) date. For example, I record the changing of the Russian national calendar as having taken place on 1 February 1918 (14 February N.S.).

¹⁵⁹ 'Right' and 'Left' here refer to the position of the SRs on the political spectrum in relation to the

to spread disorder throughout the capitalist world and, by taking advantage of the disruption created by the war, to transform the global interstate war into a global interclass war. This policy was predicated on the assumption that the capitalist system had reached the apogee of its internal tensions and that the worn-out and impoverished masses of Europe were ripe for revolutionary action. The day after the Bolshevik takeover the Council of People's Commissars, or Sovnarkom, published its very first decree, calling for a "just and democratic peace...without annexations or indemnities."¹⁶⁰ Within three weeks the Bolsheviks installed one of their most vocal and energetic revolutionaries Leon Trotsky at the head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (also known as Narkomindel, or the NKID). Thus began the era of Soviet diplomacy.

Once in power, the Soviet regime's diplomatic practice went through three distinct phases. In the first phase – from the Soviet takeover of power in late 1917 until about mid-1918 – Soviet diplomats engaged in a revolutionary form of diplomatic practice that largely ignored or conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice. In the second phase – from mid-1918 until late 1923 – Soviet diplomacy became somewhat schizophrenic in its practice. On the one hand the diplomacy conducted by the NKID became more Westphalian; on the other the diplomacy practiced by the newly-formed organization of the Comintern remained as radical as that of 1917. In the third phase – from late 1923 onward – the Comintern was subordinated to the NKID, and the Soviet

Bolshevik party.

¹⁶⁰ From its inception, the structure of the Soviet state was complex. The Bolshevik-created Sovnarkom effectively operated as an executive cabinet. At the same time that Sovnarkom was created a new legislative body was constituted: the All-Russian Central Committee. Both of these bodies were dominated by Bolsheviks. In the RSFSR foreign policy was supervised by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, its Central Executive Committee, and Sovnarkom. In addition, a Presidium of the Central Executive Committee was empowered to make decisions when Congress or the full Committee was not in session. This structure remained roughly the same when the RSFSR expanded into the USSR in 1922. While this was the official structure of the government, in reality most the actual decisions were made by

state fully accepted Westphalian diplomatic practice. Thus in a few short years the USSR had gone from publicly dismissing and disregarding the established elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice, to acting in a manner indistinguishable from the other states of contemporary international society. In this section I will describe these three shifts in greater detail. This will prepare the reader for the remainder of the chapter where I offer explanations for the variation in Soviet diplomatic practice.

Soviet Diplomacy, 1917-1918: Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice.

Early Soviet foreign policy was confrontational and provocative in both tone and substance. Not only did the Soviet government break with the policies of its provisional predecessor by publicly advocating for immediate world peace (and revolution), it engaged in diplomatic practices that actively undermined Russia's erstwhile allies. On 9 November (22 November N.S.) the NKID announced that all secret diplomatic treaties that had existed between Tsarist Russia and rest of the world would be published. Trotsky justified this act by declaring that secret diplomacy was "as universal as imperialist robbery" and fundamentally anti-revolutionary (Degras, 1978, p. 8). The Soviet regime appeared unconcerned that such actions might jeopardize Russia's diplomatic position. When asked what he would do in his new position as foreign commissar Trotsky replied that he would "issue a few revolutionary proclamations and shut up shop" (quoted in Uldricks, 1979, p. 17). This was not entirely true, however. Instead of shutting down the NKID and the Russian diplomatic missions abroad, these institutions were now tasked by Sovnarkom with precipitating global revolution. Instead of using missions to engage with the foreign governments and elites – and treating privileges such as extra-territoriality and the diplomatic pouch as tools to further these activities – the Soviets immediately

the Central Executive Committee, which was replaced in March 1919 by the Politburo.

began to exploit embassies in ways that violated accepted Westphalian practice. Missions were not used as communications hubs with governments, but as locations from which the Soviet regime could coordinate with other revolutionary movements in the world. Via the diplomatic pouch the Soviet regime funneled funds, literature, and weapons to these movements; resources that were to be used to further destabilize the interstate system.¹⁶¹

For instance, in November 1917 the Soviets opened a mission in the offices of the International Socialist Commission (ISC) in Stockholm. While funds passed through this mission to other countries in Europe Soviet agents there conducted little actual diplomacy (Senn, 1974). When sent to the mission, incoming-minister V.V. Vorovsky's official instructions made it clear that his "task was not to be an envoy to the Swedish King or government, but to be a diplomatic agent of Soviet power, located in Stockholm but empowered to establish ties and conduct talks not so much with Sweden as through Sweden with other countries" (quoted in Uldricks, 1979, p. 24). In addition to this office three more missions were established abroad: in Berlin, London, and Bern.

Activity at the Bern mission was also illustrative of the early Soviet practice of diplomacy. Although not technically legal under international law (as the Soviets had not yet been recognized), the mission was nonetheless treated with diplomatic courtesy by the Swiss government.¹⁶² Yet the first Soviet minister sent there, Ivan Zalkind, never even presented his credentials to the Swiss government; instead he spent his time meeting with radical elements in the city (Uldricks, 1979). The Bern mission was ordered

¹⁶¹ It should be noted that many Russian embassies abroad refused to follow Soviet orders. The Bolsheviks were deeply unpopular in the conservative NKID and many of its members resigned or – if abroad – ignored the Soviet regime's orders. In December Trotsky sent out a telegram to all of Russia's foreign missions requesting that their personnel pledge allegiance to the Soviet regime or step aside. Only a few representatives – such as the *chargés d'affaires* in Spain and Portugal – responded favorably to Trotsky's request. As a result, twenty-eight ambassadors, envoys, and consuls were officially dismissed (O'Connor, 1988).

by the Soviet regime to distribute money from Moscow to revolutionary organizations and to help aid in the distribution of propaganda. In terms of actual diplomacy the mission did little apart from avoiding an outright rift with Switzerland. Similar behavior was exhibited at the Soviet's Berlin embassy (founded after the signing of Brest-Litovsk), which was used as a vector through which guns were smuggled to revolutionaries.

The Soviet rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice went even further in June 1918 when Sovnarkom ordered the abolition of all titles and ranks for Soviet diplomats. Instead of distinguishing between various ambassadors, ministers-in-plenipotentiary, *chargés*, and so forth, Sovnarkom proclaimed that it would “consider identical the authority of the representation of all the diplomatic agents of foreign governments, accredited to the RSFSR irrespective of rank” (quoted in Uldricks, 1979, p. 33). The Soviet regime instituted the same policy in the NKID by appointing *polpreds* abroad. These *polpreds* were not part of the established Westphalian hierarchy of diplomatic representation and thus could not be easily slotted in to the existing system. The individual behavior of many of these new Soviet diplomats was also an affront to Westphalian diplomatic practice. Unlike their Tsarist or Provisional predecessors, Soviet representatives often paid little attention to diplomatic niceties such as protocol and etiquette. The French ambassador to Russia described Zalkind as “nervous, impulsive, and sometimes brutish” (quoted in Senn 1974, p. 12) while the German ambassador complained that Zalkind's “manners, even for a Bolshevik, [were] horrible” (quoted in Uldricks, 1979, p. 28). In short, many early Soviet representatives were selected despite their diplomatic skills, not because of them.

The Soviet rejection of, and contempt for, Westphalian diplomatic practice was

¹⁶² The mission was allowed the privileges of extra-territoriality, and the immunity of the diplomatic pouch.

most publicly demonstrated by the behavior of the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk. This conference initially met in December 1917 and was tasked with the express goal of producing peace between Germany and Russia. Yet rather than treating the proceedings with tact, the Soviet delegation – originally led by Adolf Joffe; later by Trotsky – used the venue to publicly proclaim their regime’s revolutionary values. The delegation itself included a sailor, a soldier, a peasant, and a worker; undoubtedly dramatic symbols of the revolution, but poor negotiators (Von Laue, 1974). Upon its arrival the Soviet delegation distributed revolutionary leaflets to the German honor guard (Uldricks, 1979). As soon as the proceedings began, Joffe demanded that – in a break from usual diplomatic practice – the minutes of the meetings be made public, that each sides’ soldiers be allowed to fraternize,¹⁶³ and that Joffe’s German counterpart General Hoffman agree to engage in public debate. The disconnect between the views of this Soviet delegation and the practices of Westphalian diplomacy was most dramatically demonstrated two months later when the Soviets and Germans failed to reach agreement. Despite the existence of a deal that met both sides’ substantive goals, Trotsky walked out of the talks, refusing to sign the treaty but also refusing to continue fighting; his famous policy of “no peace, no war” (O’Connor, 1988, p. 58). This proclamation declared that while the Soviet regime could accept the status quo (no war) it refused to sign a treaty to that effect (no peace). However, Trotsky’s attempt to ignore diplomatic practice only resulted in further German invasion, and an even more humiliating and onerous peace one month later.

Two-Faced Soviet Diplomatic Practice, 1918-1923. During the period from mid-1918 until 1923 Soviet diplomatic practice underwent a shift. Unlike the diplomacy

¹⁶³ The Bolsheviks had even begun printing a German-language newspaper *Die Frackel* to influence these troops.

of 1917 and early 1918, Soviet diplomatic practice was no longer performed in an exclusively revolutionary tone. Instead, the Soviets adopted an almost split personality on the manner in which diplomacy was practiced. On the one hand, the NKID grew in size and influence, and increasingly engaged in traditional Westphalian diplomatic practice. Simultaneously, the Soviet state projected its revolutionary influence through a new organization that was officially separate from the NKID: the Third Communist International, or Comintern. The Soviet regime thus simultaneously engaged in two forms of diplomatic practice. The diplomacy conducted by the NKID became more traditional and noticeably Westphalian in style. Yet the diplomacy practiced by the Comintern became even more radical and revolutionary.

Despite Trotsky's earlier claims that diplomacy would have no purpose for the Soviet state, by mid-1918 the Soviet regime had increasingly begun to accept some of the traditional elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice. New missions were opened in states not seen as likely locations of imminent revolution, such as France and the USA. In general missions were no longer openly used as revolutionary outposts; instead they were increasingly used in the typical Westphalian manner: to network with other diplomats or important local elites. Furthermore, diplomats appointed to these missions publicly embraced the "bourgeois" practices associated with Westphalian diplomacy. One newly-appointed Soviet delegate was surprised upon reaching his legation-building in Italy that it was, "equipped with mirrors and expensive furniture – a regular bourgeois interior" (Barmine, 1945, p. 122). This was typical. Soviet delegates in Turkey were instructed that "the delegation must make an impression of a representation of a great country and no economies must be made for this purpose...the delegates must take best rooms in the

hotels, and the rooms need to be perfectly furnished.” It was important for delegates to live, “a very liberal life, reminding the world-wide proletariat the recognition of Soviet Russia depends particularly on merchants” (BDFV V, p.19). This was a departure from the proletarian image that the Bolsheviks had projected upon coming to power.

The types of representatives sent to these missions differed too. For example, in mid-1918 the brusque Zalkind was withdrawn from Bern and replaced by Jan Berzin, who was able to interact with his opposites in a much more agreeable way. One foreign diplomat wrote approvingly on how Berzin was “decorously and cleanly dressed...wore gloves, irreproachably clean linen, and conducted himself thoroughly decorously and nicely, and generally struck me rather sympathetically” (quoted in Senn, 1974, p. 62). The Austrian minister described Berzin as “good-natured and enthusiastic...tubercular...and in contrast to his better known colleagues a Christian” (quoted in Senn, 1974, p. 95). In short, he seemed to fit the Westphalian mold of what a diplomat was. In time, similar manners were adopted by all Soviet diplomats at Bern. One foreign diplomat noted that a particular Soviet delegate arrived in Bern dressed in a “primitive Bolshevik fashion, [but over the course of his stay] visibly became more elegant” (quoted in Senn, 1974, p. 94). These changes were not accidental; rather they reflected new policy-decisions in the NKID. From 1918 Narkomindel increased its recruitment of diplomats from middle-class backgrounds, and put a new emphasis on traditional standards of behavior. A good example of the type of diplomat the NKID valued around this time is Alexandra Kollanti, who joined the Narkomindel in 1922. Not only was Kollanti a respected and credentialed Bolshevik, she had also been born into an aristocratic family and had been married to a Tsarist general in the 19th century. Before

being sent to Norway on her first official mission, she was informed that she was being sent abroad “because [she] had the manners from childhood to deal with diplomatic protocol” and that she would be comfortable in the company, “of highly influential men discussing matters in salons” (Kocho-Williams, 2006, p. 96-97).

The Soviets also began to walk back their attempt to establish an egalitarian diplomatic ranking system. The adoption of the *polpred* system had interfered with the Soviet’s regime ability to conduct diplomacy as many other states would not recognize this position. The Soviets decided to recognize the rank only *inside* the Soviet state. By the early 1920s it became normal for a *polpred*’s credentials to also include his or her specific rank in the established international diplomatic order. In a May 1921 statute the RSFSR defined three types of Soviet missions abroad – the *Polpredstva* (plenipotentiary representations), consular representations, and *Torgpredstva* (trade representations) – in order to better clarify and organize Soviet diplomacy abroad (Uldricks, 1979).

The new ‘traditional’ style of Soviet diplomatic practice was most noticeably displayed at the Genoa conference of April 1922; the first major conference to which the still-unrecognized Soviet government had been invited. Unlike Brest-Litovsk, which had included predominately symbolic delegates, the Soviets ensured that the sixty-three member delegation included the most experienced foreign policy experts they had; such as Georgii Chicherin, Leonid Krasin, Maxim Litvinov, Joffe, and Vatslav Vorovsky.¹⁶⁴ Although the delegations issued radical proclamations in public, it also made sure it behaved in a manner consistent with diplomatic protocol, wore top hats and tails, and did not actively antagonize the legations of the other powers as they had at Brest-

¹⁶⁴ Chicherin was Trotsky’s successor at the NKID. Krasin and Litvinov had both headed the mission in London; Joffe: the mission in Berlin; and Vorovsky: the mission in Sweden.

Litovsk. Observers of the Soviet officials at the time recorded that, “their behavior was formal, stiff, correct... [and] their manners impeccable” (Kocho-Williams, 2006, p. 134). According to one Soviet diplomat, the behavior of the delegates was met with “general applause” (Barmine, 1945, p. 121).

This apparent turn toward Westphalian diplomatic practice was not entirely sincere. Many NKID diplomats were still expected to engage in revolutionary behavior, just in a more subtle way. For instance, when Berzin was sent to Switzerland this was only partly done because he was considered sophisticated enough play the role of demure diplomat. He was also given instructions to spend most of his time engaging in revolutionary activity. In fact, the goals of his mission were very similar to Zalkind’s; it was his practice that differed. When he gave an account of his mission to the Central Committee back in Moscow, Berzin explained that he had taken pains to ensure that he would not be discovered disseminating propaganda (Kocho-Williams, 2012, p. 64-65).

Yet while the NKID attempted to disguise its revolutionary behavior, this was not true of other Soviet institutions, in particular the Third International, or Comintern. Founded in March 1919 the Comintern was designed to be “an organizer of [the] revolutions” that the Bolshevik party claimed would imminently break out in Europe (Fischer, 1951, p. 457). Although hastily organized in its first year, by 1920 its delegates came from communist parties throughout the world. The mission of these parties was made clear in the initial meeting’s section on “aims and tactics,” signed by Lenin and Trotsky in January 1919: “The task of the proletariat is to seize political power *immediately*. [This] consists in the destruction of the State apparatus of the bourgeoisie...The basic method of struggle is mass action by the proletariat right up to

open armed conflict with the political power of capital” (BDFFA I, p. 136-137, italics mine).

The Comintern engaged in a number of activities in order to meet these militant objectives. It actively supported foreign communist movements by providing them with weapons and money. These were usually smuggled in through the diplomatic pouch, an act that frequently upset the NKID (see below). The Comintern’s primary mission was to engage in anti-capitalist propaganda abroad that urged people to revolt against the governments of Britain, France, Italy, and a host of other countries. In order to do this, the Comintern took over running the departments of foreign propaganda that had originally been operated by the NKID (McDermott & Agnew, 1997). While such public diplomacy is familiar to us now, at that time diplomacy that ‘went over’ the heads of other governments was seen to be very revolutionary. In both tone and substance, the behavior of the Comintern was reminiscent of the Soviet diplomatic practice that followed Red October (Rees & Thorpe, 1998). As I will show, this revolutionary diplomacy created considerable problems for Soviet foreign policy abroad. It also generated internal friction and throughout much of the period under discussion, the Comintern and the Narkomindel shared an uneasy co-existence. Soviet diplomatic practice had become more traditional on the one hand, while becoming more radical on the other.

Soviet Diplomatic Practice after 1923: Accepting Westphalian Diplomatic Practice. After 1923, Soviet diplomatic practice underwent a final shift to a consistently Westphalian mode. Instead of treating diplomatic privileges and practices as instruments through which to conduct revolutionary activities, Soviet diplomats began follow the

diplomatic practices of international society fastidiously. While Soviet diplomacy was still expected to have a revolutionary dimension,¹⁶⁵ by 1924 NKID diplomats were formally instructed to conduct no compromising activities at all, and to do nothing that undermined the USSR's position (Uldricks, 1979, p. 160). Revolutionary policies were to be subordinated to national ones, and diplomacy was to be conducted entirely in accordance with Westphalian diplomatic practice. Although the Comintern remained a vocal agitator in favor of revolution the reality was that “nowhere was revolutionary rhetoric translated into action” (McDermott 1995, p. 409). Specifically, the propaganda campaigns the Comintern conducted in politically-sensitive areas – such as British-controlled India – were discontinued. While the Comintern was still responsible for organizing the communist parties of other countries, this was now done in order to subordinate these parties to Soviet national policies, not to organize them for impending revolution (Kozlov & Weitz, 1989). From late 1923, for all its revolutionary proclamations, the Soviets had accepted Westphalian diplomatic practice.

The Consequences of Soviet Diplomatic Practice. The Soviet regime's initial rejection of Westphalian diplomatic and its later adoption of a two-faced diplomatic practice (i.e. from 1918-1923) was not without consequence. Refusal to adhere to Westphalian diplomatic practice created a number of problems for a Soviet regime that was deeply unpopular with the most powerful states in international society. As the policies of France, Britain, and the United States made clear during the Russian Civil War (1918-1921) other states actively sought the demise of the Bolshevik-led regime. In this environment the Soviet regime's theatrical rejection of Westphalian diplomatic

¹⁶⁵ Representatives abroad were kept abreast of the tensions that existed between capitalist states, and encouraged to engage in diplomacy that exacerbated them: “The active work of all representatives must be

practices had the effect of, at best, creating inefficiencies in the Soviet ability to interact with other states or, at worst, decreasing the state's fundamental security position.

The first notable consequence of the Soviet rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was the failure of the Soviets to achieve a favorable outcome at Brest-Litovsk. Although Trotsky was initially offered a deal that was acceptable to Lenin, he refused it on the grounds of how the deal "looked" (see below), and left the conference. This act enraged the Germans who once more mobilized their forces. Within one week German troops covered 150 miles, leading to the evacuation of Petrograd. This event forced the Soviet delegation to return and sign an even more unfavorable peace than the one originally proposed.¹⁶⁶

Aside from this dramatic event, the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice also created repeated inefficiencies for Soviet diplomacy. First, Soviet rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice regarding embassies and the diplomatic pouch were used as justifications by both the Swiss and German governments to expel the Soviet missions in early November 1918. Although the underlying motive for these expulsions was almost certainly a desire to curry favor with the Allied powers that were about to win the war, such diplomatic expulsions cannot be done without a legitimate excuse. In both these cases, these excuses were provided ready-made by the Soviets themselves. Similarly, the adoption of the *polpred* system was held against the Soviet state by Poland in 1920, when it refused the Soviet representative the right to present his credentials on the grounds that his title was not recognized by international society. The inflammatory

towards increasing the already existing misunderstandings" (DBFA IV, p. 258).

¹⁶⁶ The terms of the treaty were very harsh and forced the Soviets to lose control of the Baltic provinces, Finland, part of Byelorussia, the Ukraine and the districts of Kars, Ardahan, and the oil-port of Batumi on the Turkish frontier. It totaled $\frac{1}{4}$ of the population of Imperial Russia and $\frac{3}{4}$ of its iron, coal, and steel (de

rhetoric of the Soviet regime was also held against it by other states. For instance, when the Western powers withdrew their ambassadors from Moscow behind White lines at Vologda in July 1918, this was done on the grounds that the Soviets could not be trusted to uphold the practice of diplomatic inviolability (BDFA I, p. 87). In short, there were consequences for rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that Soviet rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice necessarily caused the outcomes listed above. Rather I am pointing out that the Soviets' repeated refusal to adhere to diplomatic practice provided already-antagonistic states with ready-made excuses for engaging in hostile action against the Soviets. In other words, the Soviets paid for their rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice (more on this below).

Two Possible Explanations for Soviet Diplomatic Practice

How can we explain Soviet diplomatic practice from 1917-1924? Why did the Soviets violate so many of the existing standards of diplomacy, especially when these violations were not without consequence? From 1917 until 1922 the Soviet regime's successful consolidation of power was not a foregone conclusion by any measure. From outside their borders, the Soviet regime was under physical attack from White forces and their international allies; from inside they were threatened by revolt. Efficient diplomacy could have helped mitigate these pressures. Why then did the Soviets engage in diplomatic practices that antagonized foreign governments or that provided them with justifications for hostile action? Why did the Soviets adopt new diplomatic institutions (such as the *polpred*) that made it harder, not easier for them to engage with other states?

Mowbrey, 1990, p. 51).

Why did they fixate on issues of appearance at venues such as Brest-Litovsk to the point of causing the negotiations to collapse? Why did the Soviet regime conduct diplomacy through both the NKID and the Comintern simultaneously, especially when they appeared to undermine each other's missions? And, when the change did occur, what caused the Soviets to finally accept Westphalian diplomatic practice?

In this section I draw from the IR literature and evaluate two explanations that might account for the changes in Soviet diplomatic practice, and outline the observable implications that can adjudicate between them. First, I assess the degree to which the initial rejection, and subsequent acceptance, of Westphalian diplomatic practice was a function of strategic concerns. I find that while the Soviet regime was somewhat sensitive to the strategic consequences of rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice, it did not adopt Westphalian practices when it made the most strategic sense to do so. Instead, for most of the period under study Soviet rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice actively undermined the Soviet state's security. In fact, by the time Soviets did adopt Westphalian diplomatic practice, the state was already secure. A strategic explanation is further undermined when we consider the foreign policy goals of the Soviet state. In 1921, due to a shift in domestic economic policy, the Soviets actively sought diplomatic recognition abroad in order to secure financial credits. Yet, the persistent rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice – particularly the activities of the Comintern – made it very difficult for the Soviets to achieve this goal. In short, I find that Soviet diplomatic practice consistently undermined Soviet security and foreign policy goals.

Second, I assess the degree to which the variation in Soviet diplomatic practice was a function of the identity of the Soviet regime. There are two possible lines of

argument here. One is that Soviet rejection and acceptance of Westphalian diplomatic practice was a function of the identity of Soviet elites that ruled the state, and that changes in these elites' identities led to changes in Soviet diplomatic practice. An alternative explanation is that the Soviet state was co-constituted by its interactions with other states of international society. Here the argument is that changes in Soviet diplomatic practice were brought on through socialization. Neither of these arguments is strongly supported. In the first instance changes in Soviet diplomatic practice were not brought on by changes in the identity of Soviet elites. While the early diplomatic practice of the Soviet regime was consistent with a 'revolutionary' identity, its later adoption of Westphalian diplomatic practice – with its emphasis on bourgeois norms and the validation of the interstate system – was not brought on by an identity shift within the regime. Even though there was an increase of moderates in the party from 1918 onward, the NKID and much of the Politburo were staffed by dedicated radical Bolsheviks. In the second instance, socialization does not seem to have played a meaningful part. Even when Soviet diplomats began to adopt Westphalian diplomatic practices, they also took pains to demonstrate that they were full revolutionaries to audiences back home. Further, as I will show, the NKID was not meaningfully represented as an institution in the Politburo and so even if its personnel had been changed by processes of co-constitution, there was no means by which this identity could have been 'transmitted' to the rest of the Soviet elite. Thus, an explanation that offers an identity-shift as the explanation for why the Soviet regime's practices altered is only partially supported at best. Instead, something more calculated appears to have been taking place, but not in a manner captured by either explanation. For the remainder of this section I will address each of

these explanations in turn.

A Strategic Explanation for Soviet Diplomatic Practice. The first general explanation for changes in Soviet diplomatic practice is derived from the strategic literature. This argument posits that changes in Soviet diplomatic practice can be explained as a consequence of the Soviet regime's strategic goals. There are two versions of this explanation. The first version would expect that the Soviet regime rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice when they thought it would improve the possibility of the state meeting its foreign policy goals. The second version is a security-based variant. From this perspective shifts in Soviet diplomatic practice should have been made in order to increase the Soviet state's international security position. I will address each of these variants in turn.

There is some evidence to support the argument that Soviet diplomatic practice took the form that it did in order to help the Soviet state achieve its foreign policy goals, at least in the opening period of Soviet rule. In the first weeks and months that followed Red October, many in Sovnarkom and the Central Executive Committee seem to have been genuinely convinced that world revolution was imminent. In this very early stage of their rule the Soviets were not interested in solidifying relations with a capitalist world that they thought was on the verge of extinction, and so did not feel it was worthwhile to engage with it (Uldricks, 1979). There is also some evidence that shows that the Soviets thought that engaging in revolutionary behavior would actively aid in ushering in the revolution. For example, Trotsky argued that the publication of Russia's secret treaties would demonstrate to ordinary citizens that their own elites conspired against them, and thus hasten the internal collapse of the state system (Debo, 1979). The use of embassies

and missions as sites through which weapons and propaganda could be funneled was thus done in order to help accelerate this process of collapse. Within the logic of these expectations, the ‘reckless’ nature of early Soviet diplomatic practice still makes strategic sense.

However, this argument does not explain Soviet diplomatic practice after 1920, and especially 1921. Although Soviet foreign policy was initially highly revolutionary, it became increasingly pragmatic from mid-1918 onward. A cornerstone of this pragmatic shift was the Soviet regime’s pursuit of diplomatic recognition; initially from its immediate neighbors, later from larger powers. Although accommodations were quickly found with border states, receipt of recognition from the rest of international society was a much more difficult goal for the Soviets to achieve.¹⁶⁷ The best outcome the Soviets could often achieve was the formation of para-diplomatic institutions such as the trade cooperative that was set up in Great Britain in 1921. The goal of achieving diplomatic recognition became increasingly imperative after 1921 when domestic pressures (see below) created clear incentives for the Soviet regime to put the state on a solid diplomatic standing. At Lenin’s request, the NKID designed a “peace offensive” in order to buy diplomatic recognition from the allies by allowing the acquisition of Russian trading rights, and perhaps even the dismemberment of Russia. In order to increase the chances of other states recognizing the Soviet regime, Bolshevik party members were ordered to do nothing that would undermine this policy of peace. Lenin made clear that recognition

¹⁶⁷ In 1918 the government of the RSFSR was recognized by Afghanistan (it was also derecognized by Germany in this year). In 1919, it was recognized by Lithuania, Armenia, Latvia, and Finland. In 1920 it was recognized by Estonia, Persia, Turkey, and Poland. In 1922 it was recognized by Germany. Following recognition by Britain in 1924, the USSR was quickly recognized by Italy, Austria, Greece, Norway, Sweden, China, Denmark, Mexico, and France. The United States recognized the Bolshevik government in 1933.

with border-states had only been possible because the Soviets had “proved [their] ability to renounce in all sincerity, the use of force at the appropriate moment...and so win the sympathy of a bourgeois government... [and] win the confidence of nations hostile to us” (Debo, 1992, p. 144).

Yet despite the priority of this foreign policy goal, Soviet diplomatic practice at this time – especially the revolutionary diplomatic practice of the Comintern – repeatedly stymied the Soviet regime’s ability to achieve this goal. In a February 1920 discussion with Entente allies, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George made it clear that Bolshevik diplomacy would have to become “civilized” before Russia could be included in international society (quoted in Melograni, 1989, p. 94). When it was once again asked by the Soviets to normalize relations in July 1920 the British foreign office (FO) replied that any such agreement must include a “mutual undertaking to refrain from... direct or indirect propaganda against the institutions of the other party” (BDFFA IV, p. 192). Indeed, the British FO repeatedly warned the Soviet regime that Comintern activities abroad prevented diplomatic recognition. Specifically, the NKID was told that any possibility of serious diplomatic relations would be conditional on the Soviets’ abandonment of propaganda in India and the Middle East (Debo, 1992). The Soviets attempted to deflect these criticisms by denying any formal links between the Comintern and the NKID.¹⁶⁸ However, the British government responded to such claims with cynicism. As one official put it, “when the Russian government desires to take some

¹⁶⁸ For instance, in a September 1921 reply to propaganda complaints made by Lord Curzon, the Soviet representative in Britain declared that “the Russian Government wishes to take this occasion to emphasise [sic] once more, as it did many times before, that the mere facts of the Third International having for obvious reasons chosen Russia as the seat of its executive committee... give no more justification for the identifying of the Third International with the Russian Government... [the Soviets] not only formally reject the charges based on it being identified with the Third International, but also deny all the charges in substance” (BDFFA V, p. 258).

action more than usually repugnant to the normal international law and comity, they ordinarily erect some ostensibly independent authority” (quoted in Kocho-Williams, 2012, p. 66). Thus, Soviet diplomatic practice until 1923 actively interfered with the recognition policy the Soviet state was pursuing.

A security-focused strategic explanation is not strongly supported either. Once more, the only evidence that supports this explanation comes from the early stages of Bolshevik rule. Until the disaster of Brest-Litovsk, few in the Soviet regime thought there was much risk in adopting a revolutionary approach to diplomacy. Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that the Soviet delegation initially treated Brest-Litovsk as nothing more than a theatrical propaganda opportunity. However, the German response to Trotsky’s walk-out in February 1918 demonstrated the serious consequences of refusing to engage in sincere diplomacy. This event was just the beginning of a sequence of existential security threats that the Soviet regime faced during the period of the civil war (1918-1921). Although the Bolsheviks controlled the important centers of Petrograd and Moscow and parts of the Russian heartland during this time, they were under constant threat from the periphery of Russia. Various forces in the north, Cossack forces on the Don, the volunteer army of General Denikin in the Caucasus, the All-Russian Provisional Government at Omsk,¹⁶⁹ the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland were all engaged in direct warfare with the Soviet state at one time or another between 1918 and 1921.¹⁷⁰ These

¹⁶⁹ Recognized by Britain as the legitimate government of Russia in November 1918

¹⁷⁰ The civil war began accidentally in 1918 when Czechoslovak ex-POWs being sent home via the Trans-Siberian railroad entered into a military engagement with Bolsheviks in Novonikolaevsk. The nascent Red Guards were outmatched and by mid-June the Czech forces had reached the Volga and occupied Samara and Kazan. By November they were led by the Russian Admiral Kolchak. At the same time British expeditionary forces reinforced troops who had landed in Archangel and Murmansk in April. Almost simultaneously French troops had arrived in Odessa, and US troops had landed in Vladivostok. Most threatening of all, a force of White Russians led by General Denikin marched north from the Caucasus toward the capitals. The outcome of the Civil War was decided in 1919. By the middle of that year careful

“White” forces were directly or indirectly supported by Britain, France, the United States, and Japan, all which sent troops to Russia in this period. Under this pressure the Bolsheviks had every incentive to form a coherent strategic approach to counter these threats. Yet their rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice during this period left the Soviets badly isolated and unable to even meet with the intervening powers (who withdrew from Moscow to Vologda). From a security-perspective, this is puzzling behavior.

In addition to these immediate threats, Soviet diplomatic misconduct was even used as the excuse to initiate hostile action against the Soviet government by Britain in May 1923. In response to the insulting treatment of the British resident minister in Moscow by an NKID official, the Conservative government issued the famous “Curzon Ultimatum” against the Soviets.¹⁷¹ At the time, most of international society interpreted this ultimatum as a prelude for the declaration of war by Britain against the Soviet Union (Carr, 1985, p. 161). Although the motive for releasing this ultimatum was most likely

concentration of Soviet forces had dispatched Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich one after another.

¹⁷¹ On 30 March 1923 the British representative in Moscow, Robert Hodgson, handed a note to the Soviet government in which Britain asked for the stay of execution of a Soviet Catholic priest who had been convicted of espionage. The following day he received a note signed by the head of the western department in the Narkomindel. In violation of usual diplomatic rules of courtesy, the Soviet note used harsh language that accused Britain of “hypocritical interference” in Soviet affairs, and declared that Britain’s behavior in its own imperial possessions did not make for a convincing appeal “in the name of humanity and the sanctity of life” (quoted in Carr, 1985, p. 168). Hodgson refused to accept the note on the grounds that it was disrespectful and insulting, and that it went beyond the acceptable bounds of diplomatic practice. On 4 April, the same Soviet minister issued a second note scoffing at Hodgson’s claim “that the expressions employed in its [the USSR’s] answering note were inapt or not suitable to the circumstances of the case.” These ‘insulting’ notes were picked up by the conservative British press – the *Daily Telegraph* declared that Hodgson had been treated with the most “insulting and unjustified language” (FO 371/9365) – and began to generate public interest. Shortly afterward, the British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon issued the ultimatum. The ultimatum’s demands were numerous and addressed the accumulated grievances which the British FO had been building up against the USSR. Among the issues listed in the ultimatum’s twenty-six paragraphs was a demand that Soviet revolutionary activity in Iran and Afghanistan and the use of propaganda in India – all of which were in violation of the trade agreement – be abandoned. The FO also complained about the behavior of the Comintern in general; presented claims regarding the death of a British agent and the imprisonment of another in the USSR; and demanded the release from detention of two British trawlers. The Soviet government eventually gave-in to these demands.

not the manner in which the Soviets treated the British ambassador, Soviet diplomatic practice *did* matter for creating the political space that allowed an increase of hostilities against the USSR. In fact, the Curzon Ultimatum almost certainly would not have been issued without just such an excuse.¹⁷²

Further undermining a security explanation is the timing of the shift in Soviet diplomatic practice. When the Soviets finally adopted Westphalian diplomatic practice in 1923 the international threats that had earlier menaced the Soviet state had long been dealt with. In other words, it appears that the Soviet acceptance of Westphalian diplomatic practice (and rejection of any form of revolutionary diplomacy) was inversely correlated with the strategic security situation the Soviet regime found itself in: when it was at its most strategically-insecure position the Soviet regime rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice; when it was at its most strategically-secure it adopted it. Therefore, while this explanation can explain early Bolshevik diplomatic practice, it cannot explain the persistence of this revolutionary diplomacy in the face of an eroding strategic

¹⁷² When the contents of the notes were sent home by the British ambassador in Moscow, they caused a flurry of activity in the FO. In a series of memos passed between senior members of the FO, a consensus was quickly reached that the behavior of the Soviet foreign minister offered the perfect excuse for putting pressure on the USSR. In a large internal memo drawn up on 11 April, FO analysts explained that responding to the insults would provide a justification for hostility that others could readily accept (Case for Rupture with the Soviet Government, 11 April 1923, FO/371/9365). This conclusion was supported at another meeting held by senior FO officials on 16 April. In the minutes of this meeting those present discussed the possible arguments that could be made in front of parliament to “justify our action” [i.e. the Curzon Ultimatum]. Three different potential justifications were put forward. The first two, that the government should justify its policy on the basis of the treatment of Christians in the Soviet Union, or that it should justify its policy on the basis of the various infractions against British interests (i.e. the actual substance of most of the memo) were rejected as being too narrow or likely to only garner support from limited groups in parliament. Instead, a consensus was reached that a diplomatic rupture based on the insults received by Hodgson would work especially well (Minutes by Mr. O Malley, 16 April 1923, FO/371/9365). Thus, whatever their true motive, the British foreign office felt certain that justifications based on the violation of diplomatic protocol would rally their domestic and foreign supporters, and dissuade dissenters from speaking against the action. Furthermore, there was a conscious recognition by senior personnel that such an insult was an opportunity that they “ought not to let it slip” (Case for Rupture, 11 April 1923, FO/371/9365). In a special memo prepared for Curzon by two senior under-secretaries, the insult to the British representative was seen as the best chance that the government had to “carry the country with us” and that “we won’t get [another opportunity] again” (Russia: Internal Affairs, 14 April,

position, or the subsequent adoption of Westphalian diplomatic practice when it finally occurred.

Overall, strategic explanations for Soviet diplomatic practice are unconvincing. While early Soviet diplomatic practice makes a certain amount of sense – inasmuch as most of the Soviet leadership at least initially believed in imminent revolution – this explanation is unsupported from the post-Brest-Litovsk period onward. Although some have claimed that Soviet diplomacy in this period was coherent, the evidence simply does not support this.¹⁷³ Instead the evidence shows that, for most of the period under discussion, Soviet diplomacy was at odds with itself. Instead of committing to either a strategy of outright rejection-and-revolution or acceptance-and-reintegration, the Soviet regime adopted a set of self-contradicting policies and practices that were strategically insolvent. Indeed, nobody was more aware of this insolvency than the Soviet head of the NKID, Chicherin, who labeled the Comintern as the NKID's "enemy number one" (quoted in Kocho-Williams, 2009, p. 10). Perhaps the best example of this sentiment can be seen from a *Pravda* cartoon entitled "Friendly Jests." In this cartoon, the head of the Comintern Grigory Zinoviev is depicted delivering a revolutionary speech while behind him Chicherin clutches his head in frustration (see Figure 2).

1923, FO/371/9365).

¹⁷³ For instance, Carr (1985, p. 67-68) claims that Soviet diplomacy was "designed equally to promote world revolution and the national security of the Soviet republic....[these policies] were merely different instruments of a single consistent and integrated purpose."



Figure 2: "Friendly Jests." Source: Uldricks, 1979, p. 158.

A Constructivist Explanation for Soviet Diplomatic Practice. A second explanation for changes in Soviet diplomatic practice comes from the constructivist literature. From this perspective, we should expect that shifts in Soviet diplomatic practice were a function of the state's (or its regime's) identity. There are two versions of this explanation. The first version would expect that changes in Soviet diplomatic practice occurred following changes in the identity of Soviet elites. The second version would expect that changes in Soviet diplomatic practice occurred due to the socialization of Soviet diplomats as they interacted with diplomats from other states in international society. In other words, changes in Soviet diplomatic practice should have occurred through either a 'top-down' change in Soviet identity, or through a 'bottom-up' process of socialization. I will address each of these explanations in turn.

The 'top-down' identity explanation has some evidence to support it. From 1917 to 1923 the Soviet regime had a distinct revolutionary identity and Soviet diplomatic practice reflected the particulars of this identity. Not only did the Soviet regime break with typical standards of diplomatic practice, these breaks were noticeably 'revolutionary' in tone, focusing as they did on internationalism, egalitarianism, and global revolution. As I show in the next section, the influence of die-hard radicals was felt in all areas of the Soviet state for much of the period under discussion, including most executive branches of the Soviet state. For example, the final decision to sign Brest-Litovsk was narrowly ratified in the Central Committee by a vote of seven to six, with Trotsky being a last-minute swing vote.¹⁷⁴ Indeed, the radical wing of the Soviet regime had only agreed to seek a "peace without annexations" because they were certain such a proposal would be rejected by Germany and thus further destabilize the international system (Armstrong, 1993). With the dominance of such radicals in government, early Soviet diplomatic practice does not seem difficult to explain: it appears to have simply reflected the preferences of the majority of the Soviet leadership.

A 'dominant-elite' argument does not explain later shifts in Soviet diplomatic practice, however because while the dominance of these radicals was relatively constant over this period, Soviet diplomatic practice changed. Undoubtedly some elements of the Soviet government became less radical from mid-1918 due to the resignation and revolt of the Left SRs (see below), and the reintegration of some Mensheviks and Right SRs into the Soviet regime during the civil war. Similarly, the NEP-era (1921 onward) saw an influx of 'new men': revolutionaries who had fought for and with the Bolsheviks during

¹⁷⁴ The decision to sign the treaty was not easily reached. Lenin had to convince Trotsky and four other members of the Central Committee to vote for it (Armstrong, 1993).

the civil war, but who in themselves were not steeped in the internationalist and intellectual traditions of older Bolsheviks.¹⁷⁵ These new Communists understood themselves in a less radical way; their value system was based on ideas of “stability, continuity, hierarchy, discipline, and nationalism” (Binns, 1979, p. 596).

Yet despite these new influxes, these cadres had little to no influence on Soviet foreign policy.¹⁷⁶ This is for two reasons. First, despite these new influxes, the NKID as an institution recruited from the most radical elements of the party and still remained very revolutionary in its composition. In 1924, for example, whereas only a small minority of the staff at the Supreme Economic council and Gosplan, and 86 percent of the Commissars, deputy Commissars, and Collegium members were party members, the NKID at this time was staffed one hundred percent with communist party members (Uldricks, 1979, p. 98-99). Second, and more significantly, the *elite levels* of the party and the regime were still much more radical in their outlook. For instance, when the Politburo was formally established as the highest authority in government in March 1919 it was dominated by radical members of the Bolshevik party. Three of the five original ‘full’ members of the Politburo – Leo Kamenev, Trotsky, and Nikolai Kretinsky – were to the left of Lenin (the other member was Stalin). Similarly, two of the three non-voting ‘candidate’ members – Grigory Zinoviev and Nikolai Bukharin – were also radicals (the other candidate member was Mikhail Kalinin). The ‘expanded’ Central Committee, just below the executive committee was even more radical and had usually voted to the left of

¹⁷⁵ By 1922 the party had become a national regime and, despite two purges of ‘careerists,’ had swollen in size from 27,000 in 1917 to 500,000 in 1922.

¹⁷⁶ They were instrumental for allowing Stalin to consolidate power in the late 1920s, however (Service, 1991, ch. 8 & 9).

the Central Executive Committee and the Politburo.¹⁷⁷ Thus, until 1922, moderate views were in the minority in the Soviet executive (Debo, 1992). It was not until the inclusion of Alexei Rykov and Mikhail Tomsy in fractious political climate of 1922 that the Politburo included more moderate members. Even then, as I detail below, the influence of moderate opinion was far from dominant. Generally speaking, most Bolsheviks still possessed an identity still very much at odds with prevailing international norms. In other words, Soviet diplomatic practice shifted to a less radical mode, even while radical influence in the Soviet state remained largely constant. (This point is returned to in the next section).

There is also little evidence that that shifts in Soviet diplomatic practice occurred due to the socialization of the Soviet state into international society. There are two reasons this explanation is unsupported. First, there is no clear ‘vector’ through which the soviet state could have been socialized. The Soviet regime was largely cut off from the elites of international society, with the NKID being the only institution that regularly connected to this world. Yet, the NKID as an institution was itself isolated from the rest of the Soviet government. Although an important political instrument of the Soviet state, the NKID was not ‘represented’ at the executive level. The head of Narkomindel from March 1918 – Georgii Chicherin – was very much ‘Lenin’s man’, ignored or distrusted by other prominent Bolsheviks.¹⁷⁸ While he frequently reported to Sovnarkom or the

¹⁷⁷ See Debo (1979, chapter 4); Uldricks (1979, chapter 5).

¹⁷⁸ Chicherin replaced Zalkind in March 1918. Chicherin was intentionally selected by Lenin because of his foreign policy experience. Although a committed Bolshevik since the early 1900s Chicherin had both a social and professional background in the NKID. Chicherin was born into a noble family which had been closely linked with Imperial administration. His father had served as a counselor in the embassy in Paris, and his uncle had been Russian ambassador to the Hapsburg court at Vienna. In the 1900s Chicherin had to go into exile in order to avoid arrest for assisting social-revolutionaries in Russia. In Berlin, he joined the Bolshevik party after the failed 1905 revolution. He remained in exile until he returned from Britain in 1918

Central Committee, Chicherin was more bureaucrat than politician, and did not influence the executive (O Connor, 1988). As such, it is hard to see how he might have ‘socialized’ other Bolshevik elites.¹⁷⁹

A second, more significant, reason for rejecting a socialization explanation comes from the behavior of Soviet diplomats themselves, especially when they thought other members of international society were not observing them. Although Soviet diplomats became more outwardly Westphalian from 1918 onward, they still engaged in ‘revolutionary’ actions when home audiences were observing. For instance, even after the *polpred* system had been discarded as an international rank it was still used as the ‘in-house’ ranking system in the NKID. Similarly, although Soviet diplomats were urged to engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice in the presence of outsiders, their embassies reverted to Soviet norms of social intercourse when the doors closed. For example, the Soviet mission in Italy – noted earlier for its luxurious decoration – abandoned all bourgeois pretenses when foreigners were absent. Once the doors of the mission were closed the ambassador and all the staff, down to the porters, used the “same dining room and ate the same food.” Outside of business hours, “the rules of seniority and hierarchic distinctions were reduced to a minimum” (Barmine, 1973, p. 154-55). Of course it is impossible to determine which of these ‘faces’ was the ‘real’ one and which is the ‘fake’ one. However, the fact that Soviet diplomats and their staff felt the need to present a ‘revolutionary’ face to fellow citizens suggests that domestic Soviet society (or at least the regime) did not want people to be seen to be adopting bourgeois norms. This ‘Janus-

¹⁷⁹ In addition to having few official contacts with other party members, Chicherin did not interact with many people in a non-official capacity. A bachelor who resided in an apartment attached to the NKID headquarters, Chicherin often worked long hours. He received foreign diplomats late at night. Unlike most diplomats, he was disheveled and seemed uninterested in how he looked. He also disliked socializing and

faced' diplomatic practice was common. The Soviet representative earlier noted for his adoption of refined manners in Bern was seen to return to his original dress and demeanor as soon as he returned to Russia (Senn, 1974, p. 94). Indeed, as noted above, the NKID was actually the most 'Bolshevized' institution in the Soviet state. While they might have looked the part, its diplomats were selected from the most revolutionary segment of the nascent Soviet Union, and publicly demonstrated commitment to revolutionary values when not 'on-duty.' This suggests that any socialization that occurred was thin or, at least, suppressed by Soviet diplomats.

Taken together, these different pieces of evidence suggest that traditional constructivist explanations for changes in Soviet diplomatic practice are not convincing. Throughout much of the period under discussion, the Soviet elite was still markedly revolutionary in outlook. Although the Soviet state did ultimately take on a much more pragmatic identity of "Socialism in one country" (see conclusion of this chapter) this did not come about until the late 1920s, long after the Soviet state had abandoned revolutionary diplomatic practice. A socialization variant of this explanation is not supported either. Even after Soviet diplomats appeared to adhere to the standards of Westphalian diplomatic practice, they made sure to discard this identity when they were in the company of other Bolsheviks. This suggests that the Soviet state (or at least, its representatives) thought that there was something 'wrong' with Westphalian diplomatic practice, but that there was some payoff for adopting it. In the following section I offer an explanation for this behavior.

From Rejection to Acceptance: the Role of Narrative in Soviet Politics

allowed his deputy to take charge of receptions and entertaining (O'Connor 1988).

In order to understand the Soviet state's rejection and subsequent acceptance of Westphalian diplomatic practice it is necessary to explore the binding effect that the regime's narrative of legitimation had on its diplomatic practice. By outlining the way in which the Soviet "World Revolution" narrative bound the Soviet leadership – specifically Lenin – we can understand why Soviet diplomatic practice developed in the way that it did and why the Soviet state practiced an incoherent form of diplomacy, even when this appeared to undermine its own stated foreign policy goals. I remind the reader that two conditions need to be fulfilled in order for a narrative to bind a regime into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. First, the narrative must mandate practices that conflict with the practices of Westphalian diplomatic practice. Second, the regime's survival must be threatened. When these two conditions are fulfilled a regime will have incentives to maintain its legitimacy by rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. In this section I show how and when each of these conditions applied in this case.

First, I show how the World Revolution narrative mandated practices that conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice. The content of the World Revolution narrative promised the imminent collapse of the interstate system and its replacement by a socialist utopia. By portraying themselves as the vanguard of a revolutionary movement that would sweep away the contemporary bourgeois world and usher in this utopia, the Bolsheviks were able to distinguish themselves from political opponents, to legitimate their November coup, and to maintain the support of radicals. Fealty to this narrative was expressed not only through policy choices but also through revolutionary symbolic acts and practices. In the realm of foreign affairs, this narrative mandated that Soviet representatives engage in revolutionary diplomatic practices that violated traditional

diplomatic practices regarding rank, the privileges of resident embassies, protocol and etiquette, and – most significantly for Soviet foreign policy – the support of revolutionary movements abroad. By ostentatiously rejecting the ‘bourgeois’ practices of international society, the Bolsheviks could demonstrate their radical bona fides to the radical elites.

Second, I outline the threats to its survival that the Soviet regime faced during period under discussion, and how these threats diminished over time. The Soviet regime faced considerable threats to its survival from external enemies, divided elites, and domestic revolt as soon as it took power. Furthermore, moderates such as Lenin recognized that – despite the promises of their narrative of legitimation – world revolution was likely not imminent, and that Soviet attempts to aggressively pursue this goal were likely to lead to the regime’s collapse through some combination of outside intervention and internal revolts. Yet despite recognizing these threats Lenin could not deviate too far from the World Revolution narrative without facing possible revolt – and regime collapse – from the radicals inside the regime. In short, Lenin’s concerns with radical threats to regime survival bound him to engage in those practices mandated by the World Revolution narrative. One consequence of Lenin’s pursuit of solutions for these two competing pressures – i.e. shoring up the Soviet state’s security while also satisfying radicals’ expectations regarding world revolution – was the Soviet regime’s engagement in an increasingly mangled form of diplomatic practice. In order to satisfy radical expectations of World Revolution, Lenin sponsored the creation of the Comintern, which engaged in a revolutionary form of diplomacy. Yet at the same time Lenin ordered the NKID to pursue diplomatic recognition from international society in order to shore up the Soviet regime; a policy that required the adoption of Westphalian diplomatic practice.

This ‘two-faced’ diplomacy continued until threats to regime survival diminished. The cause of this change in survival threats was a shift in radical elite opinion regarding revolution. With the failure of revolutionary uprisings in Hungary and Germany in late 1923 the radicals in the regime came to the realization that world revolution was a distant goal (a fact Lenin had appreciated as early as spring 1918) and resigned themselves to a less immediate revolution. In terms of regime survival, this was the point when a *divided elite* became a *unified elite* (see p. 113, above). As a consequence of the changed threat to regime survival, the binding effect of narrative dissipated. This made it possible for the regime to subordinate the revolutionary elements of diplomatic practice in favor of a more pragmatic – and Westphalian – form of diplomacy.

The remainder of this chapter shows how this explanation can account for the Soviet relationship with Westphalian diplomatic practice from 1917 until 1923. It proceeds as follows. First, I unpack the content of the ‘World Revolution’ narrative of legitimation used by the Soviet regime. In particular I outline: how this narrative was used to create and sustain the Bolshevik regime that took power in 1917; the content of this narrative; and the manner in which this narrative was practiced. Second, I show how this narrative mandated particular practices on the part of Soviet diplomatic representatives, and how these practices conflicted with many elements of Westphalian diplomatic practice. Third, I outline the threats to Soviet regime survival in this period, and show how these altered over time. Last, I present detailed evidence that directly demonstrates why narrative binding lay at the heart of the Soviet regime’s initial rejection, and later adoption, of the Westphalian diplomatic practice. In particular I show how, in order to counter threats to its survival, the Soviet regime had to engage in

practices that met the expectations of radical elites, and how this imperative meant that the Soviet regime had to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. I show how it was only when the radicals finally came to the conclusion in 1923 that world revolution was not imminent, that threats to the Soviet regime dissipated. At this point the regime was no longer bound by its narrative and could finally fully accept Westphalian diplomatic practice.

The Content of the ‘World Revolution’ Narrative. The narrative of legitimation used by the Soviet regime was the same narrative that had been used by the Bolshevik party before it took power in November 1917. Prior to their coup the Bolsheviks were not really a mass political party “but rather an obscure sect hidden in exile...isolated from society” (Wydra, 2012, p. 50). In the process of establishing a public profile for themselves, the Bolsheviks competed with many other political parties in Petrograd and Moscow, including other left-wing parties such as the social-democratic Mensheviks, and the peasant-supported revolutionary SRs. Distinguishing themselves from these groups was no easy task. Most Russian citizens were not aware of or interested in the theoretical or political particulars of the various parties vying for their support. Lenin was acutely aware that, even among intellectuals, perennial inter-party debate and doctrinal squabbles had created a “certain confusion of mind” (Lenin, quoted in Corney, 2004, p. 21). This confusion made it difficult for Bolsheviks to make their mark on the public consciousness. Thus the ‘World Revolution’ narrative had been consciously articulated by the Bolsheviks during the period of the Provisional government in order to distinguish the party from the other revolutionaries active in Russia at that time and to bring together the various radicals forces across the country.

The content of this narrative was revolutionary not just in its view of political relations, but in its fundamental explanation of the world itself. Drawing heavily on Marx, the Bolsheviks believed that history was not a sequence of random and unpredictable events, but that it progressed along a singular and scientifically understandable path toward a predetermined outcome. Economic forces, not the machinations and men and states, were considered to be the determinants of this process. Economic forces gave rise to political classes that were distinguished from one another based on their relationship with the means of economic production. According to Marx and his adherents, it was the struggle between these economic classes (rather than the struggle between nations) that was the true operative force in history. This historical process would end with the final supplanting of the bourgeois by the proletarian class, and the ushering in of an eternal socialist utopia (Marx, 1983, pp. 163-189).

The narrative of World Revolution explicitly presented contemporary events as the penultimate moment in this historical process. According to Bolsheviks such as Lenin, the chaos unleashed by the endless expansion of capitalism had finally reached its endpoint in WWI, and the entire system of global politics was on the edge of collapse (Lenin, 1917). The Bolshevik insistence that the revolutionary crisis in Russia was the last stage in world history distinguished the party from its Menshevik competitors who argued that Russia still needed to enter into its 'bourgeois' phase of development before it could become a true socialist state. By contrast, as Lenin made it clear in his 1917 'April Theses,' the Bolsheviks saw the revolution as more than just a Russian phenomenon, but rather the first phase of a global revolution in human politics (Winks & Adams, 2003). Although world revolution was tumultuous and dangerous, the narrative promised that

once it was completed there would be a radical and immediate improvement in the standards of living experienced by Russians. World revolution would forever change the social and political reality that most people faced. Led by Lenin, the Bolsheviks promised a new system in which all resources would be shared by citizens of the world equally. Class exploitation, political privilege, and the very interstate system itself would evaporate to be replaced by a single political entity in which all were cared for. Once it occurred, revolution would “take place simultaneously in all civilized countries... it [would be] a world revolution and will therefore have the whole world as its arena” (Engels, quoted in Armstrong, 1993, p. 123). The entire world economy would become integrated and controlled by the global proletarian class. Thus the World Revolution narrative offered not only apocalypse, but utopia. The Bolsheviks understood the inherent attractiveness of such claims for many disaffected Russians. During the period of the Kerensky government the Bolsheviks loudly and publicly declared that their view of history best understood, and served, the interests of ordinary citizens and soldiers, as well as radicals (Service, 1979).

Although they claimed that history would unfold according to an unstoppable process, the Bolsheviks also claimed that they had a special responsibility to act as a vanguard that could accelerate this process. Once in power, the Bolsheviks would be able to hasten the demise of the state while also supporting the revolution abroad.¹⁸⁰ This vanguard was to be organized according to the precepts of ‘democratic centralism’ where the party would allow discussion by members during assemblies and conferences, but would ruthlessly enforce decisions once they had been reached. This dictatorial tendency

¹⁸⁰ As Frederick Engel’s (quoted in Armstrong, 1993, p. 123) put it, “the first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of the whole society – taking possession of the means of production in

in Bolshevik politics distinguished the party from other political revolutionaries and earned their hostility.¹⁸¹ Because of its prophecy of imminent global revolution, the narrative of World Revolution mandated that the vanguard actively and aggressively engage in those actions necessary to hasten the historical process. The claim that the revolution needed to be immediately midwifed by radical action was the other dividing line between communists and socialists. As McDermott and Agnew (1997, p. 8) note: “for the social democrats, the Bolsheviks were desperate gamblers who were prepared to wage civil war and risk destruction in the hope that European workers would come to their aid.”

Because this narrative claimed that world history was approaching its final moments, it also mandated the rejection of the contemporary cultural system, which itself was seen as the reflection of outmoded bourgeois values (Von Geldern, 1993). The Bolsheviks did not just want to eradicate the existing political order, they wanted “to annihilate everything that existed before” (Wydra, 2012, p. 54). In other words, the “red paradise” (Wydra, 2012, p. 56) promised by Lenin and his followers envisioned a world unrecognizable from the one in which Russians found themselves. World Revolution promised a systematic destruction of the social, political, and personal relationships and values of the contemporary era.

This narrative whipped up the support of radical intellectuals but also found favor with many ordinary Russians because, while this narrative was radical in content, its

the name of society – as at the same time its last independent act as a state.”

¹⁸¹ Most notably Lenin engaged in a public and polemical dispute with Karl Kautsky, and old friend and one of the prominent thinkers of the Second International. Although both men had already drifted during the war they had a decisive break when, in response to the Bolshevik coup of 1917, Kautsky published the damning *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat* in 1918. Lenin responded by publishing *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, in which Kautsky was denounced as a “parliamentary cretin” and “windbag” who promoted democratic “twaddle” (McDermott & Agnew, 1997, p. 7).

immediate policy implications were clear. If resources were to be shared by all, then workers and peasants would no longer go hungry. If the interstate system was to dissolve then the (already-deserting) army would no longer need to fight. Thus this narrative, while utopian, also promised real policy changes. Instead of advocating for compromise and continuing war as most other post-tsar parties were, Lenin's party was "offering land at once to impatient peasants, peace at once to the war-weary populace" (Winks & Adams, 2003, p. 111). However, it also promised that all of the benefits of Soviet leadership would only appear in full *after* the global revolution had finally concluded.

The Practice of the 'World Revolution' Narrative. While the Bolshevik World Revolution narrative was fundamentally intellectual in content, the regime nonetheless had to find ways to express it symbolically as sovereign authority in Russia had always been associated with symbolic politics (Corney, 2004). Prior to the revolutions of 1917 rituals, festivals and dramas had been the main medium of communication between the otherwise-distant tsars and their subjects. For instance, during the reign of Nicholas II large-scale and symbolically-laden spectacles, carnivals, and firework displays were used to celebrate important moments in the imperial calendar such as the centenary of the Battle of Borodino (1912), the bicentennial of the founding of St. Petersburg (1903), the tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty (1913), as well as dynastic events such as Nicholas II's coronation or the birth of his heir.¹⁸² Thus for the Soviet narrative of legitimation to resonate with the mass public the Bolsheviks had to engage in large-scale but simple

¹⁸² The form of Tsarist celebrations usually had two components: an extravagant and highly theatrical observance of the particular event in question, and popular entertainments that often included free food or gifts. For example, the day following Nicholas II's highly elaborate coronation at St. Petersburg (which involved over seven thousand invited guests and a city-long parade), a traditional open-air feast was held outside the city at which over five hundred thousand people appeared to avail of the free food, beer, and entertainments sponsored by the tsar. In this instance, a rumor that the not enough food and drink had been provided led to a stampede that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of subjects. For more see Massie (2000,

practices that expressed the revolutionary sentiment of Marxism without relying on Marx's complex dialectical prose. In order to do this, the Bolsheviks refashioned their narrative of legitimation into simple policy-statements and clear and distinct symbolic acts of revolutionary behavior. These practices were used to punctuate and illustrate the narrative that the Bolsheviks were trying to establish.

Expressing the content of their narrative of legitimation in symbolic terms was not an easy task for the Bolsheviks because, at least in the opening year of their revolutionary activity, they were largely bereft of their own symbolic grammar. While they could rehabilitate some historical symbols of revolution (such as the Paris Commune), their radical image generally prevented the Bolsheviks from drawing on the past to legitimize their rule. While some believed that some of Russia's cultural legacy could be a valuable resource and urged saving that which could be modified to support the new order, this history "had to be remembered selectively" (Lenin, quoted in von Geldern, 1993, p. 75).¹⁸³ After all, the whole point of the revolution, according to the Bolsheviks, was to discard the past. Revolution was to be "the people's final break with the Asiatic, with the Seventeenth Century, with Holy Russia, with icons and cockroaches" (Trotsky quoted in Lane, 1981, p. 10). Therefore, instead of drawing on the past, the new Soviet regime had to introduce a new set of symbols and practices that established their right to rule.

This was done in a number of ways. First, the Soviet regime engaged in large-scale ceremonial and symbolic acts throughout the parts of Russia it governed. Although the Bolsheviks were not the only faction to possess the revolutionary bona fides to lead,

chapter 5)

¹⁸³ For instance, the 17th century Cossack rebel Razin was rehabilitated and reinterpreted as a pre-Bolshevik revolutionary. His peasant background made him attractive to the Bolsheviks due to their lack of connection to peasants. Lenin even visited his grave and dedicated a monument to him on May Day 1919.

they did have the advantage of controlling the organs of government that had been vacated by the opposition.¹⁸⁴ The Bolsheviks used this advantage to organize monumental symbolic displays such as parades, plays, and festivals. They draped the only revolutionary symbol that they did not share with other revolutionary groups – the hammer and the sickle – all over the government buildings that they controlled. In Moscow, the Kremlin wall was covered in political posters. Red banners carrying revolutionary slogans and black banners carrying the names of fallen revolutionary martyrs ran the entire length of Red Square.¹⁸⁵

Second, the Soviets engaged in practices that reflected the narrative of World Revolution's promise of an impending end-time. As mentioned above World Revolution did not simply promise an improvement in the immediate day-to-day lives of individuals in a pragmatic way; it claimed that a classless and stateless utopia was imminent (Armstrong, 1993). The Soviet faith in revolution was demonstrated through symbolic practices that emphasized the dawning of a new era. For instance, on 1 February 1918 (14 February N.S) – in a manner reminiscent of the French revolution (Ozouf, 1998) – the regime introduced a new calendar by switching from the Julian to the Gregorian system. Such an update of the calendar was seen as more befitting to an internationalist regime, and also had the benefit of mangling and de-legitimizing the Orthodox calendar used by reactionary opponents. Old holidays were banned and new ones added. These new dates

¹⁸⁴ On 25 October the Mensheviks and Right SRs responded to the Bolshevik seizure of power by walking out of the Second Congress, thus ceding the Smolny Institute – a powerful symbol of revolution – to Bolshevik control.

¹⁸⁵ The Bolshoi and Malyi theaters were similarly draped. In Petrograd over 160,000 yards of red material adorned seventy-one points of revolutionary significance. Such symbolic monumentalism was not only restricted to the capitals, although these were the most important sites of this activity. For example, the first anniversary of the October Revolution was celebrated at Voronezh with a day-long event that included a choral "Eulogy of the Revolution" and ended with a ceremonial *Burning of the Hydra of Counterrevolution*. This event featured a sixty meter long effigy of three-headed hydra that was escorted

sacralized not only the revolution in general, but also the Bolshevik role in it.¹⁸⁶

For many Bolsheviks being a revolutionary went further and meant reordering the most basic elements of ordinary life. One way this occurred was through the proliferation of new rituals and practices, designed to create and reinforce the new ideal of the Soviet citizen (Lane, 1984). For instance, at a 1923 meeting of Party propagandists Trotsky learned that Soviet supporters were spontaneously replacing religious life-cycle rituals with secular ones.¹⁸⁷ Party circulars encouraged the holding of secular ceremonies such as weddings and funerals. The public rejection of the past and tradition allowed Bolsheviks to demonstrate their belief in a new revolutionary world. Even seemingly minor issues regarding honorifics, manners, and ordinary social intercourse were treated with contempt as attitude and demeanor could signal one's revolutionary outlook. As Binns (1979, p. 588) explains, in the early days of communist rule, "Bolsheviks affected to despise personal feelings, individualism and social conventions." For some radical Bolsheviks, then, the narrative of world revolution mandated practices that actively rejected contemporary domestic society.

'World Revolution' and its Conflict with Westphalian Diplomatic Practice.

Unpacking the content and practice of the World Revolution narrative used by the Soviet regime helps us to understand the manner in which the Soviet state rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice. The narrative of World Revolution did not distinguish between the

through the town by a mounted guard of forty before it was dismembered and set alight.

¹⁸⁶ The new calendar included six national holidays: 1 January (New Year); 22 January (Memorial Day for Bloody Sunday, 1905); 12 March ('Overthrow of the Autocracy'); 18 March (Paris Commune Day); 1 May (May Day); and 7 November (the 'October Revolution'). The nine orthodox festivals associated with Tsarism were outlawed, although other religious rest-days were permitted.

¹⁸⁷ For example, a father called a special factory meeting at which his fellow-workers voted on his newly-born son's name, and then drew up a signed memorandum authorizing it. Trotsky approved of this ritual activity, arguing that 'man's desire for the theatrical' meant that rationalism would not be sufficient prop in social and political life (Binns, 1979).

domestic and international realms, and instead saw them as inextricably linked. As Christian Rakovsky (quoted in Uldricks, 1979, p. 144) explained: “foreign policy...is only a projection of domestic policy and, clearly, has a close relationship to the form of political and social organization and to its institutions generally.” This narrative conflation of domestic and international politics mandated a number of Soviet diplomatic practices.

First, and most fundamentally, the narrative of World Revolution mandated a rejection of international society. According to the World Revolution narrative the international system itself was on the verge of transforming completely into a stateless socialist utopia. Especially in the opening few weeks of the Soviet revolution most of the senior Soviet leadership assumed that total global revolution was perhaps as close as weeks away. In this new socialist paradise the machinery of interstate communication would be obsolete (Debo, 1979). As a result there was little point in exchanging envoys, upholding treaties, and behaving in accordance with existing diplomatic norms. The NKID was a pointless relic of a bygone age. From this perspective we can make sense of Trotsky’s statement that – as head of the NKID – he would simply ‘shut up shop.’ Indeed Trotsky may have originally agreed to take the position as he was certain that it had the fewest actual governing responsibilities and would thus give him more time to focus on other political matters (Uldricks, 1979).

Second, inasmuch as this narrative did mandate engagement with the outside world, it mandated that this be done only to further the goal of global revolution. This meant that the Soviet regime was expected to ignore parochial interests. World Revolution was expected to happen to the world, not just Russia. Privileging Russian

‘interests’ was inherently anti-revolutionary. As Trotsky explained upon taking power of the NKID: “In the present historical conditions the proletariat is not interested in defending an anachronistic national “Fatherland”” (quoted in Armstrong, 1993, p. 124). Insomuch as diplomacy was practiced in a Westphalian form it was expected to be engaged in order to aid revolution, even at the expense of the Soviet state. Understanding this can help us to explain why Soviet diplomats were ordered to use diplomatic missions as little more than staging-posts from which they funded and armed foreign revolutionary movements, and why they engaged in propaganda. It also explains the mission and purpose of the Comintern, an organization that so frequently created diplomatic problems for the Soviet state: the narrative of World Revolution mandated that the interests of the state were expected to suffer in the service of global revolution.

Third, by understanding the narrative of legitimation used by the Soviet regime, we can to some extent understand the often brusque and dismissive attitude of individual Soviet diplomats. Not only did the confrontational Soviet narrative of legitimation reject the norms and traditions of Russian society, it actively rejected the broader norms of bourgeois international society. The governments of the great powers were the ultimate expression of the capitalist ruling classes and were deserving of nothing but contempt from revolutionaries. Bolsheviks were expected to openly sneer at, and reject, the bourgeois norms of this class.

In summary, the Soviet regime’s World Revolution narrative mandated practices that rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice. Insomuch as they were mandated to engage with international society, Soviet representatives were only to engage in those actions that would hasten world revolution. Therefore, like the Qing narrative, the Soviet

narrative *systematically* rejected contemporary international society. It was not simply that the Soviets were antagonistic toward certain states in the international system; they were antagonistic to the *idea* of the international system itself. The potential for conflict with Westphalian diplomatic practice was immediate and apparent.

However, while the Soviet regime, like the Qing, had contempt for Westphalian diplomatic practice, their fundamental relationship with it differed. Unlike the Qing, who rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice until Beijing was sacked, the Soviet regime's rejection of diplomacy was short-lived. Although the Soviets initially rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice outright, they soon adopted a 'two-faced' form of diplomatic practice from 1918-1923, before fully accepting Westphalian diplomatic practice. Yet this change cannot be explained as a function of the *content* of the Soviet narrative of legitimation, which remained unchanged in this period. Instead, in order to explain the Soviet shift in diplomatic practice we also have to understand the changing nature of *threats* to Soviet regime survival. It was changes in these threats, not in the narrative's content, that eased the binding force of the Soviet narrative of legitimation. As these threats diminished, the regime was no bound by its narrative of legitimation. This change in threat is the subject of the next section.

The Soviet Regime's Survival Threats, 1917-1923. The Soviet regime faced a number of survival threats from 1917 until 1923. On the borders and in the interior of the country the regime faced threats in the form of the Whites and their great power allies. In addition to these threats the Soviet regime faced threats inside its area of ostensible authority from both elites and the masses. Regarding the elite threat, the Soviet regime existed as an unstable coalition of moderates and radicals. This coalition was in constant

tension, as the moderates sought to consolidate the regime while the radicals sought increasingly revolutionary policies. In order to keep both sides on board, Lenin consistently justified all the policies he advocated as being consistent with the narrative of World Revolution. This was necessary because, as I show below, attempts by Lenin to move too far away from the narrative of World Revolution generated considerable hostility from the radicals and threatened to destabilize the regime. This elite division was exacerbated by the weak institutional control the regime exerted outside of Moscow and Petrograd. Attempts to consolidate power were uneven and often had the effect of further empowering the radicals and alienating the masses (such as the policy of war communism; see below). These radical policies created huge discontent at the mass level and ultimately led to a series of country-wide revolts that threatened to topple the regime from without. In order to satisfy the masses, the Soviet regime was forced to adopt more moderate policies, such as Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' of 1921; a policy that was itself resisted by radicals. Thus from the 1917 to 1923, the Soviet regime's survival was threatened by elite division from within, and from weak institutional control without (see table on page 113). Attempts to consolidate the regime's control over the institutions of the state had the effect of further empowering radicals. It was not until 1923 that the elite *unified* on the issue of world revolution. When this occurred the regime was no longer bound by its narrative of legitimation.

In this part of the chapter I outline the internal and external threats to Soviet regime survival from 1917 to 1923 in detail. I begin by describing the radical-moderate elite coalition at the heart of the Soviet regime, and Lenin's leadership position in this coalition. I follow this by describing the problems the Soviet regime had in consolidating

its power and how overly-radical policies led to mass protests and the near-collapse of the regime from outside. Understanding the survival threats the regime faced will prepare the reader for the final section of this chapter, where I show how these threats affected the binding nature of the Soviet narrative, and how this affected Soviet diplomatic practice until 1923.

Elite Threats to Soviet Regime Survival. At the time of the Bolshevik-led October Revolution, political power was dispersed throughout Russia. When the Second Congress of Soviets opened in Petrograd that month less than half of the soviets (workers' and soldiers' councils) that existed in the country were represented. Inside Petrograd, the Bolsheviks were only moderately popular. In order to try to supplant the more moderate Mensheviks and the agrarian SRs, the Bolsheviks formed a coalition with radical members of the SRs – the so-called 'Left SRs,' who had the support of the peasant classes. This was a strained coalition as most Left SRs were even more radical than the Bolsheviks (Winks & Adams, 2003, p. 291). This Soviet coalition had the support of disgruntled soldiers and factory workers, but only primarily in the capitals (Debo, 1979, Ch. 1). Furthermore, Bolshevik control over the radicals both within their party and without was tenuous at best. The modern remembrance of the Soviet state as a disciplined hierarchy at that time is just that: an image. The reality was that many town committees refused to respond to central Soviet demands, even when issued by their own parties (Service, 1979).¹⁸⁸ Strikes and mutinies were frequent events across the country.

¹⁸⁸ Perhaps the most notorious example of this rebellious attitude was the action of the Yekaterinburg soviet in summer 1918. The tsar and his family had been evacuated from Moscow to the Siberian town of Tobolsk in Siberia by the Kerensky government in 1917. In mid-1918 the radical-left soviet in the town of Yekaterinburg requested permission from the Moscow leadership to transport the tsar and his family to their town. Before receiving a reply a detachment from the city of Omsk forcibly removed the royal family. This began the chain of events that led to the murder of the royal family. For more see Massie (2000, chapters 33 & 34).

At the center of this amalgam of Bolsheviks, radicals, Left SRs, soldiers, workers, and peasants was Lenin, who was the instrumental figure in holding this coalition together. Contrary to the authoritarian image that exists of him today, Lenin was not in a position that allowed him to unilaterally impose his will. Although Lenin was the single most influential member of the Bolshevik party he was more a ‘first among equals’ rather than a dictator. Furthermore, his political views were in general more moderate than that of most of his senior colleagues and could not simply be foisted on others. Five of the original eight members of the Politburo were to the left of Lenin, including, at least initially, Trotsky.¹⁸⁹ Any attempts by Lenin to drive through policies were also limited by the presence of Left SRs in the Soviet coalition. Although this party was very much the junior member of the coalition, they were more radical than the most radical wing of the Bolshevik party. Many members of this radical elite (both SR and Bolshevik) expected imminent global revolution and advocated the rejection of international society wholesale. In order to deal with these radicals Lenin usually adopted a policy of compromise. For instance, Lenin was famous for promoting political opponents – such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev – in an attempt to draw them closer to him (this largely worked with Trotsky). He also attempted to distance himself from intra-party disputes. As Lockhart (1933, p. 236) put it, “squabbles among the commissars were frequent, but they never touched Lenin.”

In other words, Lenin acted as what Stacie Goddard refers to as an “identity bridge” – an actor with the ability to “yoke” together a political coalition of otherwise uncoordinated political actors in order to create a new political group (Goddard, 2006, p.

¹⁸⁹ In March 1919, the Bolsheviks reorganized the party structure and transformed the Central Executive Committee into the Politburo.

48). This ability was dependent on one of Lenin's other notable characteristics: his pragmatism. Although he was the figurehead of world revolution, Lenin seems to have been one of the very first of the Soviet elite to lose faith in the possibility of immediate world revolution. According to Melograni (1989) Lenin did not believe that world revolution would save the Soviet regime and privately embraced the goal of "socialism in one country" almost immediately after the Bolshevik takeover of Russia. As the evidence below shows, Lenin was often the main driver of the traditional foreign and domestic policies adopted by the Soviet state. In short, despite being a committed revolutionary in public Lenin was, in practice, more a pragmatist than a true believer. This was certainly the view of some contemporary observers. In a secret British intelligence report based on information from an ex-Tsarist officer in the Red Army, the Soviet regime – which was in a near-process of "disintegration" – was only held together by "Lenin's iron will and his policy of compromise" (BDFa VI, p. 182).

This policy of compromise was a necessary because as tenuous as radical elite support for the regime was, other elites were even more hostile to the Soviet regime. The Mensheviks and Right SRs elites were the most immediate threat to Soviet rule following the Bolshevik coup. These political opponents repeatedly pointed out the lack of support for the Bolsheviks.¹⁹⁰ When the first elections were held for a constituent assembly in

¹⁹⁰ The SR daily *Rabochaia gazeta* drew an unfavorable comparison between the Bolshevik-led October revolution and the one that had taken place in February: "Where are the crowds of many thousands who welcomed the February Revolution? Where are the worker mass meetings? Where are the demonstrations filing past with red flags and victorious songs on the streets of Petrograd?" (quoted in Corney, 2004, p. 27). The essence of the Menshevik critique was that the Bolsheviks were a bunch of outsider intellectuals at the front of a small mob. Casting the Bolsheviks in terms of "zagovor (coup), pogrom, putsch, *avantiura* (adventure), *miatezh* (mutiny)," the Mensheviks accused their opponents of leading an opportunistic "paper revolution." (Corney, 2004, p. 9). They depicted the Bolshevik takeover as the "Rape of the Winter Palace" and highlighted the way in which the brutal and drunken (and thus cynical and non-revolutionary) mob had pillaged the palace and viscously assaulted the women's battalion protecting it. In response to these charges of opportunism the Bolsheviks tacked further to the left, and claimed that that they were the

October 1917 (the precipitating event for the coup), the Bolshevik-led coalition won most of its votes only in Petrograd and Moscow, with some peasant support from the agrarian hinterlands. Consequently, the Soviet coalition only received only 38% of the ballots cast. It was only the action of riflemen loyal to the Bolsheviks that allowed this minority to take power. Thus the Soviets constantly faced challenges from their political opponents who often organized mass demonstrations in the capitals in an attempt to undermine the Soviet regime's authority.¹⁹¹ These acts of symbolic resistance created considerable confusion in the minds of ordinary Russians. Even a month after the Bolshevik coup many in the cities could not tell who was in power (Corney, 2004).

In short, Lenin was highly dependent on the support of the elite members to maintain the Soviet regime's survival. Maintaining their support was not easy and relied considerably on attitudinal mechanisms (see Chapter Three). As long as the elites (especially the radicals) thought the regime was meeting their goals, they would continue to support it. However, radicals who felt that the regime was being too 'moderate' in its policy orientation would go to extremes to correct this, as Lenin discovered when an attempt was made on his life in summer 1918.¹⁹² In response to this attack the regime expelled the Left SRs and permitted the partial reintegration of some Right SRs and Mensheviks (Service, 1979, p. 119). Nonetheless, the radical wing of the Bolsheviks (now re-named 'Communists') still exerted considerable power in the coalition. For

only true revolutionaries. In order to separate themselves out from their opponents, the Bolsheviks consciously legitimated their rule in the rhetoric of *revoliustiia* (revolution), *vasstanie* (uprising), *perevorot* (overthrow), and *perekhod vlasti* (transfer of power).

¹⁹¹ During the Bolshevik-organized 1918 Petrograd May Day celebrations, for example, opposition movements organized counter-marches that turned the event into a fiasco (Von Geldern, 1993).

¹⁹² On August 30 1918 a disgruntled revolutionary attempted to assassinate the Soviet leader. Fanja Kaplan fired three shots at Lenin, two of which stuck him in his lung and chest. Kaplan was executed four days after the attempt. Despite failing to kill Lenin, assassins did succeed in killing Mikhail Uritski, the head of the Petrograd *Cheka* (Uldricks, 1979, p. 49). I return to this event in the next section.

instance, attempts to centralize the regime were effectively blocked by radicals at the Ninth Party Congress in 1919 (Service, 1979, Ch. 5). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, radicals dominated the senior levels of the Soviet regime during this period.

To put this in the language of chapter 3, the Soviet regime was reliant on the support of a *divided* elite. The central point that divided radical elites from moderates was their faith in the imminence of world revolution. While some elites, such as Lenin, quickly abandoned their faith in immediate revolution, many others strongly supported any policies that encouraged global revolution. As I show below, this put considerable pressure on the regime to engage in practices that demonstrated fealty to this goal.

The Soviet elite remained divided until 1923, when – due to reasons exogenous to my theory – the radical elites abandoned their belief in imminent revolution. At this point the elites in the regime *unified* and the importance of the narrative of world revolution in holding the regime together diminished. The key events that caused this shift in radical elite beliefs were the changing political circumstances throughout Europe; most notably the continued failure of other revolutionary states to materialize. While failed revolutions had been keenly watched in places like Hungary in 1919 and Poland in 1920, radicals were always fixated on the revolutionary situation in Germany because it was, according to the logic of Marxist theory, the most likely state to undergo revolution. For instance, when a general strike broke out in Germany in March 1921, the head of the Comintern Grigory Zinoviev (who had also taken a seat on the Politburo around the same time) declared at a Comintern meeting that revolution “in the West could be achieved at one stroke” (DBFA V, p. 107). When the revolution failed to materialize, many hardliners began to question when revolution would occur. As Trotsky put it in 1921, “in 1919, we

said that it was a question of months; we say now that it is a question of years” (Florinsky, 1932, p. 210).

In 1923 a critical event occurred that shifted the revolutionary expectations of the most prominent radicals in the USSR. In October of that year a series of communist uprisings – orchestrated with the aid of the Comintern – had taken place in Germany. The German October revolution was the sign that the radicals in the Communist party had been waiting for. Moscow was “in the throes of a violent excitement” in anticipation of the impending German revolution (Barmine, 1945, p. 139). Karl Radek gave a series of lectures at the War College claiming that Germany was “on the eve of collapse” (BDFFA VI, p. 105). Zinoviev published articles in *Pravda* about what the direction of foreign policy would be in the new Soviet German State. Leaders such as Radek and Trotsky were convinced that Germany was ready to undergo a coup and urged full support. Only Chicherin had argued against supporting the rebellion as he (correctly) understood the damage it would do to Soviet-German relations (O’Connor, 1988).¹⁹³ However, despite the high expectations of Soviet radicals, the German ‘Red October’ failed completely.¹⁹⁴ The effect of this failure on Soviet policies was profound. For a second time since the Bolsheviks had taken power, Germany – the most-likely candidate for socialist revolution – had failed to transition into a Soviet state. On 6 November, speaking in front of the Petrograd Soviet, a sobered Zinoviev publicly admitted that revolution might take ten years or more (BDFFA VII, p. 70-71). The British representative in Moscow cabled home in January 1924 that while expectations of a German revolution were a certainty amongst

¹⁹³ In 1922, Germany and the RSFSR, annoyed by their mutual exclusion from international politics had mutually recognized one another.

¹⁹⁴ In addition to the abortive German revolution, there was an unsuccessful Comintern-backed uprising in Bulgaria.

the Soviets before the end of 1923, that had now changed (BDFV VII, p. 82-87). With this change in radical opinion the elites of the Soviet Union had become *unified* in their beliefs about revolution. Radicals no longer believed that they were mandated to pursue revolution to the expense of all other goals. At this point, the threats to regime survival diminished.

Mass threats to Soviet Regime Survival. Radical elites had been so influential in early Soviet politics because of the weak institutional control the regime had over the state, and the consequent threats it faced from the Russian masses. Originally, some sectors of the mass public had been instrumental in helping the Soviet regime take power. During the tenure of the Kerensky government the Bolsheviks had gained the support of industrial workers and garrison soldiers by loudly and publicly staking out a position as these groups' advocates (Service 1979, Ch. 2). The Soviet regime was also popular with soldiers at the front. While many political elites had wanted to stay in the war the famous Order No. 1 of March 1917 made it clear that most troops were unwilling to follow such a course.¹⁹⁵ The Bolsheviks had been the only party to come out in full support of this radical order, and by doing so had earned the loyalty of the soldiers (Benvenuti, 1988).¹⁹⁶ In addition to anti-war measures, the Soviet regime attempted to gain the support of the workers and peasants through a variety of redistribution programs.¹⁹⁷ In other words most

¹⁹⁵ Order No. 1 was issued by mutinous soldiers. It sanctioned the creation of soldiers' committees from the company level upwards, banned disciplinary measures and compulsory saluting, and abolished the rank system used by officers who were now expected to treat their men as comrades, not subordinates.

¹⁹⁶ When they came into power the Bolsheviks initiated policies that met these soldiers' expectations. General demobilization began on 28 October (10 November N.S.). What remained of the Russian armed forces introduced even more radical measures, banning ranks outright and allowing for the direct election of officers. Maintaining the support of such soldiers was essential for a regime wracked by external threats. "Soldiers," declared Lenin in the early days of Soviet rule, "the cause of peace rests in your hands! You will not permit counter-revolutionary generals to frustrate the great cause of peace" (quoted in Debo, 1979, p. 25)

¹⁹⁷ According to Bruce Lockhart, the British representative in Russia in 1918, the Bolsheviks had

ordinary Russians only supported revolution insomuch as they thought it would lead to tangible benefits. Unlike the elite supporters of the Soviet regime, the acquiescence of the masses to Soviet rule was far more dependent on practical results than it was on symbolic practices.

The Soviet regime was dependent on mass support largely because it had very little initial control over state institutions. Although it was able to take control of the capitals quickly after the October revolution, the regime's control of areas outside these cities was far more tenuous. Non-cooperation and outright disobedience from provincial administrations was commonplace. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks competed with other political parties; a competition which by May 1918 turned into full-blown civil war. At the same time that this war was taking place, the Central Committee was faced with serious food shortages due to the unwillingness of rural areas to hand over grain, and the inability of the Bolsheviks to coerce them to do so. In the face of these threats the Soviet regime tried to consolidate power and achieve institutional control over the state. The most far-reaching attempt at consolidation by the regime was the implementation of the policy of 'War Communism' from 1918-1920. Under this policy labor was denied the right to strike, free market trading was abolished in favor of government-run commissaries, banks were expropriated and savings extinguished, the judiciary was replaced by soviet officials, and those political parties that remained outside the regime were either banned (e.g. the Kadets) or persecuted by the state (the SRs and the Mensheviks). The policy of War Communism had itself been made possible by the reestablishment of central control over the armed forces, and their subordination to the

succeeded in gaining peasant support by giving them land and then warning that this would be taken away in any counter-revolution. Similarly, the Soviets maintained the support of the "working man" by ensuring

party.¹⁹⁸ This new Red Army was then used to speedily neutralize the Soviet regime's external enemies. By 1920 the ending of hostilities with Poland,¹⁹⁹ and the evacuation of Allied forces, meant that the borders of Russia were also secure.

However, the scale of the damage done to Russia as a result of the civil war and its radical policy of war communism was immense. By the end of the civil war, industry was producing at less than 20% of its pre-war output, and agricultural production had been reduced by 30% (Winks & Adams, chapter 3). Approximately 10-15% of the urban population had died due to food shortages alone, while eight million peasants had left the countryside. In order to provide material for the war the Bolsheviks had instituted a punishing work regime on workers. War Communism, while useful for meeting the Bolsheviks' military objectives throughout the civil war and for centralizing the state, had impoverished huge swathes of domestic society including groups – such as industrial workers and soldiers – that had been traditional supporters of the Bolshevik takeover.

As the war was coming to a close, and despite the Soviet regime's attempts to establish full authoritarian rule, this discontent exploded into rebellion. In February 1921 worker agitation against the restrictive measures of the Bolsheviks developed into full

he received better food along with his dose of anti-capitalist propaganda (BDF A I).

¹⁹⁸ In the early period of their rule the Soviet regime had no real military to speak of. The Red Guard that had been instrumental in its coup only numbered approximately 20,000. At that time, the remains of the imperial Russian army acted largely as a disorganized independent actor. By the end of the civil war this had changed. In January 1918 the Bolsheviks issued a decree establishing the Red Army of Workers and Peasants. Its stated purpose was to help to spread social revolution in Europe. The decree went ignored by much of the population and only 100,000 volunteers appeared. Yet the force expanded considerably with the appointment of Trotsky as head of the Supreme Military Council, and People's Commissar for the Army in March 1918. Upon his appointment Trotsky began to reconstitute the army immediately. Elections inside the army were abolished in April 1918. In May 1918 military service was made compulsory. These two acts swelled the ranks of the military while also removing its influence as an independent political force (Avidar, 1983).

¹⁹⁹ In April 1920 Poland invaded Soviet territory. Initially Polish forces made considerable strides and by May Polish forces had taken Kiev and overrun much of Ukraine. However, the Soviets soon pushed them back, and only a decisive Polish counterattack in August prevented Warsaw from being taken (Melograni, 1989).

protests as workers strikes broke out in major industrial centers across Russia (Service 1979, Ch. 5). In March, in response to these protests, sailors garrisoned at the fleet in Kronstadt issued a declaration demanding free and fair elections, free press, abolition of political departments in the military, and the reinstatement of a free press.²⁰⁰ Although the Kronstadt Mutiny was successfully put down, the revolts that subsequently spread across Russia made it clear that the radical policies of the Soviet regime had gone too far and that the Soviet regime was on the verge of losing its grip, including on the armed forces.²⁰¹ Protesters demanded the abolition of Bolshevik rule.

The mass-uprisings were, according to some contemporaries, the only time that Lenin truly feared for the Soviet regime (Winks & Adams, 2003, p. 161). In response to the threat of mass-insurrection Lenin appeared before the Tenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party in March 1921 and introduced his “New Economic Policy” (NEP). In order to stimulate food production, the NEP relaxed market controls and permitted peasants to sell surplus produce for private profit. This policy was designed to strike “at the point of greatest danger, as an agricultural policy to increase the supply of food by offering fresh inducements to the peasant” (Carr, 1985, p. 272). The NEP was just one part of a policy the goal of which was to kick-start the Soviet economy and to reduce domestic tension. In addition to modifying market rules at home, Lenin instructed

²⁰⁰ The mutiny itself was just an extension of workers strikes that had broken out in Petrograd in February. Like the army the Baltic Fleet had slowly come under Bolshevik control. In January 1919, following a failed naval raid against Reval, Trotsky dismissed the ship committees that managed the fleet and installed commissars. The fleet itself was largely neglected and received few supplies. This combined with the heavy-handed administration of the Bolshevik commander, Raskalnikov, meant that morale was very low. As soon as Raskalnikov was recalled to Moscow in March, the sailors at Kronstadt began to revolt (Mawdsley, 1973).

²⁰¹ Indeed despite Trotsky’s reorganization of the Soviet forces, they were still unreliable. When some of the Soviet soldiers set to put down the mutiny discovered that the Kronstadt sailors were protesting the political commissariat and were not White allies, they swapped sides. In fact, most of the communist military was unreliable and the main body of the force that attacked Kronstadt was composed of members

Chicherin to actively pursue diplomatic recognition in order to obtain credit on the international market (Carr, 1985). But this shift toward pragmatism was not without its critics and in mollifying the sentiments of the masses, Lenin came under attack from radicals.

Summary. In summary, the survival of the Soviet regime was under considerable threat from within and without during its early years in power. In addition to the immediate threats of the civil war, the regime struggled to consolidate its power. At the elite level, radicals dominated the party and Lenin had to accommodate their goals as much as possible. However, the dictatorial tendencies of the party could only be taken so far before it created a backlash among the workers, soldiers, and peasants that ultimately provided the manpower and material that was necessary for the regime to survive. Accommodating both of these groups was a struggle for Lenin, as the tension between the various factions became more and more apparent. In order to satisfy their interests the Soviet regime had to adopt sometimes-contradictory policies. However, these policies all had to remain consistent with the narrative of legitimation used by the Soviet regime. It was not until the beliefs of the radicals shifted in 1923 that the Soviet regime was able to abolish its reliance on the World Revolution narrative as an essential mechanism for ensuring regime survival. Having established (a) the content of the World Revolution narrative and the conflicting practices it mandated, and (b) the shifts in threats to Soviet regime survival, I now turn to the final section of this chapter. Here I show how the binding force of the Soviet narrative of legitimation explains how and why Soviet diplomatic practice varied as it did from 1917 to 1923.

of the Cheka and officer cadets from the Red Army academy (Daniels, 1951).

Narrative Binding and Soviet Diplomatic Practice: Assessing the Evidence

There is considerable evidence that supports the argument that the Soviet regime's adherence to its narrative of legitimation explains the shifts we observe in Soviet diplomatic practice. In this final section I show how the World Revolution narrative of legitimation bound the threatened Soviet regime into engaging in revolutionary diplomatic practice. In demonstrating this I draw on the public and private statements of Soviet officials and show how they explained and justified the diplomatic practices the Soviets engaged in.

This section proceeds in three parts. In the first part I show how Soviet diplomatic practice was revolutionary in nature until around early 1918, and the signing of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In the second part I show how Soviet diplomatic practice changed following this event. In particular I outline how Lenin came to realize that revolutionary diplomatic practice jeopardized the Soviet regime and took steps to adjust it. I also show how he tried to justify these changes in terms of the narrative of World Revolution and how, ultimately, this limited how far he could go in altering Soviet diplomatic practice. In the third section I outline how the change in the expectations of senior radicals finally disabused them of the belief that world revolution was imminent. This change in perspective led to elite unity and a shift to a more explicitly Westphalian mode of diplomatic practice.

Mandating Revolution: Soviet Diplomatic Practice, 1917-1918. The first phase of Soviet diplomatic practice – i.e. its explicitly revolutionary phase – adhered strongly with the Soviet narrative of legitimation. The Bolsheviks had taken power with the promise that world revolution and world peace were possibly only weeks away. As such,

the Soviet regime was expected to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice entirely. The very first policy proclamation of the regime declared that it Russia would withdraw from the war and tried to communicate directly with the global proletariat. The Soviet regime announced that it would abolish “secret diplomacy and on its part expresse[d] the firm intention to conduct all negotiations absolutely openly before the entire people.” It also appealed directly “to the class-conscious workers” of Germany, England and France and encouraged them to revolt (BDF A I, p. 2). The Soviet regime made clear that any interstate diplomacy on their part was only being done to usher in revolution. As a December 1917 “appeal” from the NKID to the “toiling, oppressed and exhausted peoples of Europe” made clear, an official peace would only be negotiated in order to further hasten worldwide revolution. The Soviets had, they declared, set themselves a “double-task: first, to bring an end as quickly as possible the disgraceful and criminal slaughter which is laying Europe waste; and second, to use all the means at our disposal to help the working class in all lands to overthrow the rule of capital and to seize political power in order to reconstruct Europe” (BDF A I, p. 19).

Such revolutionary diplomacy could only antagonize other states, as the Soviet leaders themselves knew (Debo, 1979). However, this did not especially worry them. In a 28 November wireless address, Trotsky publicly sneered that the Soviet regime was not concerned with the lack of recognition offered by other governments, stating that “the Government of the glorious revolution does not require recognition from the professional representatives of capitalist powers;” instead the Bolsheviks were, “recognized by the people” (Trotsky in Degras, 1978, pp. 10-12). Trotsky declared that the Soviet regime did not care about the great powers – “we shall conduct an independent class policy whatever

their attitude toward us” (Degras, 1978, p. 13). Indeed, radicals in Sovnarkom fully expected their peace proposal to be ignored. From their perspective, the purpose of offering negotiations for a “just and democratic” peace was to have it rejected by bourgeois governments. This act of rejection would then publicly illustrate to the working-classes of Europe that their governments did not have their interests at heart and further fan the flames of revolutionary sentiment (Debo, 1979, Ch. 1). Considering this aggressive approach to diplomacy by Soviet representatives it probably does not make sense to describe the regime as being ‘bound’ by its narrative, as there do not appear to be many instances where they were actively trying to deviate from it.

However, there were some occasions where traditional diplomacy was required, and when these presented themselves the Soviet regime was bound by its narrative in such a way that it could not engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice in public. For instance when, in late 1917, Trotsky wanted to make contact with British representatives, he found this difficult as secret meetings were contradictory to the revolutionary sentiment of Soviet politics. Therefore, in order to get the attention of the British, Trotsky “had to deliver a swift kick to allied posteriors while at the same time conveying the impression that [he] wanted to negotiate” (Debo, 1979, p. 34). In order to do this the Soviets began persecuting British citizens in Russia, and demanded the release of Bolshevik members in Britain.²⁰² This was done to get the attention of British diplomatic officials. Yet despite Trotsky’s public tone and threats, when the British consul finally met with him, he reported that the NKID head’s behavior was all for show, and that

²⁰² Trotsky denied exit visas for British citizens, threatened that he would begin impounding British citizens and, more ominously, stated that he might not be able to guarantee the safety of the British mission. He also warned the British that the Petrograd garrison was getting tired of the British attitude. Because “feeling ran high among soldiers, he could not answer for the consequences if the interned Russians were not let out.”

Trotsky was “perfectly courteous throughout” the meeting.²⁰³ This ‘behind-the-scenes’ acceptance of Westphalian diplomatic practice was not uncommon by the NKID once Trotsky took over from Zalkind (who himself had been removed for making threats against the US embassy). In fact, the US representative in Petrograd George Buchanan recalled that the NKID tried to protect embassies and diplomatic personnel from attack (Uldricks, 1979). Similarly, Lockhart noted that Trotsky protected the British mission when it transferred to Moscow by securing it rooms in the only functioning hotel in the city (Lockhart, 1933, p. 243). All in all, despite his public persona, Trotsky got on well with the diplomatic corps in Russia (Service, 2009, Ch. 20). Indeed, Trotsky himself later claimed that his revolutionary diplomatic practice was not sincere. Referring to his declaration that he would close up shop at the NKID, Trotsky admitted that he had “deliberately exaggerated my point of view” (Uldricks, 1979, p. 17).

Yet in public the Soviet regime engaged in the diplomatic practice mandated by its narrative. This was vividly illustrated at Brest-Litovsk conference. As I mentioned above the Soviet delegation sent to negotiate with the Germans treated the process as form of political theater even when it became clear that there were to be serious security consequences for failing to reach an agreement. Yet there was a political logic to this. When the Germans agreed to allow for public minutes, fraternization between troops, and other such revolutionary practices, this news was met with euphoria in Petrograd. Radical Bolsheviks were convinced that the public nature of the talks and the fraternization between the soldiers would act as a spur to global revolution (Debo, 1979). As Trotsky (BDFA I, p. 12) put it in a November foreign policy speech: “Sitting at a table with [the

(Foreign Office Report, FO 371/3019).

²⁰³ PRO FO 371/3019.

other delegation], we shall ask them explicit questions, which do not allow of any evasion, and the entire course of the negotiations, every word that they or we utter, will be taken down and reported by radiotelegraph to all nations.” It soon became clear that the Germans were not treating the conference as a publicity stunt, however. On 27 December they demanded both annexations and indemnities as part of any final settlement. This demand threatened the Soviet coalition with collapse. At the news of the German position angry demonstrations broke out across Petrograd. The Left SRs and many radical Bolsheviks demanded immediate war. Karl Radek declared that, “the Bolsheviks would fight... because they would perish if they did not” (quoted in Debo, 1979, p. 57). Lenin who had claimed support for revolutionary war too often to be able to reject it outright struggled to keep the radicals from this move. Indeed, he was only able to convince many of the Soviet leadership to accept negotiations at Brest-Litovsk because they believed that the negotiations were doomed to failure from the outset, and that this collapse would further spur revolution (Melograni, 1989, Ch. 1).

When Trotsky arrived to replace Joffe on 9 January 1918 he did so while political parties contested the election for the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd.²⁰⁴ For the next few days Trotsky simply grandstanded in front of the German delegation, issuing speech after speech. By 18 January General Hoffman tired of these theatrics and presented a map with a proposed frontier. On the same day the Right SRs won an absolute majority in the Assembly. Lenin’s response to this result was to dissolve the assembly and to call for a Third Congress of Soviets to endorse his action. This move made Lenin even more dependent on the radical Bolsheviks and Left SRs – groups that now sought outright revolutionary war with Germany and had not even wanted Trotsky to return to Brest-

Litovsk in the first place. Lenin attempted to defend moderation on the grounds that although Soviet power was consolidating it would be 'six months' before revolution spread in Europe. Many Bolsheviks were having none of this and reproached Lenin as a defeatist. His proposals were voted down. At this point, Lenin turned to Trotsky, who had come to realize that the Soviets could not win a revolutionary war.²⁰⁵ Yet this is exactly what many in the party were pushing for. At a minimum the radicals would not accept any move that appeared to diminish the revolutionary aura of the Soviet regime. However, the reality was that the army would not and could not accept a war. It was only by a very tight vote that the Executive Committee agreed to allow Trotsky to Brest-Litovsk on the grounds that he was not allowed to sign any separate peace (Debo, 1979, ch.3).²⁰⁶

The expectations of the radicals in Petrograd considerably constrained the type of diplomacy Trotsky could engage in. The radicals pushed for revolutionary activity of the most aggressive type. But in reality, engaging in this type of diplomacy could only lead to a calamitous war with the Germans that the Soviet regime was not equipped to fight. Trotsky's concern with 'fitting' any settlement to the existing narrative perplexed the delegation from the Central powers who, eager to sign a peace and move their divisions from east to west in full confidence, willingly offered joint control of the Ukraine's resources, as they were aware that the Russians were reliant on this.²⁰⁷ Trotsky explained

²⁰⁴ The Constituent Assembly was effectively the parliament of the February Revolution.

²⁰⁵ Until the mid-stage of the Brest-Litovsk conferences, Trotsky appears to have been convinced that world revolution was weeks away. However, Lenin slowly convinced him that the Bolshevik regime needed more time to consolidate and he agreed to somewhat moderate his position. His was the essential 'swing vote' in the early days of Bolshevik rule (Debo, 1979).

²⁰⁶ This motion barely passed. In the Executive Committee it passed seven-six. When it was put to the expanded Central Committee it was even more unpopular and was defeated thirty-two votes to sixteen.

²⁰⁷ While the Central Committee decided their position at Brest-Litovsk, Lenin was sending impassioned telegrams to Bolsheviks in Kharkov demanding food for Petrograd. On 28 January he urged the Bolsheviks

that what was preventing his striking a deal was not the substance of the deal, however, but rather the German insistence that the Bolsheviks legitimize the German annexation of the Ukraine. When Schüller argued that Trotsky seemed to be worried about the form of the potential agreement rather than its substance, Trotsky completely agreed: “It would be possible for me to conclude a peace by which Russia would be violated... but in that case this intention would have to be openly acknowledged by the other side. *We cannot be asked for a moral testimonial as well*” (Trotsky, 1930, p. 378, italics mine). Trotsky was only willing to hand over Russian territory if this was not made to look like the secret diplomacy typical of traditional powers, but could instead be used as radical propaganda against the German government. The next day, when pressed by Kühlmann to drop this demand, Trotsky made it clear he would not sign the treaty unless it included this symbolic component: “it is necessary that Germany should acknowledge in the treaty that she is making annexations, but I must reserve the right to describe Germany’s activities as annexations” (quoted in Debo, 1979, p. 100).

In short, despite the offer of strategic resources, Trotsky could not agree to any deal that created the *appearance* of acquiescence as this deviated from the World Revolution narrative. Trotsky could engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice; he could just not be *seen* to be engaging in it. When the Germans rejected this plea, Trotsky issued his famous ultimatum in the final minutes of the conference. He declared that Russia no longer wanted to take part in the “imperialist war” and was withdrawing its armies. “We are going out of the war... At the same time...we cannot place the signatures of the

there to, “for the sake of God, take all the more energetic and revolutionary measures to send *bread, bread and bread!!!*” (quoted in Debo, 1979, p. 93; italics in the original). Dr. Schüller of the Austrian delegation approached Trotsky and promised that although the Germans would maintain legal control of the territory, some grain would be redirected to Petrograd.

Russian Revolution under these conditions which bring them oppression, misery and hate to millions of human beings... we are going out of the war, but we feel ourselves compelled to refuse to sign the treaty” (Debo, 1979, p. 110). Having made his declaration of ‘No Peace, No War’ Trotsky led the Soviet delegation from the room.

Trotsky’s behavior at Brest-Litovsk shows us that while he could have accepted the sacrificing of territory and resources, he was unwilling to sacrifice the Bolsheviks’ image as revolutionaries. Upon hearing the news, and despite being worried about the German reaction to Trotsky’s declaration, Lenin remarked, “Very well. We have kept our face, and we are out of the war” (quoted in Debo, 1979, p. 113). As unusual as Trotsky’s strategy was, it won the support of the radicals who were pushing for revolutionary action. On 14 February, the Central Executive Committee ratified Trotsky’s plan. The Germans, bewildered by this radical form of diplomacy, were less accommodating. Four days later they began a march on Petrograd that was no longer protected the disintegrating Russian army.²⁰⁸ In the face of this threat, the Soviets once more sent a delegation to meet with the Germans.

This revisit to Brest-Litovsk shows how fractious the Bolshevik-led coalition was at the time. The Germans, angered by what had occurred up till then, demanded even more onerous terms than those they had previously offered. In the face of these demands, Lenin justified signing the treaty in revolutionary terms. In his speech to the Seventh Soviet Congress in March, Lenin begged the radicals to realize that “the revolution will not come as quickly as expected. History has shown this... We must know how to retreat.

²⁰⁸ The Germans forces, composed of second-tier *Landwehr*, were more than enough for the Russian troops. General Hoffman declared it the “the most comical war I have ever known... We put a handful of infantrymen with machine-guns and one [field] gun on a train and push them off to the next station; they take it... pick up a few more troops and go on. This proceeding has, at any rate, the charm of novelty”

The incredibly bitter reality cannot be hidden by words. [...] If you cannot adjust yourself, if you cannot bring yourself to crawl on your belly in the mud, you are no revolutionary, but a chatterbox, because there is no other way, because history did not work out so agreeable.” He also warned radicals that the Soviet regime could not survive without the support of the masses who did not look upon the diplomacy practiced at Brest-Litovsk favorably. If the radicals did not temper their demands “then the masses will say to you: ‘You acted like egoists. You staked everything on a lucky turn of events, which did not happen; you showed yourselves to be incompetent in the situation which actually arose instead of the expected international revolution, which will come imperceptibly, but which has not yet matured’” (BDFA I, p. 57-58). But in the same speech, Lenin still proclaimed his fundamental faith in impending world revolution: “When we sign this peace, and every right-minded person understands this, we are not putting a stop to our worker’s revolution; everyone understands that, in signing peace with the Germans, we are not putting an end to our struggle” (BDFA I, p. 61). Despite all these entreaties, Lenin barely convinced the Soviet leadership to sign the deal. It was only by getting Trotsky’s vote that Lenin was able to overrule the revolutionary sentiment of much of the Central Committee. Had this not occurred the Germans would have likely taken Petrograd.

Even with bare-majority support the consequences of Lenin’s deviation from the Soviet narrative of legitimation were severe. In response to this act Nikolai Bukharin and the radical Bolsheviks resigned their own positions in the government. At the same time the Left SRs resigned from Sovnarkom entirely claiming that the Bolsheviks had abandoned the revolution by signing the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Furthermore, in an

(Hoffman, 1925, p. 207).

attempt to derail the peace and in the “interest of the Russian and international revolution” the Left SRs assassinated the German ambassador in Moscow on 6 July (Senn & Goldberg, 1979, p. 440).²⁰⁹ Most significantly, the attempt on Lenin’s life had been justified on the grounds that Lenin’s support of Brest-Litovsk showed that he had abandoned the revolution (Melograni, 1989, Ch. 4). Indeed, Lenin’s actual preference had been for a full alliance with Germany. However he understood that radical elites – infected by “Left stupidity” – would never support such a policy (Melograni, 1989, p. 22).

Bound Diplomacy: Soviet Diplomatic Practice, 1918-1923. Brest-Litovsk had highlighted the inherent tension within the Soviet regime. Moderates in the regime wanted to shore up the Soviet regime whereas radicals remained recklessly committed to revolution. In the domain of foreign policy this tension was readily apparent. Radicals demanded and expected that the Soviet regime would take an adversarial and rejectionist stance toward international society. The tools of Westphalian diplomacy were to be ignored or exploited rather than practiced. Yet, such revolutionary diplomatic practice would likely further threaten an already threatened regime and cause insurrection. In order to resolve this tension, Soviet diplomatic practice was altered by Lenin so that it could still adhere to the Soviet the narrative of legitimation, while also ensuring that Westphalian diplomacy could be practiced sufficiently well enough to protect the Soviet regime from a revolt from below. With the adoption of Westphalian diplomatic practice by the NKID, and the simultaneous creation of the radical Comintern, the Soviet state began to engage in a ‘two-faced’ form of diplomatic practice.

²⁰⁹ On 6 July radicals stormed the German embassy and murdered the ambassador. The attempted seizure of the embassy was put down by Latvian riflemen dispatched by Lenin on 7 July.

Both of these modifications of Soviet diplomacy were spearheaded by Lenin, who was the patron responsible for founding the Comintern while also being responsible for ordering the NKID's pragmatic 'peace offensive.' The fact that Lenin sponsored both of these diplomatic initiatives suggests that Lenin was not a radical hardliner. In fact, as noted above, Lenin was the first member of the Soviet leadership to conclude that total and immediate world revolution was unlikely. Even before the fiasco at Brest-Litovsk, Lenin had warned that while "socialist revolution in Europe must come, and will come," it would be "quite impossible to determine if this was imminent." Recognizing that such a statement conflicted with the narrative of legitimation put forward by the Soviet regime, Lenin justified his position: "it is said that in a number of past statements we positively 'promised' a revolutionary war, and that by concluding a separate peace we would be going back on our word. That is not true. We said it was *necessary* for a Socialist government to '*prepare for and wage*' a revolutionary war" (BDFFA I, p. 37, italics in the original).

During Brest-Litovsk Lenin had admonished the Central Committee that for the Soviets to risk everything in order to foster revolution abroad was a dangerous strategy. States such as Germany were "only pregnant with revolution, in our country we already have a very healthy baby – the Socialist Republic – which we will murder by resuming the war" (Lenin, quoted in Debo 1975, p. 472-473). These pragmatist sentiments were also held by Lenin in private. When Bruce Lockhart met him in Moscow Lenin expressed his belief that Russia could "afford to compromise temporarily with capital" (Lockhart, 1933, p. 237). Following Brest-Litovsk Lenin pushed this line even further. He introduced a resolution to the Seventh Congress in March 1918 advocating for "breathing

space” (BDFFA I, p. 62). In short, Lenin was far more pragmatist than most of his peers. As William Bullit explained to the US Congress following his 1919 ‘Mission to Moscow’: Lenin, “as a practical matter, stands well to the right in the existing political life of Russia. He recognizes the undesirability, from the Socialist viewpoint, of the compromises he feels compelled to make; but he is ready to make the compromises” (Bullit, 1924).

However, Lenin always framed these compromises in language that was compatible with the narrative of World Revolution. In a May 1918 speech to the Central Executive Committee, Lenin explained that political pragmatism was only a necessary holding action: “From our revolutionary experience we have learnt [sic] that we must employ tactics of ruthless attack when the objective circumstances allow this.... We shall do the little that we can, whatever diplomacy is capable of doing, to prolong that brief and precarious respite which we got in March [at Brest-Litovsk]” (BDFFA I, p. 79). In November 1918 Lenin declared that “while capitalism and socialism exist side by side, they cannot live in peace; one or the other will ultimately triumph. [...] Concessions do not mean peace; they too are a kind of warfare” (Debo, 1992, p. 314). Or, as he put it in his March 1920 essay, ‘On Compromises’:²¹⁰ “May an advocate of proletarian revolution conclude compromises with capitalists or the capitalist class? [Only if] an agreement is legitimate from the angle of proletariat revolution.” In a November meeting of Moscow party secretaries he defended the use of traditional Westphalian diplomatic practice: “We, as communists, must use one country against the other. In doing so, are we not committing a crime against communism? No,... we are conducting propaganda.. To increase strength as rapidly as possible” (BDFFA IV, p. 212).

Lenin had to be careful in how far he deviated from the narrative of World Revolution because the radicals in the regime remained unconvinced of the need for pragmatism. Even after Brest-Litovsk, many senior Bolsheviks still urged for immediate world revolution at the expense of the survival of the Soviet state. On 3 October 1918 – as the Bolsheviks faced allied troops and White revolutionaries in various parts of Russia – the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued a resolution on the international situation and declared that the, “entire [Soviet] policy [was] built on the prospect of social revolution in both camps” (quoted in Degras, 1951, p. 111). As Bukharin put it, “In the end, international revolution – *and that alone* – is our salvation (quoted in Armstrong, 1993, p. 136, italics mine).

The need to satisfy radical opinion can explain some of Lenin’s diplomatic initiatives. Conscious of how skeptics in the party viewed him, Lenin often associated himself with the most radical practices of the Soviet regime. For example, when the Left SRs accused him of not taking global revolution seriously enough and being overly concerned with consolidating the Soviet position, Lenin shot back by declaring, “We are not defending secret treaties; we tore them up and exposed them to the entire world; we are not defending our Great Power status – nothing remains of Russia but Great Russia – or national interests – since for us the interests of world socialism rank higher than national interests; we are defending the socialist fatherland” (Degras, 1978, p. 79). He also sometimes engaged in abrasive acts of diplomacy that – while they may have earned him some favor with the radical wing of his own party – did not help the regime meet its international interests. For instance, on the eve of trade talks in London in 1921 Lenin sent an abrasive letter to the *London Times* in which he publicly denounced “British

²¹⁰ Not publicly published until 1936.

imperialists... who have been practicing a White terror in Finland and Hungary, in India and in Ireland” (quoted in Melograni, 1989, p. 108). Such uncouth (and apparently self-defeating) diplomacy can only make sense when one understands the pressures Lenin was under domestically.

This need to appear revolutionary can also explain some other inconsistencies in Lenin’s diplomacy, most notably his founding of the Comintern. This act might appear to offer evidence that Lenin sought revolution as much as the radicals in the party until one recognizes that the founding of this organization coincided with the American diplomat William Bullitt’s visit to Moscow. It was set up at least in part to burnish Lenin’s revolutionary credentials at a time when they might appear suspect. This initiative had unintended consequences however, as the Comintern quickly became an institution that neither Lenin or the NKID chief Chicherin could fully control. Similarly, Lenin made sure to publicly position himself as one of the biggest advocates of global revolution, especially in Germany, which was expected by most Bolsheviks to be the locus for Europe-wide upheaval. In reality, however, Lenin was actually opposed to revolution breaking out in Germany as he thought this event would likely force the Soviet regime into more radical policies. Therefore, despite offering lip-service to revolution in Germany, Lenin sent Karl Radek to Germany as the Soviet representative. This was done in order to undermine the development of full revolution in Germany as Radek was deeply unpopular with the radical movement there (Melograni, 1989, Ch. 5).²¹¹ The fact that Lenin would select such an unpopular figure suggests he was not overly-concerned with helping German revolutionaries in actually meeting their goals. However, by

²¹¹ In 1912 Radek had been expelled from the Polish socialist party and nominated (by the leading revolutionary in Germany, Rosa Luxemburg) for expulsion from the German party on the grounds that he

promoting these sorts of policies (many of which directly affected Soviet diplomatic practice) Lenin could keep the support of radicals such as Bukharin, Zalkind, and Zinoviev (who was installed as the head of the new Comintern).

Lenin's appointment of Radek demonstrates how, for all the revolutionary rhetoric, Lenin's concerns were on maintaining regime survival. Indeed, at the same time that Lenin was defending revolution he was engaging in the secret diplomacy that the Soviets had initially claimed to have rejected. For instance, on 24 October 1918 Lenin sent a note to Woodrow Wilson in which he made clear that the Soviets were willing to negotiate on any issue, including the seventeen billion rubles owed by the Tsarist regime to the West.²¹² When U.S. representatives met with Litvinov in Stockholm in January 1919, they were convinced of the Bolsheviks' sincerity stating "the Soviet government's conciliatory attitude is unquestionable" (William Buckler, quoted in Melograni 1989, p. 46). Similar concessions were offered by Chicherin to the allies in February of the same year.²¹³

As part of this pragmatic policy, the NKID attempted to distance itself from the revolutionary diplomacy of some members of the Soviet regime. In an 8 January 1920 interview with the *Manchester Guardian* Karl Radek – who had been sent to negotiate the beginnings of a diplomatic relationship with Britain – outlined the Soviet regime's foreign policy, explaining that Soviet Russia was happy to integrate itself into

had stolen from other party members and colluded with the German secret police.

²¹² In the note Chicherin asked, "Do the capitalists want some of the forests in the north, part of Siberia, interest on the 17 thousand millions? If so, then surely the you won't make a secret of it. We propose to you: state outright, *how much?*" (quoted in Melograni, 1989, p. 44; italics in the original).

²¹³ In a note to the Allied governments' invitation to peace conference on Prince's Island, Chicherin wrote: "Although both the military and the internal situation of Soviet Russia are steadily improving, the Russian Soviet Government is so anxious to secure agreement on the cessation of hostilities, that is ready to enter at once into negotiations to this end, and, as it has more than once declared, is even willing to make weighty concessions, provided they do not endanger the future development of the Soviet Government" (B DFA I, p.

international society. Concerns that the Bolsheviks were going to foment revolution were overblown: “revolutions never originate in foreign affairs but are made at home.” When the Soviet commissar for trade Leonid Krasin met Lloyd George’s cabinet in 1920 he explained that the Soviet regime’s revolutionary behavior was dependent on elements in Russia who “preferred world revolution to world peace.”²¹⁴ Chicherin also ordered NKID diplomats to behave in a way that did not undermine the goal of diplomatic recognition. In an internal circular to representatives distributed in February 1921 Chicherin made clear that “only by making use of purely diplomatic situations, even on a nationalist basis, shall we succeed in creating the situation necessary to complete our party work and to ensure victory for the workmen-peasant Government.” Consequently, “the first object of representatives is to render their positions more firm wherever they are... It is not in our interests to be feared or exaggerated – we must be forgotten” (DBFA IV, p. 256-58).

In summary, the two-faced diplomatic practice of the Soviet regime from 1918-1923 was a function of the binding effects of the Soviet narrative of legitimation. Having spent so long advocating for World Revolution, Lenin could not easily support policies or practices that ran counter to this narrative. Yet Brest-Litovsk had demonstrated that a fully revolutionary approach to foreign policy and diplomacy was entirely self-defeating and likely to cause the Soviet regime to collapse. As events such as the uprisings of 1921 demonstrated, the regime had incentives to engage with the outside world (in the policy of the NEP) in order to secure itself.²¹⁵ The regime was under pressure from two

138).

²¹⁴ This was not just hyperbole; Chicherin telegraphed Krasin on 18 June to tell him that radical members of the Central Executive Committee were urging a more bellicose international stance: that “a pacific and conciliatory policy [was] not very popular” (Chicherin, quoted in Melograni 1989, p. 108)

²¹⁵ Indeed some of those supporting uprising in 1921 drew direct links between the plight of the masses and the revolutionary diplomacy and foreign policies of the Soviet regime. During the Kronstadt Mutiny a Menshevik leader declared in a speech that “the Soviet government makes itself ridiculous by sending so-

directions. In order to demonstrate adherence to the revolutionary mandates of the narrative of World Revolution, Soviet diplomacy had to be radical; in order to meet the practical demands of the masses, Soviet diplomacy had to be Westphalian (not least on the issue of propaganda - see above). Thus, Lenin had to try to reconcile the World Revolution narrative with the political realities facing the Soviet regime. But he could only go so far in doing this. As Kocho-Williams (2012, p. 80) puts it: “Soviet diplomats were keen to secure Russia’s re-entry into a world from which she had been excluded, and they were willing to all but abandon their ideology to achieve it” (Kocho-Williams, 2012, p. 80). This was also the conclusion reached by a February British intelligence “Memorandum on Two Tendencies in the Soviet Government” which claimed that Lenin’s divergent foreign policies were “closely linked” to domestic politics (BDFIA I).

‘Peaceful Coexistence’: Soviet Diplomatic Practice from late 1923. The need to demonstrate fealty to the narrative of World Revolution persisted until late 1923. By this point the repeated failures of revolution abroad had led many radical elites to downgrade their expectations regarding world revolution. These radicals came to agree with moderates such as Lenin that world revolution was years and not months away. This shift in the Bolshevik radicals’ expectations meant that there was now elite unity on the issues of world revolution. This unity in elite opinion meant that the institutions of the state were now consolidated by the regime and threats to its survival diminished.

As a practical matter, this shift in elite opinion meant that many radicals now saw the futility of pursuing revolutionary diplomatic practice as a primary goal of Soviet foreign policy. As a result of this shift in elite beliefs the NKID, already ascendant since

called ‘official communications throughout the world as there can no longer be any doubt that they are discredited by everyone... Instead of making peace the Soviet government sends fresh troops to the front

1922, became the dominant institution of foreign policy.²¹⁶ The Comintern – which had been strongly supported by the Politburo from its inception – lost any meaningful influence following the failed Bulgarian and German revolutions of 1923 (Rees & Thorpe, 1998).²¹⁷ From this point on there was a decline in the revolutionary diplomatic practice that had dominated Soviet foreign affairs up until that point. The Soviet regime had neither the need nor inclination to pursue immediate world revolution, and was thus no longer bound by the revolutionary narrative it had used to gain and maintain power. This allowed the Soviets to strengthen their international position by fully and finally adhering to Westphalian diplomatic practice.

A few final notes on this argument. At first glance it appears possible to reconcile the above explanation with a traditional interest-groups argument, in which Soviet diplomacy can be understood as a simple function of the combined preferences of the dominant groups in power (Moravcsik, 1997). However, a careful reading of the evidence suggests that such a reading is not supported. At the most basic level, and as this account hopefully makes clear, the Soviet regime cannot be understood as being alternately controlled by radicals and then moderates. Throughout the period under discussion the regime was ruled by a coalition of radicals and moderates, both of which had sufficient influence in the regime that the removal of their support could cause the regime to collapse. As I have shown, this threat of internal collapse was real, and was mitigated by policies of compromise.

More importantly for this argument, Soviet diplomatic practice cannot be

and tries to buy war materiel everywhere...” (Secret Report no. 75, 10 March 1923, BDFV IV).

²¹⁶ On 13 May 1922 the Sovnarkom decreed that all communications between the Soviet state and foreign powers was to be directed through the Narkomindel (rather than the party or Comintern). Following the formation of the USSR in late 1922, the NKID assumed responsibility for all foreign relations.

characterized as reflective of the combined preferences of moderates and radicals. The ‘two-faced’ diplomatic practice engaged in from 1918-1923, for instance, should not be simply seen as an accommodation made by the regime to meet the preferences of both these groups. This is for a number of reasons. First, the ‘accommodation’ that was made between radicals and moderates did not manifest itself in exchanges of moderate policies for radical ones. Nowhere in evidence did I find instances where Lenin (and other moderates) horse-traded with radicals, and agreed to pursue radical policies in exchange for moderate ones. On the contrary, as I have shown, both radical *and* moderate foreign policies and diplomatic practices were *both* justified in terms of a single narrative that was assumed to be shared by moderates and radicals alike. As such, Soviet diplomatic practice was not a policy concession granted to radicals per se, but rather a *demonstration* by the regime that it shared the radicals’ belief in impending world revolution. By demonstrating this shared belief, the regime was able to maintain the radicals’ support. This can be seen by a number of strands of evidence, such as Lenin’s founding of the Comintern while he simultaneously pursued a policy of diplomatic normalization with the outside world.

This leads to a second point. As I outlined in Chapter Three, the political utility of engaging in symbolic practices is that they – rather than policy concessions – can act as the glue that creates and binds coalitions together in the first place. Although I have used the terms ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’ throughout this chapter, this is a reflection of the historical interpretation of the events and not a reflection of how these groups necessarily understood themselves or *others*. While we can understand Lenin’s foreign policy as being fundamentally moderate from an early stage, he was careful to *present* himself as a

²¹⁷ It was finally disbanded in 1943.

radical to others in in the party. Despite pursuing moderate policies in private, Lenin maintained support for his leadership by publicly embracing world revolution. Even when he engaged in practices or pursued policies that appeared to deviate from the narrative of world revolution Lenin, repeatedly justified his actions in terms of this narrative. To put it another way, Lenin’s authority stemmed from the fact that he claimed that he was a radical, not a moderate.

Third, the role of narrative is critical here because it is the narrative of World Revolution, and not the preferences of the various individuals or groups in the Soviet state that determined what *behaviors* counted as ‘radical’ or ‘moderate’ *actions*. Elites could only identify themselves or others as occupying a space on a ideological spectrum that was derived from this narrative to begin with. In this sense, narrative acted like a social structure that limited the range of possible actions Lenin or others could take. This meant that while it was possible for him to justify some diplomatic practices or foreign policies in terms of this narrative there was a limit to what he could achieve. Many of Lenin’s preferred policies – such as an alliance with Germany after Brest-Litovsk, or full accommodation with Britain – were simply not justifiable in terms of world revolution and thus could not be openly pursued. Such ‘moderate’ actions would have jeopardized his leadership (as Brest-Litovsk did) or the regime’s survival entirely, as such they could have acted as the signal to radical elites that the regime did not believe in the narrative of World Revolution.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the changes in Soviet diplomatic practice from 1917 until 1923 can

be explained by understanding the role of the ‘World Revolution’ narrative of legitimation in Soviet domestic politics and the binding effect this had on Soviet diplomacy. In the early days of its rule the Soviet regime was obliged to adopt policies and engage in practices that were mandated by this narrative. However, as time went on engaging in a revolutionary form of diplomatic practice was unsustainable without also jeopardizing the entire regime. Yet the regime was not consolidated enough for Lenin to abandon its narrative of legitimation entirely. Instead, Lenin had to try to reconcile the mandates of the World Revolution narrative with the necessities of regime survival. In the realm of diplomatic practice this led to the adoption of “dual policies” that justified short-term pragmatic expediency in terms such as, “breathing space,” and “transitional period.” This diplomatic practice allowed Lenin to satisfy radicals while also propping up the regime (Armstrong, 1993). It was only when the radicals in the party themselves lost faith in imminent revolution that the threat to the Soviet regime’s survival diminished. At this point the regime was no longer bound by its narrative and was able to transition fully to Westphalian diplomatic practice. Practically speaking, this meant the permanent reduction of the Comintern’s influence and the ascendancy of the NKID in issues of foreign affairs. Within a few short years the ‘revolutionary’ Soviet state soon earned a reputation as one of the most fastidious practitioners of diplomacy in international society (Cohen, 1987).

Despite the shifts in Soviet diplomatic practice, the narrative of ‘World Revolution’ remained the dominant discourse in Soviet politics until the late 1920s. Only after Stalin had completely vanquished his political rivals and fully consolidated his personalist regime could he abandon the narrative of ‘World Revolution’ and replace it

with the narrative of ‘Socialism in One Country.’²¹⁸ This ideological innovation dictated that socialism could claim victory when a socialist country could exist free from interference. But, unlike its narrative predecessor, it did not reject the legitimacy of an international system of states entirely (Jacobson, 1994, p. 141). Yet, however innovative this narrative was for domestic and foreign politics, it had little effect on diplomatic practice. Long before this new narrative had even arrived, the Soviet regime had adopted Westphalian diplomatic practice.

²¹⁸ When Lenin fell seriously ill in March 1923, power moved to the ‘Troika’ of Zinoviev, Stalin, and Kamenev, of which only Stalin could be considered a moderate. By 1925 the Left Communists (e.g. Trotsky and Zinoviev) lost power. By the end of the decade Stalin had eliminated all of his rivals (Conquest, 1991, Ch. 8 & 9).

Chapter 6

Traditionalists to Revolutionaries:

Iranian Diplomatic Practice, 1979-1981

This chapter investigates the variation in Iranian diplomatic practice from February 1979 until January 1981. During this period Iranian diplomatic practice went through two distinct phases. Initially the revolutionary Iranian regime – which had taken over from the fleeing shah in February 1979 – faithfully engaged in Westphalian diplomatic practice. Although its foreign policy was certainly hostile to some members of international society the Islamic Republic of Iran nonetheless accepted Westphalian diplomatic practice for the first eight months of its existence.²¹⁹ Iranian adherence to Westphalian diplomatic practice was most-visibly demonstrated in February 1979 when regime forces suppressed an attack by radicals on the US embassy, thus upholding the US' right to diplomatic immunity and inviolability. However, from November 1979 until January 1981 Iran rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice – in particular, its diplomatic obligations regarding diplomatic immunity and inviolability – when it allowed the US embassy in Iran to be seized and taken hostage by student protesters for over 400 days. The acquiescence of the Iranian regime to the students' act was a clear violation of international law and of Iran's diplomatic obligations as a member of international society. Why did the Iranian regime protect the US embassy in February 1979 but refuse to do so in November of the same year? Why did it go from accepting Westphalian diplomatic practice to rejecting it?

In the previous chapter I demonstrated that the variation in Soviet diplomatic

practice could be explained by understanding the conditions under which its narrative of legitimation became binding on the regime. Like the previous chapter, this chapter also finds that changes in Iranian diplomatic practice can be explained by understanding the manner in which the Iranian regime was bound by its narrative of legitimation. However, there is a notable difference in both these chapters. Whereas changes in Soviet diplomatic practice were brought on due to changes in threats to *regime survival*, in this chapter I find that variation in Iranian diplomatic practice occurred due to a change in the *practices mandated* by the regime's narrative of legitimation. Throughout the period under discussion in this chapter, the Iranian regime legitimated its right to rule by reference to an "Anti-Shahist Resistance" narrative of legitimation. This narrative unified radicals and moderates in Iran by mandating resistance to, and the rejection of, the shah and all that he associated with. However, unlike the Chinese and Soviet narratives outlined in the previous two chapters, this narrative did *not* mandate practices that were inherently at odds with Westphalian diplomatic practice; at least initially. To put it another way, this narrative was 'silent' regarding Westphalian diplomatic practice from February 1979 until November of that year. Consequently, while the revolutionary regime was undoubtedly unfriendly to some members of international society (including the US), nothing about its narrative of legitimation mandated the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Yet in November 1979 a certain sequence of events took place that suddenly and unexpectedly altered the binding nature of this narrative in such a way that the Iranian regime was mandated to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. The key event that changed the binding nature of the Iranian narrative of legitimation was the behavior of

²¹⁹ The name 'Islamic Republic of Iran' was conferred by referendum in March 1979.

the US. On 22 October the Carter administration allowed the exiled Shah to enter the US for cancer treatment. By doing this, the US engaged in an activity that linked the US to the Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative in such a way that the US appeared to be an active supporter of (rather than neutral to) the hated shah. The acceptance of the shah by the US acted as the trigger for an attack on the embassy by radical students, who legitimated their behavior with reference to this event. More importantly, the US' behavior also limited the regime's range of legitimate responses to this event. Because the US had taken on the appearance of a clear supporter of the the shah, and because the Iranian narrative of legitimate mandated actions of resistance against the shah, this meant the student takeover of the US embassy was inherently legitimate. For the Iranian regime, the consequences of the US' behavior and the response of the students were immediate: it was suddenly bound by its narrative of legitimation to support the student takeover of the US embassy. Because its narrative of legitimation mandated anti-shah activity this left members of the regime with little option but to either openly support the students or to resign from the government, regardless of their private opinions on the issue.

Therefore, unlike what we saw in the Soviet case, changes in Iranian diplomatic practice were brought on by changes in the mandates of the narrative, not changes in the threats to regime survival. Note that this argument does *not* imply that content of the Iranian narrative of legitimation changed. On the contrary it demonstrates the power and inflexibility of the Iranian Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative. Before the US inserted itself into this narrative, moderate members of the Iranian regime could openly associate with the US. However, as soon as the US engaged in a behavior that put it on the 'wrong side' of the Iranian narrative of legitimation, politicians of all stripes had little choice but to

support the students and, by doing so, to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. These findings also explain why the Iran rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice in such a narrow and specific way. Unlike Imperial China or the Soviets, Iran was not inherently bound by its narrative into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. Instead the regime was simply mandated to support resistance to the shah. That such support would result in the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was an unintended and unforeseen consequence of the narrative of legitimation employed by regime.

In demonstrating this argument, this chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section I provide a historical outline which details the fall of the shah and the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This section also provides an account of the variation in Iranian diplomatic practice from 1979 until 1981, and outlines the consequences of Iran's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice in this period. In the second section I consider two possible explanations for the changes in Iran's diplomatic practice – one drawn from the strategic literature and one drawn from existing constructivist literature – and find that they cannot adequately account for Iranian diplomatic behavior. In the third section I present an explanation that focuses on the role of narratives of legitimation in Iranian politics. I discuss the content of the Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative and outline the practices it mandated. I also discuss the threats to survival the Iranian regime faced during the period under discussion. Fourth, I show how – due to the US' admission of the hated shah to New York – the Anti-Shah Resistance narrative mandated the regime's support for the student takeover of the embassy, and, by extension, bound the regime into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. Finally, there is a brief conclusion.

Iran under Khomeini: from Westphalian to Revolutionary Diplomacy

Historical Background, and the Fall of the Shah. Modern Iran was created when the first shah of the Pahlavi dynasty took power in 1926. Inspired by the reforms of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Reza Pahlavi reconstructed the agrarian and underdeveloped Iranian state in an aggressively Western way. His regime replaced Islamic with secular law, banned the wearing of the veil and turban in public settings, and outlawed many religious celebrations. The traditional ruling-tribes were subdued and the army was installed as the dominant governing institution of the state. During WWII Iran was occupied by the British and the Soviets, who forced the shah to abdicate in favor of his son Muhammed Reza Pahlavi. While his power was initially limited the new shah obtained absolute power following the CIA-instigated fall of his prime minister Mohammad Mossedegh in 1953. The young shah tried to direct some of the oil wealth of Iran toward modernization programs and land reform, the so-called “White Revolution” of 1963. However, his regime was highly unpopular due to his attempts to Westernize Iranian society and due to the corruption of his courtiers.²²⁰ Over time, the shah increasingly relied on his brutality of his secret police – the *Sāzemān-e Ettlā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar*, or SAVAK – to maintain power.

There were many groups opposed to the Pahlavi regime: land-holders who had lost out in the reform programs of the 1960s; the left-wing and nationalist opposition parties suppressed after Mossadegh’s removal; the traditional merchant-classes harmed by the shah’s modernization programs; the young and unemployed of the larger cities,

²²⁰ Like many other absolute monarchs, the shah was surrounded by aristocrats; in this case, corrupt parvenus who siphoned off considerable wealth as a result of their proximity to the shah’s family. The shah’s sister amassed a fortune of \$500 million; the court physician became one of the largest landholders in Iran; and even the Shah’s butler became wealthy due to real estate investments and his monopoly control

and; separatist Kurds and Azerbaijanis. Yet despite this widespread discontent political Islam was the only organized movement left to oppose to the shah, largely due to the purging of other opposition forces during the White Revolution. Most prominent among those who protested the shah's rule was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini rose to prominence in 1963 when he began publicly opposing the Pahlavi regime from his religious school in Qom. His activities were tolerated by the regime until 1964, when Khomeini spoke out against Iran's signing of a treaty that extended diplomatic immunity to thousands of US residents in Iran.²²¹ As a consequence of this act Khomeini was expelled to Turkey, and later to Iraq. However, through smuggled-in tapes of his sermons, Khomeini remained a powerful influence on Iranian society.

In the 1970s the Pahlavi regime attempted to further consolidate its rule. Modernization programs and Iranian oil led to considerable economic growth. While many at the time thought that the regime was stable, there was considerable domestic discontent and the regime had to increasingly rely on the SAVAK in order to maintain the acquiescence of the population. On 7 January 1978 public discontent finally exploded into mass protests. The event that triggered these protests was the publication of an article entitled "Red and Black Imperialism" in the prominent Iran daily *Ettlela'at*.²²² The article accused Khomeini of a catalog of sins such as allegiance to foreign powers, corruption, and sexual deviance. Within hours of its publication demonstrations broke out in Qom. These protests culminated in an attack on the police station that was violently dispersed

of the caviar business (Harris, 2004, p. 13).

²²¹ The agreement was an extension of the Vienna Convention and granted immunity not only to US diplomats but also to military personnel, technicians, officials, and other advisors. Khomeini condemned the policy as demeaning to Iran, stating: "If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit this nation to be the slaves of Britain one day, and America the next" (quoted in Algar, 1981, p. 183).

²²² The underlying causes of the revolution are beyond the scope of this project. For more on why the Pahlavi regime fell when it did see Moaddel (1992); Parsa (1989)

by government forces. Khomeini described the events as the fulfillment of divine prophecy and declared those who had been killed martyrs. This began a cycle of increasingly large and chaotic demonstrations that eventually resulted in the police shooting on a mass protest on 8 September; an event that instantly became known as “Black Friday.”²²³ In response to Black Friday, non-state sanctioned labor unions formed and began to protest the regime. Industrial action broke out across Tehran. As the crisis deepened Ayatollah Khomeini was expelled from Iraq and moved to France. On 6 November the shah finally appeared on television to address the situation. He publicly accepted that corruption was endemic and promised that, once the military had restored order, a constitutional monarchy would be established to deal with the issue. The people ignored his pleas and violence spread across the capital.²²⁴ Finally, after installing a new prime minister in December, the shah left on 16 January 1979 for a “vacation”; never to return. When Khomeini arrived in Iran from Paris on 1 February, power was quickly transferred to a provisional government of his creation.

The revolutionary Iranian regime has become infamous for the manner in which it has thumbed its nose at the West. The most notorious expression of this posture occurred in November 1979, when the regime refused to protect the US embassy from a takeover by students. The Iranian decision to deny the United States’ rights to extraterritoriality and diplomatic immunity was a clear rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. But while this act suggests that the Iranian regime had little interest in diplomacy, the reality

²²³ In response to a declaration of martial law on 7 September, a crowd of approximately 20,000 gathered at Jaleh Square the following day for a public meeting. The police opened fire on the crowd killing and wounding many demonstrators. The exact number of deaths was disputed. SAVAK reported less than one hundred protester deaths; the opposition put the number of dead at over a thousand. The US embassy, drawing on press sources, reported a figure of approximately 125 people (Precht, 2004).

²²⁴ It was at this point that the US took seriously the possibility that the shah might lose power. On 9 November, Sullivan sent a cable entitled “Thinking the Unthinkable,” which outlined the various political

is more nuanced. Although the Iranian regime did not prevent the storming of the US embassy in November 1979, this act cannot be interpreted as indicative of the general manner in which Iran engaged in diplomatic practice. In fact, we must be careful to distinguish between two periods in Iranian diplomatic practice: one from February 1979 to November of the same year; the second from November 1979 until the hostages were released in January 1981. In the first period the revolutionary Iranian regime had been careful to fully adhere to Westphalian diplomatic practice. In the second period the Iranian regime supported the student takeover of the US embassy and thus rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice. However, it must be noted that during this second period – the embassy crisis aside – the Iranian regime continued to accept Westphalian diplomatic practice in every other way, before finally releasing the hostages. I will detail each of these periods in turn.

Iranian Diplomatic Practice until November 1979. While tensions were strained between Revolutionary Iran and many other countries – notably Israel, the US, and Egypt – the Iranian regime nonetheless faithfully engaged in Westphalian diplomatic practice for the first eight months of its rule. Certainly, there was a marked shift in Iranian foreign policy regarding some states following the flight of the shah; yet these new policies were pursued using traditional diplomatic methods. During the opening months of its rule the regime received and exchanged representatives, attended regional and global multilateral fora, and protected foreign embassies in Iran. The clearest evidence of the Iranian regime’s adherence to Westphalian diplomatic practice was its response to the storming of the US embassy on 14 February 1979. At the same time that the new Iranian provisional foreign minister Ibrahim Yazdi was receiving an official note

possibilities available to the US if the shah fell.

of diplomatic recognition from the US at the Iranian foreign ministry, left-wing militants carrying small arms attacked the US embassy. Although the official residence was stormed and ransacked, Yazdi personally led a force of armed fighters to repel the guerrillas just as the chancery doors were about to be breached. The diplomatic severity of this event was clear to all involved. As Yazdi explained to the US press attaché: “In times of revolution mistakes occur. Right now it is impossible for the government to control every group in Iran. But the provisional government of Iran did not want this to happen. We will try to insure your safety” (quoted in Farber, 2005, p. 114). In order to prove the sincerity of the Iranian regime’s regret, Khomeini himself sent apologies and asked the US to excuse the event. This act of protecting the US embassy from attack by other revolutionary forces clearly shows that Iranian regime initially accepted Westphalian diplomatic practice.

This does not mean that Iran’s diplomacy was not often hostile in tone. Khomeini frequently engaged in rhetoric that elevated the concept of the global Muslim community (*umma*), disparaged nationalism (*melli-garai*), and expressed a certain amount of contempt for international society (Ramazani, 2004). Khomeini singled out the United States and its allies in the region for special ire. The US was held out as the “Great Satan” (*shaitan-i buzurgh*) and, within days of taking power, the regime canceled a \$7 billion dollar arms deal with the US.²²⁵ Similarly, the new Iranian government officially severed diplomatic links with the Israel – or, the “Little Satan” (*shaitanha-yi kuchik*) – in late February. Thus, relations between the US and Iran prior to the hostage takeover were

²²⁵ In total the Iranian revolution cost the US about \$12.5 billion in lost arms sales in its first year (Fatemi, 1980).

undoubtedly antagonistic.²²⁶ Yet as hostile as these acts were it is important to recognize that they do not demonstrate Iranian rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice; on the contrary, they demonstrate *adherence* to it. For instance, although Iran expelled the Israeli delegation, the regime ensured that the 22-person Israeli mission was not otherwise interfered with (“Iran Breaks off,” 1979). This is entirely consistent with Westphalian diplomatic practice, which allows for the expulsion of embassies while still guaranteeing their security.

The Iranian regime did not even go this far with the US. Instead of expelling the US embassy, the Iranian regime adopted a strategy of antagonizing the US but doing so within the bounds of Westphalian diplomatic practice. This strategy allowed Iran to rhetorically dismiss the US but to still maintain essential contacts with the international community. Indeed, rhetoric aside, Iran maintained diplomatic relations with the US, and exchanged diplomatic representatives with the Carter administration. By fall 1979 Yazdi had even met directly with the US Secretary of State in New York to begin negotiating new arms deals.²²⁷ As a consequence of the New York meetings, the US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski met with the Iranian prime-minister Mehmed Bazargan and foreign minister Yazdi at an independence celebration in Algeria on 1 November 1979, just days before the hostage crisis erupted. In short, although Iranian diplomacy from February to November 1979 was hostile in tone, the Iranian regime did not reject Westphalian diplomatic practice in any way during this period.

²²⁶ This was true on both sides. For example, a congressional resolution passed in May 1979 condemning human rights abuses in Iran was received with great indignation by the Revolutionary Council. In response to this Iran refused to honor the credentials of the US nominee for ambassador. As a result of this refusal the embassy was run by the US *chargé*, Bruce Laingen.

²²⁷ At these meetings it was agreed that military spare parts would be released to Iran; new sales would be permitted; and commercial disputes would be actively resolved. For more see Ganji (2006, Chapter 10).

Iranian Diplomatic Practice from November 1979 until January 1981. The change in Iranian diplomatic practice began on 4 November 1979. On this date, the US embassy was stormed once again; this time by radical Muslim students who claimed to be protesting the US' admission of the shah into the US for cancer treatment on 22 October. Yet the regime did not respond as it had in February. Instead, for two days it did nothing. During this time of inaction tens of thousands of people gathered outside the embassy in support of the students. On 6 November, the regime finally issued an official response to the students. Khomeini declared that the US embassy was a "Den of Spies" and that there could be no release of the hostages until the shah was sent back to Iran. This declaration did not have unanimous support; both foreign minister Yazdi and the Iranian Prime Minister Mehmed Bazargan resigned rather than support Khomeini's policy.

Thus began Iran's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. By refusing to expel the hostage-takers and liberate the US embassy the Iranian regime was in direct contravention of articles 29 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations of 1961; the articles that oblige states to observe extraterritoriality and diplomatic immunity (Falk, 1980). Rather than meet these obligations some members of the regime actively supported the students who orchestrated the takeover. Iran refused to guarantee the hostages' release throughout 1980. Indeed, following the US' failed hostage rescue mission in April 1980, the Iranian regime actively abetted the students by moving the hostages to a variety of safe-houses throughout Tehran. Attempts to reach a negotiated settlement sputtered. The closest attempt to craft a solution – the so-called 'scenario' (see below) – collapsed in March 1980. It was not until September 1980 that real negotiations began to ensure the hostages' release. This release did not come into effect until January

1981, at which point Iran freed all the hostages, and once more returned to fully accepting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

The Consequences of Iranian Diplomatic Practice. The Iranian regime's decision to allow the US embassy to be overtaken had serious consequences. The Iranian military relied heavily on arms deals with the US. All branches of its forces – especially its airforce – were nearly entirely dependent on US spare parts and technology (Fatemi, 1980). In addition to this, the Iranian economy was closely tied to the West, especially the US. In 1978 American investments in Iran were approximately \$682 million. When the Iranian regime refused to forcibly eject the students from the US embassy, the effects on the Iranian economy were immediate. On 9 November, US President Carter ordered a boycott of all military parts destined to Iran. On 13 November he declared a boycott on Iranian oil. On 14 November he ordered the freezing of all Iranian assets in the US (McLellen, 1985). Once it became clear that the chance of an immediate release of the hostages was slim the US also began a diplomatic campaign against Iran. By January 1980 Western Europe and Japan announced support for economic sanctions against Iran. In May 1980, the UN world court ruled against the behavior of the Iranian regime and ordered it to release the hostages and to pay financial reparations to the US (“Iranian Radio Attacks,”1980). By the time the hostages were finally released in 1981, Iran's diplomatic reputation was seriously damaged. By flagrantly refusing to meet their diplomatic obligations and allowing the hostage crisis to continue Iran earned the animosity of the US, was hit with economic sanctions, and had its international reputation as a lawful state undermined. What explains this puzzling behavior?

Iran's Rejection of Westphalian Diplomatic Practice: Two Explanations

How can we explain Revolutionary Iran's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice? Why did the revolutionary regime agree to protect the US embassy in February 1979 but not in November of the same year? Considering Iran's precarious strategic situation, and the sanctions and isolation it suffered as the crisis dragged on, why did its regime not recapture the embassy from the students who had taken it over? For the remainder of this chapter I will consider two explanations that might account for the diplomatic practice of the Iranian regime. First, I assess the degree to which Iranian acceptance and subsequent rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice – specifically its refusal to defend the US embassy – was a function of strategic concerns. I find there is no evidence to suggest that the leadership of Iran expected there to be any international advantage to allowing the embassy to be held, and instead recognized the dangers of allowing the students to hold it. Second, I assess the degree to which Iran's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice can be explained as a function of the identity of the Iranian regime. I find that while the Iranian regime's identity was religiously fundamentalist and undoubtedly hostile to the US, that this is insufficient for explaining why Iran rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice.

A Strategic Explanation for Iranian Diplomatic Practice. An explanation derived from the strategic literature would expect that the Iranian regime rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice in order to improve the state's overall strategic position in the international system. For this explanation to be supported we should see evidence that showed that Iranian representatives thought that Iranian diplomatic practice would improve the regime's ability to meet its international goals, or that it would increase

Iranian security.

I could find no evidence to suggest that the Iranian regime rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice in order to shore up its position internationally. On the contrary, Iran's international position suffered considerably the instant the regime refused to protect US embassy staff or to force the release of the hostages. As I have shown, although the revolutionary regime was more isolated than the shah's had been, the US and other states had nonetheless diplomatically recognized it and had accepted that it was the new legitimate government in Iran. While the US might have preferred that the shah had remained in power, the consensus in the Carter administration was that militant Islam could be an ally for the US in the cold war. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance believed that both the proximity of the USSR and the anti-religious nature of Soviet ideology would lead revolutionary Iran to side with the US in the cold war (Houghton, 2001). Thus, by late October (i.e. one month before the crisis) Iran and the US were beginning to approach a *modus vivendi* on some strategic issues. Furthermore, despite the public hostility of Khomeini towards the US during the summer and fall of 1979, both the Iranian prime minister and foreign minister had forged even closer relations with the US in order to shore up Iran's strategic position.

This thaw in diplomatic relations ended as soon as the Iranian regime refused to expel the students from the US embassy. Within days of the embassy takeover, the US began to diplomatically isolate Iran. The dangers of continued support for the hostages were clear to the Iranian regime. When he met with him in November the newly-appointed foreign minister Abol Hassan Bani Sadr (Yazdi's replacement) warned Khomeini that refusal to find a solution to the crisis was "going to make Iran look

ridiculous in front of the whole world” (Bani Sadr, 1991). Indeed, Iran’s refusal to expel the students led to a direct weakening of Iran’s military and economy. The dangers of this isolation were acute by summer 1980 when it became clear to the Iranian regime that they were in danger of being attacked by Iraq. Yet as a consequence of US sanctions Iran was unprepared for this serious threat. It had difficulty procuring arms, and could only buy low-quality weapons from North Korea or higher-quality technology at inflated prices on the black market. Even after the invasion of Iran by Iraq on 22 September the regime still refused to end the hostage crisis.²²⁸ Thus, even in the face of its own potential elimination the Iranian regime continued to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice.²²⁹ Instead of meeting its diplomatic obligations, the regime supported the students and, by doing so, poisoned its relationship with the outside world. In short, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was a strategy followed in order to somehow improve Iran’s position in the international system.

A Constructivist Explanation for Iranian Diplomatic Practice. From a traditional constructivist perspective we should expect that changes in Iranian diplomatic practice occurred due to changes in Iranian identity. Concurrently, we should expect that Iran rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice because engaging in it somehow conflicted with the identity practices necessary for the regime to create or recreate its identity. There are two possible variants of this explanation. One variant is that the revolutionary Islamist identity of the Iranian regime prescribed the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice

²²⁸ The isolation of Iran was most vividly illustrated when both of the superpowers declared neutrality after Iraq invaded. This would not have happened had the shah still ruled.

²²⁹ Ultimately, the Iranians surprised everyone by successfully defending the country from Iraqi forces. However, this was not expected by any observers in the early days of the war (Sick, 1989).

on fundamentalist grounds. This is the argument put forward by scholars such as David Armstrong (1993, Ch. 5), who claims that Khomeini and his followers considered the rules, norms and institutions of international society as subordinate to those of Islam and consequently rejected any non-Islamic practices. An alternative constructivist explanation would consider the way that the practices required to maintain the Iranian regime's self-understanding of its relationship with the US might have led it to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. As Jennifer Mitzen notes, some relationships require conflictual practices in order to be recreated. Some states (and by extension, regimes) "take on [an] identity that is embodied in... competitive routines and therefore become attached to the competition as an end in itself" (Mitzen, 2006, p. 360). From this perspective, the Iranian regime may have engaged in the "dangerous routine" (Mitzen, 2006, p. 341) of refusing to protect the US embassy because doing so provided the regime with ontological security and helped it to recreate its identity.

At first glance, there is some evidence that supports both of these explanations. The radical wing of the provisional regime led by Khomeini was clearly pro-Islamic and anti-Western. Upon the formation of the revolutionary regime Khomeini declared that social life in Iran should be re-ordered along Islamic lines: "all the corrupt practices of the West must be eliminated... We will amend the newspapers. We will amend the radio, the television, the cinema. All of these should follow an Islamic pattern... We do not want our judicial system to be Western. We do not want our laws to be Western. We have divine laws" (quoted in Harris, 2004, p. 169-70). This type of rhetoric was typical of the regime, especially as time went on.

However, once the evidence is looked at more carefully, it becomes apparent that

neither explanation is strongly supported. First, although the Iranian regime was populated with radical Islamists, this does not explain why it would reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. Traditional Islamic international jurisprudence offers no source of potential conflict with Westphalian diplomacy, especially on the issues of diplomatic immunity and extraterritoriality. According to Bassiouni (1980), the Koran and Sunnah (the sayings and actions of the Muhammad), as well as the practice of Muslim heads of state (*Khalifas*) all establish and uphold the privilege of diplomatic immunity in Islamic law and practice.²³⁰ As a signatory of the 1961 and 1963 conventions on diplomatic and consular relations, Iran was obliged to uphold its obligations not only by international law, but also by Sharia law. This was the consensus position of other Islamic states – even those hostile to the US – who, while sometimes sympathetic to the regime’s position nonetheless condemned its actions (“Islamic Body Asks Iran to End Crisis,” 1980). Indeed, unlike the Soviet or Chinese cases of rejection, the Iranian regime’s rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice was particular to the US embassy takeover, and not indicative of a general pattern of rejection of the norms and practices of international society. With the exception of the US, all other states in international society were treated the same way by the Iranian regime regardless of whether they were ‘Western’ or not. For example, despite the fact that Turkey had a secular regime (it had been the model on which the shah had based his own regime) and was a member of NATO, Iran nonetheless developed strategic ties to the country. Iran also overlooked Pakistan’s close relations with the US and sought stability with its neighbor (Precht, 1988). Furthermore, as will be shown below, the Iranian regime did not justify the embassy takeover in religious terms. This suggests that however fundamentalist the regime was, its religious worldview did

²³⁰ This means freedom from prosecution, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and freedom from harm.

not prescribe a systematic rejection of international society in the same way that the Soviets' worldview did, for instance. Therefore, there is little reason to think that the Islamic component of the regime's identity led it to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Second, while there is some evidence to support the argument that the Iranian regime engaged in practices that actively recreated a specifically anti-US identity this evidence is insufficient to explain why the regime went so far as to allow the US embassy to be taken over. Certainly the revolutionary regime exhibited strong hostility toward the US. Throughout the pre-revolutionary period the US had been identified as the Great Satan: responsible for overthrowing Mossedegh and for propping up the detested Shah (Ramazani, 1986). The US was also seen as the patron of the Western values that were so detested by the radicals in the regime. Both before and after taking power Khomeini frequently spoke out against the US. Yet while there was animosity toward the US this does not explain why the Iranian regime supported the student takeover of the embassy. First, there is no clear causal route that would explain why, in its hatred for the US, the Iranian regime would go so far as to violate international law. After all, while Iran's expulsion of Israel's embassy was a hostile act that recreated an anti-Israeli identity, it was not a rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. Indeed, up until the embassy-takeover the Iranian regime was careful not to overstep the mark with the US. As Yazdi explained to the US, Khomeini "did not want to break relations with [the US] but go right up to the point of doing so" (quoted in Precht, 2004, p. 31). Second, it is not clear that the US-Iranian relationship up until November 1979 can be characterized as consisting entirely of competitive practices. As I mentioned, the regime did more than simply

observe diplomatic practice with the US; it actively engaged conciliatory policies with the US right up until the embassy-takeover. This shows that, if anything, the Iranian regime was engaging in practices that were altering and improving its relationship with the US, rather than engaging in practices that recreated a hostile relationship. Third, an ontological-security explanation cannot explain why the regime did not hesitate from defending the US embassy in February 1979 but supported its takeover in November. If the Iranian regime was simply engaging in practices that reinforced a hostile relationship why would it protect the embassy at one time but refuse to do so another time? This explanation cannot adequately answer this question.

In short, while helping to explain the Iranian regime's general level of hostility toward the US, a constructivist explanation cannot tell us why the regime would go so far as to support the students' takeover of the US embassy in November. Such behavior was not sanctioned by Islamic jurisprudence; nor was it a necessary component of recreating an anti-US identity. Therefore, while the evidence suggests identity-politics did matter in some way, it also suggests that there was a more contingent rationale behind Iran's shifting diplomatic practice.

From Acceptance to Rejection: Iran's 'Shi'ite Resistance' Narrative of Legitimation

In order to explain why the Iranian regime initially accepted and then subsequently rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice it is necessary to explain the influence of the narrative of legitimation used by the Iranian regime, and how the mandates of this narrative ultimately bound the regime into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. The Iranian regime had legitimated itself through what I call an

‘Anti-Shahist Resistance’ narrative. This narrative generated mass support for the Iranian regime by drawing on two main areas of content. First, this narrative cast the shah and all things associated with him as fundamentally illegitimate. Second, this narrative drew on Shi’ite myths and practices as a positive unifying force that provided the symbolic grammar through which resistance could be mandated and organized.

While this narrative was undoubtedly hostile to Western values it did not initially mandate practices that openly conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice; in other words, it was ‘silent’ regarding Westphalian diplomatic practice. This meant that when the regime first came to power it had no incentives to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. It was only in November 1979 that the binding effect of the narrative had changed in such a way that rejectionist behavior was mandated. This change in narrative binding was brought on by one significant event: the US’ admittance of shah for cancer treatment in October 1979. By allowing the shah to come to New York in October the US engaged in an action (protecting the shah) that could directly link the US to the Iranian narrative of legitimation. This link was made explicit by the students who overran the embassy on 4 November. By casting the US as an active supporter of the shah, the students (and their supporters) could frame the embassy-takeover as a legitimate act of resistance to the shah. Once the US action was understood in this way, support for the students’ activity was mandated by the regime’s narrative of legitimation. This ‘new mandate’ meant the regime was now bound by its narrative of legitimation into supporting the violation of the US’ diplomatic rights in a way that it had not been eight months earlier. But by supporting the students’ takeover of the US embassy, the regime also rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice.

In the remainder of this chapter I will present the evidence that supports this argument. The reader will remember that my core claim is that narratives of legitimation should only lead regimes to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice when (a) the practices mandated by a narrative conflict with Westphalian diplomatic practice, and (b) when the regime's survival is threatened. The evidence shows that the second of these conditions was fulfilled throughout the period covered; that the Iranian regime was subject to internal (and later, external) threats well into late 1980. What caused a change in Iranian diplomatic practice therefore was a change in the first condition: the practices mandated by the narrative. The Iranian narrative of legitimation mandated practices that resisted the shah, or that supported such acts of resistance. This meant that once the students responded to the US actions by attacking the embassy the narrative suddenly mandated that the regime support the students, or else lose legitimacy. In other words, as a consequence of the US' admission of the shah and the students' response to this act, the regime was bound by its narrative of legitimation into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. This account can not only explain the timing of Iran's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice, but also the very narrow and particular nature of Iran's rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice (in contrast to the more systematic break with Westphalian diplomatic practice exhibited by China and the Soviets in the previous chapters).

This section proceeds in five parts. First, I describe the narrative of legitimation used by the revolutionary Iranian regime. Second, I describe the manner in which this narrative was practiced by the regime. Third, I explain how this narrative did not initially mandate practices that conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice. Fourth, I describe

the survival threats faced by the Iranian regime in this period. Fifth, I show how the admission of the US altered the binding nature of the narrative of legitimation such that the regime was forced into supporting the takeover of the US embassy by radical students. Last, I present evidence that shows exactly how the narrative of legitimation used by the regime bound regime representatives into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice only *after* the US admitted the shah.

The Content of the ‘Anti-Shahist Resistance’ Narrative. The Iranian revolution is often characterized as religiously motivated but this is an oversimplification. For the first two years the revolutionary regime was composed of a coalition of religious radicals and moderates. While these moderates publicly supported Shi’ite Islam they also advocated for what we might consider typical human rights concerns such as freedom of speech, free elections, and freedom of association. What united these disparate groups was not so much their shared values, but rather their shared animosity toward the shah. Consequently, the narrative of legitimation used by the revolutionary Iranian regime was defined as much by what it stood *against* as by what it stood *for*. While there was a considerable Shi’ite component to this narrative, Shi’ism primarily mattered because it provided a symbolic grammar around which the masses could be mobilized to resist. While the practices mandated by Shi’ism’s tradition of resistance were critical for toppling the shah’s regime, what really drew Iranians together – and the core content of the regime’s narrative of legitimation – was its anti-shahist component.

By the late 1970s one of the few things that most Iranians could agree was that they detested the shah. By this point almost all ordinary Iranian citizens had rejected the

legitimacy of the Pahlavi regime in its entirety and most sought for a break with the monarchical system of rule. Anti-Shahist sentiment prevailed over most of the country. In turning away from the shah most ordinary Iranians also turned away from the Western and Persian narratives the shah had used to legitimize his regime. While the shah's primary method for maintaining domestic control was the terror of the SAVAK, he had also attempted to legitimize his regime by relying on what Moaddel (1992, p. 50) describes as a "monarchy-centered nationalist discourse." This discourse, an extension of the Atatürkist philosophy of the first shah, mixed Western modernist content with that of the pre-Islamic Persian Empire. By drawing on myths of Persian kingship and Zoroastrian symbols and rhetoric, the shah cast himself as the successor of the Persian emperor Cyrus the Great. The Islamic calendar was replaced with an explicitly monarchical one as new holidays were added, such as the birthdays of the shah and his son, or the date of the implementation of the shah's land reforms. This discourse not only made conscious links with the mythical past but also blamed the "barbarism" of Arabs (*vahshigari Arab*) for Iran's historical failures. Membership in the political community was redefined in terms of national citizenship rather than religious affiliation.

The original authors of this Western/Persian narrative of legitimation were the intellectual classes of early 20th-century Iran. These intellectuals, dubbed *monavvar al-fekrs* (enlightened of the mind), acted as transmitters of Western values throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and were supported by the modernizing Reza Shah. They claimed that the pre-Islamic past was an enlightened age (*'asr-e monavvar*) and published myths and histories of the Persian Empire and Zoroastrianism (Nabavi, 2003a). However, following the fall of Mossedegh, and especially following the White Revolution, many Iranian

intellectuals felt betrayed by the Pahlavi regime and turned against it. Yet, because the shah had been a vigorous supporter of modernization programs and the creation of a secular state in the Atatürkist mold, the ideologies that legitimized these programs were discredited by association. As a consequence of the shah's pro-Western narrative, even moderate liberal politicians and thinkers – who might in other circumstances have drawn on Western and/or modernist narratives in order to legitimate themselves – could not easily legitimate resistance in those terms. Instead, Iranian intellectuals turned against the West and the lifestyle associated with it, which one prominent intellectual – Jalal Al-e Ahmad – dubbed “Westoxication” (*gharbzadegi*). This concept referred to the ‘pollution’ of Iran with Western market goods and the value-system their acquisition appeared to promote. Gharbzadegi encapsulated the sense of cultural loss many Iranians felt. The arrival of a huge influx of diplomatically-immune Westerners in the 1960s further helped to de-legitimize the West in the eyes of ordinary Iranians. There was equal disdain for the importation of faux “Eastern” values as there was for the importation of Western ones. The shah's attempts to manufacture links with Iran's Persian past was seen as nothing but an Orientalist mirror of Western values and thus not deserving of serious consideration.²³¹ In the opinion of one prominent intellectual, the shah's symbolic association with the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great was little more than “cultural tourism” (Darysuh Ashuri, quoted in Nabavi, 2003b, p. 100). In short, despite the shah's desire to create a new Iranian identity through a “monarchy-centered nationalist discourse,” this discourse had little positive influence on Iranian society. On the contrary, the more the shah's regime associated itself with Persian and Western myths and values, the less legitimate these ideas became. In total contrast to what he had planned, by associating himself with

²³¹ The process of Persian identity-construction was disparagingly called *sharqzadegi* or “Eastoxication.”

these ideas the shah helped Iranian opposition movements define what they were against.

The delegitimation-by-association of Western, modern, or Persian values, meant that any potential narratives against the shah's rule could not easily draw on liberal or modernist thought. Consequently, from the 1960s onward intellectual debates in Iran focused on discovering a new "authentic social movement" (*jonesh-e asil-e ejtema'i*) to replace the failed modernizing movements of the previous decades (Nabavi, 2003a, p. 26). There was a drift in traditional left-wing and liberal thought toward more mystical and religious narratives of legitimation. The ordinary "man of the fields" was considered to be the authentic holder of Iranian values, and the Shi'ite Islamic tradition was held up as a uniquely Iranian response to the failure of the society the shah had created.²³² In the early 1970s a Shi'ite discourse was soon adopted by opposition movements; even by non-religious groups.²³³

Shi'ism was a useful for mobilizing resistance not only because it was not associated with the shah, but also because of its historical origins. As a doctrine Shi'ism was born in protest to the Umayyad caliphate that was established after the death of the Caliph Ali in 661. Shi'ite doctrine maintains that the caliphate should have remained within the family of the Prophet rather than passing to non-heredity successors.

²³² The criticisms of Iranian intellectuals regarding Westernization probably resonated strongly with the some of the cultural 'points of concern' of Islamic societies. In particular, there has been a persistent tension between urban values and rural or tribal ones in many Islamic societies. This tension had been most concretely articulated in the work of the Islamic scholar, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). Although recognizing the essential need for urban life in order to create a functioning civilization, Khaldun lamented the corrosive and atomizing effects that such urban specialization wreaked on society. According to Khaldun, the opposites to selfish and effete urban-dwellers were to be found among the tribal Bedouin, who by virtue of their primitive and severe life-style were both more self-reliant and more honorable than urbanites (Gellner, 1995, p. 17-20).

²³³ For instance, at his public trial for the attempted assassination of the shah, the empress, and the crown prince, the Marxist poet and revolutionary Khosrow Golesorkhi claimed there was a natural link between Shi'ite Islam and Marxism: "The [path] that nation have followed and continue to follow is the way of Mawla Hoseyn. It is in this way that in a Marxist society, real Islam can be justified as a superstructure, and we, too, approve of such an Islam, the Islam of Hoseyn and Mawla 'Ali'" (Quoted in Nabavi, 2003b, p.

Following the murder of the fourth Caliph Ali (who was cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad), the caliphate passed out of the Prophet's bloodline. This was challenged by Ali's son Husayn who led a failed revolt against the sixth Caliph Yazid and was eventually slaughtered with his followers at Karbala in 680. This defeat led to the creation of the Shi'ite doctrine of the Imamate (as distinct from the Sunni caliphate). The Imams were expected to be direct descendants of the prophet, and the spiritual elders of the Shi'ite faith. There are a variety of versions of the Imamate. The "Twelver" Shi'ism that dominates Iran held a number of key symbolic and rhetorical commonplaces that would help Khomeini and his followers to mobilize the Iranian public. Among the themes of Twelver faith is the acceptance and acceptability of "quietism" in the face of oppressive political forces, but also the expectation of a utopian end-point of history at the return of the Twelfth Imam, the *Mahdi*, who will institute a reign of justice and equality in the world (Keddie & Cole, 1986).

Shi'ite thought was not inherently or monolithically anti-shah, and thus a narrative which emphasized and promoted resistance had to be crafted. The most vocal and articulate author of the 'Anti-shah Resistance' narrative was Ayatollah Khomeini, who continuously drew parallels to the founding events of Shi'ism and those of contemporary Iranians. He first achieved national prominence in 1963 when he spoke out against the shah's extension of diplomatic immunity to Americans resident in Iran. Khomeini also declared that the shah's veneration of Iran's Persian past, and the manner in which the shah commemorated the rule of Cyrus the Great proved that the shah was an illegitimate ruler. As a consequence of this speech Khomeini was expelled from Iran.²³⁴

91).

²³⁴ He soon settled in Najaf in Iraq. He remained there until he was expelled in late 1978 and moved to

Yet even from outside Iran, Khomeini's narrative continued to reach ordinary Iranians. Tapes of his highly-popular sermons were smuggled into Iran and, although illegal, were easily bought in bazaars (Jervis, 2010). The narrative Khomeini offered to Iranian society was consistent. He consciously linked Islam, anti-shahism, and anti-US symbols, rhetoric, and practices into a single narrative that appealed to a broad swathe of Iranian society. In a speech given in at the start of the religious holiday of Muharram in 1978, Khomeini declared: "The leader of the Muslims taught us that if a tyrant rules despotically over the Muslims in any age, we must rise up against him and denounce him... Let the bloodstained banners of 'Ashura be raised wherever possible, as a sign of the coming day when the oppressed shall avenge himself on the oppressor" (Khomeini quoted in Algar, 1981, p. 244).²³⁵ This Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative was able to attract true religious believers but also those more secular members of society who saw Islam as an effective means of driving out the shah and/or foreign influence. Shi'ism provided not just a unifying identity-marker for the forces opposed to the shah,²³⁶ but also provided the opposition with an effective narrative for resistance. The historical myths and traditions of Shi'ism allowed opponents of the shah to cast their struggle as analogous to the founding events of the Shi'ite faith.

Thus Shi'ism offered the positive unifying content of the narrative; anti-shahism and opposition to foreign influence offered the negative unifying content. Yet it should be reiterated that this narrative drew on Shi'ism more to legitimate resistance to the shah rather than to prescribe a new social order. As Keddie and Cole (1986) note, although

Paris.

²³⁵ This quote is from an edited volume of Khomeini's speeches and writings published in 1981. Hereafter all citations from this source will be referred to as "Khomeini, 1981."

²³⁶ At the time of the Iranian revolution approximately 95% of Iran's 40 million people were Shi'ite

Khomeini used Shi'ite symbols for organizing action he avoided specifically religious speech.²³⁷ Indeed, Khomeini's presentation of Islam was expansive. While in Paris, he frequently spoke in favor of western concerns such as human rights and freedom for women. In February 1978, Khomeini declared that "Freedom of the individual is the most important part of the Declaration of Human Rights. Individual human beings must be equal before the law, and they must be free" (Khomeini, 1981, p. 213). In November 1978 he declared that "Islam, as we interpret it, is a modern religion... I can assure you that we are for the utmost tolerance" (DNSA: IR03436).²³⁸ Therefore, while Shi'ite language was used to mobilize some segments of society, it was the anti-shah sentiment of Khomeini's language that acted as the primary hook. As the first prime minister of the revolutionary regime Mehmed Bazargan put it: "In a negative sense, the Shah was the leader of the revolution" (quoted in Moaddel, 1992, p. 50).

The Practice of the 'Anti-Shahist Resistance' Narrative. Like Tsarist Russia, official politics in pre-revolutionary Iran was highly public. The Pahlavi regime did not just profess Western and Persian values; they practiced them. Persian obelisks and monuments to the shah and his father dotted the landscape of Tehran. The shah created an opulent and highly visible court that reinforced the power and grandiosity of his rule; at

Muslims (Ramazani, 1986).

²³⁷ This might explain why the revolutionary Shi'ism of Khomeini and his followers did not strike a chord with Shi'ites outside of Iran. For example, when Iran carried its war with Iraq into Iraqi borders in July 1982, there was no response to Khomeini's call for a Shi'ite uprising against the Baathist regime; despite Shi'ites making up approximately 60% of the population at the time (Ramazani, 1985)

²³⁸ While in Paris, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr (who would later become a moderate opposed to Khomeini) and his associates carefully coached Khomeini. Questions were submitted in advance by journalists allowing Khomeini's advisers the time to write delicate replies, which Khomeini memorized. Although the rhetoric was decidedly Islamic, the language nonetheless was tailored to be as accessible to Western audiences as possible. According to Bani Sadr, "We chose as our reference that period of the Prophet's life when the basic values were founded on the principle of equality among men, which presupposes democratic process and participation by the people in government affairs under a republican system" (Bani Sadr, 1991, p. 2).

the center of which was the lavish “Peacock Throne.”²³⁹ This was typical of a political narrative in which public spectacle was common. In the 1960s and 1970s a variety of festivals took place: the Festival of Culture and Art, the annual (from 1967) Festival of Arts of Shiraz, the annual (from 1975) Festival of Tus, the annual (from 1977) Festival of Popular culture, and the Festival of Popular traditions. These festivals actively encouraged Iranians to return to their “authentic [i.e. Persian] roots” (Nabavi, 2003a, p. 115). Events in Tehran included parades in which the military personnel displayed the expensive hardware acquired as part of the shah’s links with the US or were dressed in period costumes and rode camels.²⁴⁰ Aside from these ostentatious displays the shah also encouraged ordinary Iranians to display their adherence to this narrative in their everyday practice. The Pahlavi regime promoted the importation of Western clothes, magazines, and television. Even by developing a highly-advanced military, the shah emphasized the Western “modern” dimension of his rule. His own lifestyle reaffirmed the Western values he advocated. The shah dressed in tailored suits or military uniforms in the European fashion. When not vacationing in their Caspian Sea palace, the royal couple flew to Switzerland to ski. Overall, the practices associated with the Pahlavi regime’s narrative of legitimation very publicly mixed ideas of modernity and Persian history.

It was against these practices that regime opponents had to practice their own narrative. Like the narrative used by the Pahlavi regime, the ‘Anti-shah Resistance’

²³⁹ When he had succeeded his father in 1941, the British had denied the new shah a coronation ceremony. In 1967, a few years following his successful elimination of the political opposition during the White Revolution, the shah held a lavish coronation ceremony in which he ascended onto the throne wearing an elaborate crown studded with over three thousand diamonds, over three hundred pearls, five emeralds, and two sapphires.

²⁴⁰ One of the most dramatic examples of this type of spectacle occurred in October 1971. Over four days of festivities held at the ancient capital of Persepolis, the shah celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of the reign of Cyrus the Great. This \$100 million display, in which the shah cast himself as the modern successor of the Persian Empire’s most famous king, included an artificial city of luxury tents, and was attended by

narrative was highly public and theatrical. Shi'ism provided effective content for mobilizing resistance not only because most Iranians were Shi'ites but because Shi'ite history is replete with events and symbols that emphasize and encourage resistance to unjust political authority. From the outset of his public opposition to the shah, Ayatollah Khomeini drew on Shi'ite symbols in order to visualize resistance to the Pahlavi regime. One of the simplest ways that Khomeini did this was by encouraging those who resisted the shah to publicly distinguish themselves by adopting black clothing. As Khomeini put in his first public speech against the shah in 1963: "The scholars of Islam are Black Reaction! And you have carried out your White revolution in the midst of all this Black Reaction" (Khomeini, 1981, p. 179). When Khomeini's supporters were targeted by the regime, he urged them to continue to wear black as a sign of respect to those martyred. More concretely, Khomeini and his followers linked political protest directly to the Shi'ite calendar. This was an astute move as Shi'ism is a highly ritualized and public religion, suffused with what Gellner (1995, p. 69) calls "passion plays" that are linked to particular dates.²⁴¹ Of particular importance in Shi'ism is the significance of martyrdom. The martyrdom of Husayn and his followers at Karbala "provided the paradigm of suffering and protest that has guided and inspired Shii Islam" (Esposito, 1998, p. 43). Devout Shi'ites are expected to venerate and emulate this kind of behavior. Khomeini and his followers closely linked these expectations with two prominent dates in the Shi'ite calendar: Muharram and Ashura.²⁴² It was at the 3 June 1963 celebration of

four hundred people from over seventy countries including over fifty heads of state.

²⁴¹ Unlike Sunni Islam, which generally rejects iconography or public veneration, Shi'ism expects and encourages religious display. For a discussion of the differences between the two doctrines, see Esposito (1998, chapter 3).

²⁴² Muharram marks the beginning of the new year in the Islamic calendar. This date was especially significant in 1978: in the Islamic calendar it was Muharram 1399 and a new Islamic century was about to begin. Muharram is followed in the Shi'ite calendar by the festival of Ashura, which marks the death of the

Ashura in Qom (itself a symbolic location for the Iranian Shi'ism) that Khomeini publicly declared that the shah was Yazid, an usurper of the throne, and a tool of Satan.²⁴³ These dates were crucial in initially mobilizing the mass support that ultimately caused the shah to finally relinquish power. In the last week of November 1978 Khomeini issued an *elamieh* (a set of instructions) for followers during Muharram: “Muharram is being anticipated with heroism, bravery, and sacrifice,” declared Khomeini.²⁴⁴ Followers were asked to prepare to martyr themselves. Nearly ten thousand people responded to the request within the first twenty-four hours of the message.²⁴⁵ In response to the crowds, troops opened fire and, by doing so, triggered a cycle of public Shi'ite rituals so that “each time the troops would crack down there would be more commemorations for those who were killed” (Precht, 2004, p. 9).²⁴⁶ Mass public participation became the central mechanism that led to the shah's downfall. By late 1978 as much as one-fifth of the entire population of Iran was demonstrating in the streets (Cottam, 1989).

Thus the practice of the ‘Anti-shah Resistance’ narrative had a number of

Husayn in 680CE. In commemoration of this event, devout Shi'ite Muslims are expected to gather in large crowds in which some participants will slash themselves with blades in commemoration of Husayn's death. The festival is a dramatic and highly visible demonstration of faith.

²⁴³ The next day Khomeini was arrested and taken to Tehran, and action that unleashed three days of rioting in Tehran and Qom as well as other cities.

²⁴⁴ He explained that it was the month “that the powerful will be broken by the word of the right, the month that the Imam of the Muslims will show us the path of strength against the oppressors, the month the freedom fighters and patriots will clench their fists and win against tanks and machine guns... The government has been put in the hands of anti-Muslim officials to benefit the Satanic ruler and his parasitic henchmen and, thus, ruined the country... [T]he high clergy will lead the Shiites and this tree of oppression and treason will be cut down” (quoted in Harris, 2004, p. 118).

²⁴⁵ As a symbol of their willingness to martyr themselves, thousands of volunteers wearing white burial shrouds demonstrated on the first day of Muharram (1 December).

²⁴⁶ Shi'ite tradition obliges that commemorations for the dead be held forty days after their funeral. The practical expression of this obligation generated a feedback effect where regime crackdowns on protesters often created focal points for future action. For example, in January 1979 new demonstrations were organized commemorating the violence of Ashura. As Khomeini (1981, p. 249) declared from Paris: “The fortieth-day commemoration of Imam Husayn has an exceptional and ideal meaning this year. It is religious and national duty to organize great marches and demonstrations on this day. With marches and demonstrations all across the country, our great people must bury once and for all this stinking carrion of monarchy.”

elements. First, it was highly public and relied on clear practices of resistance against the Pahlavi regime. Second, these practices often drew on and were linked to Shi'ism. The Shi'ite faith provided opposition movements with symbols and myths that could both legitimize resistance and also visually distinguish regime-supporters from opponents. However, what mattered most was not the religious dimension of these practices but rather that they were done to clearly indicate a rejection of the Shah and the Western and Persian symbols and values with which he associated himself.

‘Anti-Shah Resistance’ and its Compatibility with Westphalian Diplomatic Practice. Unlike the narratives of legitimation used by Imperial China and Soviet Russia, the narrative of legitimation used by the revolutionary Iranian regime did not inherently conflict with Westphalian diplomatic practice. Neither the anti-shahist nor the pro-Shi'ite content of the regime's narrative of legitimation mandated the regime to engage in the kind of full-scale rejection of diplomatic practice that we saw in earlier chapters. This is not to say that the narrative employed by the regime was conciliatory in tone. Undoubtedly, the revolutionary regime was hostile to the West in general and to the US and Israel in particular. However the anti-western or anti-US attitude of the regime (and its supporters) was only part of the larger anti-shahist sentiment of many in Iran. The animus felt against the US was closely linked to US *policies* regarding the shah, and not about the US (or the West) per se. For example, Khomeini only spoke out against President Kennedy when the shah had extended diplomatic immunity to all Americans in Iran in 1964: “Let the American President know that in the eyes of the Iranian people, he is the most repulsive member of the human race today because of the injustice he has imposed on our Muslim nation” (Khomeini, 1981, p. 186). Similarly, Khomeini only

linked Carter's regime with the shah following a state-visit by the US president to Iran in late 1977 (Harris, 2004). In short, anti-western sentiment – and by extension hostility to international society writ large – was more about the resentment Iranians felt toward the outside world for its support of the shah, not because there was a revolutionary rejection of the outside world, or even the US, in general. This does not mean the narrative of legitimation did not mandate hostile acts toward other countries. The anti-Zionist rhetoric of Khomeini mandated that diplomatic ties with Israel be cut, for instance.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, due to the resentment of many ordinary Iranians toward the shah's backers, the diplomacy conducted with some countries, such as the US (see below), had to be done in a much more sensitive manner. Nonetheless, despite the hostility of the narrative of legitimation used by the regime, I could find nothing in it that mandated a clear break with Westphalian diplomatic practice, even with perceived enemies.

To explain how the narrative of legitimation used by the Iranian regime came to mandate the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice, we need to consider two factors. First, we need to consider the threats to its survival that the regime faced during the period under discussion, and the way in which these threats caused elites to be highly sensitive to their narrative of legitimation. Second, we need to consider how the behavior of the US in October 1979 – and the students' response to it – altered the binding nature of the Anti-Shah Resistance narrative of legitimation used by the regime. Because the students justified their actions as an act of resistance to the shah, this mandated that the regime support the takeover of the US embassy. The remainder of this chapter will outline both of these conditions, and then carefully demonstrate how the behavior of the

²⁴⁷ Prime Minister Bazargan explained that the diplomatic break was “fully in keeping with policy announced before we came to power of cutting all ties with Israel” (“Iran Breaks Off,” 1979).

US caused Iranian regime officials – both moderate and radical – to become bound by their narrative of legitimation into supporting the takeover of the embassy.

The Iranian Regime’s Survival Threats. The revolutionary Iranian regime faced considerable threats to its survival for the first 18 months of its existence. Before his departure to Egypt, the shah appointed Shapur Bakhtiar as prime minister and tasked him with managing the crumbling regime. Despite the threat of a coup from parts of the military, Bakhtiar decided to invite Khomeini to Iran, in the hope of forming a new regime. When Khomeini arrived on 1 February 1979, he was met by a chanting crowd of approximately ten million people, some of whom declared him the returned “hidden” Imam (Moin, 1999). It was immediately clear that the monarchy was finished. Khomeini called on the civil service to switch their loyalties, and dismissed Bakhtiar; appointing the moderate Mehmed Bazargan as interim prime minister in his place.

Although the provisional revolutionary regime took official control of the government as soon as the shah left, his departure had left behind a country in a precarious state. Almost as soon as he left many of the state’s institutions effectively ceased to function. One week after Khomeini’s return, the military – already wracked by mutinies²⁴⁸ – collapsed as an independent political force in Iran; a fact tacitly admitted by the army chief of staff on 11 February when he declared that the army would be non-partisan.²⁴⁹ It would be over a year before the military was reorganized. Following the

²⁴⁸ On 10 February a number of technicians, cadets, and junior officers at an airbase outside Tehran began to spontaneously demonstrate in support of the revolution. The trigger was a documentary by a television network controlled by Khomeini’s followers that broadcast a program describing Khomeini’s presence in Iran as the return of the imam. This demonstration quickly turned into a full mutiny and Imperial Guard armored units were dispatched by the army high command to put it down. Word spread in Tehran and a huge crowd of approximately one hundred thousand reached the base. By noon of the next day the base had fallen and half of the Imperial Guard had mutinied and turned to attack their own barracks.

²⁴⁹ Shortly after the Imperial Guard’s mutiny five generals were brought to Khomeini’s HQ, where they were executed on the roof.

military's collapse minor militias took control of various parts of the state. On-the-ground power was divided between various different opposition groups that can be broadly disaggregated into three camps: radicals, moderates, and (the comparatively weaker) left-wing revolutionaries (Seifzadeh, 2003). The radicals – represented by the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) – tried to take control of the justice system, which was controlled by informal committees at that point. Extra-judicial executions became commonplace as senior generals, SAVAK officers, civil servants, and other shahist sympathizers were summarily executed; sometimes for seemingly-minor offenses.²⁵⁰ The influence of the radicals was opposed by the moderates who were led by the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI). The LMI called for a return to a rule of law, individual human rights, and freedom of the press.

Despite their differences Khomeini formed a provisional government that included moderates as well as radicals. Although the radicals were the more dominant of the two factions, the moderates were still central for maintaining the survival of the regime and were given senior posts in the government. The radicals and moderates united for a number of reasons. First, there was genuine concern inside Iran that the shah would return from exile and regain power.²⁵¹ This was worrying because the new regime was aware of Iran's significance in Middle Eastern politics. Iran was a vital strategic pivot for the US; necessary for blocking Soviet advances into the Persian Gulf (Brzezinski, 1983). By removing one of its most valuable allies in the region, revolutionary Iran had attracted

²⁵⁰ For example, one shahist official was shot for comments he had made about Khomeini in 1963. The US justice department put the figure at approximately six hundred killed in the first six months of the revolution. Many of the trials preceding these deaths were only a few hours long. In March 1979 the prime minister tried to rein in the excesses and demanded that all trials take place under the supervision of the Revolutionary Council.

²⁵¹ When he left Iran, the shah first flew to Egypt and Morocco for "private visits." In March he traveled to the Bahamas where he stayed until June, before flying to Mexico. In October 1979, suffering from

the hostility of the US. Although there is little evidence that the US was planning to attempt to coup the provisional government once it came to power, the regime was nonetheless concerned that it might happen (Cottam, 1989). Second, with the collapse of the military, no single group had clear control over the state. Although the remnants of the pro-shah forces were quickly eliminated,²⁵² the government was still not been able to fully consolidate its political authority. Day-to-day life in Iran was dominated by revolutionary courts, committees, and militias; many of them self-appointed. Consensus was necessary to establish law and order and to consolidate the revolution as well as combat those opposition groups that had been excluded from the regime. These groups included leftist revolutionary organizations such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and the Cherikha-ye Fada'i-ye Khalq, which began to operate independently in mid-January, and which were in possession of over 300,000 small arms that they refused to return.²⁵³ Supporters of these organizations began violently clashing with regime supporters on campuses and at public gatherings. There were also challenges to the provisional government from religious groups. Some prominent religious leaders, such as the popular Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, considered Khomeini's brand of Islam too extreme, and challenged Khomeini's use of the title Imam and his comparison of the revolution with the rise of Islam.²⁵⁴ Third, unity was maintained due to the cooperative attitude shared by the major leaders of each of the groups. On the moderate side, the most important leaders

advanced stages of cancer, he flew to the US for treatment.

²⁵² By mid-summer, 70% of the shah's senior officers had been executed. Up to 12,000 officers were arrested and sentenced, retired, or cashiered (Ganji 2006, chapter 10).

²⁵³ The MEK blended Marxist and Islamist thought and argued that a true Islamic society was a classless one. It had carried out a number of terrorist attacks, including on the shah's family, in the early 1970s. Its influence fell off after the mid-1970s. The Cherikha-ye Fada'i-ye Khalq had a similar blend of Marxist and Islamic thought. Both were active in the early days of the revolution and attacked military bases.

²⁵⁴ Shari'atmadari even used channels to reach the US in order to try to encourage the US to prevent Khomeini achieving power. For more on the various factions inside early revolutionary Iran see Ganji

were Mehmed Bazargan and Abol Hassan Bani Sadr.²⁵⁵ On the radical side, the most important figures were Sadegh Ghotbzadeh,²⁵⁶ and Khomeini.

Khomeini was the most significant figure in maintaining this unity, as he was so well respected by the Iranian public. In the early days of the regime Khomeini did many things to encourage unity. He appointed Bazargan interim prime minister while a new constitution was being drafted. He was also careful to avoid divisive or sectarian language. According to the US ambassador William Sullivan (1980) Khomeini was genuinely worried that his return to Iran could lead to widespread bloodshed. Thus, upon arriving in Tehran, Khomeini (1981, p. 253) inclusively declared, “We must thank all the classes of the nation. Victory has been attained by the unity or purpose not only of the Muslims, but also of the religious minorities, and by the unity of the religious leaders and politicians.” Khomeini was also popular because he claimed that he would only establish an interim regime before retiring from political life. The CIA operative in Iran, Richard Cottam, reported back to the state department that Khomeini did not want a theocracy and would act as a “boundary-setting charismatic leader” (Ganji, 2006, p. 96).

This focus on Khomeini’s personality and charisma tells us much about politics in the early days of the Iranian regime, most notably the role of the masses in propping up the regime. The revolution in Iran was truly a mass-movement and was not just an elite-

(2006, chapter 8).

²⁵⁵ Bani Sadr had been a graduate student and a lecturer at the University of Tehran and had been given the task of rewriting Khomeini’s *Islamic Government* prior to the revolution. His political position was that Islam provided a third way of governance that was distinct from capitalism and communism. Bani Sadr had also played a prominent role in Paris. Once Khomeini returned to Iran, Bani Sadr served on the seven-man committee that discussed the contentious issue of *Velayat-e-Faqih*, the Rule of the Jurist (see below). Although his political career began in the Khomeini camp he very quickly became the most prominent moderate leader in Iran and was to be the country’s first president.

²⁵⁶ Ghotbzadeh was one of the leading Iranians in exile in Paris. He was a founding organizer of the LMI. In the early seventies, became a follower of Khomeini as he realized that the imam was likely to be a useful link to the Iranian masses.

led coup. Without public support the regime could not have stayed in power; yet without unity, the country could have quickly slid into civil war. Perhaps as a consequence of the public practices mandated by the Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative the public was politically active and turned out onto the streets in great numbers and with great frequency. In the first election held by the regime (a referendum on whether the monarchy should be abolished), 18 million votes were cast. In the absence of functioning state institutions, elites needed to maintain connections with this mass public. The first four months of the post-shah period were remembered as the “Spring of Freedom.” This was an era of massive free speech and alternative media, where rival political groups publicly competed for domestic support. This included Khomeini who – although he had “retired” to Qom after setting up the provisional government – still used television and mass media to communicate with domestic and international audiences (Moin, 1999). This unusual political situation was categorized by Cottam (1986, p. 58) as being “authoritarian populist.”

While the provisional government of radicals and moderates were united in their dislike of the shah, they did not trust one another and by mid-summer of 1979 divisions within the coalition had become noticeable. There were two main reasons for this. First was the failure of the revolutionary regime to provide stability and a functioning government. By May 1979 Iran’s economy had become seriously destabilized. The currency had lost fifty percent of its value and unemployment was at 35 per cent. Although anti-shah sentiment had initially been sufficient to create public support for the Khomeini-dominated government, public discontent was growing. As a consequence of this, support for the radicals began to dip, and support for moderates rose. In March 1979

an umbrella secular party, the National Democratic Front (NDF), was formed, with Bazargan at its head. According to a US embassy report from late October, the moderates had become “more vocal... and have focused their criticism on some of the obvious failures of the regime.” While they were, “still not a major force on the Iranian political scene, these groups have been able to organize themselves enough to express ideas contrary to those of the ruling establishment” (DNSA: IR03394).

The second and more significant reason that moderates and radicals began to divide was due to the highly-contested drafting of a new constitution. In early spring 1979 a new constitution was proposed that was based on a combinations of Iran’s 1906 constitution and the French Fifth Republic’s. However before a draft of the constitution was presented to the 350-member Constituent Assembly that represented all the factions involved in the revolution, Khomeini pushed that it be submitted to a 73-member “Assembly of Experts.” In March 1979 a referendum was held to sanction the creation of this assembly in which two-thirds of the seats went to Khomeini’s supporters. The first draft of the constitution was presented in June 1979. It proposed the establishment of a strong central government with ultimate authority delegated to the president.²⁵⁷ The role of the religious *ulama* was to be limited. This constitution was rejected by the “Experts.” In its place a different constitution was put forward in August. While this constitution would be broadly republican the radicals also wished to include a “Council of Guardians” that would supersede and check the republican institutions. Leading this council would be a “jurist” who, by right of religious expertise, could act as the final interpreter of laws. In practice this meant that Khomeini would be able to influence the decisions that were

²⁵⁷ The head of state would be a president that would appoint a prime minister. There would also be a separate elected legislature as well as constitutional guarantees of free speech.

made by the government by either sanctioning or condemning them. This proposal was a shock to many moderates; when he was in exile Khomeini had promised that he would not seek power once he returned to Iran. It was even a shock to many religious groups. The draft was challenged by Ayatollah Shari'atmadari who favored a *velayat-e fuqaha* (guardianship by a group of jurisconsults) that would considerably restrict the day-to-day political involvement of the *ulama*. By December 1979 Shari'atmadari claimed the constitution would "open the way for a dictatorship" (quoted in Saffari, 1993, 79)

The attempt to centralize power by Khomeini's supporters was blocked by moderates such as Bani Sadr who argued that the proposed constitution would lead to a fascist state.²⁵⁸ From their side, radicals tried to indirectly compare Bazargan and other political enemies to the *munafiqin*; people who did not believe in the Prophet in the early days of Islam.²⁵⁹ Supporters of a democratic constitution were accused of being 'traitors of Islam' and 'counterrevolutionaries' by Khomeini. On 10 August, Khomeini spoke out against those who were complaining about the assembly of experts and press freedoms: "We will close all parties [expect] the one, or a few which act in a proper manner... We thought we were dealing with human beings. It is evident we are not. We are dealing with wild animals. We will not tolerate them anymore" (quoted in Moin, 1999, p. 219).

The Assembly of Experts was expected to present the draft constitution for ratification to the people in early December of 1979. In order to win the political contest over the constitution, radicals and moderates both turned to their supporters in the streets.

²⁵⁸ Bani Sadr successfully blocked the inclusion of an amendment to the constitution that would grant the Jurist almost complete power and that managed to divide the command of the armed forces between the Jurist and the president. Technically, article 110 of the constitution designated the Jurist as the head of the armed forces, with the ability to appoint chiefs of staff and commanders; however, the president would retain command control over all Iranian forces.

²⁵⁹ As Ram (1992, p. 431) notes, the salient characteristics of the *munafiqin* is that they were hypocrites who "say with their mouths what is not in their hearts."

The newly-formed NDF organized public demonstrations against the expansive role of religion in the state and in favor of press freedoms (the launch of the NDF was attended by over a million people). These demonstrations were opposed by the radicals who, at Khomeini's urging, began restricting freedom of speech (they controlled the media branches of the state). Armed radical supporters began targeting political opponents at rallies. Despite repeated calls by Bazargan for them to disband, radicals continued to maintain revolutionary courts that targeted the educated middle-classes (Cottam, 1989). They also began recruiting their own independent military force, the Revolutionary Guards, which numbered approximately 7,000 men by mid-summer (Ganji, 2006). Yet despite the dominance of the radicals, the moderates were still very popular and could not be simply ignored by the radicals within in the regime. For instance, in early January 1980, Bani Sadr – who by then was openly feuding with the radicals – received over 75% of the 10 million ballots cast to become Iran's first President. And although the IRP won the majority of seats in the first *Majlis* (parliament) when it opened in May 1980, this was still not a supermajority.²⁶⁰ Although the radicals were the more powerful of the two political movements, they were still not able to rule without the support of moderates.

By this point, Khomeini began calling for a cultural revolution in Iran. He publicly turned against his old allies, stating that the Islamic Republic could not “tolerate those people who have been educated in Europe” (Harris, 2004, p. 373). On 9 July 1980 a coup plot against the Iranian regime was discovered, which further exacerbated the tensions in the regime.²⁶¹ Even by fall 1980 the radical-led regime's survival was

²⁶⁰ The IRP won 130 out of the 238 seats.

²⁶¹ This coup plot was organized in exile by the shah's former prime minister, Shapur Bakhtiar, and the

threatened. A continuing power-struggle between Bani Sadr and Khomeini's appointed prime-minister Raja'i had resulted in a cabinet in which seven posts were unfilled by early September. Indeed, although moderate influence waned as time went on, the radicals did not consolidate institutional power until June 1981, when the radical response to the murder of scores of high-ranking IRP officials led to ruthless crackdowns that caused Bani Sadr to go into hiding and flee.²⁶²

It is against this background of threats to regime survival that the Iranian rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice must be understood. The revolutionary regime had come into power as a united coalition of radicals and moderates that drew support from the masses of Iranian society. However, by the summer of 1979 these coalition partners began to divide and to publicly feud over political power, especially the creation of a new constitution. Because of the highly public nature of Iranian politics at this time, and the threats to regime survival, there were incentives for each side to attempt to de-legitimize the other in order to increase their support with the masses. The radicals tried to paint the moderates as Westernized and alien; the moderates tried to paint the radicals as theocrats and fascists. As these public disputes were taking place the Carter administration admitted the shah to the US for cancer treatment and, in doing so, inserted the US into the Iranian narrative of legitimation and altered its binding nature in a way that permanently weakened the moderates.

The Embassy Crisis and the Anti-Shahist Resistance Narrative. At an October

former Tehran martial-law administrator, General Gholamali Oveisi. The plan was for the capture of the Nozheh airforce base near Tehran by sympathetic officers. From this location, air strikes would be directed at Tehran, the theological seminary in Qom, the Majilis, and the headquarters of the Revolutionary Guard. In addition, assassination teams were to target members of the Revolutionary Council, the cabinet, and influential clerics. In response to the discovery of the coup plot the regime arrested over six hundred air force officers; executing 81 of them.

²⁶² For more see Ram (1992).

meeting in the White House, and after much convincing by his cabinet, President Carter agreed to permit the shah entry into the US. The shah had been ill with cancer since before his exile but had been unable to receive adequate treatment in the various states in which he had lived since January 1979. Initially, the entry of the shah into the United States was not a significant event in Iran. In an 27 October cable to the state department the US *chargé d'affaires* in Iran Bruce Laingen reported that the provisional government had offered no protest, that the media reaction was more “questioning and critical” than hyperbolic, and that the grounds around the US embassy were “quiet” (DNSA: IR03408). This changed on 4 November when a group of non-regime radicals calling themselves the “Students Following the Line of the Imam” stormed the US embassy and took the staff hostage. Critically, the students publicly legitimated their actions on the grounds that the US should not have permitted the shah entry to New York. The students’ original plan was to sit-in on embassy grounds for 48-72 hours after which time they expected to be driven out by the Bazargan government. The students’ hope was that by ordering the embassy to be relieved Bazargan would lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Ganji, 2006). The students had not expected to receive either support from the regime, or media attention. However, a number of events soon took place that changed the political effect of the embassy takeover.

First, within hours of the students taking over the embassy, crowds began to form around the embassy. By the end of the first day hundreds had gathered. This was almost certainly due to the way in which the students had linked the US embassy takeover to the hated figure of the shah, and thus the ‘Anti-Shahist Resistance’ narrative. This potential linkage had been apparent to observers in Iran even before the crisis took place. When the

State Department asked Laingen in October 1979 if there could be consequences for allowing the shah into the US he replied that “real hostility toward the Shah continues... the augmented influence of the clerics might mean an even worse reaction than would have been the case a few months ago, if we were to admit the shah” (quote in McLellen, 1985, p. 151). Laingen was similarly warned by Yazdi, who told him that by admitting the shah the US was “opening Pandora’s box. Who knows what will pop out?” (quoted in Harris 2004, p. 194). The only member of the Carter cabinet who took seriously the downside risk of admitting the shah appears to have been the president himself.²⁶³ These concerns were warranted. Within days, the crowds around the embassy numbered tens of thousands. Furthermore, contrary to the students’ expectations, the presence of these crowds was widely publicized by the radical-controlled media institutions of the state.

Second, the regime’s response was not what the students expected. Bruce Laingen, who was visiting the Iranian foreign ministry at the time of the attack, immediately issued a formal protest. In private, his complaint was received sympathetically; Bazargan was furious when he heard of the students’ actions as he recognized that it was an international crime. Yet, for the first two days after the takeover the regime publicly did nothing. On 6 November the regime finally issued an official response to the students. In a public radio address, Khomeini declared that the US embassy was a “Den of Spies” and that there could be no release of the hostages until the shah was sent back to Iran to face trial. This declaration did not have unanimous support; both foreign minister Yazdi and Prime Minister Bazargan resigned rather than support

²⁶³ During the 19 October meeting in which his senior advisors recommended admitting the shah into the US President Carter asked, “what are you guys going to advise me to do if they overrun our embassy and take our people hostage?... On that day we will all sit here with long drawn white faces and realize we’ve been had” (quoted in Harris, 2004, p. 194).

Khomeini's policy. After hearing Khomeini's speech, the students changed their activities inside the embassy. They began the process of organizing the gradual and steady release of embassy documents from inside the embassy. They also issued the conditions under which they would evacuate the embassy when they hung a banner outside the embassy that read, "No Negotiations, Just Delivering Shah" (Harris, 2004).

There a number of things to notice about this sequence of events. First, and most importantly, this crisis took on the dimensions it did because of the way that the US' admission of the shah directly 'linked' it to the Iranian narrative of legitimation. Although anti-US sentiment was always high in Iran, its embassy had not been the target of attacks since February 1979. However, once the students stormed the US embassy *and* legitimated their behavior in terms of the US' protection of the shah, this suddenly and directly linked the US to the Iranian narrative of legitimation. To put this in practice-language, the US *behavior* of allowing the shah to come to New York was reinterpreted by the narrative as an *action* of support for the shah. Critically, this US action was not only inherently illegitimate according to the Iranian narrative of legitimation, the students' behaviors were inherently legitimate actions of resistance aimed at the shah. Once the embassy takeover was framed in this way it meant that support of the students was mandated for anyone who wished to adhere to the Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative of legitimation.

Second, threats to regime survival meant that the regime could not expel the students without jeopardizing a loss of legitimacy. This was not a problem for all in the regime. Certainly, the radicals had been looking for an excuse to weaken their moderate opponents as Khomeini and his supporters had incentives to use the issue as a source of

legitimacy. After all, the final election on the constitution was set for 2 December, the presidential election was set for January, and elections to the Iranian parliament were set for May. If the hostage crisis could be prolonged until then this might increase popular support for the radicals and discredit the moderates in these elections. But while such coalition-disputes can explain the behavior of some radicals, it cannot explain why moderates chose to stay silent in public or resign, rather than contest the students' actions. Their refusal to publicly respond to this event with nothing other than tacit support for the students can only be explained by understanding the binding nature of the narrative of legitimation.

Thus the two conditions proposed by the causal mechanism of narrative binding – a narrative that mandated practices that conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice, and threats to regime survival – came together in a way that bound *all* members of the regime into supporting the students, and thus rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. The critical event in making this happen however, is not the political infighting between regime officials, but rather the way in which the US' actions and the students' reaction mandated a particular response on the part of the regime. Counter-factually speaking, while the radicals had incentives to discredit regime moderates, if the shah had not gone to the US in the first place, these radicals would not have had sufficient symbolic ammunition to support a takeover of the US embassy. Indeed, the most likely regime response to an 'unprovoked' attack on the US embassy would have been the expulsion of the students. However, by linking itself to the Iranian narrative of legitimation the US had made it impossible for any members of the regime to contest the students' action. Instead the narrative of legitimation mandated that all regime officials – including moderates –

publicly support actions that they might have opposed under other circumstances.

Summary. The content of the “Anti-Shahist Resistance” narrative of legitimation used to oust the shah had a number of components that strongly influenced the politics of legitimacy once the shah fled in late 1979. First, its anti-shahist themes were essential for forming a coalition of otherwise-disparate radicals and elites. Second, the acts of resistance that were mandated by the narrative created a highly public form of politics in which mass demonstrations and mobilization were the norm. Third, the survival of the regime that depended on this narrative was threatened from the very start. The institutions of the state had largely collapsed and there was a real threat that the country would descend into civil war. In order to maintain its survival the regime had to rely on public support. However, as time went on, the radical-led regime came under increasing pressure from its moderate wing, with which it publicly feuded. What was needed was some opportunity to undermine its moderate partners. This opportunity came when radical students stormed the US embassy in protest to the shah’s admission to America. This act linked the US to the Anti-Shah resistance narrative in a new way. Although this narrative had always been hostile to the US, the direct linking of the US to the person of shah meant that the binding nature of this narrative was altered. Specifically, the actions of the US and the students now mandated that regime officials not only oppose the US, but also *support* the students. Yet by mandating this support, the narrative now also mandated rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Narrative Binding and Iranian Diplomatic Practice: Assessing the Evidence

There is considerable evidence to support the argument that the binding nature of

its narrative of legitimation caused the Iranian regime to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. While many radicals in the regime were enthusiastic in their support of the embassy-takeover, the evidence shows that moderates were narratively bound into supporting this action, as failure to do so would appear illegitimate in the eyes of public opinion. Importantly, the evidence shows that although radicals had tried to force moderates into adopting radical anti-US positions *before* November 1979, moderates had not been constrained by these radicals' attacks enough that moderates could not engage in diplomatic practice with the US. However, once the students took over the embassy – an action that mandated the support of politicians – moderates felt unable to publicly criticize the students, or to support the US' claims to its diplomatic rights. To put it another way, moderates were able to engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice until 4 November, 1979 but after this date they could no longer do so. Furthermore, due to the anti-shahist practices mandated by the Iranian narrative of legitimation even the radicals found it very difficult to resolve the crisis once they wished to do so. In short, as consequence of the binding effect of its narrative of legitimation the Iranian regime was forced into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice, even when members of the regime preferred otherwise. It was not until the threats to its survival were neutralized that the regime was willing to release the hostages. By this time, the damage to Iran's diplomatic standing was considerable.

The 'Silent' Narrative: Iranian Diplomatic Practice until November 1979.

The key claim of the argument I am making is that while there was an anti-US element to the Iranian narrative of legitimation prior to the embassy crisis, the content of this narrative did not mandate overt acts of aggression toward the US, and certainly did not

mandate rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice. In demonstrating this, I focus on the diplomatic and foreign policy behavior of moderates in the regime. Specifically, I focus on the degree to which they felt constrained into anti-US positions. If they were bound by the narrative (or actually held strong anti-US positions) we should expect that these moderates would be reluctant to engage in diplomacy with the US. If the narrative did not have this binding effect we should expect that moderates would adhere to Westphalian diplomatic practice when engaging with the US.

The evidence shows that – despite radical attempts to paint their behavior as treasonous – moderate regime officials made sure to adhere to Westphalian diplomatic practice when engaging with the United States. The most obvious piece of evidence to support this is the behavior of foreign minister Yazdi when he put down an attack on the US embassy in February 1979. Yet the regime’s relationship went beyond simply adhering to Westphalian diplomatic practice; moderates actively sought to improve relations with US. In July 1979 prime-minister Bazargan publicly defended the need to acquire spare parts from the US for the Iranian military in order to maintain 40 billion dollars’ worth of Iranian military hardware. Foreign minister Yazdi even flew to New York in October 1979 to discuss this issue and others (DNSA: IR03436). At these meetings, Yazdi publicly advocated for improved relations between the US and Iran. That month Yazdi explained to domestic media sources that he expected the US and Iran to exchange full ambassadors (“Iranian Foreign Minister”, 1979). And, as already mentioned, Yazdi and Bazargan met with Zbigniew Brzezinski in Algeria two days before the hostage crisis began.

These activities did not go unremarked on by radicals in the regime. Even before

the hostage crisis Khomeini and his radical supporters had been discrediting Bazargan and Yazdi for forming links with the US (Seifizadeh, 2003). In late October Khomeini declared that those who sought links with the US were “traitors... dependent on the West... Those American-loving rotten brains must be purged from the nation” (quoted in Ganji, 2006, p. 149). When Brzezinski met with Bazargan and Yazdi in Algeria, news of the meeting was carried by Iranian media that included the picture of Bazargan’s handshake with Brzezinski. This gesture was taken by many ordinary Iranians to mean that the provisional government was going to align with the US, and led to many anti-US protests the following day (Harris, 2004).

What is interesting about this evidence is that it shows that – despite the hostility of the radicals, and the fact that at least some segments of society opposed it – moderates in the regime were willing to not only adhere to Westphalian diplomatic practice with regards to the US, but to actually pursue friendly policies toward it in a relatively *unconstrained* way. Moderates did not seem especially concerned that such activity would rob them of legitimacy. As Yazdi explained in his October meetings in New York, he was certain that the public animosity toward the US would not last. He expected that Iran would have “a good and productive relationship with the US.” It was simply “necessary first to tackle and dispose of problems from the old relationship” (DNSA: IR03374). Once this was done Iran and the US could form a relationship based on “mutual respect and equality” (DNSA: IR03213). This sentiment only changed *after* the students overran the US embassy in Tehran. Whereas Yazdi had been willing to publicly shake hands with senior US officials on 1 November, five days later he was unwillingly to publicly speak out against the students that overran the embassy, choosing instead to

resign. The sudden about-turn of Yazdi (and other moderates – see below) indicates that there was something *specific* about the embassy takeover (rather than general anti-Americanism) that changed the calculus of moderate politicians. In short, although the Iranian narrative of legitimation before November 1979 had anti-US content, it did not mandate anti-US practices. To put it another way, it was ‘silent’ on the issue of diplomatic practice and did not mandate that the regime act in an overtly hostile way toward the US.

Mandated Practice: Regime Support of the Students. The change in the Iranian regime’s diplomatic practice can be explained by the linking of two events – the US’ admission of the shah, and the students’ takeover of the US embassy – to the Iranian narrative of legitimation. Before these links had been made the Iranian regime had been able to engage in Westphalian diplomatic practice. Indeed, moderates had even been able to build links with the US, despite radicals’ attempts to paint this behavior as illegitimate. It was only when the acts of the US and the students were linked to the existing narrative of legitimation that regime officials were mandated by the Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative into supporting the students and, by doing so, narratively bound into rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

There are a number of different pieces of evidence to support this argument. First, this explanation can account for why the regime defended the US embassy in February but not in November. In February 1979 there was no downside risk for regime officials to aggressively defend the diplomatic rights of the US. In November, by contrast, the US was directly linked to the anti-Shah Resistance narrative, making it much harder for regime officials to support the US’ diplomatic rights without also contradicting the Anti-

Shahist Resistance narrative of legitimation. To put it another way, this explanation can explain the precise timing of the shift in Iranian diplomatic practice in a way that the other explanations cannot.

A second piece of evidence comes from comparing the private and public comments of prominent moderate politicians. As I mentioned above, Bazargan was outraged when he heard of the students' actions, and both he and Yazdi were appalled by Khomeini's support of the embassy takeover. Yet rather than speaking out against the students both of these politicians simply resigned their posts. The actions of Yazdi's successor as foreign minister – the soon-to-be-president Bani Sadr – also demonstrate the constraints that moderates appear to have been under. When Bani Sadr first replaced Yazdi, he went directly to the students to encourage them to leave the embassy. According to his own account he claims to have said, “you think you have taken America hostage. What a delusion! In fact, you have made Iran the hostage of the Americans” (Bani Sadr, 1991, p. 21). Similarly, when he met Khomeini in private he urged the leader to order the release of the hostages (see above). Yet in public Bani Sadr took a very different line. On 11 November he declared that “no compromise, no negotiation” was possible regarding the embassy without discussion of the shah's return (11 November 1979, *AP*). Even after he had been elected president in January 1980, Bani Sadr was circumspect about criticizing the students. In a January 20 interview Bani Sadr said he did not “approve of everything” the hostage takers did but said “it is good that there are differences among the people that open the possibility of a free exchange of ideas” (“Bani Sadr Outlines,” 20 January, 1980). These revolutionary proclamations – while divergent from his personal views – were consistent with the mandates of the Iranian narrative of

legitimation.

The binding effects of the narrative applied to all political actors, especially in the contentious electoral environment of late 1979 and early 1980. This environment created incentives for opportunistic politicians to associate themselves with the hostage takers. The crisis-atmosphere was encouraged by radicals such as Khomeini who blocked initial attempts to resolve the crisis. For instance, once appointed foreign minister, Bani Sadr sought an immediate resolution of the crisis at the UN yet this was blocked by Khomeini.²⁶⁴ Bani Sadr later claimed this was done by Khomeini because the crisis was useful for undercutting the Ayatollah's opponents who could not speak out against it. As he (Bani Sadr, 1991, p. 26) put it, "The mullahs knew that if this problem [the hostage crisis] were solved, the external threat would vanish and they would find it extremely difficult to seize power." In order for the "principles espoused in Paris [to] be replaced with those of Islamic power...[Khomeini] looked for a scapegoat, a satan, and found it in the United States" (Bani Sadr, 1991, p. 3). Khomeini himself agreed with this analysis. In the hostage crisis he saw an opportunity to increase support for his regime while also discrediting moderates, all while contesting the final form of the government. As he put it, the embassy crisis, "has united our people. Our opponents do not dare act against us. We can put the constitution to the people's vote without difficulty, and carry out presidential and parliamentary elections" (quoted in Moin, 1999, p. 228).

Yet even when the radicals sought to resolve the crisis, they too were bound by

²⁶⁴ Bani Sadr and his assistant Ahmed Salmatian agreed that the best way to resolve the crisis was to get a UN resolution calling on Iran to release the hostages. The strategy was to have the UN issue a resolution that included language which absolved Iran, and also include a provision that required the US to retrieve money stolen by the shah and his supporters. Bani Sadr was convinced that such language would satisfy domestic public opinion. However, after Salmatian had made some preliminary trips to New York and the UN had agreed to Iran's request to meet to discuss the issue, Khomeini issued an order forbidding any Iranian to travel to the UN.

the mandates of the narrative of legitimation. The linking of the US to this narrative meant that any solution to the crisis had to directly address the issue of the shah, and the US' protection of him. Although, in principle, the issue could have been resolved by the US returning the shah to Iran, the US made clear that this was not going to happen. Thus a solution would have to somehow address the sources of Iranian public grievance – the shah and the US' support for his regime – in such a way that (a) Iran could be made to look like it had somehow 'defeated' its opponent but (b) that did not involve the US returning the shah to Iran. Such a solution was made in even more difficult by the fact that the US public was unwilling to accept any solution that humiliated the US (Jordan, 1982).

The binding effects of the narrative of legitimation used by the Iranian regime can be clearly seen in the failure of radical Iranian officials to successfully negotiate a solution to the hostage crisis in early 1980. This keystone of this negotiated settlement was the so-called "scenario." This scenario was drawn up in secret by Carter's chief-of-staff Hamilton Jordan along with two Iranian representatives known as the "two Frenchmen," and later Ghotbzadeh himself.²⁶⁵ The two sides secretly met a number of times between January and April 1980 and finally produced what was known as the "scenario."²⁶⁶ In this five-page scenario the US and Iran agreed to engage in a very precise sequence of public actions that would make sense to domestic audiences in both states. The 'script' of the scenario was as follows. The scenario would begin with the UN being asked by Iran to form a commission regarding Iranian grievances against the shah.

²⁶⁵ The 'two Frenchmen' were actually an Argentine businessman, Hector Villalon, and a French human rights lawyer, Christian Bourget. Both represented the Iranian Revolutionary Council.

²⁶⁶ For a detailed account of the negotiations surrounding the scenario see Jordan (1982). For a copy of the scenario itself see the Jimmy Carter Library & Museum,

The UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim would then inform the Iranian government that he would be able to dispatch a commission. A prominent Iranian leader – Bani Sadr or Khomeini – would then publicly treat Waldheim’s declaration as an Iranian ‘victory’ while the US would simultaneously publicly ‘oppose’ the commission. The actions of both the Iranian regime and the US would thus create the narrative impression that the formation of the commission would be a political ‘win’ for Iran. A hand-picked commission would then fly to Iran for ten days, and while there would inspect the hostages. The commission would then report to the UN and to Khomeini that the hostages were being held in conditions that were in violation of Islamic standards. In response, and as a sign of benevolence, Khomeini would then order the hostages’ release. After the plane carrying the hostages left Iran, the US would express regret for the grievances of the Iranian people and recognize the right of Iranian independence. Finally, the scenario would end with the formation of a joint committee to solve all the outstanding issues. The scenario was carefully scripted in order to meet audience expectations at every point, and was to be played out like a piece of theater.

The scenario failed to succeed for a number of reasons. First, the script was so highly articulated that even minor deviations from it resulted in events being interpreted in a manner that contradicted the ‘Anti-Shahist Resistance’ narrative. For example, when Waldheim announced the formation of the UN commission on 14 February, he declared that he had done so at the insistence of the U.S. instead of Iran. This suddenly made the acceptance of the commission appear to be an Iranian concession rather than a victory. It also instantly cast the UN commission as suspect rather than sympathetic; an impression that was compounded by the UN commissioners, who – not fully understanding that their

commission was 'fake' – frequently went “off-script.” In fact much of the commission’s behavior gave the general impression that the UN did not care for Iranian grievances against the shah.²⁶⁷ Second, the electoral climate made it difficult for politicians to criticize the students without jeopardizing their own position. This allowed the students themselves to spoil the scenario by refusing to meet the commissioners. The students repeatedly delayed and rescheduled the meetings well past the agreed times.²⁶⁸ On the day of the agreed handover, the students stalled. While this stalling took place Iranian television broadcasted images of angry crowds that began forming outside the embassy. At 1:30pm, Khomeini’s son called the foreign ministry to say that Ghotbzadeh had been wrong to assume that Khomeini assented to the release of the hostages, and that the situation should be decided by the will of the Iranian people. Thus the Iranian regime failed to execute a scenario that it had itself authored. Although the exact motives of Khomeini cannot be discerned, it is quite likely that this rejection of the deal was not premeditated; his own representative had been an author of the scenario after all. More likely, the stalling of the students combined with the hostile attention of the public to proposed hostage-release put political pressure on Khomeini not to be seen to contradict the regime’s narrative of legitimation. To put it another way, even the radicals had

²⁶⁷ The Iranian media had heavily publicized the commission’s arrival and encouraged victims of the shah to come to Tehran to tell their story. However, the commissioners refused to go to meet the victims in the hotel where most of them were located. Instead the victims, many of them disabled or mutilated by SAVAK torture in some way, had to travel several miles in the snow to the UN headquarters in order to visit the commissioners. This created the perception that the UN was as heartless and disinterested in Iranian grievances as the US.

²⁶⁸ On 3 March, Ghotbzadeh publicly lambasted the students and told them that they had no right to ignore the wishes of the Revolutionary Council. Two days later he went directly to the embassy to confront the students where they agreed to hand over the hostages. Ghotbzadeh also visited Khomeini and explained that the foreign ministry should take the students. When Khomeini voiced no objection Ghotbzadeh declared that he would collect the hostages on Saturday 8 March. However, when the day came the students met Ghotbzadeh at the foreign ministry and told him they would not transfer the hostages without written authorization from Bani Sadr. This took three hours to procure. While waiting, the students also demanded a list of the hostages the foreign ministry wanted transferred.

become bound by the mandates of the narrative. As an exasperated Ghotbzadeh explained to US emissaries in April, the hostages didn't "even matter anymore... They have simply become a political issue: a candidate who takes a soft position on the hostages can't hope to be elected" (quoted in Jordan, 1982, p. 266).

Ultimately, the hostage crisis was not resolved until late in 1980.²⁶⁹ By this time even radicals in the regime had thought the crisis had gone too far. Ghotbzadeh had resigned in August, publicly stating that the hostage crisis had destroyed the country: "releasing the hostages will deny Imperialism an excuse for direct interference in our affairs... If we leave this issue unsolved, our new government will be constantly under pressure... It is better to settle this Crisis." Ghotbzadeh also recognized the political costs of taking such a stand: "I know by sending this letter I will receive unfavorable responses, insults, and accusation" (quoted in Harris, 2004, p. 376). When the regime finally did reach out to the US to solve the hostage crisis, this was once more done in utmost secrecy. Even while Khomeini was publicly declaring in mid-September that Iran was "at war with America" (quoted in Ganji 2006, p. 207), a secret delegation from Iran had been meeting with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in West Germany. It is not necessary to go into the intricacies of this negotiation except to note two things.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁹ On 7 April the US formally broke diplomatic relations with Iran. On 28 April, convinced that negotiation would no longer procure the hostages' release, President Carter ordered a military operation to free the hostages. The hostage-rescue operation was extremely complex undertaking. Delta force soldiers were transported in eight helicopters deep inside Iranian territory. There they were to rendezvous with four C-130 aircraft in order to be refueled before heading on to Tehran. However, three helicopters had to abort and return to their carriers before they even reached the rendezvous point, causing the mission to be abandoned. In the confusion of trying to take off in the desert a helicopter collided with a C-130, resulting in eight deaths and four seriously injured. Not only did the mission fail it led to a final breakdown in US-Iranian relations. In response to the attempted freeing of the hostages, the Iranian regime dispersed the hostages throughout a number of different secret locations in Tehran.

²⁷⁰ The revolutionary regime was conscious of the imminent attack by Iraq and needed the US to relax the sanctions it had placed on Iran and to give Iran access to military equipment. In particular, the Iranian delegation wanted to negotiate about five issues: a US declaration of non-intervention; the release of Iran's frozen assets; a renunciation of all legal claims against Iran; access to the shah's assets; and at least \$50

First, the negotiations always seized-up or were threatened with collapse whenever the Iranian public was made aware of them.²⁷¹ Second, the final agreement was both negotiated and executed in secret.²⁷² By the years' end even the radicals in the regime could not be seen to be dealing with the US.

Conclusion

In this chapter I explained why Iran rejected Westphalian diplomatic practice. I argued that the regime's refusal to expel the students from the US embassy cannot be understood without understanding the role that the Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative of legitimation played in Iranian politics. However, unlike the findings in earlier chapters, the binding effects of this narrative were not immediately inherent in it, but only became manifest once the US admitted the shah and the students responded by storming the US embassy. These two events linked the US and the students to the existing narrative of legitimation and mandated that regime officials support the students' actions. But by supporting the students, the regime was also obliged to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice.

The binding effect of this narrative continued throughout 1980. Only when the regime was able to consolidate its rule (through the formation of a functioning security

million in non-military spare parts. Once negotiations began they were not especially difficult. In fact, on the first day of negotiation Christopher made clear the first three Iranian demands could be easily met: that the US had no interest in intervening in Iran; as much as \$5.5 billion could be released to Iran; and the US would be willing to accept an international tribunal to work through all the potential lawsuits (Harris, 2004).

²⁷¹ The deal had been basically agreed by October 9 and had been sent to the Majilis on October 20. On October 27 there was a public debate on the issue. Deputies entered the hall accompanied by bodyguards with machine-guns. Despite heated debate the Majilis was unable to achieve a quorum. Thus there was another postponement before the process was removed from parliamentary scrutiny.

²⁷² The final agreement granted the Iranians \$8 billion dollars in escrow, a guarantee that the US would refrain from intervention in Iran's domestic affairs, and the facilitation of Iranian claims against the Shah in

apparatus and the neutralization of moderate opinion) was it able to release the hostages. Yet while the crisis was relatively short in duration, its effects are still being felt in Iran to this day. Iranian refusal to protect the US' diplomatic rights led directly to Iran's diplomatic isolation, and the poisoning of its relations with the West. By the time the hostages were finally released in January 1981, the Iranian state had paid dearly for rejecting Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

In October 1912 a ramshackle Balkan League comprised of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro declared war on the tottering Ottoman Empire. By November Bulgarian forces were twenty miles from Constantinople, Greek forces had conquered Salonika, and Serbia had expelled all opposition from Kosovo and Macedonia as far as the Adriatic coast (Hall, 2000). The great powers responded to the sudden collapse of the Ottoman's holdings with surprise and alarm. Austria-Hungary declared that Serbian expansion to the sea was intolerable and would be prevented by force of arms if necessary. In November it mobilized over 200,000 troops along its Serbian border and another 100,000 on the Galician border facing Russia. What began as a localized war now threatened to drag in the great powers.

Against this background of events Serbia violated Austria's diplomatic rights when it cut communications to the Austrian consul in Macedonia. Rumors spread throughout Vienna that the imperial consul had been "emasculated" by Serbian forces, and that Austria was about to issue a military ultimatum against Serbia (Helmreich, 1938, p. 214). This "Consular Affair" threatened to expand the scale of war. Even when the consul appeared unharmed days later, the Austrian government's anger was not assuaged. Instead, it demanded appropriate compensation for the offensive treatment of its mission. In the face of a possible declaration of war, the Serbians agreed to send senior military officials to the restored Austrian consular offices in Serb-occupied Macedonia and

Kosovo. There, in the shadow of the Austrian imperial flag, Austrian delegates were accorded full military honors by a Serbian honor guard. Satisfied, the Austrians stood down. In the crisis-atmosphere of the Balkan Wars Serbia and Austria-Hungary had nearly gone to war over issues of diplomatic practice. And yet they had also managed to resolve their dispute by engaging in diplomatic practice. For neither the first or the last time in international politics, small issues of diplomatic practice took on considerable political significance.

We know that Westphalian diplomatic practice matters in international politics. But how? Why? This dissertation was an attempt to at least partially answer these questions. In order to unpack the political effects of Westphalian diplomatic practice I have focused on specific instances where states contested it. In doing this I have found that these diplomatic practices can become important for states when they overlap and conflict in some way with what I call regimes' 'narratives of legitimation.' I have argued that a regime generates legitimacy with domestic audiences not only by meeting audiences' policy preferences, but also by engaging in symbolic practices mandated by the regime's narrative of legitimation. By understanding the way in which these narratives sometimes bind their regimes, I have explained how sometimes seemingly-trivial disputes over ceremonial and protocol, diplomatic immunity, ambassadorial rank, extraterritoriality, and the other elements of diplomatic practice can lead states to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. In the remainder of this conclusion I first summarize the findings of the dissertation. Second I consider some of the implications of this research and its relevance for the IR literature. Finally, I suggest further avenues of research.

Summary of Findings

The major finding of this dissertation is that political actors sometimes have strong incentives to engage in seemingly-minor symbolic practices. I proposed a causal mechanism – narrative binding – that can explain why states can become so committed to engaging in these practices that they will reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. In chapter four, I presented the clearest example of this mechanism. Qing China had strong incentives to improve its diplomatic relations with encroaching Western powers yet it chose to diplomatically isolate itself as a result of recurring disputes over diplomatic practice. I argued that the Qing regime’s decision to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice can be explained by understanding the content of its Middle Kingdom narrative of legitimation, and by understanding the survival threats the regime faced. The Middle Kingdom narrative that had legitimated imperial rule in China for millennia had also been adopted by the Manchu Qing when they invaded in 1644. This narrative mandated symbolic practices in which the emperor was explicitly presented as the apex of the social and political hierarchy of the entire world. These practices – especially those surrounding the ritual *koutou* and the housing of permanent embassies – conflicted with Westphalian diplomatic practice. The Qing regime, weak and distrustful of its Han governors, was constrained into engaging in these symbolic practices in order to uphold its legitimacy. The result was China’s rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice.

In chapter five I showed how narrative binding lay at the heart of the changing and sometimes-incoherent diplomacy that Soviet Russia practiced from 1917 to 1923. When they first took power, the Soviets publicly and contemptuously disregarded Westphalian diplomatic practice. Seven years later, they had fully accepted it. Even more

interesting was the two-faced form of diplomacy that the Soviet regime adopted between 1918 and 1923. On the one hand the regime engaged in Westphalian diplomatic practice through the NKID; on the other it engaged in a highly revolutionary form of diplomatic practice through the Comintern. Just as puzzling is the figure of Lenin, who – as patron of the traditionally-minded Chicherin in the NKID, and the founder of the radical Comintern – was ultimately responsible for both of these forms of diplomatic practice. The unusual diplomatic practice of the Soviet regime (and Lenin) becomes understandable once the binding effect of the Soviet World Revolution narrative is considered. This narrative mandated explicitly revolutionary policies and practices. Over time, it became clear that adhering to the practices mandated by this narrative would generate serious problems for the Soviet state. However, in a regime that still depended heavily on radical-elites for support, Lenin had to promote diplomatic practices that adhered to the Soviet narrative. The result was the rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. This two-faced diplomatic practice persisted as long as there were threats to regime survival from radical elites. However, once the radicals' beliefs about world revolution shifted this threat diminished. As a consequence the binding effect of the World Revolution narrative dissipated. At this point Soviet Russia accepted Westphalian diplomatic practice.

Chapter six further illustrated the somewhat unpredictable nature of narratives of legitimation. Yet whereas chapter five demonstrated how the binding effect of narrative was influenced by threats to regime survival, this chapter illustrated the how the mandates of a narrative could be dynamically altered by external events. In this case I argued that while narrative binding lay at the heart of the regime's support of the student's embassy takeover in November 1979, support for this kind of activity was not

originally mandated by the regime's Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative. Although the threatened Iranian regime was constrained by the mandates of its narrative throughout the period covered, this narrative had initially been 'silent' on issues of diplomatic practice. Consequently, the regime was not mandated to reject Westphalian diplomatic practice, at least initially. However the narrative changed once radical students stormed the US embassy. After this event the narrative mandated that the regime support the students' actions and, by doing so, reject Westphalian diplomatic practice. Critically for understanding this sequence of event was the US' role in it. By granting the shah entry into New York, the US had engaged in behavior that, reinterpreted through the lens of the Anti-Shahist Resistance narrative, became an action that linked the US to Iranian politics. More importantly, because the US had inadvertently supported the shah, actions against the US would not be considered actions against the Shah. As such, support of the students was now mandated by the narrative. Had President Carter followed his better instincts and not allowed the shah entry to the US it is unlikely that the students would have attacked the US embassy or, if they had, that the regime would not have put this down.

Aside from these case-specific findings, this dissertation yields two more general findings. First, in proposing a mechanism of narrative binding, this dissertation identifies conditions under which legitimacy becomes a principal concern of regimes. The IR literature has long recognized the importance of legitimacy and the manner in which political actors rely on it to gain authority (Finnemore and Barnett, 2004), generate support for actions (Hurd, 2008), or gain the acquiescence of the international community (Voeten, 2005). However, previous studies have not been able to adequately explain when legitimacy becomes a key strategic concern for actors. Indeed, even studies that

have shown that actors are willing to incur costs in order to remain legitimate (Schimmelfennig, 2005), these still cannot tell us when they might choose the alternative. Narrative binding offers conditions for when we should expect legitimacy concerns to take on paramount importance, at least for regimes.

A second general finding of this dissertation is that it shows that while Westphalian diplomatic practice generally hums along uncontested in the background of international society, its members nonetheless takes it quite seriously. This can be seen in two ways. First, acceptance of Westphalian diplomatic practice mattered just as much to some members of international society as rejection of it did for others. In chapter four, for instance, while I focus on the Qing regime's diplomatic stance, it was not only China that was being intransigent on issues of diplomatic practice. Neither Macartney nor Amherst, for example, would agree to engage in the *koutou* in front of the Chinese emperor. Nor would Bruce waive his right to travel to Beijing. This diplomatic behavior is just as puzzling as the that of the Qing regime. After all, if these sort of issues shouldn't matter, they shouldn't matter for anyone. What these cases show is that states care about their diplomatic rights. This point is reinforced when we consider the response of the international community to the Iranian hostage crisis. During this crisis, even Arab states that were hostile to the US rallied to the US' position ("Islamic Body Asks," 1980).

Indeed the evidence in these cases suggest that disputes over diplomatic practice might be one of the *most accepted* reasons to engage in hostilities with another state. For instance, when the British foreign office sought to justify a break with the Soviets in 1923, senior FO officials argued that there was *no better* justification for this policy than Soviet violations of diplomatic practice. In a secret 1923 FO memo entitled "Case for the

Rupture with the Soviet Government” senior advisors explained that breaking relations with the Soviet on the grounds of diplomatic practice would “find the widest measure of assent, and [would leave the government] least exposed to criticism by the opposition and the newspapers opposed to the government.”²⁷³ Furthermore, such a justification might “command the approval and perhaps cooperation of foreign governments.”²⁷⁴ At a minimum, such an action would at least be “intelligible” to the outside world.²⁷⁵ Instances like this demonstrate that for all of its anachronisms and oddities, Westphalian diplomatic practice has considerable political power. To put it another way, engaging in Westphalian diplomatic practice seems like it doesn’t matter only because states are so careful to get it right. This as true today as it was in the past. As the diplomatic historian Maurice Keens-Soper (2001a, p. 95) notes, “it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that although the twentieth century rejected monarchism and its panoply of aristocratic manners, the diplomats of liberal and people’s democracies are no less punctilious in upholding the dignity of nations.”

Implications

This dissertation was motivated by a desire to understand how and why the practice of diplomacy can take on political significance. In forming an answer to this question two challenges presented themselves. First, I was unsure how to conceptualize the activities that diplomats actually engage in on a day-to-day basis. Existing

²⁷³ Case for the Rupture with the Soviet Government, 16 April 1923, FO/37/9365.

²⁷⁴ Minutes by Mr. O’Malley, 16 April 1923, FO/37/9365.

²⁷⁵ Russia: Internal Affairs, 14 April 1923, FO/37/9365). As a matter of fact, despite their certainty that this was the best possible justification under which to issue a threat of rupture, a specially-commissioned report explained that Britain had never previously broken diplomatic relations on the basis of discourteous conduct (Proposed Rupture with the Soviet Government, 26 April 1923, FO/371/9365). Therefore, this was to be a justification based not on legal precedent, but on the its intelligibility by the largest possible

international relations theory provided an uneven guide to solving this conundrum. Much of the diplomatic literature does not really study diplomacy as it is conducted. Rather diplomacy is usually treated as another word for the general activity of negotiation or as a large macro-structure that nudges states down certain paths of action. In short, it is generally seen as some form of institutionalized bargaining. Initially, my own attempt to understand diplomacy use a similar conceptual scheme. I attempted to separate out one specific element of diplomacy – diplomatic ceremonial and protocol – and analyze how this feature of diplomacy was used as negotiation tool. Eventually I realized that this was not possible. Over time I came to understand that the different elements of diplomacy could not be readily divided up from one another. When individual leaders or diplomats engage in diplomacy they do not rely on written notes in one set of circumstances, embassy officials in another, and ceremonies in another. Instead, such elements of diplomacy are often mixed together and used in novel and context-specific ways. While it is possible to distinguish these elements from one another, it is not possible to predict how and why they might be used in any particular instance, or to claim that some of them were the ‘real’ parts of diplomacy and the others were epiphenomenal. I came to understand that diplomacy is not just bargaining or a set of rules; it is a practice. Once I had recognized this about the ‘unit of analysis’ I was studying, it became clearer how I needed to go about researching it.

The second challenge was finding a suitable set of cases to allow me to determine when diplomatic practice went from being a medium of interstate interaction to being something that could directly determine political outcomes. This was difficult because, in terms of international relations, I contend that Westphalian diplomatic practice it is *the*

audience.

dominant activity of states, and is something that they engage in literally thousands of times every day. Given such a colossal universe of observations, how could I uncover when it ‘mattered’ and when it didn’t? Oddly, diplomatic guides were not helpful in answering this question as even diplomats often seem uncertain exactly why diplomatic practice matters. For instance, in the highly influential *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* the career diplomat Ernest Satow advises the aspiring diplomat that he should “be on his guard to protect the dignity of the state which he represents,” but that he should not spend too much time worrying about the specific practices that diplomats engaged in (Satow, 1958, p. 98). Yet, despite his own advice, Satow rarely discusses the abstract principles of diplomacy and instead fills almost his entire book with a series of chapters that discuss in detail the ceremonial rights, behaviors, obligations, and privileges of different states.²⁷⁶

I was confused. Did these elements of diplomatic practice matter or not? If so, why did authors like Satow said that they did not? If not, then why did he spend so much time worrying about them? This dissertation is a first-step in attempting to answer this question, and to help better understand how the confusing politics of diplomatic practice matter in international politics. By narrowing the focus to instances of ‘rejection’ I was able to uncover some of the political dimensions of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In particular I was able to understand how Westphalian diplomatic practice can overlap and conflict with the symbolic practices used by regimes to legitimate their rule, in sometimes

²⁷⁶ An example from chapter 2 - ‘Immunities of the head of a foreign state’ - will illustrate the point: “At 12 noon the President of the French Republic, and Madame Auriol, attended but the Master of the Horse and the Members of the Suite, left Buckingham Palace on a visit to Guildhall, arriving at 12.25 P.M., where an Address was presented by the Lord Mayor and Corporation of the City of London at 12.30 P.M. The Duke and Duchess of Gloucester met the President and Madame Auriol at Guildhall. The Lord Mayor and Corporation of the City of London subsequently entertained the President of the French Republic and Madame Auriol at Luncheon. The King’s Guard, found by the First Battalion, Irish Guards, completed to 100 rank and file, with the King’s Colour and the Band of the Regiment, and the Pipes of the Battalion, was mounted at Buckingham Palace, and a Sovereign’s Escort of the Household Cavalry, with Standard,

volatile ways. This gave me an insight into the power of practice that has a number of implications for existing literatures in the discipline.

First, this dissertation contributes to existing discussions on legitimacy by showing how and why practice matters. My focus on practice is not necessarily novel. For instance, Michael Barnett (1998) has shown how Arab leaders competed with one another to define the norms of Arabism by engaging in expressive acts in which they associated themselves with potent political symbols. However, my approach differs in that it focuses on the precise micro-processes of such associations. As I hope has been made clear to the reader, it is not enough to simply talk about symbols and practices as resources, it is also necessary to carefully demonstrate how the practices of political actors are linked back up to a broader narrative of legitimation that situates and makes these practices understandable and meaningful to an audience. The importance of this approach is that it does not presuppose that some practices carry more “weight” than others. What determines the significance of a practice is the way that it reconnects with the narrative that validates it. In Imperial China, the ritual *koutou* – a practice that may appear ridiculous to some modern readers – was more important to the Qing regime than territory, trade rights, or a host of other ostensibly more important issues. Similarly, the British foreign office in 1923 – long-seeking a reason to break relations with the Soviet regime – finally found its excuse when its representative in Moscow was handed two insulting notes. These findings remind us that the what politically “matters” is what others say matter, not what a researcher might think should matter. This asks us to possibly revise our understanding of some of the puzzling symbolic disputes that are not uncommon in international society.

escorted the President to Guildhall” (Satow, 1958, p. 11).

Second, understanding the specific ways that practices are connected to narratives of legitimation has important implications for how we understand bargaining dynamics. Very often there is a tendency to assume that disputes over trivial things like seating arrangements are just stalling or blocking tactics and not meaningful sources of dispute in their own right.²⁷⁷ However, there is an increasing recognition by IR scholars that seemingly-small symbolic disputes might be far more intractable than they first appear (Lind, 2008). The mechanism of narrative binding offers another reason for understanding for why this might be the case. This mechanism provides us with a theoretically-grounded way to adjudicate between symbolic disputes and to determine which are being contested for substantive reasons (i.e. the practices really do matter) and which are being contested for frivolous or obstructionist ones. It also offers guidance for understanding when engaging in symbolic practices might increase the likelihood of bargains being struck. If symbolic practices have political payoffs for regimes then it should be possible to use them to expand the ‘bargaining space’ between actors. Deals might be struck based simply on granting of symbolic concessions (Atran & Axelrod, 2008), or by one party exchanging symbolic practices for something much more substantive. For example, in August 2009, in exchange for a public visit to North Korea by former US President Bill Clinton, North Korea agreed to release two American journalists being held captive on espionage charges. In this bargain President Clinton

²⁷⁷ One of the most infamous example of such a dispute was the debate over the shape of the table during the early stages of the Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam in late 1968/early 1969. In what became an early point of deadlock in the negotiations, US and North Vietnamese representatives could not come to an agreement about how to seat the representatives from the Viet Cong (which the US refused to recognize) and those from the Southern Vietnam government (which North Vietnam refused to recognize). Although both sides played up the issue for the press, neither seemed to be genuinely interested in the actual symbol under dispute. Instead, both felt their own military forces were poised to make imminent and significant gains, and thus both had an incentive to delay negotiations until they thought they were in a stronger bargaining position (Kissinger, 1994)

agreed to engage in a symbolic action in exchange for a material outcome. By appreciating the role of narratives of legitimation in domestic politics, this deal is readily understandable.²⁷⁸ It was the same logic that made it possible for Caleb Cushing to receive such favorable terms when dealing with China in 1844.

Third, the findings of this dissertation also challenge one of the implicit assumptions in much of the domestic audience costs literature: that domestic audiences only pay attention to an international political event when their leadership draws their attention to it. This large literature argues that domestic audiences can constrain a leader and thus influence the potential range of bargains the state is likely to accept. The logic is an extension of the costly-signaling argument: states that wish to make themselves credible in the eyes of their opponent draw their domestic audience's attention to the issue under contention. Because domestic audiences will punish their leaders when they fail, this shrinks the leader's outside option, and thus improves the state's ability to prevail in a bargain.²⁷⁹ This proposition has generated considerable research. Partell & Palmer (1999) argue that states with the potential for high audience costs are more likely to win disputes. Others have argued that domestic audiences can help us to understand military crises (Prins, 2003; Guisinger & Smith, 2002; Fearon, 1997),²⁸⁰ how states achieve international cooperation (Leeds, 1999; McGillivray & Smith, 2000), why states

²⁷⁸ North Korea did not seek Clinton's presence as an interlocutor with whom to bargain; Clinton's presence was the bargaining outcome that North Korea sought. The North Korean regime had repeatedly turned down offers which involved the presence of other U.S. emissaries, and demanded that Clinton come in person. In exchange for a photo-opportunity in which an uncharacteristically stony-faced Clinton shared a ceremonial dais with Kim Jong Il, North Korea released the journalists ("Bill and Kim's Excellent Adventure," 2009). While much of the world looked on in bemusement at this political theater, the North Korean regime – which carefully controls and crafts narratives about its political leaders ("Red skies and stormy seas," 2011; Lankov, 2007) – saw this symbolic act as having political value.

²⁷⁹ A number of mechanisms have been proposed for why audiences might punish a leader for foreign policy decisions. Smith (1998) argues that domestic audiences will use a leader's international successes and failures as a indication of his general competence. Fearon (1994) argues that domestic audiences might

form alliances (Gaubatz 1996), why democracies prevail in crises (Schultz, 1999), why states trade (Mansfield et al. 2002), and even the behavior of autocracies (Weeks, 2008).

As plausible as these arguments might be, there is little substantive evidence to support the posited effects of domestic audiences on disputes. This is in part because most of the literature is based primarily on large-n correlative evidence, which creates considerable selection problems.²⁸¹ Yet even qualitative investigation of the evidence has provided little evidence in favor of this explanation. Trachtenberg (2012) has traced the independent role of domestic audiences in causing democracies to prevail in a dozen crises between 1875 and 1962 and found that audiences rarely influenced the way bargaining occurred. Sometimes audiences didn't care about foreign policy,²⁸² or if they did they usually preferred that a leader back down rather than escalate a crisis.²⁸³ What is most notable about his findings is that when audience attention *was* triggered – as it was during the Fashoda Crisis of 1898 between the UK and France²⁸⁴ – the effect of audiences operated in a way *opposite* to the one predicted by the literature. Instead of domestic audiences improving their leaders' chances of striking a deal, democratic

care about their state's "national honor" and wish to punish leaders who sully it.

²⁸⁰ For a good overview of the literature on audience costs and military issues see Schultz (2001).

²⁸¹ Schultz (2001) argues the focus on large-n statistical techniques suffers from a selection effect in that states that are likely to suffer high domestic costs are less likely to engage in risky confrontational behavior to begin with. Downes & Schescher (2012) find that when the question is actually posed correctly, democracies (i.e. states with active domestic audiences) do not prevail in disputes any more than non-democracies.

²⁸² Experimental findings show that while publics are concerned about their state's "reputation"; these findings do not make clear if the respondents value their state's credibility for normative reasons (i.e. whether they think their state should be honest) versus the pragmatic calculated reasons offered by traditional IR analysis (Tomz 2007).

²⁸³ This finding is supported by Aldrich, Sullivan, & Borgida (1989) who show that the salience of foreign policy for domestic publics varies by time and issue-area, and that political candidates' ability to politick on these areas is not fixed.

²⁸⁴ The Fashoda Crisis was a dispute between France and Britain in 1898 over the possession of a small fort in the lower Nile region. The state that could claim control over this region was able to split Africa along on either an East-West (French) axis, or a North-South (British) axis. The event was the closest that Britain and France ever came to war in the post-Napoleonic period.

leaders had to *prevent* domestic audiences from derailing the diplomatic process.²⁸⁵ The findings of this dissertation support these recent critiques of the audience costs literature. They suggest that the presence of culturally significant symbols and symbolic practices can automatically attract the attention of domestic audiences, even if leaders might prefer otherwise. If this occurs this can constrain leaders to engage with these symbols and practices in ways that meets domestic expectations. This need to maintain legitimacy might trigger or escalate a crisis, *even* if the decision-makers on both sides might prefer they did not. In an age of visual media, this observation has genuine policy implications and suggests that political actors should take seriously their symbolic responsibilities and obligations or else suffer adverse consequences.

Fourth, the potentially-explosive influence of domestic audiences and symbolic practices has interesting implications for the literature on two-level games. This literature takes seriously the active role of domestic constituencies in achieving diplomatic outcomes. The basic argument is as follows: at the first level domestic constituents pressure national governments to adopt policies favorable to the constituents' interests. At the second level national governments meet with one another to try to maximize their own domestic constituents' needs while minimizing any concessions (Putnam, 1988). In this model, the focus is usually on how leaders (the second level) actively try to influence the domestic constituencies of opposing states (the first level) in order to expand the overlapping 'win-sets' of their opponent. This dissertation has implications for this research in two ways. First, by taking seriously the importance of symbolic practices it

²⁸⁵ For example, Lord Salisbury's decision to release documents to the public during the Fashoda Crisis was done in order to calm domestic opinion; not to inflame it. Furthermore, domestic reactions to the crisis did not reveal any more information about the British bargaining position to the French than the French already had (their intelligence agencies had far more credible information about Britain's intentions).

offers another way for understanding how diplomats might expand win-sets. By engaging in symbolic practices that have value for domestic constituencies, it might be possible to reconfigure the political possibilities between two states. For instance, there is widespread agreement among historians that the state visit of the British King Edward VII to France in 1903 was instrumental in shifting French public opinion from anti-British to pro-British, and thus creating the political space that made the Entente Cordiale possible (MacMillan, 2013; Massie, 1992). Second, this dissertation also suggests that diplomats do not always try to exploit each other's domestic constituencies but instead collaborate together against these domestic constituencies. In the Iran case, for instance, the Carter administration and the Iranian regime actively colluded in the creation of the 'scenario' that might have allowed them to escape the hostage crisis. What is notable about this is that what was preventing agreement was not the preferences or bargaining strategies of the leadership in either state, but rather the potential domestic political backlash either regime might suffer. To combat this both governments tried to craft a solution to the hostage crisis that would satisfy both of their domestic audiences. Contrary to the expectations of some of this literature, elites did not exploit each other's domestic constituencies in order to strike bargains; rather they collaborated together to present a bargain that would look palatable to both sides' domestic audiences. If this sort of collaboration is common then this suggests that we need to re-evaluate the relationship between the two-levels of diplomacy.

Further Research

All of the issues discussed above point toward lines of possible future research.

However, there are also some potential lines of research that deal more directly with the topic of Westphalian diplomatic practice. The most obvious line of future research is to test the mechanism of narrative binding on a wider set of cases. There are a number of ways to do this. One would be expand the universe of cases to include all instances of rejection – sustained or otherwise – to see if similar political dynamics are at play in these cases. An alternative method would be to collect a data-set of famous diplomatic crises in international political history and determine the degree to which these were influenced by the mechanism proposed in this research. In doing this it is likely that we would find that this mechanism would not operate in the same way. The cases in this study were selected precisely because they took on extreme values of both the independent variable (narratives of legitimation) and the dependent variable (rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice). This was done in order to allow me to clearly determine how the proposed causal force was transmitted. While this was a useful analytic decision, it generates problems concerning what we should expect to see in a broader universe of cases in two ways.

First, narratives of legitimation are rarely as highly-articulated as the ones presented in the cases in this dissertation. For various reasons of historical tradition (China), high-stakes competition with opponents (Russia), and a narrow political discourse (Iran), it was not overly difficult to disentangle what the narratives of legitimation were in these cases.²⁸⁶ In a broader set of cases this would be unlikely to be as easy or clear-cut. All political systems are legitimated in some way, but often their narratives are unspecific. This means they are likely to be more readily contested by political actors who might engage in symbolic practices that privilege one ‘reading’ of a

narrative over another (Brysk, 1995). This does not mean that narratives do not matter, or are too broad a concept to have much utility, but it would mean that any future research might only be able to make claims about narratives at a particular moment in time, rather than the much broader way than I have in this study. Second, the concept of regime survival might also need to be re-conceptualized for a broader set of cases. In this study it was effectively treated as a binary measure – a regime’s survival was threatened or it was not – but in a larger study this might need to be turned into a categorical variable in order to capture a broader set of internal political dynamics.

That said, this does not mean that this study does not have broader applicability. For one thing, the central conditions of narrative binding – the content of narratives, and regime survival – are factors that could plausibly influence the outcomes of the symbolic disputes we often see in international society. They may just need reconceptualization for a broader set of cases. Furthermore, while this explanation only accounts for extreme cases of sustained rejection, it does so comprehensively. This means that we should expect that this mechanism to be operative in similar cases of sustained rejection of Westphalian diplomatic practice. In this sense, the argument still points toward a general explanation for some of the diplomatic disputes we see in international society.

Another potentially fruitful line of research could focus on Westphalian diplomatic practice as a cause or an outcome, not just the subject of conflict. For analytic reasons in this study diplomatic practice was treated in a largely static way, and was seen as something that states disputed, rejected, or accepted. Although I did attempt to show how diplomats could engage in diplomatic practice in order to try to escape the political problems they faced, and how it could open up or close down lines of action, I did not

²⁸⁶ It also helped that these narratives are much discussed and well-documented in the secondary literature.

seriously consider the way that Westphalian diplomatic practice made the world around the actors that practiced it. Yet this is what a practice approach implies. When we put Westphalian diplomatic practice at the front of the discussion it becomes apparent that it is the primary mechanism for creating the international world as we understand it. Diplomats do not just represent their states in the technical sense of the word, but also in the literal sense. Without the everyday practices of Westphalian diplomacy we could not imagine the existence of the international world (Banai, 2010). Diplomats (and in certain settings, leaders) occupy an unusual ontological space. They are not just themselves but also – by affecting certain manners – come to represent their sovereigns. In order for diplomats to meet their representative function, they must adopt a persona. They must ‘withdraw’ in order for the state to appear (Constantinou, 1996; Sofer, 1997). By adopting this persona the individual diplomat becomes the physical link to, and manifestation of, the posited metaphysical world of sovereign states (Der Derian, 1987, Ch. 3). To put it another way, diplomatic practice creates the international system, not the other way around. Agamben (2011, p. 227) quotes Durkheim to make the point, “No doubt, the men could not live without gods; but on the other hand, the gods would die if they were not worshiped. Thus the purpose of the cult is not only to bring the profane into the communion with the sacred beings but also to keep the sacred beings alive, to remake and regenerate them perpetually.”

This opens up some intriguing questions regarding the politics of practice. How does practice change? How do new elements become introduced into diplomatic practice while others are retired? Or how do new meanings become attached to already existing elements of diplomatic practice? There are at least some instances where statesmen

intentionally rewrote the rules of diplomatic practice. At the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815 for instance, the great powers agreed to introduce new rules of diplomatic precedence (see Ch. 2). But by doing so they did more than create new rules, they also changed the nature of international society itself. States were now – by the virtues of the practice they engaged in – both socially and legally equal to one another, at least in principle. This was made true not by words statesmen uttered, or by the norms they claimed adherence to, but through the everyday practices of diplomats who created and recreated this reality. What sort of practices need to be engaged in today to change the international system? A practice approach suggests that any future changes to the structure of the international system and the actors that inhabit with will not come solely from new ideas or due to new distributions of power, but by also from new or changing practices. This opens up interesting implications for how actors become recognized. By this logic NGOs or MNCs will become legitimate international actors when they can get a seat at conferences, or are allowed to sign international treaties, whether or not other actors realize this or not. No wonder states guard Westphalian diplomatic practice so carefully. It is not just a reflection of state power; it is one of its sources.

References

Unpublished Papers

Qing Emperor Ch'ien Lung (Qianlong). (1792). *Letter to British King George III*.

Retrieved from <https://sites.google.com/site/mccallworldhistory/qing-emperor-ch-ien-lung-qianlong-letter-to-british-king-george-iii-1792>.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Correspondence and Records from 1782, National Archives, Kew, *Letter from Amherst to Foreign Office*, 8 August 1816, FO/17/3/44-51.

---*Letter from Amherst to Viceroy of Pecheli*, 8 August 1816, FO/17/3/57.

---*Letter from Amherst to George Canning, President of the Board of Commissioners for India*, 10 February, 1817 FO/17/3/75-87.

---*Letter from Amherst to George Canning, President of the Board of Commissioners for India*, 7 March 1817, FO/17/3/89-98.

---*Letter from Amherst to George Canning, President of the Board of Commissioners for India*, 22 March 1817, FO/17/3/100.

---*Letter from Amherst to British Prince Regent*, 7 January 1817, FO/17/3/116.

Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966, National Archives, Kew, *Daily Telegraph [extract]*, 9 April 1923, FO/371/9365/N3198/3198/38.

---*Case for the Rupture with the Soviet Government*, 11 April 1923, FO/371/9365/N3228/3198/38.

---*Russia: Internal Affairs*, 14 April 1923, FO/371/9365/N3334/3198/38.

---*Minutes by Mr. O'Malley*, 16 April 1923, FO/371/9365/N3360/3198/38.

---*Proposed Rupture with Soviet Government*, 26 April 1923,
FO/371/9365/N3908/3198/38.

---*Foreign Office Report*, FO 371/3019/227713

Digital National Security Archive: Iran Collection. *Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Yazdi*, 4 October 1979, IR03213.

---*Meeting with Yazdi, Confidential, Cable Tehran*, 24 October 1979, IR03374.

---*Moderation: Does it Have a Chance? Confidential, Cable Tehran*, 26 October 1979, IR03394.

---*The Shah in the U.S. Confidential, Cable Tehran*, 27 October 1979, IR03408.

---*Compilation of Interviews/Speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini and Other Iranian Leaders, November 13, 1978 to October 30, 1979*, 30 October 1979, IR03436.

Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Series ID: 142099 (ARC), Container 35. Retrieved from

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/digital_library/cos/142099/35/cos_142099_35_11-Iran_Scenario.pdf

Government Sources

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. (1984). *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II From the First to the Second World War. Series A: the Soviet Union, 1917-1939*. D.

Cameron Watt (ed.), University Publications of America.

---*Volume I: Soviet Russia and her Neighbours*, Jan. 1917-Dec. 1919.

---*Volume II: Dec. 1919-Mar. 1920*.

---Volume III: Apr.-Oct. 1920.

---Volume IV: Nov. 1920-Mar. 1921.

---Volume V: Mar.-Oct. 1921.

---Volume VI: Sept. 1921-May 1923.

---Volume VII: June 1923-Feb. 1925.

Newspapers and Media Sources

Bani-Sadr Outlines Views on Hostages. (1980, January 20). *The New York Times*.

Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com.

Bill and Kim's Excellent Adventure. (2009, August 6). *The Economist*. Retrieved from

<http://www.economist.com/node/14177567>.

Fahim, Kareem, and Sebnem Arsu. (2013, November 23). Egypt expels Turkey's

Ambassador, Further Fraying Diplomatic Ties. *New York Times*. Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/middleeast/diplomatic-ties-fraying-between-egypt-and-turkey.html?_r=0.

Iran breaks off diplomatic relations with Israel. (1979, February 20). Xinhua News

Service. Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com.

Iranian Foreign Minister on Relations with the USA (1979, October 3). BBC summary

of World Broadcasts. Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com.

Iranian Radio attacks ruling of UN's Court. (1980, May 26). *The Globe and Mail*

(Canada). Retrieved from www.lexisnexis.com.

Islamic Body Asks Iran to End Crisis. (1980, May 21). *Washington Post*. Retrieved from

www.lexisnexis.com.

Israel Contribute over Turkish Ambassador Snub. (2010, January 13). *BBC News*.

Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8456008.stm.

Page, Susan. (2008, July 2). Poll: Flag pins, protests both patriotic. *USA Today*. Retrieved

from http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-07-02-patriotism_N.htm?csp=1.

Red Skies and Stormy Seas Heralded Kim Jong Il's Death, State Media Says. (2012,

December 22). *NBC News*. Retrieved from

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45763055/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/red-skies-stormy-seas-heralded-kim-jong-ils-death-state-media-says/#.U53fVvldWSo.

Schmemmann, Serge. (1987, September 7). Honecker's West German Visit: Divided

Meaning. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from

<http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/07/world/honecker-s-west-german-visit-divided-meaning.html>.

Syrian Soldiers Drive out Iranians in Beirut. (1979, November 12). *Associated Press*.

Retrieved from

<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1876&dat=19791112&id=3oIsAAAIBAJ&sjid=tc0EAAAIBAJ&pg=6366,2762044>.

Books and Journal Articles

Adelman, Jonathan R., and Chih-yu Shih. (1993). *Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of*

Force, 1840-1980. Taipei, Taiwan: Institute of International Relations, National

Chengchi University.

- Adler, Emanuel & Vincent Pouliot. (2011). International Practices. *International Theory*, 3(1), 1-36.
- Agamben, Giorgio. (2011). *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Homo Sacar II, 2)*. [Kindle DX version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com.
- Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. (1989). Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates "Waltz Before a Blind Audience"? *The American Political Science Review*, 83(1), 123-141.
- Alexander, Jeffery C. (2004). Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy. *Sociological Theory*, 22(4), 527-573.
- Algar, Hamid. (1981). *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Berkeley, CA: Mitzan Press.
- Anderson, M. S. (1993). *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*. New York, NY: Longman Press.
- Anglo, Sidney. (1969). *Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Armstrong, David. (1993). *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*. New York, NY: Oxford University.
- Atran, Scott, and Robert Axelrod. (2008). Reframing Sacred Values. *Negotiation Journal*. 24(3), 221-246.
- Avidar, Yosef. (1983). *The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

- Axelrod, Robert. (1973). Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition. *The American Political Science Review*. 67 (4), 1248-1266.
- Banai, Hussein. (2010). Diplomacy and the Public Imagination. In Costas M. Constantinou & James Der Derian (eds.) *Sustainable Diplomacies*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bani-Sadr, Abol Hassan. (1991). *My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution & Secret Deals with the U.S.* New York, NY: Brassey's (US), Inc.
- Barmine, Alexander. (1945). *One Who Survived: The Life Story of a Russian Under the Soviets*. New York, NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- Barmine, Alexander. (1973). *Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat: Twenty Years in the Service of the U.S.S.R.* Westport, CT: Hyperion Press.
- Barnes, Barry. (2001). Practice as collective action. In Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina & Eike von Savigny (eds.), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (pp. 25-36). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Barnett, Michael, & Martha Finnemore. (2004). *Rules for the World: International Organizations in World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Barnett, Michael, & Raymond Duvall. (2005). Power in Global Governance. In Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall (eds.) *Power in Global Governance*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Barnett, Michael. (1998). *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Barston, R.P. (1997). *Modern Diplomacy: Second Edition*. New York, NY: Longham.

- Bassiouni, M. Cherif. (1980). Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law. *The American Journal of International Law*. 74 (3), 609-663.
- Beckwith, Christopher. (2009). *Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bennett, Andrew, & Jeffrey T. Checkel. (2014). Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices. In Andrew Bennett & Jeffrey T. Checkel (eds.) *Process Tracing in the Social Sciences: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Bennison, Amira K. (2009). *The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the 'Abassid Empire'*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Benvenuti, Francesco. (1988). *The Bolsheviks and the Red Army, 1918-1922*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Berg, Maxine. (2006). Britain, Industry and Perceptions of China: Matthew Boulton, 'useful knowledge' and the Macartney Embassy to China 1792-94. *Journal of Global History*. 1(2), 269-288.
- Berger, Peter L., & Thomas Luckmann. (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
- Bernard, Mountague. (1868). *Four Lectures on Subjects Connected with Diplomacy*. London, UK: Macmillan and Co.
- Berridge, G. R. (2001a). Machiavelli. In G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (eds.) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. New York, NY: Palgrave.

- Berridge, G. R. (2001b). Guicciardini. In G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (eds.) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Berridge, G. R. (2001c). Grotius. In G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (eds.) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Berridge, G. R. (2001d). Richelieu. In G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (eds.) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Berridge, G. R. (2004). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London, UK: Palgrave.
- Binns, Christopher A. P. (1979). The Changing Face of Power: Revolution and Accommodation in the Development of the Soviet Ceremonial System: Part I. *Man* (14) 4, 585-606.
- Bloch, Maurice. (1974). Symbols, Song, Dance and Features of Articulation. *European Journal of Sociology*. 15(1), 55-81.
- Blumer, Herbert. (1986). *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Boli, John, & George M. Thomas. (1999). Introduction. In John Boli & George M. Thomas (eds.) *Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, CA. Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (Richard Nice, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Brady, Henry E. (2004). Doing Good and Doing Better: How Far does the Quantitative Template Get Us? In Henry E. Brady, & David Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (pp. 53-68). New York, NY: Rowan & Littlefield.
- Brown, Jonathan. (1988). Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. 37, 53-88.
- Brownlee, Jason. (2007). *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Brunsson, Nils. (1989). *The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions, and Actions in Organizations*. New York, NY: Wiley Publishing.
- Brysk, Alison. (1995). "Hearts and Minds": Bringing Symbolic Politics Back In. *Polity*. 27(4), 559-585.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, & James D. Morrow. (2003). *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bull, Hedley. (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Bullitt, William. (1924). *The Bullitt Mission to Russia*. Retrieved from <http://archive.org/stream/thebullittmissio10713gut/10713.txt>.
- Busch, Marc. (2007). Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement. *International Trade*. 61(4), 735-761.

- Buzan, Barry. (2004). *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Cameron, Lisa A. (1999). Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game: Experimental evidence from Indonesia. *Economic Inquiry*. 37(1), 47-59.
- Carpenter, Charli. (2003). 'Women and Children First': Gender, Norms, and Humanitarian Evacuation in the Balkans 1991-95. *International Organization*. 57(4), 661-694.
- Carr, Edward Hallet (1985). *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol. 1 (History of Soviet Russia)*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Cecil, Lamar (1976). *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Chang, Michael G. (2007). *A Court on Horseback: Imperial Touring & the Construction of Qing Rule, 1680-1785*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Chayes, Abram, & Antonia Handler Chayes. (1993). *On Compliance*. *International Organization*. 47(2), 175-205.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005). International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. *International Organization*. 59(4): pp. 801-826.
- Chia Kuo, Ping. (1933). Caleb Cushing and the Treaty of Wanghia, 1844. *The Journal of Modern History*. 5 (1), 34-54.
- Churchman, David. (1993). *Negotiation Tactics*. Lanham, MD: University of America Press.

- Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. (2001). *Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Clark, Ian. (2005). *Legitimacy in International Society*. London, Oxford University Press.
- Codd, J. (1990). Making distinctions: The eye of the beholder. In Richard Harker, Cheleen Mahar, and Chris Wilkes (eds.), *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory* (pp. 132-159). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990.
- Cohen, Abner. (1974) *Two-Dimensional Man*. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Cohen, Raymond (1991). *Negotiating Across Culture: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Cohen, Raymond. (1987). *Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signaling*. New York, NY: Longman.
- Collier, David, James Mahoney, and Jason Seawright. (2004). Claiming Too Much: Warnings about Selection Bias. In Henry E. Brady, & David Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (pp. 85-102). New York, NY: Rowan & Littlefield
- Collier, David. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 44 (4), 823-830.
- Collins, Randall (with Joan Arnett). (2009). A Short History of Deference and Demeanor. In Randall Collins (ed.) *Conflict Sociology: A Sociological Classic Updated*. Colorado, Paradigm Publishers.
- Compilation Group for the "History of Modern China" Series. (1979). *The Opium War*. Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press.

- Conquest, Robert. (1991). *Stalin: Breaker of Nations*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
- Constantinou, Costas. (1996). *On the Way to Diplomacy*. London, UK: University of Minnesota Press.
- Corney, Frederick C. (2004). *Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Cottam, Richard W. (1986). The Iranian Revolution. In Nikki R. Keddie & Juan R. I. Cole (eds.) *Shi'ism and Social Protest*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Cottam, Richard. (1989). Inside Revolutionary Iran. *Middle East Journal*. 43 (2), 168-185.
- Cranmer-Byng, J.L. (ed.). (1963). *An Embassy to China: Being the Journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung 1793-1794*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Crawford, Neta. C. (2002). *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Croxton, Derek. (1999). The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty. *The International History Review*. 21(3): 569-591.
- Daniels, Robert V. (1951). The Kronstadt Revolt of 1921: A Study in the Dynamics of Revolution. *American Slavic and East European Review*. 10(4), 241-254.
- Davis Cross, Mai'a K. (2007). *The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

- De Callières, François. (1983). *The Art of Diplomacy*, edited by H. M. A. Keens-Soper & Karl W. Schweizer New York, NY: Leicester University Press.
- De Mowbrey, Stephen. (1990). *Key Facts in Soviet History*. New York, NY: Pinter Publishers.
- De Wiquefort, Abraham. (1716). *The Ambassador and his Functions*. Translated by John Digby.
<https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=VGIUAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=en&pg=GBS.PP13>
- Debo, Richard K. (1975). Litvinov and Kamenev - Ambassadors Extraordinary: The Problem of Soviet Representation Abroad. *Slavic Review*. 34 (3), 463-482.
- Debo, Richard K. (1979). *Revolution and Survival: the Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1917-18*. Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto.
- Debo, Richard K. (1992). *Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918-1921*. Montreal & Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Degras, Jane (ed). (1978). *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy: Volume I 1917-1924*. New York, NY: Octagon Books.
- Der Derian, James. (1987). *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. New York, NY: Basil Blackwell.
- Downes, Alexander B., and Todd S. Sechser. (2012). The Illusion of Democratic Credibility. *International Organization*. 66(3), 457-489.
- Dunn, David. (1996). *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: the Evolution of International Summitry*. London: St. Martin's Press.

- Duyvendak, J.L.L. (1938). *The Last Dutch Embassy to the Chinese Court (1794-1795)*.
T'oung Pao, Second Series. 34(1/2), 1-137.
- Edelman, Murray. (1964). *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Edelman, Murray. (1971). *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. & Melissa E. Graebner. (2007). Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges. *Academy of Management Journal*. 50(1), 25-32.
- Elder, Charles D. and Roger W. Cobb. (1983). *The Political Uses of Symbols*. New York, NY: Longham.
- Elliot, Mark C. (2001). *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ellis, Henry. (1818). *Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to china; Comprising a Correct Narrative of the Public Transactions of the Embassy to China; Comprising a Correct Narrative of the Public Transactions of the Embassy, of the Voyage to and from China, and of the Journey from the Mouth of the Pei-Ho to the Return to Canton*. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/journalofproceed00elli>.
- Elman, Colin, & Miriam Fendius Elman. (1997). Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Differences and Crossing Boundaries. *International Security*. 22 (1), 5-21.
- Esposito, John L. (1998). *Islam: The Straight Path*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

- Eyre, Dana P., & Mark C. Suchman. (1996). Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Approach. In Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (pp. 79-113). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Fairbank, J. K. (1942). Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West. *The Far Eastern Quarterly*. 1(2), 129-149.
- Falk, Richard. (1980). The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers and Hard Questions. *The American Journal of International Law*. 74 (2), 411-417.
- Farber, David. (2005). *Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter with Radical Islam*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Farrell, Henry. (2005). Trust and Political Economy: Institutions and the Sources of Interfirm Cooperation. *Comparative Political Studies*. 38(5), 459-483.
- Farrell, Henry. (2009). *The Political Economy of Trust: Institutions, Interests, and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy and Germany*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Fatemi, Khosrow. (1980). The Iranian Revolution: Its Impact on Economic Relations with the United States. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 12 (3), 303-317.
- Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt. (2002). Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (eds.). *Handbook of International Relations* (pp.52-72). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Fearon, James D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *The American Political Science Review*. 88(3), 577-592.

- Fearon, James. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization*. 49(3): 379-414.
- Finnemore, Martha. (1996). *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Finnemore, Martha, & Kathryn Sikkink. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*. 52(4), 887-917.
- Firth, Raymond. (1973). *Symbols: Public and Private*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fischer, Louis. (1951). *The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of the Relations between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World, 1917-1929*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Florinsky, Michael T. (1932). World Revolution and Soviet Foreign Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*. 47 (2), 204--233.
- Gambetta, Diego. (2009). *Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ganji, Babak. (2006). *Politics of Confrontation: The Foreign Policy of the USA and Revolutionary Iran*. New York, NY: Tauris Academic Studies.
- Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. (1996). Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations. *International Organization*. 50(1), 109-139.
- Geddes, Barbara. (1990). How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. *Political Analysis*. 2 (1), 131-150.
- Geertz, Clifford (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

- Geertz, Clifford (1980). *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali*.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. (1995). *Muslim Society*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- George, Alexander L., & Andrew Bennett. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gernet, Jacques. (1987). Introduction. In S.R. Schram (ed.) *Foundations and Limits of State Power in China*. London, UK: School of Oriental and African Studies.
- Gerring, John, & Jason Seawright. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. *Political Research Quarterly*. 61 (2), 294-308.
- Gerring, John. (2007). *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilpin, Robert. (1981). *War & Change in World Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Goddard, Stacie E. (2006). *Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy*. *International Organization*. 60(1), 35-68.
- Goffman, Erving. (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
- Gong, Gerrit W. (1984). *The Standard of 'Civilisation' in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Graham, Gerald, S. (1978). *The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830-1860*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press

- Greenberg, Michael. (1951). *British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-42*.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Greene, Kenneth F. (2007). *Why Dominant Parties Lose*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press
- Greenwald, David E. (1973). Durkheim on Society, Thought and Ritual. *Sociological Analysis*. 34(3), 157-168.
- Gross Stein, Janice. (1993). The Political Economy of Security Agreements: The Linked Costs of Failure at Camp David. *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University California Press.
- Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith. (2002). Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 46(2), 175-200.
- Haggard, Stephen, & Beth Simmons. (1987). Theories of International Regimes. *International Organization*. 1(3), 491-517.
- Hall, Richard C. (2000). *The Balkan Wars: 1912-1913*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Hamilton, Keith, & Richard Langhorne. (2011). *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its evolution, theory, and administration*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Harris, David. (2004). *The Crisis: The President, the Prophet, and the Shah - 1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam*. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company.
- Harrison, John A. (1967). *China since 1800*. New York, NY: Harbinger Books.
- Helmreich, Ernst Christian. 1938. *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Herodotus. (1954). *The Histories*. (Rex Warner, Trans.). New York, NY: Penguin Classics.
- Hevia, James L. (1989). A Multitude of Lords: Qing Court Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793. *Late Imperial China*. 10 (2, 72-105).
- Hevia, James L. (1993). The Macartney embassy in the history of Sino-Western Relations. In Robert A. Bickers (ed.) *Ritual and diplomacy: The Macartney mission to China 1792-1794. Papers presented at the 1992 Conference of British Association for Chinese Studies marking the bicentenary of the Macartney mission to China*. London, UK: British Association for Chinese Studies and Wellsweep Press.
- Hevia, James L. (1994). Sovereignty and Subject: Constituting Relations of Power in Qing Guest Ritual. In Angela Zito & Tani E. Barlow (eds.) *Body, Subject & Power in China* (pp. 181-200). Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hillemann, Ulrike. (2009). *Asian Empire and British Knowledge: China and the Networks of British Imperial Expansion*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hoffmann, Max. (1925). *The War of Lost Opportunities*. New York, NY: International Publishers.
- Holland, Tom. (2005). *Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the Ancient World*. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
- Honneth, Axel. (1995). *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Hörner, Johannes. (2012). Signalling and Screening. In Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume (eds.) *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2012 Version*.

Retrieved from

<http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doi/10.1057/9781137336583.1642>

- Houghton, David Patrick. (2001). *US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Hsü, Immanuel C.Y. (1964). Russia's Special Position in China during the Early Ch'ing Period. *Slavic Review*. 23(4), 688-700.
- Huang, Philip C.C. (1998). Theory and the Study of Modern Chinese History: Four Traps and a Question. *Modern China*. 24(2), 183-208.
- Hui, Victoria Bin-Tor. (2005). *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Hulsewé, Anthony. (1987). Law as One of the Foundations of State Power in Early Imperial China. In S.R. Schram (ed.) *Foundations and Limits of State Power in China*. London, UK: School of Oriental and African Studies.
- Hurd, Ian. (2008). *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ilich, John. (1973). *The Art and Skill of Successful Negotiation*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Israel, Jonathan. (2005). *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford History of Modern Europe). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. (2006). *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Jackson, Peter. (2008). Pierre Bourdieu, the 'cultural turn' and the practice of international history. *Review of International Studies*. 34, 155-181.

- Jackson, Robert. (1987). Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory: International jurisprudence and the third world. *International Organization*. 41(4), 519-49.
- Jacobson, Jon (1994). *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- James, Eight Earl of Elgin. (2004). *Letters and Journals of James, Eight Earl of Elgin: Governor of Jamaica, Governor-General of Canada, Envoy to China, Viceroy to India*. Theodore Walrond, C.B. (Ed.). Retrieved from The Project Gutenberg, <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10610/pg10610.html>.
- Jervis, Robert L. (2010). *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Jervis, Robert. (1970). *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, James D. (1991). *Symbol and Strategy: On the Cultural Analysis of Politics*. (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (Accession Order No. AAT 31757).
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. (1995). *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. (2001). Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. *International Studies Quarterly*. 45(4): 487-515.
- Jones, Raymond A. (1983). *The British Diplomatic Service: 1815-1914*. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press.

- Jönsson, Christer. (2002). Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (pp. 212-234). London: Sage Publishing.
- Jordan, Hamilton. (1982). *Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency*. New York, NY: G.R. Putnam's Sons.
- Joshi, S. (2008). Honor in international relations. *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs: Working Paper Series*.
- Kang, David. (2012). *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade & Tribute* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Kaufman, Stuart J. (2001). *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keddie, Nikki R. & Juan R. I. Cole. (1986). Introduction. In Nikki R. Keddie & Juan R. I. Cole (eds.) *Shi'ism and Social Protest*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Keene, Edward. (2002). *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Keens-Soper, Maurice. (2001a). Wicquefort. In G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (eds.) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Keens-Soper, Maurice. (2001a). Wicquefort. In G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (eds.) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. New York, NY: Palgrave.

- Keens-Soper, Maurice. (2001b). deCallières. In G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (eds.) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Kelman, Herbert C. (2001). Reflection on Social and Psychological Processes of Legitimation and Delegitimization. In John T. Jost & Brenda Major (eds.) *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O., & Lisa Martin. (1995). The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security*. 20(1), 39-51.
- Kertzer, David I. (1988). *Ritual, Politics and Power*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Khomeini, Ruhollah. (1981). In Hamid Algar (ed.) *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Berkeley, CA: Mitzan Press.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kissinger, Henry. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Klotz, Audie. (1995). Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa. *International Organization*. 49(3), 451-478.
- Kocho-Williams, A. (2009). The Comintern through a British lens. *Presented at American Historical Association Annual Meeting, 2-5 January 2009*.

- Kocho-Williams, Alastair. (2006). *The Culture of Russian and Soviet Diplomacy, Lamsdorf to Litvinov, 1900-1939*. (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from WorldCat. (Accession Order No. OCLC 643369473).
- Kocho-Williams, Alastair. (2012). *Russian and Soviet Diplomacy, 1900-39*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, & Duncan Snidal. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*, 55 (4), 761-799.
- Kozlov, Nicholas N. & Eric D. Weitz. (1989). Reflections on the Origins of the 'Third Period': Bukharin, the Comintern, and the Political Economy of Germany. *Journal of Contemporary History*. 24 (3), 387-410.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (1983). Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. In Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (pp. 1-21). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (1983). Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. In Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (pp. 1-21). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (1991). Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. *World Politics*, 43(3), 336-366.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (1995). Power politics, institutions, and transnational relations. In Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations* (pp. 257-279). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Krebs, Ronald R. and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. (2007). Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric. *European Journal of International Relations*. 13(1), 35-66.
- Laitin, David D. (1986). *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba*. Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Lake, David, & Robert Powell (eds.). (1999). *Strategic Choice in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lane, Christel. (1981). *The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case*. London, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lane, Christel. (1984). Legitimacy and Power in the Soviet Union through Socialist Ritual. *British Journal of Political Science*. 14(2), 207-217.
- Lankov, Andrei. (2007). *North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. (1999). Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science*. 43(4), 979-1002.
- Legro, Jeffrey W. (2005). *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lenin, Vladimir, (1917). *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Retrieved from <http://www.history.vogels.org/ebooks/Vladimir%20Lenin%20-%20Imperialism,%20the%20highest%20state%20of%20Capitalism.pdf>.
- Levi, Margaret. (1998). *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Lewis, Arnold. (1979). The Peace Ritual and Israeli Images of Social Order. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 23(4), 685-703.
- Lind, Jennifer. (2008). *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Linklater, Andrew, & Hidemi Suganami. (2006). *The English School of International Relations: A Continuous Reassessment*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Lockhart, R. H. Bruce. (1933). *British Agent*. New York, NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- Lynch, Richard A. (2011). Foucault's theory of Power. In D. Taylor (ed.) Michel Foucault: Key Concepts (pp. 13-26). Durham, UK: Acumen.
- Macartney, George. (1963). *An Embassy to China: Being the Journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung 1793-1794*. Cranmer-Byng, J.L. (ed.). Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Mackie, John L. (1974). *The Cement of the Universe: A Study in Causation*. Oxford, UK. Clarendon Press.
- MacMillan, Margaret. (2013). *The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914*. New York, NY: Random House.
- Mahoney, James. (2012). The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences. *Sociological Methods & Research*. 41 (4), 570-597.
- Mann, Michael. (2012a). *The Sources of Social power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Mann, Michael. (2012b). *The Sources of Social power: Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- March, James G., & Johan P. Olson (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organization*. 52(4), 943-969.
- Markey, Daniel. (1999). Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism's Roots. *Security Studies*. 8(4), 126-172.
- Markey, Daniel. (2000). The Prestige Motive in International Relations. (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. (Accession Order No. AAT 304615854).
- Marshall, P. J. (1993). Britain and China in the late Eighteenth Century. In Robert A. Bickers (ed.) *Ritual and diplomacy: The Macartney mission to China 1792-1794. Papers presented at the 1992 Conference of British Association for Chinese Studies marking the bicentenary of the Macartney mission to China*. London, UK: British Association for Chinese Studies and Wellsweep Press.
- Marx, Karl. (1983). In Eugene Kamenka (ed.) *The Portable Karl Marx*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
- Massie, Robert K. (1992). *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War*. New York, NY: Ballantine Books.
- Massie, Robert K. (2012). *Nicholas and Alexandra: An Intimate Account of the Last of the Romanovs and the Fall of Imperial Russia*. New York, NY: Modern Library.
- Mattingly, Garrett (1971). *Renaissance Diplomacy*. New York, NY: Cosimo.
- Mawdsley, Evan. (1973). The Baltic Fleet and the Kronstadt Mutiny. *Soviet Studies*, 24 (4):506-521.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, & Charles Tilly. (2001). *Dynamics of Contention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- McCaffree, M. J., & Pauline Innis. (1989). *Protocol: The complete handbook of diplomatic, official and social usage*. Washington DC: Devon Publishing.
- McDermott, Kevin & Jeremy Agnew. (1997). *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- McDermott, Kevin. (1995). Stalin and the Comintern during the 'Third Period', 1928-33. *European History Quarterly*, 25, 409.
- McGillivray, Fiona, and Alastair Smith. (2000). Trust and Cooperation through Agent-Specific Punishments. *International Organization*. 54(4), 809-824.
- McKeown, Timothy J. (2004). Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantative Worldview. In Henry E. Brady, & David Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (pp. 139-168). New York, NY: Rowan & Littlefield.
- McLellen, David S. (1985). *Cyrus Vance*. NJ: Rowan & Allanheld Publishers.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden. (1994). Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games: An Experimental Investigation. *Theory and Decision*. 36, 163-185.
- Melograni, Piero. (1989). *Lenin and the Myth of World Revolution: Ideology and Reasons of State, 1917-1920*. New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc.
- Mercer, Johnathan. (1995). Anarchy and Identity. *International Organization*. 49(2), 229-252.
- Mercer, Johnathan. (1996). *Reputation and International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Mercer, Jonathan. (2005). Rationality and Psychology in International Politics. *International Organization*, 59(1), 77-106.
- Mercer, Jonathan. (2010). Emotional Beliefs. *International Organization*. 64(1), 1-31.
- Migdal, Joel S. (1997). Studying the State. In Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.) *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Millar, Fergus. (1988). 'Government and Diplomacy in the Roman Empire during the First Three Centuries.' *The International History Review*. 10(3), 345-377.
- Miller, Benjamin & Korina Kagan. (1997). The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era, *International Studies Quarterly*, 41(1), 51-85.
- Mills, C. Wright. (1959). *The Sociological Imagination*. London, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Milner, Helen. (1992). International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations. *World Politics*. 44, 466-96.
- Mitzen, Jennifer. (2006). Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma. *European Journal of International Relations*. 12(3), 341-370.
- Moaddel, Mansoor. (1992). *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Moin, Baqer. (1999). *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*. New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*. 51 (4), 513-553.

- Moravcsik, Andrew. (1993). Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining. In Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (eds). *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. California, CA: University of California Press.
- Morse, Hosea Ballou. (1910). *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: Volume I*. New York, NY: Longmans, Green.
- Mousseau, Michael. (2005). Comparing New Theory with Prior Beliefs: Market Civilization and the Democratic Peace. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 22(1), 63-77.
- Murray, Michelle. (2010). Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War. *Security Studies*. 19(4), 656-688.
- Muthoo, Abhinay. (2000). A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory. *World Economics*. 1(2), 145-166.
- Nabavi, Negin. (2003a). *Intellectuals and the State in Iran: Politics, Discourse, and the Dilemma of Authority*. Gainesville, FL: Florida University Press.
- Nabavi, Negin. (2003b). The Discourse of "Authentic Culture" in Iran in the 1960s and the 1970s. In Negin Nabavi (ed.) *Intellectual Trends in Twentieth-Century Iran: A Critical Survey*. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida.
- Naquin, Susan. (1982). Connections between Rebellions: Sect Family Networks in Qing China. *Modern China*. 8(3), 337-360.

- Nexon, Daniel. (1999). *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nickles, David Paull. (2008). US Diplomatic Etiquette during the Nineteenth Century. In Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy 1815-1914* (pp. 287–316). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Nicolson, Harold. (1946). *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822*. New York, NY: Grove Press.
- Nicolson, Harold. (1954). *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*. London, UK: Constable & Co Ltd.
- Nicolson, Harold. (1963). *Diplomacy: Third Edition*. London, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Nitsch, Volker. (2007). State Visits and International Trade. *The World Economy*. 30(12), 1797-1816.
- North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, & Barry Weingast. (2009). *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Neill, Barry. (1999). *Honor, Symbols, and War*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Oatley, Thomas H. (2001). Multilateralizing Trade and Payments in Postwar Europe. *International Organization*. 55(4), 949-969.

- O'Connor, Timothy Edward. (1988). *Diplomacy and Revolution: G.V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930*. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press.
- Oksenberg, Michel. (2001). The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context. In Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Oliphant, Laurence, Esq. (1970). *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, '58, '59*. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.
- Olson, Mancur. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Osiander, Andreas. (2001). Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth. *International Organization*. 55(2), 251-287.
- Otte, T. G. (2001a). Satow. In G.R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (eds.) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Owen, John M. (1994). How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. *International Security*. 19(2), 87-125.
- Ozouf, Mona (1998). *Festivals and the French Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pahre, Robert. (2001). Most-Favored-Nation Clauses, Domestic Politics, and Clustered Negotiations. *International Organization* 55 (4), 861-892..
- Partell, Peter J., and Glenn Palmer. (1999). Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: an Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute. *International Studies Quarterly*.43(2), 389-405.

- Pecquet, Antoine. (2004). *Discourse on the Art of Negotiation*. Translated by Aleksandra Gruzinska & Murray D. Sirkis. New York, NY: Peter Lang.
- Pouliot, Vincent. (2008). The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities. *International Organization*. 62(2), 257-88.
- Precht, Henry. (1988). Ayatollah Realpolitik. *Foreign Policy*. 70 (Spring), 109-128.
- Precht, Henry. (2004). The Iranian Revolution: An Oral History with Henry Precht, Then State Department Desk Officer. *Middle East Journal*. 58 (1), 9-31.
- Press, Daryl. (2004/05). The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the 'Appeasement Crises of the 1930s. *International Security*. 29 (3), 136-139.
- Price, Richard. (1998). Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines. *International Organization*. 52(3), 613-644.
- Prins, Brandon C. (2003). Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs: Political Participation and Interstate Crisis Bargaining, 1816-1992. *Journal of Peace Research*. 40(1): 67-84.
- Pritchard, Earl H. (1943). The Kowtow in the Macartney Embassy to China in 1793. *The Far Eastern Quarterly*. 2(2), 163-203.
- Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*. 42(3), 427-460.
- Ram, Haggay. (1992). Crushing the Opposition: Adversaires of the Islamic Republic of Iran. *Middle East Journal*. 46 (3), 426-439.
- Ramazani, R. K. (1985). Burying the Hatchet. *Foreign Policy*, 60 (Autumn), 52-74.
- Ramazani, R. K. (1986). Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf. In Nikki R. Keddie & Juan R. I. Cole (eds.) *Shi'ism and Social Protest*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Ramazani, R. K. (2004). Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign Policy. *Middle East Journal*. 58 (4), 549-559.
- Rauer, Valentin (2006). Symbols in action: Willy Brandt's kneefall at the Warsaw Memorial. In Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, Jason L. Mast (eds.). *Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*. London, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Rees, Tim & Andrew Thorpe. (1998). Introduction. In Tim Rees & Andrew Thorpe (eds.) *International Communism and the Communist International: 1919-43*. New York, University of Manchester Press.
- Reus-Smit, Christian (1997). The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions. *International Organization*. 51(4), 555-589.
- Reus-Smit, Christian. (1999). *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ringmar, Erik. (1996). *Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Ringmar, Erik. (2010). The International Politics of Recognition. In Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (eds.) *The International Politics of Recognition*. Colorado, Paradigm Publishers.
- Ringmar, Erik. (2012). Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order. *International Organization*. 66(1), 1-25.

- Risse, Thomas. (2000). "Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics. *International Organization*. 54(1), 1-39.
- Rockhill, William Woodville (1897). Diplomatic Missions to the Court of China: The Kotow Question II. *The American Historical Review*.2(4), 627-643.
- Ross, Marc Howard. (2007). *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Roy, Gandhi Jee. (1981). *Diplomacy in Ancient India*. Patna, India: Janaki Prakashan.
- Russett, Bruce (1993). *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Saffari, Said. (1993). The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 20 (1), 64-82.
- Sagan, Scott D. (1996-1997). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb. *International Security*. 21(3), 54-86.
- Sartori, Anne E. (2002). The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory Communication in International Disputes. *International Organization*. 56(1), 121-149.
- Satow, Ernest (1958). *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice: Fourth Edition*, Neville Bland (ed.). New York, NY: Longmans, Green and Co.
- Saurette, Paul. (2006). You dissin me? Humiliation and post 9/11 politics. *Review of International Studies*. 32(3), 495-522.
- Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Schimmelfennig, Frank. (2005). Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe. *International Organization*, 59(4), 827-860.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. (1999). Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. *International Organization*. 53(2), 233-266.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Looking for Audience Costs. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 45(1), 32-60.
- Schwartz, Benjamin I. (1987). The Primacy of the Political Order in East Asian Societies: Some Preliminary Generalizations. In S.R. Schram (ed.) *Foundations and Limits of State Power in China*. London, UK: School of Oriental and African Studies.
- Schweller, Randall L. (1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. *International Security*. 19(1), 72-107.
- Seifzadeh, Hossein S. (2003). The Landscape of Factional Politics and Its Future in Iran. *Middle East Journal*. 57 (1), 57-75.
- Senn, Alfred Erich, and Harold J. Goldberg. (1979). The Assassination of Count Mirbach. *Canadian Slavonic Papers/ Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*. 21(4), 438-445.
- Senn, Alfred. E. (1974). *Diplomacy and Revolution: the Soviet Mission to Switzerland, 1918*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Service, Robert. (2009). *Trotsky: A Biography*. London, UK: Macmillan.
- Service, Robert. (1979). *The Bolshevik Party in Revolution: A Study in Organisational Change, 1917-1923*. USA, Harper & Row.

- Sharp, Paul (2009). *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Sharp, Paul. (1999). For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations. *International Studies Review*. 1 (1), 33-57.
- Sick, Gary. (1989). Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War. *Middle East Journal*. 43 (2), 230-245.
- Sidanius, Jim, Shana Levin, Christopher M Federico, and Felicia Pratto. (2001). Legitimizing Ideologies: The Social Dominance Approach. In John T. Jost & Brenda Major (eds.) *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Simpson, Barbara (2009). Pragmatism, Mead and the Practice Turn. *Organization Studies*. 30, 1329-1347.
- Singer, Aubrey. (1992). *The Lion & the Dragon: The Story of the First British Embassy to the Court of the Emperor Qianlong in Peking, 1792-1794*. London, UK: Barrie & Jenkins.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. (2006). Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs. *International Studies Quarterly*. 50(2), 445-477.
- Slater, Dan & Sofia Fenner. (2011). State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability. *Journal of International Affairs*. 65(1), 15-29.
- Slater, Dan. (2010). *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Smith, Alistair. (1998). International Crisis and Domestic Politics. *American Political Science Review*. 92(3), 623-638.
- Snyder, Jack. (1991). *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca, NY: New York.
- Sobel, Joel. (2008). Signaling Games. In Robert A. Meyers (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science* (pp. 8125-8139). New York, NY: Springer Publishing.
- Sofer, Sasson. (1997). The Diplomat as a Stranger. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*. 8 (3), 179-186.
- Spence, Jonathan D. (1990). *The Search for Modern China*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Spruyt, Hendrik. (1994). *The Sovereign States and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*. Princeton: NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ssu-ming, Meng. (1960-1961). The E-lo-ssu kuan (Russian Hostel) in Peking. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. 23(1), 19-46.
- Steller, Verena (2008). The Power of Protocol: On the Mechanisms of Symbolic Action in Diplomacy in Franco-German Relations, 1871-1914. In Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy 1815-1914*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Sugden, Robert. (1995). A Theory of Focal Points. *The Economic Journal*. 105 (May), 533-550.
- Sullivan, William H. (1980). Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken. *Foreign Policy*, 40 (Tenth Anniversary), 175-186.

- Swidler, Ann. (1986). Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review*. 51(2), 273-286.
- Swidler, Ann. (2001). What Anchors cultural practices. In Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina & Eike von Savigny (eds.) *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (pp. 83-101). New York, Routledge.
- Tang, Shiping. (2005). Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict. *Security Studies*. 14(1), 34-62.
- Tannenwald, Nina. (1999). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. *International Organization*. 53 (3), 433-468.
- Tarrow, Sidney. (1992). Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meaning through Action. In Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg (eds.) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Taylor, Simon. (1981). Symbol and Ritual under National Socialism. *The British Journal of Sociology*. 32(4), 504-520.
- Thaler, Charles W. (1959). *Diplomat*. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
- Thaler, Richard H. (1988). Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 2(4), 195-206.
- Tilly, Charles. (1992). *Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. *International Organization*. 61(3), 821-40.

- Trachtenberg, Marc. (2012). Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis. *Security Studies*. 21(1), 3-42.
- Trotsky, Leon. (1930). *My Life: An Attempt at Autobiography*. New York, NY: C. Scribner's Sons.
- Turner, Victor (1969). *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Uldricks, Teddy J. (1979). *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of the Soviet Foreign Relations 1917-1930*. Riverside, CA: University of California.
- Van Braam Houckgeest, Andre' Everard (1798). *An Authentic Account of the Embassy of the Dutch East-India Company, to the Court of the Emperor of China, in the years 1794 and 1795*. Retrieved from <http://ebook.lib.hku.hk/CTWE/B2962471X/>.
- Van de Mieroop, Marc. (2004). *A History of the Ancient Near East ca. 3000-323 BC*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Van de Ven, Hans J. (1996). War in the Making of Modern China. *Modern Asian Studies*. 30(4), 737-756.
- Van Evera, Stephen. (1998). Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War. *International Security*. 22 (4), 5-43.
- Voeten, Erik. (2005). The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. *International Organization*. 59(3), 527-557.
- Von Geldern, James. (1993). *Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

- Von Laue, Theodore. (1953). G.V. Chicherin. In Gordon A. Craig & Felix Gilbert (eds.) *The Diplomats, 1919-1939* (pp. 234-281). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wagner, R. Harrison (2007). *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics*. Ann Arbor, MN: Michigan University Press.
- Wakeman Jr., Frederic. (1998). Boundaries of the Public Sphere in Ming and Qing China. *Daedalus*. 127(3), 167-189.
- Wakeman Jr., Frederic. (1998). Telling Chinese History. *Modern China*. 24(2), 162-182.
- Wakeman, Jr., Frederick. (1977). Rebellion and Revolution: The Study of Popular Movements in Chinese History. *The Journal of Asian Studies*. 36(2), 201-237.
- Waley-Cohen, Joanna. (1993). Politics and the Supernatural in Mid-Qing Legal Culture. *Modern China*. 19(3), 330-353.
- Waley-Cohen, Joanna. (1998). Religion, War, and Empire-Building in Eighteenth-Century China. *International History Review*. 20(2), 336-352.
- Waley-Cohen, Joanna. (2004). The New Qing History. *Radical History Review*. 88, 193-206.
- Waley-Cohen, Joanna. (2006). *The Culture of War in China: Empire and the Military under the Qing Dynasty*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Walt, Stephen M. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security*. 9(4), 3-43.
- Waltz, Kenneth. (1979). *The Theory of International Politics*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Publishers.

- Wang, Tseng-Tsai. (1971). The Audience Question: Foreign Representatives and the Emperor of China, 1858-1873. *The Historical Journal*. 14(3), 617-626.
- Wang, Tseng-Tsai. (1993). The Macartney Mission: A Bicentennial Review. In Robert A. Bickers (ed.) *Ritual and diplomacy: The Macartney mission to China 1792-1794. Papers presented at the 1992 Conference of British Association for Chinese Studies marking the bicentenary of the Macartney mission to China*. London, UK: British Association for Chinese Studies and Wellsweep Press.
- Watson, Adam. (1992). *The Evolution of International Society*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Weber, Max. (1978). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Wedeen, Lisa (1999). *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Weeks, Jessica. (2008). Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization*. 62(1), 35-64.
- Welch, Richard E. (1957). Caleb Cushing's Chinese Mission and the Treaty of Wanghia: A Review. *Oregon Historical Quarterly*. 58(4), 328-357.
- Wendt, Alexander. (1987). The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization*. 41(3), 335-370.
- Wendt, Alexander. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Wendt, Alexander. (2001). Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design. *International Organization*. 55(4), 1019-1049.
- Wight, Martin. (1991). *International Theory: The Three Traditions*. Edited by Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter. Leicester & London: Leicester University Press.
- Winks, Robin W. & R.J.Q. Adams. (2003). *Europe 1890-1945: Crisis and Conflict*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Wohlforth, William C. (2009). Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. *World Politics*. 61(1), 28-57.
- Wood, John, & Jean Serres. (1970). *Diplomatic Ceremonial and Protocol: Principles, Procedures & Practices*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Wydra, Harald. (2012). The Power of Symbols - Communism and Beyond. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*. 25 (1-3), 49-69.
- Yashar, Deborah J. (1997). *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s-1950s*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Zamoyski, Adam. (2007). *Rites of Peace*. New York, NY: Harper Collin.
- Zelditch, Morris. (2001). Theories of Legitimacy. In John T. Jost & Brenda Major (eds.) *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Zhang, Shundong. (1993). Historical Anachronism: the Qing Perception of Reaction to the Macartney Embassy. In Robert A. Bickers (ed.) *Ritual and diplomacy: The Macartney mission to China 1792-1794. Papers presented at the 1992 Conference of British Association for Chinese Studies marking the bicentenary of*

the Macartney mission to China. London, UK: British Association for Chinese Studies and Wellsweep Press.